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This thesis investigates the physical, material, and experiential aspects of thought 
and emotion in the Iliad and the Odyssey; more specifically, the ways in which the 
Homeric mind is extended through and by the body, and in which the body and its 
extensions express, illustrate, and inform psychological processes and mental 
concepts in Homer. Recent studies in cognitive science—in embodied, extended, 
embedded, and enactive approaches to mind—demonstrate the extent to which our 
psychological development is deeply and inextricably shaped not just within the 
confines of the brain, but also in the body and the world. This thesis seeks to apply 
these insights to the Iliad and the Odyssey, in order to show how this is also the case 
for Homer’s characters. In doing so, it primarily argues that Homeric 
conceptualizations of mind constitute the narrator’s way of presenting a 
“phenomenology of experience” throughout the poems: a reconstruction of the 
psychological workings of his characters that draws upon the physical, material, 




The study of thought and emotion is a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary field. In recent 
years, contributors in cognitive science in particular—in the so-called “second 
generation” of embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive approaches to mind—
have shown, despite an historic tendency to view psychological development as 
“brain-bound” (occurring solely within the head), that our cognitive functioning is 
influenced and shaped by our bodies, environment, interactions with other people, 
and evolution. This thesis applies some of these studies to Iliad and Odyssey and, in 
doing so, argues against traditionally held views of the Homeric mind and body as 
being separate and mutually exclusive. In Homer, as in the every day, brain-body-
world interactions underpin the way in which we develop within and perceive our 
world; this thesis shows how this is so through in-depth analyses of four primary 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The Homeric narrator is intensely concerned with the thoughts, emotions, 
motivations, and intentions of his characters. While the Iliad takes as its major focus 
the μῆνις of Achilles, Odysseus is described as being both πολύτροπος and 
πόλυτλας, qualities that enable him to achieve a successful homecoming. As is 
common in Homer, the poet conveys these aspects of his characters’ psychology 
using metaphors, metonymies, and similes that draw their source material from the 
physical world, as well as nonverbal behaviour as a means of delineating cognitive 
activity. Idomeneus, for example, articulates bravery and cowardice based on the 
nonverbal behaviour with which each is associated (Iliad 13.267-291), 
Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ psychological dissonance is metaphorized using 
concepts of physical distance (Il. 1.6-7), and Penelope’s weakening resolve, grief, 
and longing for her lost husband is compared to snow melting under the onslaught of 
the West Wind (Odyssey 19.205-207). In employing techniques such as these, the 
narrator consistently advocates an interpretation of mind that consists of the brain, 
the body, and the world, and presents his cast of characters as individuals whose 
psychological experiences are structured by the interaction between them. 
 
This psychosomatic account of cognition is the primary focus of this study, which 
investigates the physical, material, and experiential aspects of thought and emotion 
in the Iliad and Odyssey. It examines the ways in which the Homeric mind is 
extended through and beyond the body, and in which the body and its extensions 
express, illustrate, and inform mental processes and concepts in Homer. These issues 
have, more broadly, been the concern of cognitive science, which contends that all 
human thought and emotion is structured by physical, developmental, evolutionary, 
material, and interactional modes of experience. In examining the Homeric data, I 
have found that this approach provides the greatest insight to presentations of 
psychological functioning in the Iliad and the Odyssey.  
 
For readers of ancient poetry, and of Homer in particular, an analysis of this kind has 
two primary functions: first, it elucidates the interplay between the mental and the 
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physical as it is presented by the poems; and second, it enables more accurate 
speculation about the types of associations made by the narrator between different 
concepts, ideas, and modes of experience. In doing so, it proposes a radically 
different view of Homeric psychology than was assumed by early commentators 
such as Snell (1953), Adkins (1970), and Jaynes (1976). More recent studies of the 
Homeric data, such as those of Cairns (2005, 2012, 2013), Minchin (2001a, 2001b, 
2008) and Scodel (2002, 2008, 2014), have, accordingly, applied insights from 
cognitive science with considerable success. These re-examinations of Homeric 
psychology demonstrate the value in interdisciplinary dialogue between the 
humanities and the sciences. 
 
Studies such as these have also been the concern of scholars working on other phases 
of literature. Critics such as Turner (1998), Boyd (2009), and Zunshine (2006, 2011, 
2015) contend that literary minds are as complex and multi-modal as our own; 
cognitive science plays a central role in demonstrating how this is the case. This 
thesis therefore also occupies a place in a wider scholarly movement, loosely termed 
as “cognitive poetics”. It not only seeks to demonstrate the explanatory power of 
cognitive approaches to mind for students of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but also 
asserts, contrary to previous thought, that Homeric psychological functioning is 
highly complex and cohesive. 
 
With these considerations in mind, Chapter Two seeks to orient this study in relation 
to both Homeric scholarship of mind and, more broadly, work done on other literary 
genres. In doing so, it outlines the theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approach adopted in the successive chapters of this thesis, following four specific 
approaches to cognition in the sciences: from embedded, extended, embodied, and 
enactive approaches to mind. These fields of study have important implications for 
articulations of psychological functioning in the Iliad and the Odyssey. This chapter 
thus establishes, as far as it can, (first) the basic premises that underlie cognitive 
science, (second) how it articulates the relationship between the brain, the body, and 
the world, and (third) how insights from these approaches to mind have been used to 
interpret literary minds. This chapter concludes with a brief survey of recent 
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applications of cognitive science to Homer, and establishes the contribution that this 
study seeks to make to current scholarship. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured around four case studies that I have found 
to be especially illustrative of brain-body-world interactions in Homer. The first of 
these is in Iliad 13 (274-294), where Idomeneus, in attempting to appease Meriones, 
describes the function of nonverbal behaviour in discerning the psychological 
activity of others. My discussion addresses two overarching aspects of the passage: 
the perceived affective quality of emotions on the body and its implications for a 
psychosomatic account of experience in Homer, and the communicative potential of 
these phenomena, via this nonverbal behaviour, for characters, audiences, and 
narrators. It takes place in three parts. Section One establishes that Homer’s 
characters are able to speculate and make inferences about the mental lives of others. 
In the second section, I address the symptoms that characterize Idomeneus’ brave 
and cowardly men, showing how they constitute an important dimension of cognitive 
activity that incorporates the physical and the psychological. Finally, and with 
respect to affective approaches to mind, I examine the extent to which Idomeneus 
perceives the body as entering and influencing emotional experience. 
 
Chapter Four focuses on extended and enactive approaches to cognition, with special 
reference to and discussion of Odysseus, Penelope, and Eurycleia in Odyssey 19. In 
doing so, I argue that their interactions are especially good examples of these 
phenomena because they present a full picture of how Homer’s characters build, 
explore, and structure relationships, and how these external systems play active roles 
in an individual’s cognitive life. My discussion takes place in four parts. I first 
establish that the Homeric narrator presents external resources (material media, 
environments, and other people) as playing active roles in his characters’ 
psychological functioning. I then turn to Odysseus’ use of disguise, showing how it 
demonstrates awareness of both extended and enactive cognition in the epics.1 
Section Two examines the role of memory and imagination in Book 19, with 
																																																								
1 This is not to say that the Homeric narrator had knowledge of enactive and extended cognition as 




reference to ancient and modern thought on concepts of mental imagery, 
imagination, and communication. The third section then shifts focus to Odysseus’ 
and Penelope’s interview from the perspective of social cognition. It especially aims 
to show how recent research on shared remembering in intimate relationships, as 
expressed by recent and popular elaborations of extended mind theory, aids 
understanding of their exchange. Finally, this chapter examines Eurycleia’s and 
Odysseus’ encounter from the perspective of attachment theory, studies of deimatic 
behaviour, and nonverbal communication. 
 
Chapter Five narrows its focus to Penelope’s mindedness in Odyssey 19, which is 
problematized by the question of whether she has yet recognized Odysseus-Aethon 
as her returned husband, and the ambiguity with which her mental states are 
presented in the narrative. Though reports of her behaviour in the Odyssey 
consistently emphasize her virtue and loyalty, the narrator provides us no direct 
insight to Penelope’s intentions and motivations. He remains frustratingly ambiguous 
on these points; Penelope’s actions in relation to her husband, son, and suitors are 
thus difficult to rationalize in any concrete sense. This chapter examines how 
audiences infer and attribute mental states to others when there is no concrete 
information available to them. It takes place in four parts. The first section briefly 
outlines contextual considerations that influence Penelope’s mental state in Odyssey 
19. Sections Two and Three then examine Penelope’s own accounts of her 
psychology, with particular reference to Laertes’ funeral shroud and the nightingale 
simile. The final section discusses how others—the Suitors and Odysseus in 
particular—interpret Penelope’s mindedness throughout the narrative, with reference 
to theory of mind and studies of nonverbal behaviour. 
 
This thesis concludes with an examination of the opening sequence of Odyssey 20 
(5-30). Ancient and modern scholarship alike has commented on its dense 
psychological imagery and interplay; it is important, in these senses, because it 
demonstrates the full range of ways in which the Homeric poet conceptualizes his 
characters’ internal experiences. Chapter Six thus discusses the cognitive aspects of 
this passage in depth, with respect to its place in the broader context of the Homeric 
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corpus and with reference to insights from cognitive science. It takes place in four 
parts. I first examine the narrator’s use of metaphor, simile, and embedded narrative 
in his descriptions of internal organs (5-13) and monologues. Sections Two and 
Three investigate the hungry man (24-28) and canine similes (14-15), with especial 
reference to evolutionary theory, psychophysical aspects of emotion experience, and 
conceptual metaphor. The final section examines Odysseus’ didactic use of memory, 
but especially as it related to the Polyphemus episode of Odyssey 9. 
 
Chapter Seven reiterates the key areas of focus and major arguments of this study, 
and suggest some implications for future research. 
 
This thesis does not aim to provide an exhaustive account of psychological 
functioning in Homer. The Homeric data, as I hope to demonstrate, is so fruitful that 
I believe it would take more extensive further study to do the material justice. This 
thesis instead offers itself as a starting point for future analysis of the poems; in 
doing so, it demonstrates the explanatory power of cognitive science in elucidating 
the full extent of brain-body-world relationships in the Iliad and the Odyssey. It is for 
this reason that I have chosen to focus on providing full and thorough accounts of 
choice passages from the corpus; these excerpts, I argue, not only tell us important 
things about Homeric psychological functioning, but also are (with respect to other, 
similar passages in the corpus) illustrative of the narrator’s poetic craft on a larger 
scale. In taking this approach, I hope to show how insights from cognitive science 
enrich our understandings of the mechanics underlying these scenes. 
 
Before moving to the theoretical frameworks that have informed my approach, I 
would like to briefly discuss one passage that I think is especially interesting for our 
purposes, so to establish how rich and multi-modal is the Homeric data.  
 
II. A Brief Look at Odyssey 19.221-243 
Book 19 of the Odyssey is concerned, for the most part, with the night-time interview 
between the disguised Odysseus and his wife, Penelope. This exchange, which takes 
place in two sequences (170-120, 508-604), contains one of the most extensive 
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descriptions of Odysseus’ adopted persona: the Cretan prince Aethon, who, now a 
beggar, has found temporary and uneasy refuge in Ithaca, and whose continued 
presence in the royal house depends upon his success in negotiating the fraught and 
dangerous politics between its mistress, heir, servants, and guests. Aethon’s story is 
elaborate: he explains that he traces his lineage to King Minos of Crete as the son of 
Deucalion and the brother of Idomeneus; additionally, he claims to have hosted 
Odysseus for twelve days while the hero was on his way to Troy (185-202). 
Penelope challenges Aethon on three aspects of his story that, combined, will verify 
his identity and their established guest-friend relationship: (first) the clothing 
Odysseus wore when he met Aethon, (second) his appearance and bearing, and 
(third) his companions (215-219). Aethon addresses each of these points in his 
response (221-243), 
 
“ὦ γύναι, ἀργαλέον τόσσον χρόνον ἀμφὶς ἐόντα 
εἰπεῖν· ἤδη γὰρ τόδ’ ἐεικοστὸν ἔτος ἐστίν, 
ἐξ οὗ κεῖθεν ἔβη καὶ ἐμῆς ἀπελήλυθε πάτρης· 
αὐτάρ τοι ἐρέω, ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ.               
χλαῖναν πορφυρέην οὔλην ἔχε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,  
διπλῆν· ἐν δ’ ἄρα οἱ περόνη χρυσοῖο τέτυκτο 
αὐλοῖσιν διδύμοισι· πάροιθε δὲ δαίδαλον ἦεν·           
ἐν προτέροισι πόδεσσι κύων ἔχε ποικίλον ἐλλόν, 
ἀσπαίροντα λάων· τὸ δὲ θαυμάζεσκον ἅπαντες, 
ὡς οἱ χρύσεοι ἐόντες ὁ μὲν λάε νεβρὸν ἀπάγχων,  
αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐκφυγέειν μεμαὼς ἤσπαιρε πόδεσσι.                
τὸν δὲ χιτῶν’ ἐνόησα περὶ χροῒ σιγαλόεντα, 
οἷόν τε κρομύοιο λοπὸν κάτα ἰσχαλέοιο· 
τὼς μὲν ἔην μαλακός, λαμπρὸς δ’ ἦν ἠέλιος ὥς. 
ἦ μὲν πολλαί γ’ αὐτὸν ἐθηήσαντο γυναῖκες.                
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν·  
οὐκ οἶδ’, ἢ τάδε ἕστο περὶ χροῒ οἴκοθ’ Ὀδυσσεύς, 
ἦ τις ἑταίρων δῶκε θοῆς ἐπὶ νηὸς ἰόντι 
ἤ τίς που καὶ ξεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πολλοῖσιν Ὀδυσσεὺς 
ἔσκε φίλος· παῦροι γὰρ Ἀχαιῶν ἦσαν ὁμοῖοι.            
καί οἱ ἐγὼ χάλκειον ἄορ καὶ δίπλακα δῶκα 
καλὴν πορφυρέην καὶ τερμιόεντα χιτῶνα, 
αἰδοίως δ’ ἀπέπεμπον ἐϋσσέλμου ἐπὶ νηός. 
καὶ μέν οἱ κῆρυξ ὀλίγον προγενέστερος αὐτοῦ           
εἵπετο· καὶ τόν τοι μυθήσομαι, οἷος ἔην περ·  
γυρὸς ἐν ὤμοισιν, μελανόχροος, οὐλοκάρηνος, 
Εὐρυβάτης δ’ ὄνομ’ ἔσκε· τίεν δέ μιν ἔξοχον ἄλλων 
ὧν ἑτάρων Ὀδυσεύς, ὅτι οἱ φρεσὶν ἄρτια ᾔδη.”  
 
“My lady, it’s difficult for me, away for such a long time, to tell you, since it’s 
the twentieth year for him, from when he went from there and left my 
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fatherland. But I will tell you as my ētor depicts it to me. God-like Odysseus had 
a purple cloak of wool, double-folded. And the pin was gold and made with 
double grooves, and the front was cunningly wrought. A dog held a spotted 
fawn with his front paws, gripping it as it was struggling. Everyone admired it, 
how, although the figures were of gold, the dog held the fawn, strangling it, 
while the fawn struggled as it tried to escape him with its feet”. And I saw the 
glittering garment about his skin, of such a sort as the peel of a dried onion. It 
was soft, and it was radiant as the sun. Many of the women were gazing at it. I 
will tell you another thing, and cast it into your phrēn, I do not know either if 
that which Odysseus wore about his skin was from this house, or if some 
companion gave it to him going onto his swift ship, or a stranger, since 
Odysseus was a friend to many people. Few of the Achaians resembled him. I 
gave him a bronze weapon and a double-folded mantle, beautiful and purple, 
and a fringed tunic, and sent him off with respect upon his well-benched ship. 
And a herald, a little older than him, went with him. I’ll tell you what he was 
like, too. Round in the shoulders, dark-skinned, wooly-haired, his name was 
Eurybates, and Odysseus valued him beyond his other comrades, in that he knew 
in his mind thoughts that suited him”.2 
 
This speech tells us several interesting and important things about presentations of 
the Homeric mind. On a preliminary note, it reflects the cunning and mental aptitude 
with which Odysseus approaches and overcomes the final difficulties of his journey. 
In this particular case, it does so because it engages Penelope in several different 
ways: (first) as a woman, whose personal honour and reputation are partially 
invested in the items she creates for her household, (second) as a wife, for whom 
Odysseus’ clothing are especially potent relics of her marriage, and (third) as a host, 
who is even more obliged to offer Aethon her hospitality if he can prove his prior 
link to her husband. The success with which Odysseus appeals to these different 
identities demonstrates his skill as a manipulator par excellence, the recovery of 
which is essential for the re-invigoration of his heroic identity. But is also reflects the 
famous like-minedness that he shares with Penelope; in this sense, it is by mutually 
engaging in these psychological challenges that Odysseus demonstrates the intimacy 
with which he understands his wife and the enduring bond between them. 
 
One of the reasons we are able to understand the cognitive aspects of this speech is 
because of Odysseus’ reliance on material media—but especially garments and 
																																																								
2 All translations are my own, unless where otherwise indicated. 
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textiles—in engaging Penelope’s mindedness. This short discussion highlights some 
of the different ways that this occurs.3 
 
Odysseus’ clothing—described by the poet as σήματα—evokes Penelope’s position 
as wife and matriarch in the Ithacan household. Similar tokens are, elsewhere in the 
Odyssey, important indicators of Odysseus’ identity and relationships with others: 
while Eurycleia (19.392-394) and Eumaeus (21.221-222), for example, recognize 
Odysseus because of his scar, it is Odysseus’ correct identification of the process by 
which he made the marriage bed—another of these σήματα—that leads to 
Penelope’s public recognition of him as her returned husband (23.183-230). The 
garments of this speech operate in a similar way, in that they are first and foremost 
σήματα that are highly personal and recognizable items for Penelope of her role as 
Odysseus’ wife. As craftswoman and caretaker of her household’s textiles, Penelope 
herself would have made these garments, store and maintained them in the house, 
and supplied them to Odysseus to use as clothing; she confirms this final point in 
particular at the close of Aethon’s speech (“αὐτὴ γὰρ τάδε εἵματ’ ἐγὼ πόρον, οἷ’ 
ἀγορεύεις, πτύξασ’ ἐκ θαλάμου”, 255-256). They are thus especially potent 
symbols for the intimacy that exists between herself and Odysseus; they are 
representations of a wife’s care for her household and her husband. On a more 
personal level, the technical aspects of the clothing allude to the emotional bond 
between them: the cloak is voluminous, the tunic soft and glittering, and the pin 
golden and elaborately decorated. While these details doubtlessly make Odysseus’ 
outfit more unique and memorable, and reflect his social status in the Homeric 
world, they are also costly, labour-intensive, and time-consuming to produce. In this 
sense, Penelope’s effort in obtaining the clothing also reflects the emotional 
investment she has with its owner; the value of the brooch, furthermore, hints at the 
expense to which she has gone to complete an already costly outfit. 
 
The clothing’s primary function as a gift is likewise important, but especially 
because of the memories with which it is associated. Odysseus’ garb, as other 
																																																								
3 I provide a more thorough and in-depth analysis of this speech—and Odyssey 19 more generally—in 
the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis. 
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σήματα, recalls an important historical event that has poignant connotations for both 
the immediate and broader narrative action: his departure for Troy, his separation 
from his family, and the point at which Penelope’s role as wife and matriarch is 
thrown into turmoil. In describing these items, Aethon not only meets Penelope’s 
challenge and verifies his false identity, but cuts to the heart of her present anxieties: 
her dilemma regarding the Suitors, and the external pressures she faces to resolve her 
situation. He also aims to evoke emotions associated with Penelope’s husband, the 
painful memory of his departure, and the reality of his continued absence (and 
possible demise). This strategy is especially useful, as Penelope begins crying at the 
close of Aethon’s speech (249-260). Weeping is, elsewhere in Homer, a common 
response to painful memories: Odysseus weeps during Demodocus’ tales of Troy 
(8.521-534), and Laertes cries as a disguised Odysseus informs him of his son’s 
death (23.280). Penelope cries twice in this sequence: (first) when Aethon tells her 
that we met with Odysseus in Crete (205-212); and second, after he correctly 
identifies her husband. Both examples operate as proof for Odysseus, as in the case 
of Laertes, of Penelope’s loyalty and faithfulness to his memory. This is essential 
because, as Agamemnon (11.440-444) and Athene (13.333-338) warn Odysseus, 
verifying Penelope’s trustworthiness is an important step in reclaiming his position 
as Ithaca’s patriarch. 
 
Aethon’s speech also appeals to Penelope’s honour and reputation, particularly when 
it describes the reaction of the Cretan women to his fringed tunic (235). In the 
Homeric world, textile production is a source of τιμή and κλέος for the women who 
create them, as an indicator of their skill at weavers (van Wees 2005, 47; Thomas 
1988, 61). “Penelope uses weaving as a ruse to forestall the suitors”, Thomas (1988, 
261) argues, “but it is clear that she is an expert at the loom in creating physical as 
well as intellectual products”. Odysseus’ clothing is especially rich: his cloak, as 
discussed above, is double-folded and purple; it is secured with an elaborate golden 
pin; and it is worn with a tunic that is shimmering, as soft as the skin of a dried 
onion, and as radiant as the sun. The admiration that the tunic in particular garners 
from the Cretan women is an effort, on Odysseus’ part, to appeal to Penelope’s ego. 
The Cretan woman, more specifically, recognize her prowess as a weaver, and this 
	 	
	 16	
acknowledgement increases her reputation beyond the limits of her own household.  
 
Odysseus also establishes a link, through material media, between Penelope and the 
fictitious women of his account, in which there is a form of relationship between the 
clothing’s creator and its admirers. But these issues of textile-centred communication 
between women are especially important when Aethon describes the weapon and 
clothing given to Odysseus upon his departure from Crete (226-228). On one level, 
these gifts are particularly rich, and therefore quantify the relationship between the 
Cretan and Ithacan households as one of great value to both parties; the material 
worth of the items, in other words, directly reflects the importance of the newly 
established relationship between Crete and Ithaca. On another, it reflects well on 
Aethon as Odysseus’ host, as it communicates to Penelope that he followed the 
proper conventions of guest friendship. This is a useful means by which Odysseus 
ensures his continued presence as a guest of the house until he can take revenge on 
the suitors. 
 
This gifted clothing might also have been the same handiwork of the women who 
had admired Penelope’s craftsmanship. If Odysseus had returned to Ithaca with this 
clothing, then the skill of these women would have fulfilled the same function as 
Penelope’s in Crete. Odysseus’ description of these guest gifts might, thus, be 
understood as a physical link between Penelope and these anonymous Cretan women 
that operates in three temporal phases: (first) the past, because Odysseus’ narrative 
relates to events that have already happened, which partially acts as a trigger for 
Penelope’s memories; (second) the present, in which Aethon’s guest-gifts assure that 
Penelope will act as host to her disguised husband (and thereby ensure his continued 
presence in the house until the time he can reclaim it; and (third) the future, in which 
the exchange and display of clothing—a process that is intensely relateable to a 
Homeric woman—is emblematic of a persistent relationship between the Ithacan and 
Cretan household. Put more simply: if we understand the giving and receiving of 
clothing as a means of embodying relationships between two Homeric houses and 
their craftswomen, we might be able to see how Odysseus’ description creates 
intangible connections between Penelope and the Cretan women; connections that 
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are reified and represented by material objects. 
 
The Cretan women’s reaction also appeals to Odysseus’ ego. Aethon uses αὐτὸν 
when describing their reaction, thus making ambiguous whether the women admire 
Odysseus’ clothing or the man himself. If the latter, then it is possible that Aethon’s 
comment reflects Odysseus’ continued tendency for conceit and self-praise; this is 
also the case for the preceding lines, in which Aethon expresses doubt about the 
origin of Odysseus’ clothing by citing his wide-ranging popularity (237-240). In 
doing so, Odysseus also attempts to incite Penelope’s jealousy in two different ways: 
(first), because other women—all of whom are of comparable social standing to 
Penelope—admired her husband; and (second), because the uncertain origin of 
Odysseus’ outfit suggests a liaison with another woman, one who is skilled and 
wealthy enough to produce and gift elaborate clothing. “Clothes and pin”, Mueller 
(2010, 5) argues, “act as Penelope’s signature on Odysseus”; it is in this same way 
that another woman’s clothes have the potential to “mark” Odysseus. These 
possibilities demonstrate how reference to the Cretan women can serve several 
different motives: it is a strategy by which Odysseus can not only praise Penelope, 
but also himself; in this latter sense, it also provides the audience with additional 
insight to his personality. 
 
Aethon’s speech is also framed by conceptual metaphors that provide insight to the 
complex mental mechanics underlying his interactions with Penelope. In the first 
case, Aethon states that—although it has been twenty years since he met with 
Odysseus—he will describe him as depicted by his ētor (“αὐτάρ τοι ἐρέω, ὥς μοι 
ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ”, 224). Aethon, on a preliminary note, presents his ἦτορ as a 
personified entity capable of producing images drawn from their shared memories. 
This particular statement is also important for what it tells us about ancient concepts 
of memory and imagination; of ἐναργεία and φαντασία. Second, Aethon instructs 
Penelope to cast the information provided by his ētor and communicated by his 
speech into her phrenes (“ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν”, 236), 
and he, third, describes the well-made pin holding Odysseus’ clothing together. In 
the first two cases, Aethon employs physical imagery in describing the processes of 
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reproduction, reconstruction, and communication taking place between himself and 
Penelope; in the third, his description of the pin comments on Odysseus’ rhetorical 
skills that figuratively bind the different elements of his speech into a coherent, 
successful whole. 
 
This short case study aims to show how even brief and superficial analyses of 
excerpts from the Homeric poems reveals a plethora of complex psychological 
processes and interactions. The third and fourth chapters of this thesis discuss both 
Aethon’s speech and the episode to which it belongs in much greater depth; but it is 
important to point, for now, to some of the ways in which it is interesting and 
important to a study of body-brain-world relationships in Homer. 
 
There are ways of thinking about Aethon’s speech that complement modern studies 
of mind, cognitive embodiment, imagination, and memory. As stated above, insights 
from cognitive science have, in recent years, demonstrated the extent to which 
thought, emotion, and human reasoning are influenced by physical, material, 
interactional, and evolutionary aspects of experience. The following chapter outlines 
some of these theoretical frameworks, with a view to show, throughout the rest of 
this thesis, how similar influences that shape our minds in the everyday are also at 
play in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Psychological experience in Homer is deeply 
psychosomatic, complex, and multi-modal; composed of mind, body, and world. 
Any plausible account of Homeric psychology, therefore, must consider these 
physical aspects experience as playing an indispensible role in cognitive 




Chapter Two: The Embodied Mind in Science and Literature 
 
The development of an individual’s cognitive abilities is deeply and inextricably 
shaped by physical, material, interactional, and evolutionary modes of experience. 
Studies demonstrate that, within an hour of birth, an infant mimics the facial 
expressions and eye movements of its caregivers (Gallagher 2005; Plotkin 1997). In 
their first year of life, they not only learn the boundaries and capabilities of their 
bodies by manipulating their environment through play, but also able to attribute 
false belief to others (Buttelmann, et al. 2014, 2015). Children of two years have a 
basic concept of intentionality and causation (Meltzoff 1995). At four years, a child 
has fully functioning capacity to attribute thoughts, emotions, and beliefs to those 
around them. The physical and concrete so permeate our psychological development 
that they also shape our understanding of abstract concepts: studies in this area 
demonstrate that linguistic development and expression are primarily sourced in 
physiological experiences, many of which are universal (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Lakoff and Turner 1989; Kövecses 2000; Fauconnier and Turner 2008). “What we 
call ‘mind’ and what we call ‘body’ are not two things”, Johnson (2007, 1) argues, 
“but rather aspects of one organic experience, so that all our meaning, thought, and 
language emerge from the aesthetic dimensions of this embodied activity”. The body 
plays a central role in each stage of our cognitive development; we are, first of all, 
embodied beings. 
 
This cognitive-phenomenological approach to the human mind is the central focus of 
linguists, philosophers, neuroscientists, developmental psychologists, and 
sociologists working within cognitive science. What unites their areas of study is the 
basic premise that all our thought, emotion, and sense making is framed and shaped 
by the outer experiences of the body. In doing so, they steer from Cartesian “brain-
in-a-vat” interpretations of cognition that dichotomize psychological and 
physiological functioning (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Rowlands 2010). This chapter 
examines how these fields of study articulate the intimate relationship between brain, 
body, and world, with particular focus on embodied, embedded, extended, and 




My discussion takes place in four parts. Section One briefly defines these four major 
areas of thought in cognitive science and, in doing so, outlines how they articulate 
different kinds of psychological embodiment. The second section discusses the 
universalist approach to nonverbal behaviour, using Ekman’s preliminary 
investigations of facial expression and emotion concepts as a case study. Our theory 
of mind abilities are also important in terms of how we intuit the mental activity of 
others. This section, thus, discusses contributions to this area from evolutionary and 
developmental psychology, as well as neurobiology. It concludes by examining some 
recent applications of these ideas in literary analysis. Section Three discusses how 
bodily experiences provide structure for mental concepts, both in everyday and 
poetic metaphor. The final section of this chapter surveys previous applications of 
cognitive science to the Iliad and the Odyssey. I conclude this chapter with a 
comment, based on the material covered below, on my thesis’ contribution to 
scholarship of the Homeric mind. 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is thus to orient my study with respect to current 
understandings of mind in cognitive science, literary analysis, and Homeric 
scholarship. In the successive chapters of this thesis, I demonstrate how analysis of 
the Iliad and Odyssey on these terms can tell us interesting and important things 
about psychological functioning, embodied cognition, and conceptual metaphor in 
the poems. 
 
I. Embodied Approaches to Cognition 
According to Wilson (2002, 626), cognitive approaches to mind make six major 
claims of the relationship between brain, body, and world: (first) that cognition is 
primarily embedded in real-world environments, and thus “inherently involves 
perception and action” (626); (second) that, because of the speed with which our 
brains function in performing everyday tasks, cognition is highly “time-pressured” 
(626); (third), that we often use external resources in performing mental tasks in 
order to “reduce the cognitive workload” (626); (fourth) that our environment is 
heavily enmeshed with our cognitive functioning: “the information flow between 
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mind and body is so dense and continuous that the mind alone is not a meaningful 
unit of analysis” (626); and (sixth), that even when cognition is “de-coupled” from 
its immediate context (for example, in recollecting the past), it is still deeply and 
inextricably shaped by bodily experiences (626). 
 
These six claims fall under umbrella-terms that, combined, constitute the “4E” 
approach to cognition: to embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended approaches to 
the human mind (Rowlands 2010, 3). In arguing for psychological, physical, and 
environmental cohesion, it opposes dualistic, Cartesian approaches to mind that view 
brain and body as mutually exclusive entities. “Each of these ideas”, Rowlands 
(2010, 3) explains, “has been understood as denying… the central assumption of 
Cartesian cognitive science: [that] mental processes are identical with, or exclusively 
realized by, brain processes”. This section briefly defines each of these four 
approaches to cognition. 
 
Cognitive embodiment espouses the view that psychological functioning involves 
body-based structures and mechanisms (Damasio 1999; Shapiro 2004, 186; 
Rowlands 2010, 53).4 As Shapiro (2004, 190) explains, 
 
Psychological processes are incomplete [author’s emphasis] without the body’s 
contributions. Vision for human beings is a process that includes features of the 
human body… [p]erceptual processes include and depend on bodily structures. 
This means that a description of perceptual capacities cannot maintain body 
neutrality, and it also means that an organism with a non-human body will have 
non-human visual and auditory psychologies.  
 
																																																								
4 “Embodiment in the field of cognitive science”, Gibbs (2005, 1) explains, “refers to understanding of 
the role of an agent’s own body in its everyday, situated cognition”. See also Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch (1993, 172-173), who argue that, “By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two 
points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body within 
various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context”. In 
emphasizing the role of cultural and biological embeddedness, their definition of embodied cognition 
also incorporates theories of extended and embedded cognition; but it is important to point out that, 
although I define each of these methods of embodiment separately, they are inherently entwined. As 
Dawson (2014, 62) points out, “In viewing cognition as embedded or situated, embodied cognitive 
science emphasizes feedback between an agent and the world. We have seen that this feedback is 
structured by the nature of an agent’s body… [t]his in turn suggests that agents with different kinds of 
bodies can be differentiated in terms of degrees of embodiment… [e]mbodiment can be defined as the 
extent to which an agent can alter its environment”. 
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Rowlands (2010, 53) elaborates on this example of human vision in further 
illustrating Shapiro’s argument. The size, placement, and number of our eyes, he 
(2010, 53) claims, determine how we visually gauge depth and perspective; our 
“visual-depth information”, therefore, is partially governed by our bodily structure. 
“The same is true”, Rowlands (2010, 53) continues, “of other perceptual abilities: the 
way in which we hear, touch, smell, and taste is, in other words, also defined by the 
kinds of bodies we possess—by our ears, fingers, noses, and tongues”. These aspects 
of our experience are thus primarily embodied, and play a role in the formation of 
our mental processes. These features of our experience also determine how we 
structure abstract concepts. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) refer to this idea as 
“semantic embodiment”, and argue that the structure, composition, and motor 
abilities of the body determine both how we experience the world and how we create 
meaning within it. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in particular propose that our 
conceptual frameworks are determined not only by our spatial and motor behaviours, 
but also our bodily experiences in the world. I explore these ideas in greater depth in 
the third section, which focuses especially on conceptualizations of conceptual 
metaphor. 
 
Extended approaches to mind consider cognitive functioning as partially comprised 
of external resources such as mobile phones, computers, tablets, and notebooks. It 
differs from embodied cognition theory in the sense that it considers these 
nonorganic media as equal components of psychological functioning. Clark and 
Chalmers (2010[1998]) coin this idea as the “parity principle” or “active 
externalism”.5 In a more recent discussion of the extended mind theory, Tollefson 
(2006, 141) describes its implications for our use of objects such as smart phones and 
palm pilots: 
 
They are functionally equivalent to mechanisms like short- and long-term 
memory, mental images and calculations, and so on. We would have no problem 
accepting them as part of the cognitive process if they were located in the head 
and so, according to the parity principle, these devices ought to be considered 
																																																								
5 For more recent studies of extended mind theory, see (for example), Menary’s edited volume, The 
Extended Mind (2010). 
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part of the cognitive process of a system that includes human body and 
environment.6 
 
An external medium of this kind must fulfil four basic criteria: (first) it must be 
accessible and oft-used; (second) it must be trustworthy as “something retrieved 
clearly from biological memory” (Tollefson 2006, 142); (third) the information 
contained within must be easily accessible; and (fourth) the information “must have 
been previously endorsed by the subject” (Tollefson 2006, 142). In this way, 
extended mind theorists argue, “cognition is not an activity of the mind alone, but is 
instead distributed across the entire interacting situation, including mind, body, and 
environment” (Wilson 2002, 629-630). 
 
In illustrating their point, Clark and Chalmers use the analogy of a game of tetris 
(2010[1998], 27-29), and outline three distinct scenarios. In the first (1), an 
individual mentally rotates shapes on a screen until they fit their sockets. In the 
second (2), they either physically (with a button) or mentally (through imagination) 
manipulate the shape. The final (3) scenario takes place in a technologically 
advanced future, in which the player has a “neural implant” that performs the same 
function as the button in (2). The player can chose whether to use the implant or his 
imagination; “each resource”, Clark and Chalmers (2010[1998], 29), “makes 
different demands on attention and other concurrent brain activity”. Which scenario 
requires the highest level of cognizing? Clark and Chalmers propose that, on the 
surface, scenario (1) and (3) are more closely aligned than (2), which is clearly 
distributed over brain, body (pressing the button), and world (the button itself). But 
Clark and Chalmers deny that there is any real boundary between them in terms of 
cognition. Scenario (3), they argue, should be considered as containing the same 
level of cognizing as (1) and (2) (2010[1998], 29). Clark and Chalmers (2010[1998], 
29) conclude that,  
																																																								
6 See also Rowlands (2010, 59), who identifies the four basic premises of Clark’s and Chalmer’s 
extended mind approach: “(1) The world is an external store of information relevant to processes such 
as perceiving, remembering, reasoning… (and possibly) experiencing; (2) Cognitive processes are 
hybrid—they straddle both internal and external operations; (3)The external operations take the form 
of action, broadly construed: the manipulation, exploitation, and transformation of environmental 
structures—ones that carry information relevant to the accomplishing of a given task; and (4) At least 
some of the internal processes are ones concerned with supplying the subject with the ability to 




In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-
way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system 
in its own right. All components in the system play an active causal role 
[author’s emphasis]. 
 
The extended mind thesis is primarily one of “composition” and “constitution” 
(Rowlands 2010, 67); it espouses the view that “some cognitive processes are partly 
composed of environment process” (67). By contrast, embedded mind theory 
proposes that cognitive functioning is dependent upon these environmental features. 
It suggests that, “cognitive processes are often (and on some versions, essentially) 
embedded in the environment” (2010, 67). In this view, interactions between the 
body and its environment not only restrict the behaviour of individuals, but also 
influence the cognitive functions arising from these interactions. 
 
The fourth cognitive approach to mind is the enactive mind thesis, which proposes 
that the function of perception is action. These bodily interactions with the world, 
furthermore, shape our cognitive processes. Valera, Thompson, and Rosch first 
coined the term “enactivism”, who argue that it emphasizes (1993, 9), 
 
…the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given 
world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on 
the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs. 
 
While enactivism agrees with the extended mind thesis that cognizing is not limited 
to the brain, it differs in emphasizing the special role of the body. Bodily 
experiences, it contends, shape and contribute to the development of our cognitive 
abilities in an irreplaceable way; it is thus most closely related to embodiment theory. 
Mackay (1962, 1967, 1973), for example, describes the motor-sensory issues implicit 
in holding a bottle, in which an individual discovers information about it through 
interaction: by touching it, looking at it, or manipulating it. The sensory aspects of 
this experience, he argues, determine how an individual forms a mental 
representation of a bottle (O’Regan and Nöe 2001, 945; Wilson 2002, 70). In a later 




You have the impression of seeing a bottle if there is knowledge in your nervous 
system concerning a certain web of contingencies. For example, you have 
knowledge of the fact that if you move your eyes up towards the neck of the 
bottle, the sensory stimulation will change in a way typical of what happens 
when a narrower region of the bottle comes into foveal vision; you have 
knowledge expressing the fact that if you move your eyes downwards, the 
sensory stimulation will change in a way typical of what happens when the 
white label is fixated by central vision. 
 
Our concept of what a bottle is, how it feels, and how it looks, in this view, is shaped 
directly by our physical interactions with the world; these interactions, in turn, 
provide structure for mental models of external stimuli. 
 
II. Nonverbal Behaviour and Theory of Mind 
Each of these approaches to mind assert that cognition extends into, and is influenced 
by, the body and the world. While there are differences between these four 
approaches—embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive—there is also ample 
overlap between them. This approach has, over the past decades, signalled 
considerable change in our understanding of cognitive development. This is the case 
for both science and literature, in which analysts of the latter argue for the 
explanatory power of cognitive science for artistic expression. 
 
Nonverbal behaviour is an important means by which individuals embody thought 
and emotion. The human body is capable of communicating numerous unspoken 
messages by way of facial expression, gesture, body language, and paralanguage. In 
these senses, nonverbal behaviour is both an important component of psychological 
functioning and inherently communicative. Darwin’s early studies of nonverbal 
behaviour emphasize its universality, making the claim that the expression of certain 
emotions are shared by human and nonhuman primates, as well as by other animals 
(2009[1872]). Though contemporaries of Darwin dismissed his work, more modern 
studies of emotion expression lend weight to his original interpretations. Ekman 
(1982[1972]), for example, demonstrates the universality of facial expressions in 
embodying certain emotions.7 He and Friesen explain (2003, 24):  
																																																								
7 Ekman’s work stands, as Darwin’s, in opposition to cultural relativists, who deny this universalist 





Since Darwin’s time, many writers have emphatically disagreed [with his work]. 
Just recently, however, scientific investigations… [show] that the facial 
appearance of at least some emotions is indeed universal, although there are 
cultural differences in when these expressions are shown. 
 
Ekman shows how six basic emotions—happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, disgust, 
and fear—share specific facial expressions that are identifiable by members of 
different cultures. 8 One of these experiments tested the emotional response of 
Japanese and American students to “stress-inducing” films, first, when watching the 
video alone, and second, with a member of the participant’s own culture (2003, 23). 
Both the American and Japanese participants responded with similar facial 
expressions when they viewed the video alone. In company, however, “the Japanese 
masked their facial expressions of unpleasant feelings more than did the Americans” 
(2003, 23). While members of different cultures may express certain emotions in 
similar ways, therefore, there are certain modifiers that differ between cultures 
(2003, 24): 
 
This study was particularly important in demonstrating what about facial 
expression is universal and what differs for each culture. The universal feature is 
the distinctive appearance of the face for each of the primary emotions. But 
people in various cultures differ in what they have been taught about managing 
or controlling their facial expressions of emotion. 
 
Ekman determined two further conclusions from these findings: (first) he coined the 
term “leakage”, which he and Friesan define as, “the non-intended betrayal of a 
feeling the person is trying to conceal” (2003, 144), and (second) that there is notable 
distinction between contrived and genuine facial expressions.9 One further 
																																																								
8 In limiting his study to these six facial expressions, Ekman recognizes that there are very likely other 
emotions that are also expressed by the face. In a more recent work, Unmasking the Face, both he and 
Friesen (2003, 22) comment that, “There are probably other emotions conveyed by the face—shame 
and excitement, for example; but these have not yet been as firmly established”. In this work, 
however, Ekman and Friesen describe both facial expressions for these six emotions and for thirty-
three “blends”, which, they argue, means that, “quite a large portion of the emotional repertoire [are] 
represented”. 
9 Ekman and Friesen (2003, 144) also point to “deception clues”, which “tell you that facial 
management is occurring, but not what the concealed emotion is; you simply know the something is 
amiss”. Using the example of anger, they continue on that: “When a person is attempting to neutralize 
the anger he actually feels, if he does a poor job, you may still see a trace of his anger (leakage). Or he 
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experiment tested North American, Japanese, Chilean, Argentinian, and Brazilian 
participants who, after being shown photographs of different facial expressions, were 
asked to identify their associated emotions. The majority of participants, regardless 
of language or culture, attributed the same emotions to the same facial expressions 
(Ekman and Friesen 2003, 25 [adapted from Fig. 2]): 
 
 United States Brazil Chile Argentina Japan 
Fear 85% 67% 68% 54% 66% 
Disgust 92% 97% 92% 92% 90% 
Happiness 97% 95% 95% 98% 100% 
Anger 67% 90% 94% 90% 90% 
 
Both these experiments show how nonverbal facial expressions are both universally 
determined and culturally specific. “It is not just that”, Cairns (2008, 44) argues, 
“cultures share facial expressions; according to Ekman, they also share the 
association between those expressions and their evaluations of certain types of 
scenarios”.10 
 
This short case study shows not only how nonverbal behaviour plays a crucial role in 
embodying and extending psychological states and processes, but also how this 
behaviour can be both universally determined and culturally specific. In the latter 
case, this is partially because we share the same physiological structure, and are thus 
limited as to how we express emotions by the confines of our bodies. But, despite 
our similar physiology, we also live and operate within cultures and are thus, to a 
certain extent, bound by their specific norms and traditions. While recognizing the 
universality of cognitive functioning and development is important, therefore, it is 
																																																																																																																																																													
may successfully neutralize it with a poker face, but his face looks sufficiently awkward for you to 
know that he is not showing how he really feels (deception clue)”. 
10 This is also the case for other types of nonverbal behaviour. Poyatos (1993, 316), for example, 
points to work undertaken on high-intensity calls by both human and non-human primates, but 
especially that of van Lawick-Goodall (1971, 241-242, 263-266). He explains of this study that, “It 
would first establish animal cries as means of conveying information about basic needs and instinctive 
drives (e.g., attention, hunger, aggression, etc.), and human cries as responding also to basic situations 
of survival, to which man adds the expression of his emotions”. 
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also essential to examine culturally specific deployments of universal aspects of 
experience. 
 
The processes by which we attribute mental states to others based on this behaviour 
are best explained by our theory of mind (hereafter ToM) abilities.11 “Theory of 
Mind”, Leverage et al. (2010, 1) explain, “Is mind reading, empathy, creative 
imagination of another’s perspective; in short, it is simultaneously a highly 
sophisticated ability and a very basic necessity for human communication”. There 
are two major subdivisions of ToM. The first is “theory-theory”, which asserts that 
understanding others occurs via an inferential process until the best approximation of 
their mental state is reached (Carruthers 1996). “Mental states such as beliefs and 
desires”, Colombetti (2014, 171) explains, “are posited as theoretical entities that, to 
the best of one’s knowledge, explain and predict the other’s behaviour”. The second 
is “simulation theory”, in which individuals understand others by simulating their 
mental states. “I put myself in another’s situation”, Colombetti (2014, 171) 
describes, “Decide what I would think or feel in that situation, and eventually ascribe 
that thought or feeling to another”. Following Zahavi (2011), Colombetti identifies 
the unifying principle of these approaches as being that, “the mental states of others 
are private and hidden, and therefore understanding the other requires ‘getting at’ 
these hidden mental states via an intermediate inferential process” (2014, 171-172).12 
 
ToM is universal; shared not only by humans, but also by non-human primates and 
other animals (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Avis and Harris 1991; Horowitz 2003; 
Dally et al. 2010). Theorists speculate that this is because it is grounded in 
evolutionary development. ToM, Kidd and Castano claim (2013, 377), is one of the 
most complex evolutionary features of human cognition, primarily because, “it 
allows successful navigation of complex social relationships and helps to support the 
empathic responses that maintain them”. Evolutionary psychologists typically place 
																																																								
11 It is called a “theory” insomuch as there is, as yet, no proven neurobiological or evolutionary basis 
for these capacities; though (as I will discuss below), ToM has been widely and compellingly linked 
to the existence and function of mirror neurons, as well as expanding social groups in our far-flung 
evolutionary history, debate continues on about its underlying brain-based processes. 
12 For further studies on these two subdivisions of theory of mind, see Goldman and Sripada (2005), 
Tomasello, et al. (2005), Rattcliffe (2007), and Gallagher and Zahavi (2008). 
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the development of ToM in the “massive neurocognitive evolution” of the 
Pleistocene era (1.8 million to 10,000 years ago) (Zunshine 2011, 64). “The 
emergence of these adaptations”, Zunshine (2011, 64) argues, “was evolution’s 
answer to the staggeringly complex challenge faced by our ancestors, who needed to 
make sense of the behaviour of other people in their group”.13 
 
Dunbar best articulates the possible evolutionary origins of ToM (1992a, 1992b). He 
observed not only that human and non-human primates have a tendency to form 
social groups, but also that there was correlation between the size of the neocortex—
the sector of the brain that governs memory, emotion, language, and learning—and 
the size of a social group. “In lemurs”, Oatley (2001a, 15) explains of these findings, 
“the cortex is about 1.2 times the size of the rest of the brain, in cebus monkeys 
about 2.4 times, in chimpanzees about 3.2 times, and in humans about 4.1 times”. 
This size difference is partially accounted for by changes in attachment and 
relationship-building practices, which differ in larger social groups. Dunbar (1993, 
2003) notes that human and non-human primates establish relationships through 
grooming; but demands on time mean that this strategy becomes unfeasible, as social 
groups grow larger. ToM abilities accordingly developed from man’s need to 
navigate and interpret the behaviour of others in an environment of larger-scale 
social groups and more complex interpersonal networks. From an evolutionary 
perspective, our empathic abilities thus reflect both our status as deeply social 
animals and our need to form bonds with larger numbers of people. This necessity is 
partially based in social pressures (Dunbar 2000, 36-37): 
 
The main reason that primates live in groups is as a defence against predators… 
group size increases, and to support this, their social relationships shift to being 
ever more intensely bonded, presumably in order to ensure that individuals stick 
together and come to each other’s aid when necessary. 
 
																																																								
13 Baron-Cohen (1995, 21) also argues that: “Attributing mental states to a complex system (such as a 
human being) is by far the easiest way of understanding it… [that is, of] coming up with an 
explanation of the complex system’s behaviour and predicting what it will do next”. See also Baron-
Cohen, et al. (2000) for another example of his work, but especially as it relates to neurobiological 
perspectives of theory of mind. 
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From a neurobiological standpoint, the brain-based processes underlying these 
abilities have been widely (though controversially) attributed to mirror neurons 
(Borenstein and Ruppin 2005, 229).14 Studies focusing on ToM in human and non-
human primates suggest that, “an action is understood when its observation causes 
the motor system of the observer to ‘resonate’” (Borenstein and Ruppin 2005, 229). 
When an individual observes another’s behaviour, in other words, “the same 
population of neurons that control the execution… becomes active in [his own] 
motor areas” (Rizzolatti, et al. 2001, 662). Our brain, thus, activates the same areas 
that come into play when we ourselves perform certain actions; it is in this way, from 
a neurobiological standpoint, that we understand the behaviour of others. In this 
sense, the brain does not distinguish between others’ and our own actions (Zunshine 
2011, 64; Goldman and Sripada 2005; Goldman 2006). Zunshine (2011, 64-65) 
concludes that, “our neural circuits are powerfully attuned to the presence, 
behaviour, and emotional display of other members of our species. This attunement 
begins early… and it takes numerous nuanced forms as we grow into our 
environment”. 
 
Primate cognitive features that have been linked to mirror neurons include, for 
example, empathy (Preston and de Waal 2002, Decety 2002, Decety and Jackson 
2004; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese 2001), language (Porter et al. 1980, 
McCarthy and Warrington 1984, 2001; Marslen-Wilson 1973), and imagination 
(Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Lakin and Chartrand 2003; van Baaren, et al. 2003; 
Kosonogov 2011), while experiments using fMRIs, EEGs (electroencephalography), 
and MEGs (magnetoencephalography) suggest that the same sections of the brain are 
active when individuals experience emotions as when they observe similar processes 
in others (Botvinick et al. 2005; Cheng et al. 2008; Morrison et al. 2004, Jabbi et al. 
																																																								
14 There is some doubt, however, about the existence and function of mirror neurons. See Hickok et al. 
(2009), for example, who argue that it is unclear whether they differ as a distinct type of neuron; they 
doubt, furthermore, whether their function is a distinct response or just a part of the brain’s overall 
motor functioning. “The early hypothesis”, Hickok (2009, 1242) goes on to claim, “that these cells 
underlie action understanding is… an interesting and prima facie reasonable idea. However, despite 
its widespread acceptance, the proposal has never been adequately tested in monkeys, and in humans 
there is strong empirical evidence, in the form of physiological and neuropsychological (double-) 
dissociations, against the claim”. See also Lingnau et al. (2009), Kilner et al. (2009) and Kosonogov 
(2012) for other objections to the concept of mirror neurons. 
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2007).15 While there is still debate as to the existence and function of mirror neurons 
and their potential role in ToM, these studies suggest the possibility that our ability 
to empathize and connect with others is based not only in our evolutionary roots, but 
also in neurobiological processes. 
 
ToM abilities are present from infancy and develop in the first years of a child’s life 
through interactions with their caregivers (Meltzoff 1995; Carruthers 2013, 167).16 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) explored this idea through a series of tasks that tested 
false belief. In one of these—the “unexpected transfer task”—children from four- to 
nine-years-old were given a scenario and question such as (109): 
 
Maxi is helping his mother to unpack the shopping bag. He puts the chocolate 
into the GREEN cupboard. Maxi remembers exactly where he put the chocolate 
so that he can come back later and get some. Then he leaves for the playground. 
In his absence his mother needs some chocolate. She takes the chocolate out of 
the GREEN cupboard and uses some of it for her cake. Then she puts it back not 
into the GREEN but into the BLUE cupboard. She leaves to get some eggs and 
Maxi returns from the playground, hungry. 
 
Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?  
 
Doherty (2007, 9) explains that this test creates notable distinction between Maxi’s 
beliefs and that of the participant’s; it measures, “whether subjects have an explicit 
and definition representation of the other’s wrong belief” (Wimmer and Perner 1983, 
106). Maxi, who did not witness his mother move the chocolate, falsely believes that 
it will be in the green cupboard. In order to correctly answer the scenario’s 
accompanying question, the participant must reasonably predict Maxi’s behaviour 
based on his knowledge, rather than on what they know to be the case. Wimmer and 
Perner found that, while children were able to successfully pass the test at four to 




15 Other studies have, furthermore, widely linked autism in humans with mirror neuron deficiency 
(Baron-Cohen 1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 2000, Oberman et al. 2005). 
16 Understanding belief and desire, Doherty (2007, 3) claims, is among the most basic of these early 
developments: “If I want a cookie”, he explains, “I believe reaching inside the cookie jar will get me a 
cookie, then I will reach inside the cookie jar”. 
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 Number of correct answers 
Age (years) 2 1 0 
4-5 4 2 6 
6-7 11 0 1 
8-9 11 1 0 
 
A second test—the “unexpected contents” task—explored whether young children 
were able to recognize false belief in others after having experienced it themselves 
(Hogrefe et al. 1986). Participants were first asked to guess the contents of a box of 
matches; after (typically) responding with the case’s label, the container was opened 
to show that it contained chocolate (1986, 570). They were then asked what another 
child—one who was waiting outside the room—would think was in the box. “This 
procedure”, they (1986, 570) argue, “greatly emphasized subjects’ insight into how 
one can be misled by the external appearance of a box. This should have made the 
false belief attribution fairly easy”. Results showed that only 50% of three-year-olds 
were able to correctly identify that the other child would not know what was in the 
box (“Does [name] know what is really in that box or does he not know that?”); this 
rose to 75% of four-year-olds, and 95% in children of five years (Hogrefe et al. 1986, 
571). Accordingly, only 21% of three-year-olds were able to recognize that, before 
looking in the box, the other child would think it contained matches (“What will 
[name] say is in this box?”); this rose to 71% in four-year-olds, and 86% in five-
year-olds (Hogrefe et al. 1986, 571). 
 
The first test shows that, while children have ability to attribute false belief in others 
at four- and five-years-old, they are better able to do so in their next few years of life. 
The second test, by contrast, demonstrates that while some children had ability to 
attribute false belief to others, the rate of success was exponentially higher for four- 
and five-year-old children. Wimmer and Perner (1983) and Wimmer, Perner, and 
Hogrefe (1986) were able to demonstrate that, based on these results, children have a 
functional, well-developed ToM at the age of four; they also show that these abilities 






III.I. Theory of Mind in Literature 
The same processes that enable ToM in the everyday are also implicit in literature. 
Dunbar accordingly describes three levels of ToM: (first) awareness of our own 
thoughts; (second) ability to make sense of others’ emotions; and (third) ability to 
imagine the reactions and behaviour of potential (imagined) audiences (1996, 101). 
This third level is in particular enables us “to write stories that go beyond simple 
description of events as they occurred to delve more and more deeply into why the 
hero should behave the way he does, into the feelings that drive him ever onwards in 
his quest” (1996, 102). Recent studies of literary ToM, such as those undertaken by 
Doherty (2007), Leverage (2010), Oatley (2011), Auyoung (2013), and Zunshine 
(2014), lend weight to Dunbar’s claim. Oatley (2011b, 18) labels this form of ToM 
“Theory of Minds”; that is, “the idea that narrative fiction is a model or simulation of 
the real world”. In Tess of the D’Urbervilles, for example, Hardy describes Tess’ 
turbulent emotions based on her facial expressions (2005[1891], 119): 
 
Her face had latterly changed with changing states of mind, continually 
fluctuating between beauty and ordinariness, according as the thoughts were gay 
or grave. One day she was pink and flawless; another pale and tragical. When 
she was pink she was feeling less than when pale; her more perfect beauty 
accorded with her less elevated mood; her more intense mood with her less 
perfect beauty. 
 
In making connections between her change of facial expressions and her fluctuating 
mindedness, Hardy claims that (first) nonverbal behaviour is a functional part of 
Tess’ emotional experience, and (second) that observing audiences gain insight to 
Tess’ mood changes based upon these external outputs. Internal audiences 
understand these ideas because they possess ToM abilities akin to Hardy’s readership 
who, in the latter case, not only bring these abilities to bear in interpreting the text, 
but also use them constantly in everyday life. Similar processes are at play in 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (2005[1813], 111), 
 
Elizabeth could not help observing, as she turned over some music books that 
lay on the instrument, how frequently Mr. Darcy’s eyes were fixed on her. She 
hardly knew how to suppose that she could be an object of admiration to so 
great a man; and yet that he should look at her because he disliked her, was 
stranger still. She could only imagine, however, at last that she drew his notice 
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because there was something about her more wrong and reprehensible, 
according to his ideas of right, than in any other person present. The supposition 
did not pain her. She liked him too little to care for his approbation. 
 
Elizabeth considers two potential reasons for Darcy’s frequent visual attention; her 
reasons for rejecting the more optimistic of the pair is based not only on his greater 
social standing, but also on her own feigned feelings about him (she liked him too 
little to care). At the same time, however, she expresses confusion based on her 
understanding of how people behave when they dislike another person (that he 
should look at her because he disliked her was stranger still). “Elizabeth”, Doherty 
(2007, 2) summarizes, “notices Darcy’s attention, and tries to infer his attitude and 
intention. She uses opinion about his particular beliefs of what is good and bad in 
other people [author’s emphasis]”. Austen continues appealing to our ToM abilities 
as the scene develops. After neglecting to respond to one of Darcy’s questions, 
Elizabeth (2005[1813], 111)… 
 
…having rather expected to affront him, was amazed at his gallantry… and 
Darcy had never been so bewitched by a woman as he was by her. Miss Bingley 
saw, or suspected enough to be jealous; and her great anxiety for the recovery of 
her dear friend Jane received some assistance from her desire of getting rid of 
Elizabeth. 
 
This is not the only important narrative point for our purposes; immediately prior to 
this, and upon Darcy’s inquiry as to Elizabeth’s silence, she had responded that, 
“You wanted me, I know, to say ‘Yes’ [to dancing], that you might have the pleasure 
of despising my taste; but I always delight in overthrowing those kind of schemes, 
and cheating a person of their premeditated contempt” (2005[1813], 111). 
 
Darcy, however, refutes Elizabeth’s assessment of him; Elizabeth, in return, is 
shocked (Elizabeth… was amazed at his gallantry). Elizabeth, therefore, must 
navigate yet more intentions, beliefs, and emotions in her exchange with Darcy: 
(first) her initial (pessimistic) assessment of his attitude towards her (“he watches me 
because he disapproves of me, rather than because he admires me”), (second) her 
feelings about his attitude (“I don’t like him, anyway”), (third) her predictions about 
his motives (“he wants to accuse me of having bad taste in music”, (fourth) self-
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knowledge (“I like surprising people by acting in unexpected ways), and (finally) 
Darcy’s own description of his motives (“I’d never do such a thing”). Elizabeth is 
primarily shocked because her speculation about Darcy’s state of mind is incorrect—
she possesses false belief about him, his opinion of her, and his motives in 
questioning her. Darcy, in the mean time, is “bewitched” by Elizabeth; thus we are 
also given insight to the reasons for both his prior (his watching Elizabeth) and 
current (questioning her about the music) behaviour. 
 
Miss Bingley senses the mutual attraction between Darcy and Elizabeth by observing 
their interactions with each other. The reader, additionally, is given insight to her 
own feelings about a potential romance between them, in that she not only feels 
jealous of Darcy’s attention towards Elizabeth, but also perceives Elizabeth as a 
potential threat to her own efforts with Darcy. It is for both these reasons, Austen 
informs us, that she begins feeling greater anxiety about Jane Bennett’s illness: a 
prompt recovery, the reader might extrapolate, means that Elizabeth will leave more 
quickly, thus putting her out of Darcy’s immediate reach (and thereby eliminating 
the threat). 
 
Both Tess and Pride and Prejudice demonstrate how ToM is important in 
constructing of fictional narratives. In the former case, we understand the 
relationship between Tess’ outer behaviour and inner mental state because it echoes 
the means by which we interpret others’ thoughts and emotions in the every day. In 
the latter, their fully developed ToM makes the complex exchange that takes place 
between Elizabeth, Darcy, and Miss Bingley possible. As readers, we are able to 
navigate and understand these interactions because we, too, possess a theory of mind 
that we bring to bear in our everyday lives. In this sense, fictional scenes such as 
these are also a form of training, in which we refine and test our cognitive abilities 
for real-world use. “It is possible, then”, Zunshine (2008, 1.4) argues, “that certain 
cultural artifacts, such as novels, test the functioning of our cognitive adaptations for 
mind reading while keeping us pleasantly aware that the ‘test’ is functioning quite 
smoothly”. When we are led to explore Elizabeth Bennett’s mindedness, she goes on 
to argue, we know that we are gauging the mental state of another (fictional) person; 
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in successfully doing so, thus, “I am being made aware that my Theory of Mind must 
be functioning quite well” (Zunshine 2008, 1.4).17 
 
Childrens’ ability to speculate about the mental states of others is also implicit in 
literature aimed at an audience younger than Austen’s or Hardy’s. A good example 
of this is in Winnie the Pooh, in which Rabbit, jealous about the new arrival of 
Kanga and its possible implications for stealing the attention of Christopher Robin, 
reveals his plan to kidnap Baby Roo (1925, 91): 
 
“The best way”, said Rabbit, “would be this. The best way would be to steal 
Baby Roo and hide him, and then when Kanga says, ‘Where’s Baby Roo?’ we 
say, ‘Aha!’”. 
“Aha!”, said Pooh, practicing, “Aha! Aha! …of course”, he went on, “we could 
say ‘Aha!’ even if we hadn’t stolen Baby Roo”. 
“Pooh”, said Rabbit kindly, “you haven’t any brain”. 
“I know”, said Pooh humbly. 
“We say ‘Aha!’ so that Kanga knows that we know where Baby Roo is. ‘Aha!’ 
means, ‘We’ll tell you where Baby Roo is, if you promise to go away from the 
forest and never come back’”. 
 
Making sense of Rabbit’s and Pooh’s conversation requires that we understand 
several different cognitive processes and predictions: (first) that Rabbit is jealous of 
and feels threatened by Kanga’s arrival; (second) that Kanga cares enough about 
Baby Roo’s whereabouts that the prospect of finding him is sufficient blackmail; 
(third) that Kanga will understand the ‘Aha!’ to signal a shared conspiracy on 
Rabbit’s and Pooh’s part; and (fourth) that Kanga’s departure will ensure 
Christopher Robin’s continued attention. “To understand this passage”, Doherty 
(2007, 2) claims, “Amongst other things children need to understand Rabbit’s 
jealousy, and that Rabbit thinks that, when they say ‘Aha!’, Kanga will know that the 
conspirators know where Baby Roo is”. We can see how Milne appeals to our mind 
reading abilities in concocting this fictitious scenario; though the average readership 
of Winnie the Pooh might not be old enough to understand the psychology 
underpinning this exchange in its entirety, passages such as these demonstrate that 
authors expect younger readers to possess some form of ToM that we also see at play 
in Austen and Hardy. Doherty (2007, 2) goes on to claim, accordingly, that this level 
																																																								
17 For a study of Austen’s work from the perspective of neuroscience, see Phillips (2015). 
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of complex reasoning is typically only available to children of seven years; but, 
“whether or not children understand them, children’s books are stuffed with 
references to mental states” (Doherty 2007, 2).18 
 
III. Cognitive Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor 
This section turns to the field of cognitive linguistics, particularly as it articulates 
constructions of conceptual metaphor in everyday and poetic language. Cognitive 
linguistics is primarily concerned with how the body provides structure for 
understanding experience; with the foundations of concepts expressed in and through 
language. “The peculiar nature of our bodies”, Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 19) argue, 
“shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization”. Abstract 
concepts (target domains) are conceptualized, in this view, using mental models 
derived from bodily experience (source domains). Kövecses (2000, 4) explains that, 
 
Conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains (or concepts) into 
correspondence with one another. One of the domains is typically more physical 
and concrete than the other (which is thus more abstract). The correspondence is 
established for the purpose of understanding the more abstract in terms of the 
more concrete. 
 
Individuals, in other words, systematically map points of correspondence between 
elements of source and target domains. The mappings themselves are motivated by 
image schema: persistent cognitive structures formed of our bodily experiences 
(Lakoff 1987; Mandler 2004).19 These linguistic features—termed “conceptual 
metaphors”—allow individuals to express highly complex thought and emotion 
concepts via metaphorical mappings. It is accordingly through linguistic metaphors 
																																																								
18 See Dyer et al. (2000) for an analysis of children’s books in particular, who argue that, “because 
storybooks for young children frequently center on the actions and interactions of people or 
personified animals, they may also contribute to children’s understanding of mind” (2000, 18). In 
testing this hypothesis, Dyer et al. survey ninety children’s books (forty-five for three- and four-year-
olds and forty-five for five- and six-year-olds), “for references to mental states in three ways: (a) via 
words and expressions in the test, (b) via the pictures, and (c) via ironic situations” (2000, 17). They 
concluded that, based on this study, “the rate of textual references to mental state was high for both 
groups, with a mental state token occurring on average every three sentences in books for both age 
groups (2000, 17). 
19 Johnson (1987) gives an excellent summary and description of image schemata as they relate to 
metaphor construction. He explains, for example, that (1987, xiv), “An image schema is a recurring 
dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure 
to our experience”. 
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that concepts are expressed in their greatest complexity (Kövecses 2000, 3-4). 
Metaphor is thus an essential feature of both thought and language. It is not only that 
our experience is embodied in the sense that it is composed of mind, body, and 
world, but also that these embodied aspects of experience provide structure for the 
way we understand and express psychological functions and processes. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson articulate this theory of conceptual metaphor in its earliest form 
in Metaphors We Live By (1980). Their main aim is to demonstrate how these 
linguistic features permeate everyday language.20 “Metaphor”, Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980, 3) argue, “is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought 
and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, 
is fundamentally metaphorical in nature”. As a brief example, psychological 
dissonance is sometimes understood using image schemata derived from concepts of 
physical combat and aggression. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 4-5) describe this image 
schema as, “Argument is War”; examples of which include, “Your claims are 
indefensible”, “He attacked every weak point in my argument”, and “He won the 
argument”. In each of these cases, an abstract concept (mental discord) is understood 
by making points of comparison with physical behaviour (martial aggression). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 4) argue that, 
 
It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We 
can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person with whom we are 
arguing as an opponent. We attack his position and defend our own. We gain 
and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, 
we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in 
arguing are partially structured by the concept of war [author’s emphasis]. 
 
																																																								
20 Though the field is, unsurprisingly, much expanded since. For studies that have developed from 
Lakoff and Johnson’s original investigation, see (for example) Kövecses (1986, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007) on metaphor and emotion, Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (2007, 2010), Talmy (1988), and 
Sweetser (1990) on the role of image schemata and mental imagery, Stockwell (2002, 2007), Turner 
(1998, 2007), and Mandler (2004) on cognitive/linguistic development in infancy and childhood. 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 17) argue that, “Conceptual framing has been shown to arise very early 
in the infant and to operate in every social and conceptual domain. Metaphoric thinking, regarded in 
the common sense view as a special instrument of art and rhetoric, operates at every level of cognition 
and shows uniform structural and dynamic principles, regardless of whether it is spectacular and 
noticeable or conventional and unremarkeable”. 
	 	
	 39	
Lakoff and Johnson claim that the “Argument is War” image schema is so pervasive 
that it has become a framework through which we understand the concept itself; in 
other words, that our understanding of arguments is inextricably shaped by concepts 
of physical aggression and martial activity. 
 
Concepts of justice and virtue are likewise metaphorized using physical aspects of 
experience. Common metaphors for justice, for example, draw on concepts of 
balance, in which one weighs conflicting arguments, describes biased or bad 
judgements as being “skewed”, and conceives of an emerging victor as having the 
scales “tip” in their favour. These metaphors are derived not only from physical 
experience, but also from the common personification of justice as blind folded and 
carrying scales. In this sense, both everyday metaphors for justice and the 
personification of the concept is derived from very basic physical experiences. 
Virtue, additionally, is metaphorized in terms of vertical orientation, in which 
individuals can be “upstanding” citizens and immoral or unkind behaviour is 
described as being a, “low blow” (Kövecses 2007, 40-41). 
 
Metonymy is another major area of concern in cognitive linguistics. Lakoff and 
Turner (1989, 103-104) explain that, despite its similarity to metaphor, metonymy 
has some distinctive features, 
 
1. In metaphor, there are two conceptual domains, and one is understood in 
terms of the other. 
whereas 
Metonymy involves only one conceptual domain. A metonymic mapping occurs 
within a single domain, not across domains. 
 
2. In metaphor, a whole schematic structure (with two or more entities) is 
mapped onto another whole schematic structure. 
whereas 
Metonymy is used primarily for reference: via metonymy, one can refer to one 
entity in a schema by refereeing to another entity in the same schema. 
 
3. In metaphor, the logic of the source-domain structure is mapped onto the 
logic of the target-domain structure. 
whereas 
In metonymy, one entity in a schema is taken as standing for one other entity in 




The similarities between them, according to Lakoff and Turner, are (1989, 104): 
 
Both, however, are conceptual in nature. 
Both are mappings. 
Both can be conventionalized, that is, made part of our everyday conceptual 
system, and thus used automatically, effortlessly, and without conscious 
awareness. 
In both, linguistic expressions that name source elements of the mapping 
typically also name target elements. That is, both are means of extending the 
linguistic resources of a language.21 
 
Metonymical mappings, therefore, occur between one part of a conceptual domain 
and another. Consider, for example, “The saxophone (= saxophone player) has the 
flu today”, “I have a new set of wheels (= a new car/motorcycle)”, and “The Times 
(= the reporter from the Times) has not arrived yet” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 35-
36). The second case in particular is termed by more traditional rhetoricians as 
synecdoche (part as whole), in which one attribute of a domain is used to describe the 
overall concept. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 36) also argue that metonymy can also 
provide additional understanding. Using “The Times” metonymy as an example, they 
argue that, “When we say, ‘The Times hasn’t arrived at the press conference yet’, we 
are using ‘The Times’ not merely to refer to some reporter or other but also to 
suggest the importance of the institution the reporter represents” (1980, 36). This 
metonymy, thus, “means something different from ‘Steve Roberts has not yet arrived 
for the press conference’, even though Steve Roberts may be the Times reporter in 
question”. 
 
Conceptual domains—and the image schemata of which they are formed—are thus 
essential for understandings of metaphor and metonymy in everyday language. That 
they are derived from bodily aspects of experience demonstrates that thought- and 
emotion-concepts are metaphorically embodied. These processes are universal: 
Kövecses, for example, shows how conceptual metaphor underlies common 
linguistic phrases in a range of different language systems (2000). 
 
																																																								
21 See also Kövecses (2000, 4-5), for the differences between metaphor and metonymy. 
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Another important subdivision of cognitive linguistics is termed as “conceptual 
integration”, or “double-scope blending”. In The Way We Think (2002), Fauconnier 
and Turner describe it as the process by which two disparate source domains are 
combined within a “generic space”, the comparable structures between them merged, 
and the resulting blend used to produce a third mental model. “Conceptual blending”, 
Turner (1998, 93) argues, “is a fundamental instrument of the everyday mind, used in 
our basic construal of all our realities, from social to scientific”. More recently, 
Turner (2007, 214-215) demonstrates the mechanics of this process by describing a 
wedding participant. The participant fulfils a roll in the “wedding story”, in which 
there are parts, participants, plots, and goals (2007, 214). While the man focuses on 
enacting his part in the story (2007, 214), “he is remembering a different story, 
which took place a month before… where he and his girlfriend went diving in hopes 
of retrieving sunken archaeological treasure”. In recalling this story as he participates 
in the wedding, the participant is cognitively able to interweave the two narratives 
without becoming confused by them; he would not, for example, confuse the bride 
for his girlfriend, nor does he, “swim down the aisle or speak as if through a snorkel 
(2007, 214). Turner argues that the participant is able, however, to match comparable 
parts of the story in order to produce a new mental model. In comparing the bride to 
his girlfriend, for example, he might daydream that he is at his own wedding. Turner 
concludes that (2007, 214), 
 
The blended story is manifestly false, and he should not make the mistake, as he 
obediently discharges his duties at the real wedding, of thinking that he is in the 
process of marrying his girlfriend. But he can realize that he likes the blended 
story, and so formulate a plan of action to make it real. Or, in the blended story, 
when the bride is invited to say “I do”, she might say, “I would never marry 
you!”. Her response might reveal to him a truth he had sensed intuitively but not 
recognized. 
 
The wedding and the scuba diving narratives are thus compared and combined to 
result in a new, third narrative (2007, 215). The first two narratives are “organizing 
frames” with different features that may “clash” in some ways, but are comparable 
enough in others to allow for mapping between them. It is by making systematic 
connections between the organizing frames (the narratives) in the “generic space” 
that the wedding participant produces an “emergent structure”—a successfully 
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blended narrative (Turner 1998, 83). Fauconnier and Turner provide a simple 




Input 1 represents the wedding narrative, while Input 2 denotes the scuba diving 
memory. A blend occurs when the participant maps comparable features in each 
organizing frame in the generic space (as shown by the connecting triangles). These 
points of contact (the bride and groom with the participant and his girlfriend) are 
then used to produce the blend, while points of disconnect (the bride’s acceptance 
and the girlfriend’s potential refusal) are also mapped onto the third, emergent 
structure. This new blend may produce new understanding for the participant of his 
circumstances: either that he wants to marry his girlfriend, or that his relationship is 
in jeopardy. 
 
The above example outlines an instance in which an individual consciously forms a 
cognitive blend. This form of double-scope integration, however, also operates on a 
more mundane, subconscious level. A common blend, Turner (2007, 216) argues, is 
formed of human and animal physiologies. Seals and humans, for example, share 
some common characteristics; because of these points of contact, we may perceive 
ourselves as “sharing a category” with a seal: “Compelling and evident analogies 
leap out at us”, Turner (2007, 216) explains, “between the seal’s appearance and 
ours… the result is a conception of a seal that has not only all the seal’s 
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appearance… but a feature we know only of ourselves—the possession of mind”. 
Turner amends the original blending diagram to accommodate and illustrate this 




This demonstrates that blends need not be elaborate narratives, but can operate 
subconsciously, in everyday cognitive processing. The difference between the two 
examples it the level of effort required in constructing a blend; the wedding/scuba 
narratives, in this view, require more conscious effort to interweave than blends 
between humans and animals. 
 
III.I. Metaphor in Poetry 
Conceptual metaphor, metonymy, and blends permeate everyday language, thought, 
and understanding. This is also the case for poetry, of which Lakoff and Turner argue 
(1989), 
 
Recent discoveries about the nature of metaphor suggest that metaphor is 
anything but peripheral to the life of the mind. It is central to our understanding 
of ourselves, our culture, and the world at large. Poetry, through metaphor, 
exercises our minds so that we can extend our normal powers of comprehension 
beyond the range of metaphors we are brought up to see the world through.22   
																																																								
22 For recent studies that apply these insights to different phases of literature, see Lakoff and Turner 
(1989) on Shakespeare, Dante, and Dickenson; Boyd (2008) on Homer and Geisel, and Zunshine 
(2006) on Woolf, James, and Dostoyevsky; also Zunshine (2015) for an introduction and collection of 




Despite an historical tendency to view the construction and understanding of poetry 
as an elevated and isolated process, poetic expression and imagination are 
inextricably embedded in everyday language and experience. Poets, therefore, rely 
on basic, subconscious metaphors employed in everyday language to construct 
meaning in their work. 
 
Lakoff’s and Turner’s preliminary analysis of poetic metaphor has been instrumental 
in demonstrating how these subconscious practices permeate the history of literature. 
In doing so, they claim that poetic metaphor is not only sourced in everyday 
linguistic expression, but is also a universal, timeless impulse. Their analysis focuses 
particularly on Shakespeare, Dante, and Dickinson; but others have more recently 
applied these insights to other forms of literature. Boyd (2008), for example, focuses 
on Homer and Geisel in emphasizing the role of evolution in the way that stories are 
compiled and understood by their audiences, 23 while Zunshine (2006), in focusing 
upon Woolf’s work, discusses how awareness of ToM can enrich our understanding 
of interactions between characters in literature.24  
 
Lakoff and Turner dedicate a considerable portion of More Than Cool Reason to 
poetic metaphors of life, death, and time. These concepts, they argue, are commonly 
metaphorized in literature using everyday image schemata such as, “Life is a 
																																																								
23 Though Boyd focuses especially on the Odyssey in Homer, his analysis is somewhat disappointing. 
Boyd’s study of Homer focuses on the narrative from only the broadest point of view, arguing, in a 
general sense, about what kinds of stories might appeal to audiences of the Iliad and Odyssey. In 
doing so, his discussion is rather limited and unsatisfying; in the thesis that follows, I hope to provide 
more thorough and specific analysis of the Homeric epics, to show how evolutionary aspects of 
experience operate on a deeper and more pervasive level. 
24 Lakoff and Turner’s work, however, continues to be one of the most influential in the field. More 
recent contributions include: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (2007), which includes 
contributions from (for example) Turner, Fauconnier, Tomasello, and Zlatev, which focuses primarily 
on linguistic structure, language use, grammar, and metaphor; Stockwell (2002, 2007), who provides 
excellent and thorough analysis of how cognitive science can enrich our reading of poetry and 
literature; The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies (2015), which takes a less language-
based approach to literature and, instead, focuses on topics such as emotion-concepts, empathy, 
literary experience, and imagination; and Imaginative Minds (2007), which especially focuses on 
recent and extremely fruitful advances in ideas of imagination, metaphor, and memory. The fact that 
this is only a very small selection of the available literature demonstrates the level of interest, over 
time, in these fields of study. That they have been so successfully applied to different phases and 




Journey”, “Death is Departure”, “People are Plants”, and “Death is going to a Final 
Destination”. Frost’s The Road Not Taken (1916), for example, begins with, 
 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry I could 
not travel both and be one traveller. Long I stood and  
looked down one as far as I could to where it bent in the undergrowth. 
 
And ends with, 
 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—I took the one less 
travelled by, and that has made all the difference. 
  
Frost famously uses concepts of journeys in constructing his metaphor for life in this 
poem. We might make this connection because we, as readers, use these types of 
metaphors in everyday speech, in which important decisions are forks in the road, 
different choices are diverging pathways, difficulties are rough terrain, and death is a 
final destination: these ideas are implicit in commonly used metaphors such as, “He 
came to a crossroads” and “He’s gone to a better place”. We see a comparable 
process taking place in the beginning of Dante’s Divine Comedy, Lakoff and Turner 
note, which describes life as a road to be traversed: “In the middle of life’s road,| I 
found myself in a dark wood”. “Knowing the structure of this metaphor”, Lakoff and 
Turner (1989) argue, “means knowing a number of correspondences between the two 
conceptual domains of life and journeys”; they list them as, 
 
The person leading a life is a traveller. 
His purposes are destinations. 
The means for achieving purposes are routes. 
Difficulties in life are impediments to travel. 
Counsellors are guides. 
Progress is the distance travelled. 
Things you gauge your progress by are landmarks. 
Choices in life are crossroads. 
Material resources and talents are provisions. 
 
Frost thus conceptualizes two choices—or ways of living life—as roads down which 
his speaker could travel. In taking the “road less travelled”, however, we are meant 
to infer that he chose the less conventional path. Death is also conceptualized in 
poetry as an agent who guides one on their journey to the afterlife: the Grim Reaper, 
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for example, is one common articulation of this theme, as is the idea of life being 
“taken” by a personified agent. Mythologies from different cultures, Lakoff and 
Turner point out, similarly conceive both of death as a journey and of a personified 
agent who guides them to their destination: the Hermes and Charon lead the Suitors 
and Odysseus (respectively) to the Underworld in the Odyssey, while, in the Biblical 
tradition, Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell are conceptualized as locations to which one’s 
soul departs after death. Dickinson’s Because I Could Not Stop For Death, Lakoff 
and Turner argue, is another, particularly good articulation of this theme. It begins 
with, 
 
Because I could not stop for Death – 
He kindly stopped for me – 
The Carriage held but just Ourselves – 
And Immortality. 
 
We slowly drove – He knew no haste 
And I had put away 
My labor and my leisure too, 
For His Civility – 
 
The speaker initially describes life as a journey, and Death as an agent that conveys 
her through each stage until, finally, they reach their destination: “We paused before 
a House that seemed| A Swelling of the Ground –| The Roof was scarcely visible –| 
The Cornice – in the Ground –”; in other words, the gravesite and the burial mound 
in which the speaker will have their “final resting place”. “Life is a journey”, “Death 
is a destination”, and “Death is an agent” are not the only metaphors at work in this 
poem, however; in the third stanza, for example, 
 
We passed the School, where Children strove 
At Recess – in the Ring –  
We passed the Field of Grazing Grain –  
We passed the Setting Sun – 25 
																																																								
25 Another famous example of these same metaphors, Lakoff and Turner (1989) point out, is in the 
twenty-third psalm: 
 
The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want. He maketh me to lie down in green pastures: 
he leadeth me beside the still waters. He restoreth my soul: he leadeth me in paths of 
righteousness for his name’s sake. Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow 




This stanza interweaves the “People are plants”, “Lifetime is a day”, and “Death is 
night” (a sub-division of the “Lifetime is a day” image schema). Death leads the 
speaker past children at mid-point through their school day and fields of “grazing 
grain”—both images that evoke ideas of immaturity. Dickinson perhaps leads the 
reader to make complex connections between them: between (first) the stalks-and-
heads of the grain and the bodies of children, (second) the movement of playing 
children and the sway of fields of grain, and (third) between planting, growth, and 
harvest and birth, life, and death. On this final note, there is perhaps a comparison to 
be made between the growth and harvest of grain with children completing their 
lessons—becoming adults, or reaching maturity, and with death. Death, in this sense, 
is the farmer—thus we have, in common conceptions of the Grim Reaper, his 
scythe—who harvests lives as a farmer harvests a field at the end of the season. What 
Dickinson describe is life as a cycle of the seasons; as birth, life, and death 
concretized with images from the natural world. She does so not only by drawing 
connections between the playing children and the fields of grain, but also by 
portraying Death as a personified agent who oversees the process. The reason why 
we, as readers, might make these connections so easily is because “we know 
subconsciously and automatically many basic metaphors for understanding life, and 
Dickinson relies on our knowledge of these metaphors to lead us to connect the 
sequence she gives to the sequence of life-stages” (Lakoff and Turner 1989). A 
personified agent, in other words, leads the speaker through each stage of her life, 
patiently and “kindly” waiting until they have achieved their goals (“Because I could 
not stop for Death| he kindly stopped for me”). Once the sun has set, however, the 
																																																																																																																																																													
me… surely goodness and mercy shall follow me through all the days of my life: and I 
will dwell in the house of the Lord forever. 
 
There are compelling and notable similarities between Dickinson’s poem and the psalm: in particular, 
that (first) God is constructed as a personified agent—a shepherd—who guides the speaker through 
life and into death; (second) life and death are metaphorized through images of the natural world (the 
“green pastures” and “valley of death”), and (third) heaven—or the afterlife—is a final destination—a 
“house” to which the speaker is eventually led. “The life-as-a-journey metaphor”, Lakoff and Turner 
(1989) argue, on this point, “is so taken for granted in the Judeo-Christian tradition that we instantly 
understand that God is a guide, that there are alternative paths of good and evil through life, and that 
death hands over us throughout”. 
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speaker is finally conveyed to their final destination—to the house/burial mound that 
will be their final resting place.  
 
IV. Homeric Scholarship and the Embodied Mind 
I have so far outlined the theoretical frameworks that inform my reading of Homer in 
the successive chapters of this thesis. It describes how cognitive science articulates 
the relationships between brain, body, and world and, in doing so, presents a view of 
mind that is deeply and inherently psychosomatic. The final section of this chapter 
turns to applications of insights from cognitive science to the Homeric epics, as well 
as earlier accounts of Homeric psychology. I then conclude this chapter by 
describing my contribution to discussions of Homeric physiology and psychology 
and by outlining my methodological approach to the material. 
 
IV.I. Early Accounts of Homeric Psychology 
Early studies of Homeric psychology focus mainly on the organ terms that, 
combined, loosely denote a Homeric lexicon of mind. Pelliccia (1993, 16) points, for 
example, to scholarly discussion of internal monologues that typically regard them as 
either (first) “literary and dramatic techniques” (Leo 1908; Schadewaldt 1926; 
Böhme 1929) or (second) “evidence for psychology” (Snell 1953); it is on the latter 
category that I place my focus. Of these, Snell’s Discovery of the Mind has been one 
of the more influential works on Homeric psychology that, similar to traditional 
Cartesian dualism, adopts a fragmented approach to concepts of physiological and 
psychological aspects of experience. “The early Greeks did not”, Snell (1953, 7) 
argues, “either in their language or in visual arts, grasp the body as a physical unit”. 
Snell justifies this claim by arguing that, because there was no word denoting a 
whole, unified man that encapsulates both body and mind—his study points only to 
words that correspond, for example, to the outer skin of the body—the early Greeks 
must not have possessed the concept itself.26 Adkins (1970) and Dodds (1951) 
likewise take a dualistic approach to Homeric psychology. In From the Many to the 
One (1970), Adkins explains of internal organs that, “the presentation of separate 
																																																								
26 Purves (2014), accordingly, states that it is only after death that the Homeric body is described using 
a single word: σῶμα (body). 
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springs capable of impulse, emotion, and through, the existence of, so to speak, 
separate ‘little people’ within the individual, seems natural in light of Homeric 
psychology” (1970, 2), while Dodds argues in The Greeks and the Irrational that, “A 
man’s thymos tells him that he must now eat or drink or slay an enemy, it advises 
him on his course of action… [h]e can converse with it, with his ‘heart’ or his 
‘belly’, almost man to man”.27 
 
These views have received strenuous objections over the years.28 Pelliccia (1993, 17 
n.12), for example, compares Snell’s argument with the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis,29 
which proposes that, because Eskimo languages possess no unified word for “snow”, 
they must not possess the concept.30 Pelliccia ultimately argues of Snell that (1993, 
17-18): 
 
It was desirable [for Snell] to describe the constituent organs as being as 
autonomous as possible: the fewer restrictions on the organs’ capabilities, the 
more plausible the claim that there is no sense of union or self. What we find in 
Homer, then, is not simply a forceful way of describing a familiar psychological 
condition, “the divided self”—for Snell denied that Homeric man had a self, and 
a fortiori a divided self: conflict between Odysseus and his thumos, according to 
Snell, is an argument between two separate and independent entities. 
 
																																																								
27 See also Voigt (1934) whose argument is similar to that of Snell’s, Adkins’, and Dodd’s. 
28 In addition to Pelliccia’s (1993) and Halliwell’s (1990) objections below, see also Schmitt (1990), 
who attributes his (and Voigt’s) views to both existentialism and philosophical concepts of aesthetics. 
In his review of Schmitt, Cairns (1992, 1-2) expresses criticism of this approach, however, in stating 
that, “his gradualist and detailed approach needlessly postpones the ‘punchline’, that Snell’s criteria 
for freedom of decision are totally unreasonable”. 
29 Pelliccia is not the only scholar to do so; Padel (1992, 45f.) likewise refers to the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis in her repudiation of Snell’s claims, but, as Pelliccia (1993, 19 n. 16), endorses it in her 
discussion. “This hypothesis”, Pelliccia (1993, 17 n. 12) argues, “is controversial; the illustration has 
been shown to misrepresent the evidence of Inuit and Yupik (i.e. “Eskimo”) entirely”. For other 
objections to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, see Martin (1986), Murray (1987), Pullum (1991) and 
Eastman (1990). Pelliccia refers to objections made of another of Whorf’s studies on Hopi perceptions 
of time; this is by Comrie (1985, 4), who objects that, “In some instances, the claim that a certain 
culture lacks any concept of time, or has a radically different concept of time, is based simply on the 
fact that a language in question has no grammatical device for expressing location in time, i.e. has no 
tense… [P]erhaps the most famous of such equivocation is in Whorf’s account of the Hopi, where the 
absence of straightforward past, present, and future categories and the overriding grammatical 
importance of aspect and mood is taken to be indicative of a radically different conceptualisation of 
time”. 
30 “Eskimo” languages, rather, have a set of words that denote different aspects of snow; Pelliccia 
(1993, 17 n. 12) points, for example, to “falling snow” and “snow in a drift” in his discussion. 
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Halliwell (1990, 34-42) similarly objects to Snell’s, Adkins’, and Dodd’s 
conceptualizations of Homeric psychology.31 He identifies two main principles 
underlying their views: first, as Pelliccia noted, the lack of a word which denotes a 
unified being in Homer; and second, the multiplicity of words that form the Homeric 
lexicon of mind (1990, 37).32 In objecting to this view, Halliwell rightly states that 
this lexicon of mind should not supersede in importance the presentation of 
psychology in Homer’s broader narrative; that, “it should not be one particular area 
of vocabulary, but the entire narrative and dramatic style of the poet, and the images 
created in this style, which give expression to a view of men and the workings of 
their mind” (1990, 38). His discussion of the opening passage of Odyssey 20 (which 
occupies the sixth chapter of this thesis), lends further weight to his repudiation of 
Snell’s, Adkins’, and Dodds’ view of Homeric psychology. In briefly examining this 
passage, Halliwell (1990, 39) contends that, “the conflict of impulses within 
Odysseus is exactly that”; he continues, 
 
It is only because we know what it is for an individual mind to be caught in an 
agitated dilemma of contending impulses, and yet for the experience to be 
played out within an integral state of consciousness, that we can understand this 
remarkable scene and implicitly relate it to other possible experiences of psychic 
tension. 
 
The Odyssey 20 passage also demonstrates, Halliwell argues, “a dynamic and 
expressive flexibility” of Homeric organ terms that discourages a fragmented view of 
the mind; that, in other words, the interchangeability of the ἦτορ, καρδία, and  
θυμὸς suggests that they are not independent, detachable entities.  
 
																																																								
31 “In their attempts to deny to the Homeric epics”, Halliwell (1990, 37) argues, “and, by doubtful 
extrapolation from them, to the world in which they were produced, recognition of the basic unity of 
human consciousness, Snell and others have applied a faulty method and drawn unwarranted 
conclusions from it.”. Halliwell refers especially to Adkins’ argument that (1970, 13), “Homeric 
language… would have tended to encourage the fragmentation of Homeric man’s psychological 
experience”, which he argues, “implies that Homeric man and his language existed outside the 
poems” (1990, 37 f. 4). He similarly refers to Long (1970, 122), who considers the language of the 
Homeric poems a “direct record” of the culture in which it was produced. 
32 Dodds (1951, 16), for example, argues of these terms that the capacities they denote, “are not felt as 
a part of the self, but show themselves as ‘detached entities’”. Commenting on these two underlying 
principles in particular, Halliwell argues that (1990, 37): “Both halves of this argument are impaired 
by what one might call a lexical bias—an assumption, to which I have already referred, that individual 
lexical items and locutions, or lack of them, are the most significant facts about the way in which a 
language shapes the conceptions expressible within it”. 
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More recently than Snell, Adkins, and Dodds is Jahn’s study of these different organ 
terms (1987), which concludes that certain terms denoting mental capacities— 
θυμὸς, φρήν/φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, and κραδίη/καρδία—are (to a certain extent) 
synonymous, operating within a formulaic system. Padel, in her In and Out of the 
Mind (1992), devotes a chapter of her work to a description of the nature and 
function of internal organs in the Homeric psychology imbued with mental or 
emotional capacities. While her aim is to establish a context for later Classical 
conceptualizations of psychology and physiology (which, she argues, are based in 
Homer) (1992, 18), her summary is useful here because it focuses in particular on the 
physical aspects of emotions on these internal organs. Clarke’s Flesh and Spirit in 
the Songs of Homer (1993) endeavours “to gain an inkling of the earliest knowable 
ancestor of this idea of the ‘little world’ of man, by asking how the Greeks of the 
early first millennium BC conceived of human identity in relation to the visible 
substance of the body” (1993, 3). The first four chapters of Clarke’s inquiry focus on 
Homeric perceptions of body and soul, where he argues against a dualistic view of 
the mental and physical as “insidious” and limiting (1999, 39-42).33 Instead, Clarke 
places emphasis on body and soul as a single, unified entity, and then begins locating 
and analysing Homeric perceptions of the “mental life” of the individual through 
taxonomy of the physical aspects of the mind. These four chapters provide a basis for 
the remainder of his study: an examination of the “unified” Homeric body in relation 
to death and dying.34 Pelliccia, in his Mind, Body, and Speech in the Songs of Homer 
and Pindar (1993) provides discussion of the speech capabilities of organs in Homer 
and Pindar. 
 
IV.I. Homer and Cognitive Science 
There has been increasing interest, in recent years, in the application of insights from 
																																																								
33 See also Claus (1981) for a study of ψυχή in Homer. 
34 Other studies that have explored Homeric organ terms, but have not contributed to the formation of 
my own research, include the work of scholars such as Darcus-Sullivan (1979b, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 
1981, 1988) and Caswell (1990). Darcus-Sullivan devotes the majority of her work on Homeric 
psychology to listing the many occurrences, contexts, and usages of Greek words associated with 
thought and emotion, while Caswell presents taxonomy of the semantic associations and usages of 
θύμος in early Greek epic. Despite the value of these works for contributing to our understanding of 
linguistic patterns and usages of these concepts, these works fail to provide a comprehensive picture 
of Homeric psychology, owing to their highly limited scope. Because of this, my study avoids this 
kind of investigation. 
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cognitive science to the Homeric poems, which has resulted in a lively and 
burgeoning re-examination of body-brain-world relationships in the Iliad and 
Odyssey.35 Cairns (2001, 2003, 2005a, 2009, 2012, 2013) in particular examines 
nonverbal behaviour (including the use of dress) and conceptual metaphor in both 
Homer and Greek literature more generally, with a special emphasis on emotion 
concepts. In Vêtu d’Impudeur et enveloppé de chagrin (2012), Cairns focuses on 
metaphors for experiences such as αἰδώς and ἆχος that, he determines, are 
constructed based on physical uses of dress. In introducing his study, he argues that 
(2012, 175), 
 
Les categories émotionnelles d’une culture s’appuient sur l’experience; elles 
sont fondées sur l’interaction physique d’êtres humains en chair et en os et de 
leur environnement et prolongées via des metonymies et des metaphors qui 
dérivent d’une telle experience. Les proprieties de ces emotions ne sont pas 
données objectivement, mais ressenties; elles dépendent non seulement de 
processus concrets dans le corps, dans le monde, mais aussi de la représentation 
de la phenomenology de tells processus dans le système intersubjectif qu’est le 
langage.  
 
For example, Cairns examines a passage from Theogony in which Gaia is “covered” 
by Uranus (126-127, ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι). The image schema that 
underlies this metaphor, Cairns argues, includes (first) the “celestial”, (second) the 
sexual (“male covers female”), and (third) the “moral (Gaia is a female being whose 
nakedness must be covered)” (Cairns 2012, 180). Another good example of similar 
phenomena, Cairns argues, is in garment metaphors that describe death or fainting, 
as in Od. 20.351-357. In this passage, Theoclymenus perceives the suitors’ heads, 
faces, and knees “clothed” in “night” (351-352, νυκτὶ μὲν ὑμέων εἰλύαται 
κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νέρθε τε γοῦνα); “this metaphorical and physical 
clothing”, Cairns (2012) argues, “represents at once their own deaths and their 
lamentation at their own deaths”. In other studies such as “Bullish Looks and 
																																																								
35 This is likewise the case for other phases of Greek literature (and music). Cairns’ work (2012, 
2013), while placing most of its emphasis on the Homeric poems, also considers examples from 
tragedy. Budelmann and Easterling (2010) apply theory of mind studies to tragedy, while Budelmann 
and LeVen (2014) borrow work done in cognitive linguistics on conceptual blending in their analysis 
of Timotheus. Meineck (2011, 2012) focuses on the theatrical mechanics of tragedy, but especially on 
neuroscientific approaches to the “tragic mask” and visuo-spatial experiences in the Greek tragic 
theatre. Canevaro’s (2015) work focuses on cognitive applications to the Hesiodic corpus. Similar 
work is also being done for Latin; see Short (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013), who focuses especially on 
conceptual metaphor in the Latin language. 
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Sidelong Glances” (2005a), “Weeping and Veiling” (2009), and “A Short History of 
Shudders” (2013), Cairns examines the role of nonverbal behavior (including, in the 
second, uses of dress) in the conceptualization and performance of emotion. 
Borrowing from modern studies of mind, for example, Cairns φρίκη in Greek 
literature, which he argues is a common dimension of both “emotional and non-
emotional events” (2013). In doing so, he argues that (2013), “there are substantial 
aspects of emotional experience that depend on the biological heritage of our species 
and are deeply rooted in basic mechanisms of bodily regulation that human beings 
share with other animals”. Ancient Greek emotion concepts are, thus, partially 
defined by evolutionary pressures; common conceptualizations of emotions typically 
associated with φρίκη, such as fear, are also partially constructed using the affective 
quality of those emotions on the body. 
 
Minchin (2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006, 2012) and Scodel (2002, 2014) both contribute 
valuable discussions of memory, narrative, and nonverbal communication in Homer. 
A major contribution to these fields is Minchin’s Homer and the Resources of 
Memory, which applies cognitive theory to the Iliad and the Odyssey. Minchin’s 
discussion primarily focuses on how stories are compiled by narrators from memory, 
as well as communicated to and understood by their audiences (2001b, 1). At the 
heart of Minchin’s analysis, thus, is how the Homeric narrator was able to recite and 
communicate the Homeric poems from memory; Minchin convincingly argues that 
studies on memory from cognitive science can aid us in understanding this process.36 
Minchin (2006, 2007), however, is also interested in how memory functions for 
Homer’s characters in an intra-narrative sense. In “Describing and Narrating in 
Homer’s Iliad” (2007), for example, she focuses on the mnemonic function of 
material objects, while in “Memory and Memories” (2012), she applies insights from 
cognitive science in distinguishing between personal, social, and cultural memory in 
Homer. Scodel (2002) is also interested in intra-narrative memory in Homer; in 
“Homeric Signs and Flashbulb Memory”, for example, she considers the Odysseus-
Eurycleia episode of Odyssey 19 with respect to modern studies of flashbulb 
																																																								
36 I discuss Minchin’s work on memory further in Chapter Five of this thesis, with regard to Aethon’s 
comments about the process by which he will respond to Penelope’s challenge. 
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memory.37 I discuss these ideas in greater depth in my own discussion of the passage.  
 
More recently, Minchin (2012) and Scodel (2014) examine nonverbal behaviour in 
Homer from two different perspectives. Minchin employs modern studies of 
nonverbal behaviour to Homeric examples such as the Hector-Andromache-
Astyanax episode of Iliad 6, the “embassy” scene of Iliad 9, and Patroclus’ weeping 
in Iliad 16. In doing so, she argues that body language plays as important a role in 
communication for Homer’s characters as it does in the everyday; in this sense, it can 
successfully replace speech when communicating meaning within the narrative. But, 
according to Minchin, it also serves an extra-narrative purpose: in describing 
especially vivid and “pictureable” behaviour, the narrator makes his poem more 
memorable for his audience (2012, 38): 
 
The economy with which gestures, facial expressions, physical movements, 
physiological reactions, and behaviours such as touching and standing close may 
be described, the richness of the information that they individually encapsulate 
for the audience, and the vividness—the ‘pictureability’—of these universally 
recognizable behaviours ensure the memorability of these moments for the poet 
who composes as he sings—and for the audience who follow the tale. 
 
Minchin, thus, places the relationship between narrators and audiences at the fore of 
her studies of Homeric nonverbal behaviour. In contrast to this, Scodel (2014) has 
recently applied theory of mind studies to Homer in “Narrative Focus and Elusive 
Thought in Homer”. She demonstrates how Homer’s characters and audiences 
employ these capacities in speculating about others’ mental states, even when there 
is little concrete information at hand.38 Characters, Scodel (2014) argues, “read” the 
nonverbal behaviour of others in intuiting and inferring their mental states; this is 
similar to the processes (as described in modern theory of mind studies) in which we 
engage in the everyday). She terms efforts to do so “gap management”. 
 
A more extensive (though earlier) study of nonverbal behaviour in Homer is 
																																																								
37 On applications of cognitive science to Homeric memory, see also Clay (2010), who argues that 
concepts of memory, imagination, and mental imagery usually attributed to later Greek literature is 
already explicit and fully utilized in the Homeric poems. 
38 A related work by Scodel, Epic Facework (2008) demonstrates how Homer’s characters manage 
“face” in the epics; in doing so, she applies the work of Goffman in particular. 
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Lateiner’s Sardonic Smile (1995), which examines Homeric gesture, body language, 
facial expression, and paralanguage in (primarily) Iliad 24 and the Odyssey. In line 
with modern studies of nonverbal behaviour, Lateiner identifies five main categories 
that underlie his methodological approach to the Homeric material (1995, 11): “A. 
Ritualized and conventional gestures, postures, and vocalics; B1. Affect display: 
psychophysical, out-of-awareness emotional signs; B2. Subconscious, out-of-
awareness gesticulation and vocalics; C. Objects, tokens, clothes (external adaptors); 
D. Social manipulation of space and time (proxemics and chronemics); and E. 
Informal, in-awareness gestures, postures, and verboids”. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This study briefly outlines the theoretical frameworks that have influenced my 
reading of Homer in the successive chapters of my thesis. As I show above, there has 
been increasing interest, in recent years, in applying these insights to the Homeric 
poems; scholars such as Cairns, Scodel, Lateiner, and Minchin have been 
instrumental in demonstrating the explanatory power of this methodological 
approach for archaic poetry in particular. There is, however, no single, extended 
study focused solely on body-brain-world relationships in the Homeric poems. While 
Cairns fruitfully and convincingly interweaves cognitive science in his reading of the 
Iliad and Odyssey, his work also focuses on Greek literature more generally. 
Minchin, in the mean time, focuses most specifically on how cognitive science 
elucidates issues of memory and imagination, but especially in narrator-audience 
relationships. Scodel’s main area of interest is in narratology. While Lateiner’s study 
is useful and insightful, finally, it (first) focuses exclusively on nonverbal behaviour, 
(second) takes the Odyssey as its major focus, and (finally) precedes recent and 
important developments in cognitive science over the past two decades. 
 
Earlier studies of Homer have avoided some of the issues that I aim to investigate in 
my own research. While Pelliccia’s Mind, Body, and Speech is insightful and 
comprehensive, it is limited for the purposes of my investigation in the sense that it 
discusses a very specific kind of mind-body interaction: more precisely, it focuses 
only on communication with internal organs to the neglect of the many other aspects 
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of mental-physical contact and influence in the Homeric poems. Other works, such 
as Padel’s In and Out of the Mind and Clarke’s Flesh and Spirit focus in part on the 
physical aspects of the mind, these investigations are intended for other purposes; 
Padel uses her discussion of Homeric psychology as context for later Classical views 
of the mind, and Clarke is predominantly interested in death, dying, and the 
“afterlife” of body and soul. Other studies on Homeric psychology, such as the work 
of Claus and Bremmer, focus on the study of one particular organ; while these 
studies are useful, they provide only a limited and partial view of the Homeric mind. 
  
This thesis aims to contribute to current scholarship by presenting the first extended, 
concentrated study of cognitive approaches to the Iliad and Odyssey. In doing so, it 
not only seeks to follow in the footsteps of Cairns, Minchin, and Scodel, but also 
focuses primarily on conceptual metaphor, simile, nonverbal behaviour (gesture, 
facial expression, paralanguage, and dress), and individual interaction with 
environment and other people. My work, in other words, aims to differentiate itself 
from the previous scholarship by offering analysis and discussion of cognitive 
embodiment that focuses specifically and exclusively on the Homeric epics. 
Halliwell’s (1990) claim that Homeric psychology is not just presented by the 
narrator through the organ terms is an important one: as this thesis will show, the 
psychological functioning of Homer’s characters is as complex as our own, primarily 
because it is based in physical, developmental, material, interactional, and 
evolutionary aspects of experiences that were as persistent in the ancient world as 
they are, for us, in the everyday. With this in mind, I begin my study with a 
discussion of Idomeneus and Meriones in Iliad 13 and, more specifically, with 
Idomeneus’ claims about the explanatory power of nonverbal behaviour.  
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Chapter Three: Idomeneus’ Brave and Cowardly Men, Iliad 13.274-294 
 
On his way to the battlefield in Iliad 13, Idomeneus crosses paths with Meriones 
who, having broken his spear on Diomedes’ shield, has returned to the Achaian camp 
to obtain a new one. After offering Meriones one of the many he has captured in the 
past, Idomeneus attempts to reassure his companion that he is well aware of his 
martial skill and valour, despite the implications of his initial boast (274-294): 
 
τὸν δ’ αὖτ’ Ἰδομενεὺς Κρητῶν ἀγὸς ἀντίον ηὔδα· 
“οἶδ’ ἀρετὴν οἷός ἐσσι· τί σε χρὴ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι;  
εἰ γὰρ νῦν παρὰ νηυσὶ λεγοίμεθα πάντες ἄριστοι  
ἐς λόχον, ἔνθα μάλιστ’ ἀρετὴ διαείδεται ἀνδρῶν,  
ἔνθ’ ὅ τε δειλὸς ἀνὴρ ὅς τ’ ἄλκιμος ἐξεφαάνθη·  
τοῦ μὲν γάρ τε κακοῦ τρέπεται χρὼς ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ,   
οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἧσθαι ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός,    280 
ἀλλὰ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει, 
ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίη μεγάλα στέρνοισι πατάσσει 
κῆρας ὀϊομένῳ, πάταγος δέ τε γίγνετ’ ὀδόντων·  
τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ’ ἂρ τρέπεται χρὼς οὔτέ τι λίην   
ταρβεῖ, ἐπειδὰν πρῶτον ἐσίζηται λόχον ἀνδρῶν,    285 
ἀρᾶται δὲ τάχιστα μιγήμεναι ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ·  
οὐδέ κεν ἔνθα τεόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ὄνοιτο. 
εἴ περ γάρ κε βλεῖο πονεύμενος ἠὲ τυπείης  
οὐκ ἂν ἐν αὐχέν’ ὄπισθε πέσοι βέλος οὐδ’ ἐνὶ νώτῳ,    
ἀλλά κεν ἢ στέρνων ἢ νηδύος ἀντιάσειε     290 
πρόσσω ἱεμένοιο μετὰ προμάχων ὀαριστύν. 
ἀλλ’ ἄγε μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα νηπύτιοι ὣς  
ἑσταότες, μή πού τις ὑπερφιάλως νεμεσήσῃ· 
ἀλλὰ σύ γε κλισίην δὲ κιὼν ἕλευ ὄβριμον ἔγχος”. 
 
Then Idomeneus, lord of the Kretans, answered him in return, “I know your 
valour and who you are. Why do you need to speak about it? For if now 
alongside the ships all the best of us were to gather in a hidden place, there the 
excellence of men would be best distinguished, where the brave and cowardly 
show themselves clearly. The skin of the coward changes one way and then 
another, and the thumos in his phrenes cannot restrain him to sit steadily, but he 
shifts from one leg to another, and then settles on both feet, and the kardia 
inside his chest pounds violently, thinking of the death spirits, and his teeth 
become chattered together. But the brave man’s skin does not change colour, nor 
is he very frightened whenever he takes his place at the forefront in the hidden 
position, but he prays to meet quickly in bitter division. There none could find 
fault with your battle strength or your hands. For even if you were to be 
wounded in your toil from a spear-cast, the weapon would not strike you in the 
back of the neck, nor in the back, but would strike into your chest or belly as 
you rush forwards through the meeting of champions. So come, do not let us any 
longer stand and talk about this like fools, for fear that someone arrogantly 




This dichotomy between bravery and cowardice on the battlefield—and the 
nonverbal behaviour with which each is associated—is at the heart of Idomeneus’ 
speech. While the coward is restless and fearful, with chattering teeth, pale skin, and 
a rapidly beating heart, the brave man is focused and determined, exhibiting none of 
his companion’s physical symptoms. Within this context, Meriones is doubtless 
comparable to the brave man, who rushes eagerly to the forefront of battle and is not, 
unlike the coward, afraid of dying. In establishing this dichotomy, Idomeneus not 
only claims that one gains insight to the inner workings of the mind by observing 
these external outputs, but also defines bravery and cowardice based primarily on 
their somatic, affective qualities. This is also the case more generally for the Iliad 
and Odyssey, in which in- and out-of-awareness nonverbal behaviour—body 
language, gesture, facial expression, and paralanguage—constitutes, as in the 
everyday, an important dimension of cognitive activity.39 And as in the every day, 
Homer’s characters process and interpret this behaviour based on their theory of 
mind abilities, which enables them to attribute mental states to others through their 
own subjective, first-person familiarity with similar physiological and psychological 
experiences. “For literary characters”, Lateiner (1989, 22) argues, “as well as in real-
life situations, facial expressions, postures, and gestures communicate emotional 
states, convey urgent messages, and allow individuals to avoid explicit and non-
negotiable conflicts”.  
 
This chapter unpacks Idomeneus’ claims about nonverbal behaviour and its function 
in understanding the psychological activity of others. It takes as its focus two major 
aspects of the passage: (first) the perceived affective quality of emotions on the body 
and its implications for a psycho-somatic account of experience in Homer; and 
(second) the communicative potential of these phenomena, via this nonverbal 
behaviour, for characters, audiences, and narrators. Modern studies of nonverbal 
behaviour and theory of mind, such as those explored in the previous chapter, can 
																																																								
39 Recent studies on the role of gesture and expression as nonverbal indicators of thought and emotion 
include the works of Cairns (2005a, 2005b, 2013), Föllinger (2009), Minchin (2008), Lateiner (1989, 
1995), and Scodel (2008); conversely, see Boegehold (1999) for the absence of gesture in ancient 
Greek literature more generally. 
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help us access some of the ways in which Homeric poets and characters understand 
the body as an active component of psychological experience. That this nonverbal 
behaviour is based in physical, material, interactional, and evolutionary experience 
might also make the internal processes of Idomeneus’ imagined men more accessible 
on an extra-narrative level. In exploiting phenomenological aspects of experience 
that are deeply ingrained in our earliest development, the poet foregrounds cognition 
in the narrative through the body and makes it possible for audiences to identify and 
empathize with his characters.40  
 
In a more specific narrative sense, Idomeneus and Meriones are at pains to assure 
one another that, despite their presence in the Achaian camp, they are not avoiding 
their martial responsibilities.41 Both men are here concerned with protecting their 
own reputations and avoiding confrontation; in lingering away from the battlefield, 
moreover, they are keenly aware that they may invite the judgment of others, were 
they to be seen (291-292). Issues of shame, honour, and censure are thus integral to 
this exchange as a whole; but Idomeneus’ speech is particularly interesting for the 
purposes of this study because it draws intimate connections between psychological 
and physical modes of experience. Exploring this perceived relationship in greater 
depth, and with respect to similar examples from elsewhere in the corpus, reveals 
more about the function of nonverbal behaviour as a means of delineating cognitive 
activity, demonstrates that Homer’s characters possess a theory of mind that they 
automatically employ in their interactions with others, and illustrates the perceptual, 
interactional, neurological, and evolutionary roots of the poet’s presentation of 
emotion concepts and experience in the narrative. 
																																																								
40 Minchin (2008, 25) refers to this idea as “pictureability”: that the audience of the poems are able to 
understand the narrator’s use of body language because they are able to picture it in their minds and 
relate it to their own experiences. According to Minchin, this also makes the narrative more 
memorable: “Not only can we empathize with and evaluate these behaviours, we can also picture 
them in our mind’s eye. And, because these moments are ‘pictureable’, they are readily memorable: 
they linger in our minds”. Minchin’s argument thus interacts with ancient concepts of ἐναργεία 
(clearness, vividness) and φαντασία (imagination, representation/appearance of images, mental 
imagery).  
41 Scodel (2008, 50-51) identifies this passage an attempt at responding to “face threats” to which 
Homeric heroes are particularly sensitive. “The boast that protects his [Idomeneus’] own face 
threatens that of Meriones’”, she argues, “Idomeneus then must work to repair the damage, but 
realizes that the time he is spending on this remedial exchange exposes both of them to face-damaging 




The material for this chapter falls into two major parts. First, building on my 
previous discussion of theory of mind, I establish that Homer’s characters are able to 
speculate and make inferences about the mental lives of others. In doing so, I show 
how mindreading studies and extended mind approaches can help to elucidate the 
complex mental mechanics used and assumed by Idomeneus, in the hopes of further 
unpacking his claim that nonverbal behaviour provides a “window” to the character 
and experiences of others. Second, I address the symptoms that characterize 
Idomeneus’ brave and cowardly men, showing how they constitute an important 
dimension of cognitive activity that incorporates both the physical and 
psychological. Here, physiological, neurobiological, and evolutionary approaches to 
mind demonstrate how the universality of some aspects of nonverbal behaviour 
enables characters and audiences to access the psychological through their awareness 
of and familiarity with the physical.42  
 
I. Understanding Other Minds 
In a recent study of affective-scientific approaches to emotion, Colombetti (2014) 
focuses, in part, on the extent to which the body occupies the foreground of 
emotional experiences and the mechanics underpinning others’ interpretation of 
them. In doing so, she places particular emphasis on face-to-face interaction, where 
simulation, mimicry, and inference have been understood as playing integral roles in 
understanding the mental lives of others (171-173).43 It is on the broad umbrella term 
under which these are categorized—theory of mind (or mind-reading)—which I want 
to focus here. As discussed in the previous chapter, theory of mind explores our 
																																																								
42 In making a claim for the universality of nonverbal behaviour, I acknowledge that it is also 
culturally determined. My analysis focuses primarily on universality, however, as it has been 
articulated in scientific approaches to nonverbal behaviour. 
43 Colombetti, as stated in the previous chapter, identifies two major sub-divisions of theory of mind 
in her work: “theory-theory”, which posits that understanding of others occurs via an inferential 
process until the best approximation of their mental state is reached: “mental states such as beliefs and 
desires are posited as theoretical entities that, to the best of one’s knowledge, explain and predict the 
other’s behaviour” (171); and “simulation theory”, in which individuals understand others by 
simulating their mental states: “I put myself in the other’s situation, decide what I would think or feel 
in that situation, and eventually ascribe that thought or feeling to the other” (171).  
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ability to intuit mental states and processes such as thoughts, emotions, beliefs and 
desires based on the behaviour of others.44 As Zunshine (2006, 2.1) explains: 
 
We engage in mind-reading when we ascribe to a person a certain mental state 
on the basis of observable action; when we interpret our own feelings based on 
our proprioceptive awareness; and when we intuit a complex state of mind based 
on a limited verbal description. 
 
The ability to make these complex mental calculations derives from infancy and 
refines in the first few years of a child’s development until, by the age of four, he 
possesses a fully developed capacity for attributing thoughts, emotions, intentions, 
and beliefs to both himself and others.45 
 
I.I. Theory of Mind in Homer 
The valuable insights these studies provide are a concern not only of scientific but 
also, more recently, literary analysis. Work in this area, of which Zunshine has been 
a recent contributor, aims to show how the same mental processes underpinning our 
mind-reading abilities in the everyday are also inherent in literature.46 Along these 
lines, there is ample evidence in Homer which suggests not only that its characters 
possess a full-fledged theory of mind which they bring to bear in their interactions 
with others, but also that the poet, in constructing scenes which foreground theory of 
mind, expects his audience to exercise their own mind-reading abilities as they 
interpret the narrative. In a recent article, Scodel (2014, 65) demonstrates how 
Homer’s characters and audiences employ these capacities in speculating about 
others’ mental states, even when there is little concrete information at hand; she 
terms efforts in the latter case as “gap management”. In illustrating her point, Scodel 
																																																								
44 Certainly, theory of mind abilities underlie all interpretations of others’ nonverbal behaviour; in 
turn, our own understanding of human mind-reading abilities makes it possible for us to send specific 
nonverbal messages or intentionally deceive others. Tomasello, et al. (2005, 675), however, prioritize 
one particular aspect of our mind-reading abilities: “[a]lthough the pinnacle of mind reading is 
understanding beliefs—as belies are indisputably mental and normative—the foundation skill is 
understanding intentions”, because intentions are key to understanding why someone is behaving or 
acting in a particular way. 
45 Apperly (2001, esp. Ch. 2), Carruthers (2013, 167), Doherty (2009, 37-41). For a fuller description 
of the development of theory of mind capacities from infancy, see Chapter Two (18-23). 




focuses on a scene from Book One of the Iliad where, having withdrawn from the 
Achaian assembly, Achilles receives a delegation of Agamemnon’s heralds at his 
shelter (327-333): 
 
τὼ δ’ ἀέκοντε βάτην παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο, 
Μυρμιδόνων δ’ ἐπί τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἱκέσθην,  
τὸν δ’ εὗρον παρά τε κλισίῃ καὶ νηῒ μελαίνῃ 
ἥμενον· οὐδ’ ἄρα τώ γε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς. 
τὼ μὲν ταρβήσαντε καὶ αἰδομένω βασιλῆα  
στήτην, οὐδέ τί μιν προσεφώνεον οὐδ’ ἐρέοντο·  
αὐτὰρ ὃ ἔγνω ᾗσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φώνησέν τε· 
 
They went against their will beside the beach of the barren salt sea, and came to 
the shelters and the ships of the Myrmidons. The man himself they found sitting 
beside his shelter and his black ship. Achilles took no joy at all when he saw 
them. These two, terrified and in awe of the king, stood waiting quietly, and did 
not speak a word at all nor question him. But he knew the whole matter in his 
phrēn, and spoke first. 
 
The narrator provides us the bare minimum about his characters’ mental processes: 
(first) that the heralds approach Achilles unwillingly (ἀέκοντε, 327), (second) that 
Achilles is displeased by their presence (οὐδ’ γήθησεν, 330), (third) that the heralds 
are terrified (ταρβήσαντε, 331) and awed (αἰδομένω, 331), and (fourth) that this 
physically manifests itself in a reluctance to speak.47 In order to interpret the 
psychology motivating these aspects of the exchange, the audience is forced to 
undertake Scodel’s “gap management”: it might speculate, for instance, that the 
heralds are afraid of and intimidated by Achilles because of his martial prowess and 
renowned temper (especially given his behaviour at the assembly from which he has 
just withdrawn); that, because of this, they are afraid of how he might react once they 
announce the purpose of their visit; that they fear an impending confrontation with 
Agamemnon, should Achilles refuse to willingly relinquish Briseis; and that Achilles 
is displeased because the heralds’ very presence confirms Agamemnon’s intent to 
follow through on his threat. In the mean time, the heralds’ silence is an indication 
for Achilles of their mental state and its possible underlying motivations (Scodel 
																																																								
47 Silence in Homer can communicate fear, grief, disappointment, reluctance, or amazement. For 
examples of this, see Il. 24.358-360 [Priam, fear], 18.22.27 [Achilles, grief], 2.169-171 [Odysseus, 
disappointment], 7.293 [the Achaians, reluctance], 24.482-484 [Achilles, amazement]. See Montiglio 
(2000, 54-55) on the Iliad 1 passage and on silence in Homer more generally (but especially Chapter 
Two). She quotes ancient commentators on Homer (particularly Eustathius 112.8-9), who speculate 
that silence is a nonverbal behaviour characteristic of fear, grief, and amazement. 
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2014, 59). We have confirmation that Achilles has understood this link between the 
heralds’ external behaviour and internal mental processes when he initiates a 
conversation in their stead (αὐτὰρ ὃ ἔγνω… φώνησέν, 333). The content of his 
speech in the proceeding lines, moreover, qualifies that this process of inference and 
interpretation has taken place: ἦ γάρ μ’ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων| 
ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας (335-336). 
 
Achilles, thus, exercises his mind-reading abilities in speculating about and 
interpreting the heralds’ behaviour based on the cognitive activity it delineates. In 
doing so, he attempts to access their underlying motivations, emotions, and beliefs. 
But this is also the case for the poem’s audience, who are required to intuit and keep 
track of these background considerations and pre-verbal calculations. In other words, 
all these inferences take place prior to speech during which, by managing the gaps, 
both characters and audiences must rely on their theory of mind. We witness similar 
processes at play in Iliad 9, where Aias nods at Phoenix (222-224): 
 
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο, 
νεῦσ’ Αἴας Φοίνικι· νόησε δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,  
πλησάμενος δ’ οἴνοιο δέπας δείδεκτ’ Ἀχιλῆα·  
 
When they had put aside their desire for eating and drinking, Aias nodding to 
Phoenix, and brilliant Odysseus saw it. He filled a cup with wine, and lifted it to 
Achilles. 
 
In her analysis of this passage, Minchin (2008, 26-29) points to the nod as an 
indicatory nonverbal gesture that, when undertaken by equals and paired with eye 
contact, signifies that it is time to act.48 This is clearly the case in this passage: Aias, 
																																																								
48 See Il. 1.524, 27, 29, 8.246, 9.223, 620, 17.209; Od. 16.283, 17.330, 18.237, 21.129 for further 
examples of nodding and its nonverbal significance in Homer. Eye-contact in Homer is, more 
generally, a powerful means of earning attention. An excellent example of this phenomenon is in 
Odyssey 19 where, after seeing Odysseus’ scar and recognizing him for her returned master, Eurycleia 
attempts to catch Penelope’s attention (476-479). In this case, the pair of women are explicitly unable 
to communicate because, with Athene’ intervention, Eurycleia is unable to make eye-contact with 
Penelope; it is clear that doing so would enable her to nonverbally transmit the message about her 
returned husband (or, at least, indicate a desire to speak). Doing so, in a wider narrative context, 
would subvert Athene’s intention for Odysseus to remain incognito until after he has taken revenge on 
the suitors. Rutherford (1992, 190) points out, accordingly, that this nonverbal contact is essential in 
Penelope’s recognition of Odysseus at this crucial point in the narrative. In his investigation of sight 
in ancient Greek literature, Cairns (2005, 123) points to scientific studies of early childhood 
development, noting that, “The way that the infant makes, withdraws, then re-establishes eye-contact 
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sensing that it is the correct moment to begin presenting their case for Achilles to 
return to the fighting, nods at Phoenix to encourage him to speak. In this sense, the 
nod is also an acknowledgement of a pre-determined plan and represents, thus, a 
shared intentionality that Aias assumes Phoenix will read and interpret in the absence 
of speech.49 Despite the fact that Aias clearly intends the gesture for Phoenix, 
however, Odysseus undermines this process by taking control of the situation. In 
Minchin’s (2008, 27) words: 
 
It is clear that Odysseus has interpreted the nod quite correctly as an instruction 
to proceed with negotiations—and it is clear also that he has overridden the 
instruction addressed to Phoenix to the extent that he, Odysseus, has seized the 
floor. 
  
Agamemnon’s delegation, then, rely on their shared intentionality and theory of 
mind abilities in this charged narrative moment; that Odysseus subverts this, 
furthermore, signals not only that he has understood the messages that Aias attempts 
to nonverbally convey, but also that he believes himself best-suited to put their plan 
into motion. In this sense, and as both Hainsworth (1993, 92) and Minchin (2008, 27-
28) argue, it also reflects Odysseus’ beliefs about his own mental aptitude, and his 
own calculation about his role in the meeting.50 That Odysseus’ initial attempts are 
unsuccessful demonstrates that he has misunderstood Achilles’ mindedness: it is 
more likely that his childhood mentor, Phoenix, will be the one to persuade him and 
that Odysseus, in miscalculating the moment, has compromised the effectiveness of 
the meeting. This scene, therefore, is particularly powerful in what it can tell us 
																																																																																																																																																													
with others is the origin of the characteristic ambivalence in human interaction between contact-
seeking and contact-avoidance”. I will discuss this passage, and another instance of similar 
phenomena—that of Athene turning her face from Hector’s offered gift in Iliad 6—in the next 
chapter, similarly as a refusal to communicate. 
49 This idea of collaboration and shared goals, while not directly relevant to the Idomeneus passage, is 
an especially interesting aspect of the Il. 9 excerpt. In line with this, Tomasello, et al. (2005) have 
dubbed such collaborative efforts as “shared intentionality”, which they argue is a uniquely human 
development that arises partially out of biological pressures. “The motivations and skills for 
participating in this kind of ‘we’ intentionality”, they argue, “are woven into the earliest stages of 
human ontogeny and underlie young children’s developing ability to participate in the collectivity that 
is human cognition’”(676). Aias’ nod and the shared goal it represents is in this sense, therefore, not 
only an example of theory of mind capacities in Homer, but also of an awareness of shared 
intentionality.  
50 Minchin also comments on Odysseus’ failure when she argues that (2009, 28): “Achilles appears to 
suspect Odysseus (as a representative of Agamemnon) and his motives (308-313) in a way that we 
would not suspect Phoenix, whom he trusts”.  
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about the complex mental mechanics underlying even momentary interactions 
between individuals. 
 
I.II. ἐκφαίνω and διαείδω 
Passages such as these show that Homer’s characters possess robust ability to 
speculate about and interpret the mental states of others. Within the scope of these 
exchanges, nonverbal behaviour constitutes an important tool in delineating this 
cognitive activity. Similarly, I think that theory of mind best accounts for 
Idomeneus’ claims in the Iliad 13 passage, in which he informs Meriones that it is 
through the nonverbal and external that one gains insight to the tendencies, 
personalities, and mental experiences of his imagined men (ἀρετὴ διαείδεται 
ἀνδρῶν… ἄλκιμος ἐξεφαάνθη, 277-278). The two compound verbs used here, 
ἐκφαίνω (278, in the aorist passive) and διαείδω (277, in the present 
middle/passive), are instrumental in understanding the mechanics of this process. 
 
In the case of the former, ἐκφαίνω (I bring to light, show forth) denotes the 
disclosure of knowledge, of revelations and, more mundanely, of physical objects 
(including bodies) coming to view.51 In the more specific context of the Iliad 13 
passage, this suggests that nonverbal behaviour literally and physically extends (or 
“brings to light”) the act of cognizing beyond the boundaries of the body. This is the 
case for Achilles, whose emotional reaction to the new-forged armour presented by 
Thetis is rendered using the same verb in Iliad 19 (15-17):  
 
                                                   αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς 
ὡς εἶδ’, ὥς μιν μᾶλλον ἔδυ χόλος, ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε  
δεινὸν ὑπὸ βλεφάρων ὡς εἰ σέλας ἐξεφάανθεν· 
 
Only Achilles looked, and as he did his anger came greater, and his eyes shone 
terribly from under his lids, as a flame. 
 
The narrator regularly employs fire imagery in characterizing Achilles in the later 
books of the Iliad; shining eyes, too, are common nonverbal representations of 
																																																								
51 See, for example, Il. 19.46, 104; Od. 10.260, 12.441.  
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several emotional experiences in Greek literature.52 But we also have similar 
expressions in English: as Kövecses (2000, 212) points out, “bright eyes” often 
function as physical expressions of happiness. In the Iliad 19 passage, ἐκφαίνω 
clearly hints at the communicative function of this nonverbal expression, in which 
the preposition ἐκ, “out of”, gives a sense of external projection (projected beyond 
the surface of the skin and out into the world), and φαίνω suggests that they 
(Achilles’ eyes) make present and visible what might otherwise be hidden (his 
anger). For both Achilles and Idomeneus’ imagined men, therefore, emotions are 
extended by the body via this nonverbal behaviour; witnesses of these phenomena, in 
turn, come to know of experiences that would otherwise be invisible and hidden 
based on these external outputs.  
  
In contrast, διαείδω (I discern, see through) encapsulated ideas of seeing, knowing, 
and learning. Here, the preposition διά (through, by means of) may suggest the 
function of the body as a conduit for internal processes. In other words, and put more 
simply, the body acts as an intermediary for and a part of the activity taking place in 
the brain, which is extended into the world for an observing audience. εἴδω, related 
to ὁράω (I see) and οἶδα (I see with the mind’s eye, I know) marries ideas of seeing 
and knowing. The links between sight, knowledge, and communication are important 
for Idomeneus’ claims because they present a picture of nonverbal behaviour in 
Homer that emphasizes its role as representative of inner mental process: that, in 
observing nonverbal behaviour, internal and external audiences are provided insight 
to the psychological. The use of διαείδω (278) and οἶδα (276) helps not only 
affirms this link between perception (observing nonverbal behaviour) and knowledge 
(the psychological state of an individual), but also ties together two aspects of the 
passage: as an audience would come to know the personality of brave and cowardly 
																																																								
52 For a collation and discussion of examples of fire motifs used of Achilles in the Iliad, see in 
particular Whitman (1958, 137-147), who describes the connection between fire and Achilles’ armour 
(138): “As he puts on the panoply, the motif of fire is closely conjoined with images of agony, lonely 
despair, and the heavenly bodies: in his eyes are the flash of fire, but in his heart his unendurable grief 
sets him in contrast to the other Myrmidons”. For a discussion of eyes in Greek literature that takes 
into account modern studies of nonverbal behaviour, see Cairns (2005). Other examples of “shining” 
eyes in Homer include Il. 1.104, 200, 16.645. In a similar category is, perhaps, the formulaic ὑπόδρα 
ἰδὼν,”looking darkly”, an in-awareness nonverbal gesture that commonly occurs (Il*17 [i.e. 1.148, 




men by observing their nonverbal behaviour, so too does Idomeneus have irrefutable 
proof about Meriones’ martial valour from past observational experiences. In this 
sense, Idomeneus also clearly highlights the instructional function of nonverbal 
behaviour that might be implicit in διαείδω and οἶδα in appeasing Meriones.  
 
In the only other use of this verb in the Homeric corpus, Hector tells the Trojan 
assembly that Diomedes’ conduct on the battlefield (or, more specifically, in reaction 
to Hector’s advance), might teach him something about his own heroic qualities (Il. 
8.535-536): 
 
αὔριον ἣν ἀρετὴν διαείσεται, εἴ κ’ ἐμὸν ἔγχος 
μείνῃ ἐπερχόμενον· 
 
Tomorrow he will learn of his own strength, if he can stand up to my spear’s 
advance. 
 
External behaviour and conduct, according to Hector, provides not only a witnessing 
audience with opportunity to make inferences about others, but also a means for self-
reflection. In both these cases, διαείδω thus encapsulates the process by which 
others learn important things about the psychological states of others, and by which 
individuals come to know themselves. 
 
In using ἐκφαίνω and διαείδω, Idomeneus appeals primarily to the communicative 
and didactic capacities of nonverbal behaviour that, in a modern sense, is best 
accounted for with reference to our universal theory of mind abilities. The processes 
that Idomeneus describes in this passage, implicit in the meanings of both words, tap 
into abilities to intuit and speculate about the mental states of others that take shape 
at the earliest stages of human development, in which the body is an integral 
component for representing and projecting psychological states. In this sense, and 
with respect to extended approaches to mind, nonverbal behaviour may also function 
as a component of the “external loop” of cognition. It is not just that nonverbal 
behaviour, in other words, reflects internal mental processes: these external outputs 
(in each of the three passages discussed here), in operating as a part of cognition, 
extend the boundaries of the mind beyond the body. In this sense, thus, nonverbal 
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behaviour might be considered evidence of the “mind in the world”, or cognizing 
taking place as much in the world as within the confines of the brain and body. In 
exhibiting this in-awareness (Phoenix and the brave man) and out-of-awareness (the 
heralds and the cowardly man) behaviour, these passages operate as evidence for an 
understanding of the cognitive activity that transgresses boundaries between brain, 
body, and world. 
 
II. Nonverbal Universals and the Body in Emotion Experience 
The mechanics by which we intuit cognitive activity in others, therefore, points to 
the body (first) as an important component of psychological functioning and 
(second) as a communicative and didactic tool. In representing the physical and 
interactional aspects of experience in these ways, Idomeneus alludes to a theory of 
mind that, in a broader sense, is universally possessed by humans and shaped in the 
earliest stages of cognitive development. As audiences of Homer, it is possible to 
navigate scenes such as these because we share the same mind-reading abilities as 
the characters that, within the narrative, speculate about the cognitive activity of 
others. Characters and audiences, furthermore, interpret certain behaviour as being 
indicative of bravery and cowardice based on their own subjective, first person 
experiences with similar phenomena. To be precise, and as I discussed in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, nonverbal behaviour is both culturally determined and 
universally non-specific.53 In the latter sense, it is because some of our most 
fundamental physiological experiences are timeless and universal that we, as an 
audience, make sense of the nonverbal behaviour in passages such as these. 
																																																								
53 The face, for example, while capable of displaying thousands of different expressions, is an entity 
with physical boundaries that limit what it is able to communicate to its audience. As explored in the 
previous chapter, the work of Ekman (1982, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004) in particular shows how the 
execution and reception of facial expressions are partially determined by universal, evolutionary 
factors. See also Keltner and Lerner (2010, 322), who identify the value in taking a Universalist 
approach to body language and embodied cognition: “The study of signalling behaviour has enabled 
the developing science of emotion. Comparisons of human and nonhuman emotional display reveal 
the evolutionary origins of specific emotions, for example, that embarrassment evolved out of 
appeasement process in nonhuman primates, that laughter and smiling evolved out of distinctive 
affiliative displays in other primates, and that human emotion vocalizations related to food, sex, 
affiliation, caretaking, and play”. Boyd (2008, 20-25), however, warns against dichotomizing 
evolution and culture, arguing that they are deeply entwined (25): “It makes no sense to set biology in 
opposition to society or culture. Sociality occurs only within living species, and hence within the 
biological realm, through genes that encourage social animals to associate. Culture occurs only within 




With these considerations in mind, this chapter now turns to the nonverbal behaviour 
of Idomeneus’ account. In doing so, I am especially concerned with the 
psychophysical, evolutionary, neurobiological, and linguistic origins underpinning 
the nonverbal dimension of emotion experience. I argue that exploring these bases 
can enrich our understanding of the passage as a whole. Furthermore, I show how the 
narrator highlights these aspects of human experience in presenting the psychological 
functioning of his characters. 
 
II.I. The Biology of Fear: Idomeneus’ Cowardly Man 
Idomeneus introduces the first of his two imagined warriors at 280, whose pale skin, 
chattering teeth, pounding heart, and restless demeanour characterize his dread at the 
prospect of battle (280-284): 
 
“τοῦ μὲν γάρ τε κακοῦ τρέπεται χρὼς ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ, 
οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἧσθαι ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός,   
ἀλλὰ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει, 
ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίη μεγάλα στέρνοισι πατάσσει 
κῆρας ὀϊομένῳ, πάταγος δέ τε γίγνετ’ ὀδόντων”·  
 
“The skin of the coward changes one way and then another, and the thumos in 
his phrenes cannot restrain him to sit steadily. He shifts from one leg to another, 
and then settles on both feet, and the kardia inside his chest pounds violently as 
he thinks of the death spirits, and his teeth become chattered”. 
 
It is primarily through the nonverbal that Idomeneus conceptualizes and explains the 
coward’s emotional processes. We are given only the briefest direct insight to his 
thoughts (κῆρας ὀϊομένῳ, 284) and so must rely on interpreting physical behaviour 
for a full, cohesive picture of his cognitive activity. In this sense, thus, it is not only 
that Idomeneus places emphasis on the affective quality of emotional experience, but 
also that the poem’s internal and external audiences are given access to the 
psychological almost solely through the physical. This is the case more generally in 
Homer, where similar physical symptoms are used to articulate experiences of fear 
and anxiety.54 Agamemnon, for example, describes a rapidly beating heart, trembling 
																																																								
54 For further references of similar nonverbal behaviour, see Il. 17.33, 21.412 (τρέπεται χρὼς); Il. 
11.486, 745, 17.729; Od. 6.138 (ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ); Il. 3.33, 5.862, 6.137, 8.452, 10.95, 11.117, 14.506, 
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limbs, and physical restlessness when, concerned by Achilles’ absence from the 
battlefield and its implications for the Achaian army, Nestor finds him roaming the 
camp sleeplessly55 in Iliad 10 (91-95).56 Hector and his Trojan comrades, too, exhibit 
similar physical symptoms in Iliad 7 (214-218) as they watch Aias’ approach on the 
battlefield: 
 
τὸν δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μὲν ἐγήθεον εἰσορόωντες, 
Τρῶας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ὑπήλυθε γυῖα ἕκαστον,   
Ἕκτορί τ’ αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσεν·  
ἀλλ’ οὔ πως ἔτι εἶχεν ὑποτρέσαι οὐδ’ ἀναδῦναι  
ἂψ λαῶν ἐς ὅμιλον, ἐπεὶ προκαλέσσατο χάρμῃ. 
 
And the Argives looking upon him were glad, while the Trojans were taken 
every man in the knees with trembling and terror, and for Hector himself his 
thumos beat hard in his stēthos, but he could not find means to take flight and 
shrink back into the throng of his men, since he in his pride had called him to 
battle. 
 
Evolutionary, neurobiological, and psychophysiological approaches to emotion, 
especially with regard to “flight-or-fight” responses and experiences of fear, can shed 
light on the physical symptoms of these passages. Cannon (1929) was the first to 
articulate the “fight-or-flight” impulse from a neurobiological standpoint. His work 
shows that humans and animals respond to threats with a general discharge of the 
sympathetic nervous system—one of the two parts of our autonomic system that 
regulates unconscious action. More specifically, the adrenal medulla (a part of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
19.14, 20.44, 22.136; Od. 18.88, 24.29 (τρόμος); Il. 11.41, 12.149, 20.168 (πάταγος γίγνετ’ 
ὀδόντων). 
55 Sleeplessness is a common symptom of anxiety in Homer: Zeus, for example, is unable to sleep at 
the beginning of Iliad 2, where he deliberates how he will fulfil his promise to Thetis (1-34), while 
Odysseus lies awake the night before he slays the Suitors and punishes the maidservants, deliberating 
how he will take revenge on them (Od. 20-3-4). I will discuss both these passages in greater detail in 
the seventh chapters of this thesis, which deal specifically with internal monologues and deliberative 
scenes in the Iliad and Odyssey, with special reference to Agenor’s debate in Iliad 21 and Odysseus in 
the opening sequence of Odyssey 20. 
56        πλάζομαι ὧδ’ ἐπεὶ οὔ μοι ἐπ’ ὄμμασι νήδυμος ὕπνος 
ἱζάνει, ἀλλὰ μέλει πόλεμος καὶ κήδε’ Ἀχαιῶν.  
αἰνῶς γὰρ Δαναῶν περιδείδια, οὐδέ μοι ἦτορ 
ἔμπεδον, ἀλλ’ ἀλαλύκτημαι, κραδίη δέ μοι ἔξω  
στηθέων ἐκθρῴσκει, τρομέει δ’ ὑπὸ φαίδιμα γυῖα.   
 
“I am driven thus, because the ease of sleep will not settle on my eyes, but fighting and 
the cares of the Achaians perplex me. Terribly I am in dread for the Danaans, nor does 
my pulse beat steadily, but I go distracted, and my kardia is pounding through my chest, 
and my shining limbs are shaken beneath me”. 
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adrenal gland) produces hormones that discharge catecholamines (but especially 
norephinephrine and epinephrine/adrenaline) into the body. With respect to 
nonverbal behaviour, catecholamines can cause physiological changes that prepare 
an organism for quick action and strenuous physical activity: some of these effects 
include increases in heart rate, blood pressure, muscle tensity, and glucose levels.57 
This physical process is essential for self-preservation and survival. Where “fight” is 
an option, the body stimulates an excess of energy aimed towards overcoming 
potentially fatal threats. In “flight” scenarios, however, the body slows down in the 
interests of preserving energy and facilitating escape; the physical effects, here, 
include a decrease of activity in the digestive and circulatory systems, muscle 
contraction, and breathing. Both the Iliad 13 and 7 passages are clear instances of a 
“fight” response: Idomeneus’ coward, Hector, and the Trojans all variously 
experience accelerated heart-rates, muscle contractions (shuddering limbs and 
chattering teeth), increases in blood pressure, and physical restlessness.  
 
But these same symptoms are also consistent with modern studies of fear and 
anxiety, which suggest that both emotions have strong bases in evolutionary 
development. In a recent article, Öhman (2008, 709) argues that fear and anxiety are 
“closely related emotional phenomena originating in evolved mammalian defense 
systems”.58 He continues (2008, 710): 
																																																								
57 For a more recent discussion of the neurobiological underpinnings of this process, see Jansen et al. 
(1995). For a discussion of “fight-or-flight” responses and play, see Boyd (2008, 92-93), who argues 
that these impulses might be the reason that humans develop games specifically aimed at refining and 
rehearsing their skills and abilities in these areas (“flight” games might include chase, tag, running, 
whereas “fight” games include wrestling and throwing, and recovery of balance includes skiing, 
surfing, and skateboarding). In line with this, Boyd (92) argues that, “The more often and the more 
exuberantly animals play, the more they hone skills, widen repertoires, and sharpen sensitivities. Play 
therefore has evolved to be highly self-rewarding. Through the compulsiveness of play, animals 
incrementally alter muscle tone and neural wiring, strengthen and increase the processing speed of 
synaptic pathways, and improve their capacity and potential for performance in later, less forgiving 
circumstances”. On this point, see also Bekoff (2007, 100). 
58 The distinction between fear and anxiety as two emotional experiences is still a topic of debate in 
the sciences. The American Psychiatric Association identifies anxiety as a “pre-stimulus” 
(anticipatory or propositional) response to perceived future threats. Fear, on the other hand, is “post-
stimulus” in that it has a current, identifiable target (Öhman 2005, 710). Öhman (2005, 710), 
following Lader and Marks (1973), explains the distinction between the two: “Fear denotes dread of 
impending disaster and an intense urge to defend oneself, primarily by getting out of the situation. 
Clinical anxiety, on the other hand, has been described as an ineffable and unpleasant feeling of 
foreboding”. In contrast to both these arguments, however, Epstein (1972, 311) concludes that fear 




Fear is a functional emotion with a deep evolutionary origin, reflecting the fact 
that earth has always been a hazardous environment to inhabit. Staying alive is a 
prerequisite for the basic goal of biological evolution… even the most primitive 
of organisms have developed defense responses to deal with life threats in their 
environment. 
 
In line with this, a study by Arrindell et al. (1991, 79) identify four basic motivating 
factors in experiences of fear: (first) interpersonal events or situations (criticism, 
rejection, and conflict), (second) death, injury, blood, and illness, (third) animals, and 
(fourth) agoraphobia. Each of these factors, Öhman (2008, 711) argues, has its basis 
in evolutionary pressures, where urges to survive and propagate, establish safe kin 
groups and secure environments, and avoid social humiliation and status threats drive 
the development of certain phobias and shape our most commonly occurring fears. 
Put more simply (Öhman 2008, 712), 
 
Evolution has equipped humans with a propensity to associate fear with 
situations that threatened the survival of their ancestors… thus the development 
of phobias is jointly determined by genetic predispositions and specific 
environmental exposures. 
 
Idomeneus’ description of the coward evokes a fear of death (κῆρας ὀϊομένῳ, 284) 
that may be intrinsically connected to this urge for self-preservation and, therefore, 
taps into our most ingrained evolutionary urges and neurobiological responses to 
threat. Within the specific context of the narrative, the reasons for this are perhaps 
obvious: the coward waits in a hidden location prior to an ambush; death is thus an 
immediate and very real possibility. Similar considerations also underpin the 
emotional experience of Hector, the Trojans, and Agamemnon: while Hector and the 
Trojans, like Idomeneus’ coward, are in a situation that directly threatens them in a 
physical sense, Agamemnon anticipates the losses to his army that Achilles’ absence 
from the fighting will cause, and thus his failure to make amends not only poses a 
threat to his status and reputation as a capable leader, but also points to his anxieties 
																																																																																																																																																													
restraints, internal or external, fear would support the action of flight. Anxiety can be defined as 
unresolved fear, or, alternatively, as a state of undirected arousal following the perception of threat”. 
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about the survival of his kin group. They all, accordingly, exhibit different kinds of 
physical behaviour consistent with “flight-or-fight” impulses, as well as experiences 
of fear and anxiety: the coward’s, Hector’s, and Agamemnon’s heart-rates accelerate 
(μεγάλα πατάσσει); the coward’s skin changes colour (ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ); and the 
coward (οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἧσθαι… θυμός), the Trojans (τρόμος… γυῖα ἕκαστον), 
and Agamemnon (τρομέει δ’ ὑπὸ φαίδιμα γυῖα) are unable to control the shudder 
of their muscles; and the coward’s teeth chatter (πάταγος δέ τε γίγνετ’ ὀδόντων).  
 
In an early and foundational account of the affective aspects of fear on the body, 
Darwin (2009[1872], 291) not only describes just these symptoms, but also alludes to 
their possible evolutionary and neurobiological roots:  
 
The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the 
ribs; but it is very doubtful whether it works more efficiently than usual, so as to 
send a greater supply of blood to all parts of the body; for the skin instantly 
becomes pale, as during incipient faintness. This paleness of the surface, 
however, is probably in large part, or exclusively, due to the vaso-motor centre 
being affected in such a manner as to cause the contraction of the small arteries 
of the skin. That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see 
in the… manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. The hairs 
also on the skin stand erect; and the superficial muscles shiver.59 
 
Homeric conceptualizations of fear, then, complement both Darwin’s early 
observations and more modern empirical data from neurobiological and evolutionary 
analyses. These connections are compelling: they suggest that Homeric poets (first) 
had implicit understanding of the universality of some of the affective aspects of 
emotion on the body, and (second) that they monopolized on this physical dimension 
in articulating important emotional processes in the narrative. More specifically, the 
pounding heart may point to increases in activity in the body’s circulatory system 
produced by hormonal discharges in the sympathetic nervous system; changes in 
skin colour may be derived from increased skin conductance that, for example, 
Hamm, et al. (1997) and Hare and Blevings (1975) note in experiments that 
																																																								
59 Darwin continues on to hint at how these bodily processes are used in formulating language about 
their underlying emotional processes (291): “This exudation is all the more remarkeable, as the 
surface is then cold, and hence the term ‘a cold sweat’; whereas, the sudorific glands are properly 
excited into action when the skin is heated”. In addition to this, Darwin also identifies changes in skin 
temperature, increases in breathing, and decreased activity in the saliva glands (291). On increases in 
respiratory activity, see Ax (1953). 
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measured individual responses to specific fears;60 shuddering or uncontrolled 
muscles, finally, might be based in increased glucose levels in the body designed to 
overcome threat.  
 
What the Homeric poet represents, thus, is a picture of emotional experience based 
primarily on how they feel; these affective qualities, in turn, have their bases in 
everyday physical experience and bodily processes. In appealing to the universal 
aspects of emotional affectivity, both Idomeneus and the narrator facilitate audience 
understanding and interpretation of otherwise invisible psychological processes, and 
present a cohesive picture of individual experience. While our theory of mind 
abilities allows us to attribute thoughts and emotions to Idomeneus’ coward, 
Agamemnon, Hector, and the Trojans, it is our physical experiences of similar 
psychological processes, grounded in and actualized by the body, that enable us to 
identify what characters might be thinking or feeling.  
 
This psychosomatic account of experience is important not only in terms of 
accessing the thoughts and emotions of characters, but also in providing source 
material for metaphors of fear in the narrative. In Book Ten, for example, Diomedes 
and Odysseus pursue Dolon during their night-time expedition (374-376): 
 
                                ὃ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔστη τάρβησέν τε 
βαμβαίνων· ἄραβος δὲ διὰ στόμα γίγνετ’ ὀδόντων·  
χλωρὸς ὑπαὶ δείους· 
 
And Dolon stood still, terrified, gibbering: and through his mouth there was a 
chattering of his teeth in green fear.  
 
On a preliminary note, Dolon experiences what is termed within the modern sciences 
as thanatosis or tonic immobility (ὃ… ἔστη τάρβησέν, 374), an adaptive behaviour 
in which an animal “plays dead” in the hopes of escaping the notice of a predator.61 
																																																								
60 There is a wealth of studies suggesting that an accelerated circulatory system is a common 
physiological response to fear stimuli. For further work in this area, see Keane et al. (1998), who 
examines psychophysiological responses to stress tasks in Vietnam veterans; Cuthbert et al. (2003) in 
patients with personality disorders; Hoehn-Saric and MacLeod (2000); and Lang et al. (2005). 
61 Researchers have identified thanatosis in a very broad range of animals, including sharks (Whitman, 
et al. 1986; Watsky and Gruber 1990; Franklin and Grigg, 1993; and Heithaus, et al. 2002), chickens 
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Diomedes has just exhorted Dolon to remain still, informing him that, regardless of 
his attempts to escape, he and Odysseus will catch him (369-371). In order to 
demonstrate the inevitability of capture, Diomedes throws his spear, intentionally 
missing and aiming, instead, at just scraping Dolon’s shoulder (372-373). Within the 
context of the passage, and with respect to “fight-or-flight” responses, Dolon is 
aware that neither fight or flight is an option; his reaction is, therefore, a defense 
mechanism designed to escape notice. Again, Darwin (2009[1872], 290) pre-empted 
future scientific analysis of this condition in humans when he identified it as a 
symptom of fear: “[t]he frightened man at first stands like a statue motionless and 
breathless, or crouches down as if to instinctively escape observation”. Like 
Idomeneus’ coward, too, Dolon’s teeth chatter, suggesting increased muscle tensity 
characteristic of “flight-or-flight” impulses and experiences of fear.  
 
But the metaphor here is particularly interesting: the narrator describes the source of 
Dolon’s external behaviour as “green fear” (χλωρὸς ὑπαὶ δείους, 376). This is a 
relatively common metaphor in Homer for describing fear, appearing four times in 
the Iliad and six times in the Odyssey. 62 Its adjective, χλωρὸς (greenish-yellow, pale 
green) is used to describe pale honey (Il. 11.631), young wood (Od. 9.378-379, 
16.47) and, in later texts, sand (Soph. Aj. 1064) and fresh cheese (Lys. 23.6). Beekes 
(2010, 1638-1639), accordingly, links χλωρὸς etymologically to χλόη (first green 
shoots, young verdure); he also notes, more broadly, that, “[t]he Greek words for 
vegetation belong to a group of words which is represented in Baltic, Slavic, and 
Latin in the same meaning” (2010, 1638). He lists these as being: želti/želiù (to 
green, sprout), želmuō (plant, shoot growth), and žālias (green, raw, uncooked) for 
Lithuanian; helus, (h)olus, -eris (green plants, vegetables, cabbage) for Latin; and 
hari- (fallow, greenish) and zairi (yellow) for Indo-Iranian (2010, 1638). The relation 
between these different times is, I think, in ideas of freshness and “newness”, in 
which there are conceptual links between young plants and fresh or uncooked food. 
When used of people, χλωρὸς can signify pale or pallid skin, as in the Shield, where 
																																																																																																																																																													
(Gilman, Marcuse, and Moore 1960), mice and rats (Griebel, Stemmelin, and Scatton 2005), and 
lizards (Pestrude and Crawford 1970). 
62 Other instances of the same metaphor occur at Il. 7479, 8.77, 10.376, 15.4; Od. 11.43, 633, 12.243, 
22.42, 24.450, 533. 
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the personified Mist is described as being “green” (265). But the use of χλωρὸς in 
this passage might be derived from increases in skin conductance and colour change 
that, as was discussed above, are common symptoms for responses to fear stimuli, 
and exhibited by both Idomeneus’ coward in Iliad 13 (χρὼς ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ) and 
Dolon in Iliad 10. In line with this, Kövecses points out that metaphors for fear are 
“constituted by a large number of conceptual metonymies” such as “Drop in Body 
Temperature”, “Physical Agitation”, and “Increase in Rate of Heartbeat”, and that, 
thus, “the physiological aspect of the concept is greatly elaborated in language” 
(2000, 23-24). From the standpoint of cognitive semantics, therefore, Dolon’s “green 
fear” is a good example of this phenomena, in which physiologically felt aspects of 
an emotion are used in describing the emotion itself within the narrative. 
 
II.II. Bravery on the Battlefield: Idomeneus’ Brave Man 
Having identified cowardice based on its nonverbal behaviour, Idomeneus turns his 
attention to his brave man who, unlike his comrade, has no thoughts of death as he 
waits in ambush (284-291): 
 
“τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ’ ἂρ τρέπεται χρὼς οὔτέ τι λίην   
ταρβεῖ, ἐπειδὰν πρῶτον ἐσίζηται λόχον ἀνδρῶν,   
ἀρᾶται δὲ τάχιστα μιγήμεναι ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ·  
οὐδέ κεν ἔνθα τεόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ὄνοιτο. 
εἴ περ γάρ κε βλεῖο πονεύμενος ἠὲ τυπείης  
οὐκ ἂν ἐν αὐχέν’ ὄπισθε πέσοι βέλος οὐδ’ ἐνὶ νώτῳ,    
ἀλλά κεν ἢ στέρνων ἢ νηδύος ἀντιάσειε   
πρόσσω ἱεμένοιο μετὰ προμάχων ὀαριστύν”. 
 
“But the brave man’s skin does not change colour, nor is he very frightened 
whenever he takes his place at the forefront in the hidden position, but he prays 
to meet quickly in bitter division. There none could find fault with your battle 
strength or your hands. For even if you were to be wounded in your toil from a 
spear-cast, the weapon would not strike you in the back of the neck, nor in the 
back, but would strike into your chest or belly as you rush forwards through the 
meeting of champions”. 
 
Idomeneus achieves his characterization of his two men by means of a contrast: 
unlike the coward, the brave man’s skin remains the same colour, he is not physically 
restless, and his position at the forefront of battle reveals his eagerness to fight. 
Additionally, the location of their wounds is an indication of courage and cowardice: 
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the coward, who presumably flees from battle, would be more likely to be injured in 
the back, whereas the brave man, rushing forwards into battle, is struck in the front 
of his body. While the coward is therefore characterized by his lack of control and 
reticence to fight, the brave man is determined, confident, and self-possessed; this is 
reflected, again, by his physical behaviour, which is described interchangeably with 
his thought processes (ἀρᾶται δὲ τάχιστα μιγήμεναι ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ, 286). 
 
This link between courage and control is elsewhere conceived of in Homer by means 
of comparison to the natural world, but especially using concepts of physical stability 
and animal aggression. In the previous section, I briefly explored the way in which 
bodily experiences are used in metaphors for thought and emotion (Dolon’s green 
fear). The same might be said for metaphorical descriptions of bravery, which 
likewise borrow from observable behaviour in articulating courage and martial 
eagerness. A good example of this is in the Book Twelve of the Iliad, where the 
Lapithae defend the Achaian gates (131-136): 
 
τὼ μὲν ἄρα προπάροιθε πυλάων ὑψηλάων 
ἕστασαν ὡς ὅτε τε δρύες οὔρεσιν ὑψικάρηνοι,  
αἵ τ’ ἄνεμον μίμνουσι καὶ ὑετὸν ἤματα πάντα 
ῥίζῃσιν μεγάλῃσι διηνεκέεσσ’ ἀραρυῖαι· 
ὣς ἄρα τὼ χείρεσσι πεποιθότες ἠδὲ βίηφι  
μίμνον ἐπερχόμενον μέγαν Ἄσιον οὐδὲ φέβοντο. 
 
Now these two, who had taken their place in front of the high gates, stood there 
like two oaks who rear their crests in the mountains and through day upon day 
stand up to the wind and the rain-beat, since their great roots reach far and are 
gripped in the ground. So these two, in the confidence of their strength and their 
hands’ work, stood up to tall Asios advancing upon them, nor fled. 
 
The simile in 132-134 is the first of a triplet describing the Lapithae’s courage, their 
ferocity in battle, and the odds against which they fight.63 For the purposes of this 
study, only the first simile is directly relevant to the Idomeneus passage, and is 
important in terms of explaining the links between courage and physical control to 
which he alludes. Here, we can see that the Lapithae are compared to two great oaks, 
																																																								
63 The two other similes occur from 146-153 and 154-158. In the first instance, the ferocity of the 
Lapithae is compared to that of two boars, which destroy the forest around them as they wait for 
hunters and dogs to close in on them; in the second, the stones being flung at the Achaian wall by the 
Trojans are likened to snowflakes. 
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whose roots “reach far and are gripped into the ground” (ῥίζῃσιν μεγάλῃσι 
διηνεκέεσσ’ ἀραρυῖαι, 134), and who withstand the harsh elements for “all days” 
(ἤματα πάντα, 133). In his commentary of these lines, Hainsworth (1993, 333) 
observes that the description of verse 134 is “under-represented” in the Homeric 
corpus. He points to one additional use in Hesiod, however, in which it recurs with 
ἀρηρώς and is used metaphorically to describe the gates of Tartaros (Th. 811-812):  
 
ἔνθα δὲ μαρμάρεαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδός,  
ἀστεμφὲς ῥίζῃσι διηνεκέεσσιν ἀρηρώς. 
 
There are the glistening gates and the threshold of natural bronze set fast and 
unbroken, fixed to continuous rooted foundations.  
 
The use of διηνεκής (continuous, unbroken, unceasing) in the Theogony passage 
evokes concepts of immovability and inflexibility. When applied to the Lapithae of 
Iliad 12, this same adjective fittingly describes both their body language and their 
mental state. In the case of the former, διηνεκής describes the physical resolve with 
which they wait for Asios at the Achaian gates which, perhaps, is similar to that of 
Idomeneus’ brave man in Iliad 13. In this sense, the solidity of their physical 
presence is literally reflected in μίμνω (to stand fast, remain): they remain at their 
post, and stand as tall and steadfast as the oaks in the mountains, who are likewise as 
unyielding in the face of constant wind and rain (also described using the same verb, 
μίμνουσι). The Lapithae’s physical behaviour (and the simile used to describe it) is 
thus comparable to that of Idomeneus’ brave man, whose body is unmoving and 
controlled as he waits eagerly for battle. In the latter case, διηνεκής reflects the 
determination and constancy characteristic of courage, and their confidence in their 
martial prowess (τὼ χείρεσσι πεποιθότες ἠδὲ βίηφι, 135); the Lapithae, 
additionally, have no thoughts of fleeing (οὐδὲ φέβοντο, 136), unlike the cowardly 
man who is struck in the back as he runs away.  
 
What this passage describes to us, thus, is both physical and mental courage as two 
halves of a cohesive experience. The double meaning of διηνεκής in the simile not 
only communicates this, but also suggests the interchangeability of an image that 
describes both physiological and psychological toughness. There are, in other words, 
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direct links between the deep roots that stabilize the oaks under the onslaught of the 
elements, the firmly placed feet of the Lapithae that keep them at their posts, and the 
mental toughness that enables them to withstand the onslaught of the Trojans. I think 
that this simile primarily relates to their physical behaviour, however, which is, in 
itself, an extension and a part of their psychological processes. As in the case of 
Idomeneus’ cowardly and brave men, we are led to infer a certain mental state; the 
simile, in drawing close connections between the Lapithae’s nonverbal behaviour 
and the deep-rooted trees, explores further how this is the case. 
 
The Lapithae therefore demonstrate the same courage and confidence similarly 
demonstrated by Idomeneus’ brave man in the Iliad 13 passage; the connection 
between them is their physical and mental fortitude, which is, in the Iliad 12 passage, 
metaphorized using images from the natural world. For the purposes of this study, 
the simile is so interesting and important (first) because it combines both body and 
mind in one cohesive experience by describing both in terms of solidity and 
constancy, and (second) because bodily experiences (the physical toughness of brave 
men) are here used in constructing similes that describe psychological states. 
 
Metaphors for physical and mental toughness and resolve that use ἔμπεδος in Homer 
are likewise interesting for our purposes. In his Greek etymological dictionary, 
Beekes (2010, 1160-1161) identifies πέδον (soil, earth, ground), and its compounds, 
(first) ἔμ-πεδος (firm, standing on the ground) and its derivative ἔμ-πεδόω (to 
confirm, consider inviolable), (second) ἄ-πεδος (flat, having one surface), and 
(third) πεδο-βάμων (earth-walking). A derivative, he (2010, 1160) notes, 
furthermore, is πεδίον (surface, plain, field), which has a possible etymological 
derivation is *ped- (foot). Notably, Beekes (2010, 1161) also explains that among its 
cognate forms are: (first) the Hittite peda- (place), (second) the Sanskrit padá- 
(footstep, piece of ground), (third) the Latin oppidum (fort), (fourth) the Armenian 
het and the Lithuanian pėdà and pēdas (footprint), (fourth) the Latvian pêda 
(footsole, footstep).  ἔμπεδος, thus, is a verb that has firm grounding in concepts 
from the natural world, in that πέδον and its derivatives denote soil, earth, 
steadfastness, and immobility. When it is used to describe individual psychology, 
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ἔμπεδος accordingly denotes the same physical and mental steadfastness likewise 
demonstrated by Idomeneus’ brave men and the Lapithae. Zeitlin (1995, 125-126) 
explains that, 
 
Empedos as an adjective is a highly prized trait of human behaviour. In the 
world of warriors, it characterizes a man’s strength, vigour, wits, heart, mind, 
feat, and limbs, as well as his shield and spear… [t]he obverse is a man who is 
past the flowering of his youth and can no longer count on such steadfast 
strength, and its negation is fear and timidity as opposed to courage. 
 
In a psychological sense, therefore, ἔμπεδος describes the antithesis of cowardice 
and helplessness (both in the sense of being overcome with fear or old age):64 its 
associations are with bravery, certainty, youth, and resourcefulness. It is also 
associated with faithfulness: we see in Odyssey 23, for example, that Odysseus’ bed 
is described as being ἔμπεδος in three major ways: (first) in that it is literally 
“rooted” in the earth (23.190-201); (second) that it is a sure sign of his identity—it is 
one of the many secrets shared by himself and Penelope (23.109-110); and (third) it 
is evidence of Penelope’s faithfulness to their marriage—the immovable bed is a sign 
of her constancy (23.202-204). “As a double-sided sign”, Zeitlin (1995, 120) argues, 
“of identity for him, fidelity for her, it is meant to be the visual proof of a private and 
unique relationship”.65 As the Iliad 12 and 13 passages, these ideas are underscored 
primarily by movement: ἔμπεδος and διηνεκής are immoveable, unchanging, and 
constant. Another good example of these ideas is in Odyssey 10, where Circe 
transforms Odysseus’ men into pigs (239-240): 
 
οἱ δὲ συῶν μὲν ἔχον κεφαλὰς φωνήν τε τρίχας τε  
καὶ δέμας, αὐτὰρ νοῦς ἦν ἔμπεδος ὡς τὸ πάρος περ. 
 
They had the head, hair, voice, and shape of pigs, but their minds were steadfast, 
as they had been before.66 
																																																								
64 For youth as being ἔμπεδος, see Il. 7.157, 11.670, 19.33, 20.183, 23.627; Od. 14.468, 503. 
65 See also Newton (1987, 17) on this point; also Murnaghan (2011[1987], 116), who argues that, “Its 
inalienable quality is essential to its use as a token of Odysseus’ identity to Penelope and as a sign of 
Penelope’s fidelity to Odysseus: that quality allows it to signify that Odysseus is not simple an 
acceptable stranger but Penelope’s husband and that Penelope would not accept a stranger in her 
husband’s place”.  
66 For further instances of ἔμπεδος being used to describe mental fortitude, see Il 4.314, 5.254, 
11.813, 18.158; Od. 10.240, 493. For body language as ἔμπεδος, see Il. 13.37, 15.622, 683, 16.107; 




Though the bodies of Odysseus’ companions change from being those of men to 
animals, their minds remain the same. The narrator achieves this comparison 
primarily by use of ἔμπεδος, which evokes concepts of immobility and 
steadfastness. The underlying image, here, is one of motion, in which the sudden 
“movement” of their bodies between forms is compared to the steadfastness—the 
lack of “movement”—in their minds. While the men’s bodies undergo change, in 
other words, their minds remain firmly rooted in place: they continue to posess 
human minds, and they continue to be aware of their surroundings. The narrator 
contrasts their distinction primarily in his metaphorical use of ἔμπεδος, which draws 
heavily on ideas from the physical and natural world. 
 
This double use of διηνεκής and ἔμπεδος is also accounted for in cognitive 
linguistics, where abstract concepts can be metaphorized in terms of structural 
integrity and solidity, in image schemata such as “Arguments are Buildings”. 
Consider, for example, statements such as, “We’re building on solid foundations” 
and “You need to construct a strong argument” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 98-99). 
Though this image schema is not directly applicable, here, it should be noted that 
ideas of strength and wholeness are being used in order to describe the soundness 
and quality of arguments. In this sense, it may be the case that, for the Iliad 12 and 
Odyssey 10 passages, that διηνεκής and ἔμπεδος serve similar purposes, in 
constructing ideas of courage, bravery, and mental steadfastness as being physically 
constant and sound. Mental instability is, conversely, reflected in ontological 
metaphors such as “The Mind is a Brittle Object”, where one might say (for 
example), “he broke under cross-examination”, “she is easily crushed”, and “I am 
going to pieces” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 27).  
 
																																																																																																																																																													
changeable and unstable using ἔμπεδος when she informs Hector that she would rather be a wife to a 
better man than him: “τούτῳ δ' οὔτ' ἂρ νῦν φρένες ἔμπεδοι” (Il. 6.352). Helen, here, identifies the 




But battlefield courage and prowess are more often described in Homer using animal 
similes,67 as is the case for Idomeneus in Iliad 13, who is likened to a boar while he 
awaits an enraged Aeneas on the battlefield (13.469-475): 
 
βῆ δὲ μετ’ Ἰδομενῆα μέγα πτολέμοιο μεμηλώς. 
ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἰδομενῆα φόβος λάβε τηλύγετον ὥς,  
ἀλλ’ ἔμεν’ ὡς ὅτε τις σῦς οὔρεσιν ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς, 
ὅς τε μένει κολοσυρτὸν ἐπερχόμενον πολὺν ἀνδρῶν 
χώρῳ ἐν οἰοπόλῳ, φρίσσει δέ τε νῶτον ὕπερθεν· 
ὀφθαλμὼ δ’ ἄρα οἱ πυρὶ λάμπετον· αὐτὰρ ὀδόντας 
θήγει, ἀλέξασθαι μεμαὼς κύνας ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρας· 
 
He went against Idomenus, being greatly eager for battle. But no desire for flight 
seized Idomenus like a child, but he was as a boar in the mountains when, being 
persuaded by his battle strength, remains against a tumult of men coming upon 
him in a solitary place, his back bristling from above. His two eyes shine with 
fire, and he sharpens his teeth, desiring to ward away both dogs and men. 
 
Like the Lapithae, Idomeneus has no desire to flee (ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἰδομενῆα φόβος 
λάβε, 470), is confident in his martial abilities (ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς, 471), and faces his 
opponents unflinchingly (ὅς τε μένει… πολὺν ἀνδρῶν, 472-473). This description 
of bravery draws heavily from threat displays in both animals and humans, and thus 
has a strong basis in evolutionary development. Idomeneus’ physical behaviour is 
likened to that of a boar, who glares at his opponents (ὀφθαλμὼ… πυρὶ λάμπετον, 
475), bristles his back threateningly (φρίσσει δέ τε νῶτον ὕπερθεν, 474), and 
grinds his teeth (αὐτὰρ ὀδόντας θήγει, 474). In line with this, Redican (1982) 
identifies hostile facial expressions as something that is inbuilt for humans and 
animals. Based on studies conducted on aggressive emotion displays in nonhuman 
primates, he describes the facial movements that typically accompany a threat 
display (1982, 226-227): 
 
In its complete form, as often seen in most taxa of Old World monkeys and 
apes, the display is characterized by a slightly to full open mouth with upper lip 
tensed over the teeth and corners of the mouth brought forward, and the upper 
and often lower teeth are not usually visible; especially in profile; the ears are 
																																																								
67 Lion and boar similes are especially common in Homer (but moreso in the Iliad) in this sense. For 
examples of lion similes, see Il. 3.23, 5.136, 5.299, 476, 554, 782, 10.297, 10.485, 11.129, 173, 293, 
12.42, 16.823; Od. 10.433, 11.611; for boars, see Il. 4.253, 783, 8.338, 9.539, 11.293; Od. 11.611. 
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usually flattened against the head; the gaze is fixed upon the percipient; the 
eyebrow may be faces; and the nostrils may be flared.68 
 
This connection between the expression of aggression in humans and animals is also 
attested in Homer, where threat displays on the battlefield sometimes involve a 
baring of teeth from beneath a bristled brow.69 In these cases, the “bristled brow” is 
described using the adjective βλοσυρός. The word βλοσυρός itself, as Kirk (1990, 
262) comments, is a complicated term of uncertain origin; translators typically gloss 
it as “terrible”, “grim”, or “threatening”. βλοσυρός, however, does not seem to be 
strictly understood in this sense until Aeschylus.70 It is used in early hexameter 
poetry to denote an animal’s shaggy or bristling coat.71 Several Iliadic warriors, 
likewise, bare or grind their teeth on the battlefield as expressions of aggression. 
Lateiner argues, acorrdingly, that teeth most often appear in Homer as instruments of 
violence and destruction for both humans and animals (1989, 18): “Teeth in Homer 
bite other creatures to destroy them, to block ineffectively a superior weapon’s thrust 
wielded at their owner’s face, or to keep words from escaping the mouth”.72  
 
There is a link, thus, between human and animal threat displays that is deeply 
grounded in evolutionary development, which is reflected in the similarities between 
human and animal nonverbal behaviour (baring teeth, glaring) both in Homer and in 
the every day. We can see this link more obviously in the Iliad 13 passage, in which 
the bristling back of the boar is meant to reflect Idomeneus’ aggressive physical 
demeanour, confidence, and eagerness to fight. This connection is more easily made 
																																																								
68 For other examples of the application of this threat displays (but especially mirthless smiling) in 
Homer, see Clarke (2005, 38-39). See also Goffman (1967, 24-26) on the aggressive use of “face-
work”. 
69 Il. 7.211-213, 15.607-609. 
70 Beekes (2010, 222), similarly, is uncertain about its meaning, but (like other translators) speculates 
that it might be “terrible”, based on its uses in the Iliad.  
71 For examples from Hesiod, see Sh. 175, 191. 
72 For examples of teeth as weapons or expressions of aggression in Homer, see Il. 11.114, 175, 17.63; 
Od. 12.91-92. Scylla, especially, is described as having teeth “full of black death” (σμερδαλέη 
κεφαλή, ἐν δὲ τρίστοιχοι ὀδόντες, πυκνοὶ καὶ θαμέες, πλεῖοι μέλανος θανάτοιο) at Od. 12. 91-
92, which, as Lateiner (1989, ft. 1) argues, indicate her “monstrous destructiveness”. The violent 
capacity of teeth is also attested outside Homer, and especially in the Shield of Heracles. In a first 
example, Panic is described as having “dreadful” (δεινῶν) and “terrible” (ἀπλήτων) teeth: τοῦ καὶ 
ὀδόντων μὲν πλῆτο στόμα λευκαθεόντων| δεινῶν, ἀπλήτων (146-147). In the second, the snakes 
coming from the Gorgones’ girdles teeth gnash as they pursue Perseus across the shield: “ἐπὶ δὲ 
ζώνῃσι δράκοντε| δοιὼ ἀπῃωρεῦντ’ ἐπικυρτώοντε κάρηνα·| λίχμαζον δ’ ἄρα τώ γε, μένει δ’ 
ἐχάρασσον ὀδόντας| ἄγρια δερκομένω” (233-236). 
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for an audience not only because of its solid evolutionary basis, but also because it 
mirrors commonly occurring aggression displays in the every day.  
 
I think that Idomeneus’ description of bravery is best understood with reference to 
other examples of battlefield courage and aggression, in which the determination, 
eagerness, and confidence of a warrior is highlighted using images of stability, 
fortitude, constancy. In each these cases, both the mental and physical dimensions of 
experience are described as interchangeable, and the kind of behaviour exhibited by 
each warrior (Idomeneus and the Lapithae) are in direct contrast to Idomeneus’ 
described coward: where the coward trembles and shivers with fright, his skin 
changes colour, his heart beats rapidly, and his teeth chatter, brave men are 
physically stoic and calm, hold their ground, and grind their teeth in a display of 
martial aggression and confidence. In the case of both Idomeneus’ imagined men, 
these external outputs are best understood and explained with reference to their 
evolutionary, neurobiological, and psychophysical background, which reveal (first) 
the narrator’s awareness of the intrinsic role of the body in emotion, and (second), 
given the descriptive consistency of bravery and cowardice in the poems, his 
awareness of the universality of some aspects of psychological experiences for both 
his characters and audiences. 
 
III. The Body in Emotion Experience 
The final section of this chapter turns, briefly, to affective approaches to mind, but 
especially as they explore the extent to which the body is felt in emotional 
experience. So far, I have explored the mechanics and influences underpinning 
different types of nonverbal behaviour and its interpretation by observing audiences. 
But I think it is also important to identify, as far as we can, the extent to which 
Idomeneus perceives the body as entering and influencing emotional experience. By 
doing so, I argue, we can better understand how Idomeneus perceives and expresses 
the relationship between the body and the mind, and the role of physiologically felt 




With respect to affective approaches to mind, James (1884, 1894) and Lange 
(1922[1885]) were among its pioneers who, contrary to the traditional Cartesian 
model that dichotomizes body and mind, proposed that phenomenal arousal precedes 
and prompts emotional experience. The physical dimension of emotional experience 
are primary, in other words, and an emotion is experienced when the brain reacts to 
information received via the body’s nervous system (James 1884, 189). Although 
this theory (commonly referred to as the “James-Lange Theory”) has been amended 
and criticized over time—psychologists such as Feldman-Barrett (2012) point, for 
example, to more specific subjective and contextual considerations as influencers in 
emotional experience—James and Lange’s initial observations on the relationship 
between mind and body remain enormously influential for psychologists, 
neurologists, philosophers, and biologists working within the affective sciences.73 In 
a very recent examination of bodily affectivity and emotional experience, Colombetti 
(2014) seeks to enrich and refine James’ account by exploring, in further detail, the 
ways in which the body enters emotional experience. In doing so, Colombetti, 
following the work of other recent contributors to the debate such as Gallagher 
(2005), Zahavi (2005), and Legrand (2007), considers the body both as a locus of 
experience and as a medium through which one experiences the world.  
 
For the former, Colombetti (2014, 115) distinguishes (first) between the body as 
central and peripheral to individual attention (when I specifically touch my arm, as 
opposed to the tension in my left shoulder as I focus on typing on a keyboard with 
my hands), and (second) between the Leib (the lived body, as when I stretch my legs 
beneath the desk) and the Körper (the body as any other extended object, as when I 
measure my waistline). In the latter case—bodily feeling through—the body is taken 
as a medium or “obscurely felt” object of experience (Colombetti 2014, 122-124). In 
order to illustrate her precise meaning, Colombetti uses the analogy of sitting on a 
delayed train. An individual’s attention might, in this scenario, be focused on 
surrounding objects rather than on the body (the time indicated on a watch, the 
																																																								
73 For more recent discussions and applications of the James-Lange Theory, see Dalgleish (2004), 
Redding (2011), and Prinz (2003).  
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train’s speed, and the driver’s announcements). According to Colombetti, however, it 
is never completely absent from experience; rather (2014, 122), 
 
[I]t contributes to my feelings of anxiety, and specifically to my experience of 
the situation as tight and confining; in particular, it is through my tense and 
constrained body that I experience the situation as such.74 
 
In this way, Colombetti argues, the body might be metaphorically considered as “a 
transparent window out of which one looks at the world”, in which background 
bodily feelings are comparable to coloured panes of glass (2014, 123): 
 
One may be mainly oriented toward the world and nevertheless experience it as 
affectively toned (coloured) depending on how one’s body is felt-through in the 
background (depending on the colour of the glass); different emotions affect the 
body (colour the glass) in different ways, and the affective quality of the 
experienced world (the perceived colour of the world beyond the glass) changes 
accordingly. 
 
Within the context of these definitions, the coward’s body is a conspicuous object of 
experience; his bodily feelings are diffuse, in that they involve his entire body (as 
when the entire body feels warm when one is embarrassed, or when the entire body 
is energized in experiences of happiness).75 In an earlier work on diffuse bodily 
feelings, Frijda (1986) defines it primarily as “action readiness”: that is, diffuse 
bodily feelings as an urge to act as when, as Colombetti describes, one might feel 
like grabbing, shaking, and hitting in anger, or running and jumping with joy (2014, 
119). Accordingly, Idomeneus lists the coward’s heart, muscles, teeth, skin, and 
limbs as involved in his emotional experience. Additionally, as explored in the 
previous sections of this chapter, the coward’s physical symptoms are consistent with 
																																																								
74 Colombetti further illustrates her point through the analogy of a dog chasing her down a river (2014, 
122): “Although my attention is directed toward he dog, I also sense my bodily vulnerability and 
agitation—I have a nonattended sense of my body as rigid and ready to be attacked, through which I 
attend the dog”. For further discussions of bodily feeling-through, see Colombetti (2011), Colombetti 
and Thompson (2008). In contrast to Colombetti’s account, Damasio (1994, 149-151) distinguishes 
between three different types of feelings: (1) basic emotions (happiness, sadness, etc.), (2) secondary 
emotions (euphoria, shyness, etc.) and (3) background bodily feelings. In the final case, these 
“background feelings” are conscious representations of “background emotions” unattended bodily 
changes, constantly occurring, that operate as a part of an individual’s “self-regulatory activity”. “A 
background feeling”, he argues (1994, 150), “corresponds to the body state prevailing between 
emotions”. 




“fight-or-flight” responses to threatening situations, which, depending on the 
individual’s plan of action, either provides the body with a burst of energy with 
which to fight, or slows its respiratory and circulatory systems in order to conserve 
energy for flight. These diffuse bodily feelings, within the scope of Frijda’s account, 
are geared principally towards action; this might coincide with phenomenological 
accounts of emotion developed by Sheets-Johnstone (1999, 2009) that emphasize the 
kinetic dimension of emotional experience.  
 
Conversely, I think that the brave man’s body is a peripheral object of experience: 
his thoughts are focused on the coming battle (οὔτέ τι λίην ταρβεῖ… ἀρᾶται δὲ 
τάχιστα μιγήμεναι ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ, 286-287), and his body and bodily feelings, 
outwardly calm and under control, are not central to his experience. For both men, 
however, it should be noted that their bodies are mediums of experience: in 
describing their thoughts and emotions (death and fear for the coward, fighting and 
eagerness for the brave man) concurrently with their emotions, Idomeneus alludes to 
an account of bodily feelings as a lens through which they perceive their 
circumstances.  
 
IV. Conclusions: οἶδ’ ἀρετὴν οἷός ἐσσι 
This chapter has explored the ways in which Idomenus conceptualizes and articulates 
bravery and cowardice based on their physical, experiential, and interactional 
dimensions. It draws (first) from theory of mind studies that explore how others 
interpret nonverbal behaviour based on its potential underlying cognitive activity, 
(second) from neurobiological, evolutionary, and psychophysical studies whose 
findings, I argue, underlie each imagined man’s symptoms, (third) from cognitive 
linguistics, which demonstrates how emotions are metaphorized based on their 
associated phenomenal experiences, and (fourth) from affective-scientific approaches 
to mind, which examine how the body enters and influences emotional experience. I 
argued that applying these approaches to the passage, and with reference to similar 
examples in the Homeric corpus, enriches our understandings of how Idomeneus 
constructs realistic and relatable accounts of bravery and cowardice for Meronies. In 
this sense, Idomeneus’ role in the passage also mirrors that of the Homeric narrator 
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who, in appealing to real-world, universal aspects of psychological experiences, 
presents accessible, comprehensible pictures of his characters’ thoughts and 
emotions for his audiences. 
 
The considerations underpinning Idomeneus’ response to Meriones, in other words, 
are also those of the Homeric narrator, whose cohesive and inclusive 
conceptualization of psychological functioning incorporates brain, body, and world; 
we see this especially in Idomeneus’ claims about the role of nonverbal behaviour as 
a communicatory device. The Idomeneus passage is not just a study of Homeric 
manners and concepts of shame and censure, therefore, but is also important in that it 
reveals the extent to which, as in the everyday, sense-making and meaning in Homer 
are shaped and constrained by bodies and environments. 
 
Idomeneus’ account in Iliad 13 primarily depends upon the contrast between 
observable nonverbal behaviour exhibited by brave and cowardly men. In this sense, 
it is important that they are both on the battlefield: we see that while the brave man is 
largely unaffected by his surroundings (indeed, they seem to have a positive affect on 
him), the cowardly man is consumed both by his environment and thoughts of what 
is to come. Environment thus plays a crucial role in their psychological states. The 
primary differences between them are accordingly grounded in the extent to which 
each man has control of his own body: while the brave man is stoic and self-
possesses, the coward’s nonverbal behaviour is one of frenetic physical movement.  
 
In establishing this dichotomy, Idomeneus doubtlessly likens Meriones to the brave 
man who, in rushing eagerly to the forefront of battle, shares none of the coward’s 
fear of death. Idomeneus’ description of the two ways in which men respond to 
impending battlefield dangers is, thus, an elaboration of his initial assurance to 
Meriones that he knows what sort of a man he is (“οἶδ’ ἀρετὴν οἷός ἐσσι· τί σε χρὴ 
ταῦτα λέγεσθαι;”, 274): as one gauges the inner qualities of men based on their 
nonverbal behavior, so too has Idomeneus observed Meriones’ martial valour and 
bravery on the battlefield. Idomeneus’ account is therefore interesting from a 
psychological perspective in what, above all, it is meant to be doing: in its capacity 
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as a conciliatory speech, it is aimed towards engaging with Meriones on a 
psychological level. 
 
As an explanation of the mechanics by which one comes to know of the 
psychological character and experiences of others, Idomeneus’ account might also 
have a strong didactic function for the narrative’s external audiences. On one level, 
the poet reinforces the importance of nonverbal behavior in coming to know others. 
In order to do so, he provides two case studies (the brave and cowardly men) in 
which the audience, as well as Meriones, might engage with Idomeneus’ imagined 
men and draw conclusions about their mental states. In doing so, he foregrounds our 
theory of mind abilities, highlight processes in which, in the everyday, we engage 
automatically and subconsciously. On another level, and as Boyd (2009, 92-93) and 
Bekoff (2007, 100) argue from an evolutionary perspective, the opportunity to 
practice and refine skills necessary to real-world engagement is a central functioning 
of art. In this sense, passages such as these might enable an audience to hone their 
theory of mind abilities as they listen to and interpret the narrative for themselves.  
 
Idomeneus’ narrative is not just an exercise in mind reading for Meriones, in other 
words, but for the audience who listens to the poet’s performance. It thus fulfills, in 
conclusion, several different psychological functions: (first) it is an exploration of the 
role of nonverbal behavior and theory of mind as communicatory tools; (second) for 
the more immediate narrative context, it seeks to assuage Meriones’ concerns about 
Idomeneus’ opinions about his bravery; and (third) it is an explanatory and 
instructional verse for the audience who, in processing the ideas put forward by the 
poet, both hone their own theory of mind skills and explore the concepts laid out in 
full in the narrative. 
 
The next chapter of this thesis turns from issues of nonverbal behaviour and theory 
of mind to extended cognition in Homer. Though my discussion of some of the 
issues in this chapter persists, I place more emphasis on how individuals establish, 
maintain, explore, and re-affirm relationships with each other, primarily through 
their use of material media. Odyssey 19, in which a disguised Odysseus interacts 
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with both Penelope and Eurycleia in a pair of night-time interviews, is an especially 
good example of how these ideas operate in Homer. In the introduction to this thesis, 
I identified one passage in particular—Odysseus-Aethon’s response to Penelope’s 
challenge—as being especially rich in what it tells us about psychosomatic structures 
of experience in Homer. But I think that this passage—and the Book to which it 
belongs—deserves more thorough analysis. 
 
On these grounds, thus, I focus my attention on cognitive approaches to Odyssey 19 
in the following study, but especially on recent insights from social cognition, 
memory and imagination studies, and the extended mind. 
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Chapter Four: Odysseus, Penelope, and Eurycleia in Odyssey 19 
 
When Odysseus first returns to Ithaca in Book Thirteen of the Odyssey, he is met by 
a disguised Athene who, after listening to his concocted tale of how he came to be 
there, reveals her true identity and praises him for his cleverness (330-336): 
 
“αἰεί τοι τοιοῦτον ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα 
τῶ σε καὶ οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστηνον ἐόντα, 
οὕνεκ’ ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων.  
ἀσπασίως γάρ κ’ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀλαλήμενος ἐλθὼν  333 
ἵετ’ ἐνὶ μεγάροισ’ ἰδέειν παῖδάς τ’ ἄλοχόν τε· 
σοὶ δ’ οὔ πω φίλον ἐστὶ δαήμεναι οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι, 
πρίν γ’ ἔτι σῆς ἀλόχου πειρήσεαι”. 
 
“Always you have such thoughts in your stēthos, and so I am unable to leave 
you, unhappy as you are, because you are courteous, shrewd, and sensible. 
Another man, returned from wandering, would gladly hurry to see his wife and 
children in his hall. But it is not dear to you to learn or discover until you have 
tested your wife”. 
 
Athene’s words are a homily to the traits that distinguish Odysseus from most others 
in the Homeric world: to, primarily, the μῆτις that she herself personifies and that, 
eventually, enables him to achieve a successful homecoming. The narrator makes 
clear, however, that Odysseus’ νόστος is equally contingent upon his relationships 
with his family and longtime servants. “The permanence of Odysseus’ claim to his 
position”, Murnaghan (2011[1987], 21) argues, “may mimic the timeless power of 
the gods, but it actually rests on the durability of his domestic relationships, on his 
capacity to recover a series of roles defined by his relations with others”. This is 
especially the case for Penelope and Telemachus, both of whom share in Odysseus’ 
character-defining intellect: while Penelope figuratively and literally weaves wiles in 
order to delay her remarriage until her son’s maturation or her husband’s return, 
Telemachus, aided by Athene-Mentes (and, eventually, by Odysseus himself), 
exhibits the first signs of his inherited tact and cunning in his dealings with Nestor 
(3.120-125), Menelaus (4.609-611), and the Suitors (20.257-269).76 
																																																								
76 Nestor and Menelaus both comment on the similarities between Telemachus and Odysseus. Nestor 





Odyssey 19 focuses primarily on the way the Ithacan royal family employ these 
intellectual capacities, but especially as they are brought to bear in their interactions 
with each other, and especially as they are facilitated and structured by different 
kinds of external media.77 This chapter examines the mechanics underpinning these 
interactions, with particular reference to extended, embedded, enactive, and 
embodied approaches to mind. In doing so, it focuses on (first) how external stimuli 
operate as part of extended cognitive systems in Homer, (second) how the narrator 
embodies these complex interpersonal relationships and networks through metaphor, 
simile, and nonverbal behaviour, and (finally) how cognition is enacted through 
material media. I ultimately argue, in line with recent studies on the extended mind, 
enactivism, embodiment, and social cognition, that Homeric minds are as capable of 
integrating and using a range of external media as our own. In doing so, I argue that 
these external dimensions not only act as much of a part of individual cognizing as 
																																																																																																																																																													
“ἔνθ’ οὔ τίς ποτε μῆτιν ὁμοιωθήμεναι ἄντην 
ἤθελ’, ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὸν ἐνίκα δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς  
παντοίοισι δόλοισι, πατὴρ τεός, εἰ ἐτεόν γε 
κείνου ἔκγονός ἐσσι· σέβας μ’ ἔχει εἰσορόωντα. 
ἦ τοι γὰρ μῦθοί γε ἐοικότες, οὐδέ κε φαίης 
ἄνδρα νεώτερον ὧδε ἐοικότα μυθήσασθαι.” 
 
“There was no man who desired to be set up in mētis against him, since god-like 
Odysseus far surpassed them in all kinds of strategems; your father, if you are truly his 
son. Wonder seizes me, looking at you. For your words, at least, are like his, nor might 
one think that a younger man could say things so like him”. 
 
Telemachus’ inherited mental capacities are also implicit in the epithet most commonly assigned him, 
πεπνυμένος (68*; thoughtful, wise). In the final instance—his dealings with the Suitors—
Telemachus’ behaviour demonstrates his final maturation, a process that Lateiner (1995, 74) argues is 
best mapped throughout the epic by the Suitors’ nonverbal behaviour, but especially lip-biting and 
sudden silence: “This formulaic nonverbal act marks three stages in Telemakhos’ emergence into 
manhood and the insertion of himself into adult community… Homer intensifies these three scenes by 
having Telemakhos speak in an increasingly goading manner”. The narrator also very explicitly 
references Telemachus’ inherited abilities in the last of these three instances, at Od. 20.257, when he 
describes him as “wielding wiles” (κέρδεα νωμῶν). 
77 I identified one particular example of this in the introduction to this thesis—in which a disguised 
Odysseus-Aethon describes the clothing, demeanour, and companions of Penelope’s lost husband—as 
being especially important for what it tells us about Homeric presentations of mind. In doing so, I 
argued that Odysseus’ use of material media acts as scaffolding for different kinds of psychological 
engagement with those around him. More specifically, I argued that it is through these items that he 
(first) affirms his status as a manipulator par excellence, (second) demonstrates his understanding of 
the most deep-seated and affecting aspects of Penelope’s identities as mother, wife, and matriarch, and 
(third) appeals to and engages with their persistent ὁμοφροσύνη. 
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the “brain matter” within the head, but also, as elsewhere in Homer, provide structure 
for metaphorical conceptualizations of thought and emotion in the epics. 
 
This chapter focuses on four main aspects of Odyssey 19. First, building on 
discussions of extended cognition, I establish that the Homeric narrator presents 
external resources as playing an active and indispensible role in his characters’ 
psychological functioning, particularly in Helen’s weaving in Iliad 3 and Hector’s 
supplication of Athene in Iliad 6. That the narrator does so has important 
implications for Odysseus’ use of disguise. The remainder of this section therefore 
examines the material aspects of Odysseus’ adopted personae, both in Odyssey 19 
and the poem more generally. Section Two examines the role of memory and 
imagination in Book 19. Both ancient and modern thought on concepts of mental 
imagery, imagination, and communication are relevant here; weaving these insights 
together, I argue, enables a better understanding of the mechanics underpinning this 
exchange. 
 
My focus then shifts, in Section Three, to Odysseus’ and Penelope’s interview from 
the perspective of social cognition. In particular, I aim to show how modern research 
on shared remembering in intimate relationships, which takes as its starting point the 
belief that other people can operate as part of an individual’s extended mental 
“machinery”, helps us in unpacking their exchange. Section Four examines 
Eurycleia’s and Odysseus’ encounter, but especially how nonverbal behaviour 
reflects the intimacy shared by and dominance/subordinance implicit in the pair. The 
next chapter takes a closer look at the long-debated question of Penelope’s 
mindedness; at how the narrator presents her motives, intentions, and deceptive 
capacities using material media, theory of mind, and embodied imagery. 
 
The main focus of the next two chapters is, thus, on how different types of external 
resources operate as part of an individual’s extended cognitive system; as part of the 
machinery of mind. While the previous chapter focused especially on theory of mind 
and nonverbal behaviour, the present and following studies place more emphasis on 
nonorganic (in the sense of not belonging to the subject’s body-matter) extensions of 
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thought and emotion: on material objects, other people, and environments. In these 
senses, I consider different Homeric models of communication with the outside 
world: instances in which individuals not only communicates their thoughts and 
emotions to others, but also incorporates external resources as active components of 
cognition. Odyssey 19 is a particularly good example of this phenomenon because it 
presents a full picture of (first) how Homer’s characters build, explore, and structure 
relationships with their environment, and (second) how these external systems play 
an active role in an individual’s cognitive life. 
 
I. Extending the Mind 
In a seminal study on extended approaches to cognition, Clark and Chalmers 
(2010[1998]) introduce the analogy of Otto and Inga who, upon hearing of an 
exhibit, simultaneously travel to a museum. Otto, who has early-onset Alzheimer’s, 
has a notepad containing vital day-to-day information that he consults for directions. 
Inga, who requires no such external media, is able to recall the information she 
requires from memory. In discussing the process by which the pair navigates its way 
to their destination, Clark and Chalmers argue that, for Otto, the notepad fulfills the 
role performed by Inga’s memory. In this sense, therefore, the notepad should be 
considered a part of the external “hardware” or “machinery” of the mind that plays as 
equal a role in Otto’s psychological functioning as memory otherwise would for Inga 
(33-34). Clark and Chalmers term the idea behind this “coupled system” (organic 
and nonorganic dimensions of psychological functioning) the “parity principle” or 
“active externalism” (Clark and Chalmers 2010[1998], 44; Tollefson 2006, 141). In a 
more recent study, Supersizing the Mind, Clark provides an alternate analogy of pen 
and paper. In arguing that the “output” of the activity—the writing—forms part of 
the cognitive process itself, he concludes that (2011, 1): 
 
Such considerations of parity, once we put our bioprejudices aside, reveal the 
outward loop as a functional part of the extended cognitive machine. Such body- 
and world-involving cycles are best understood… as quite literally extending the 
machinery of the mind out into the world—as building extended cognitive 
circuits that are themselves the minimal material bases for important aspects of 
human thought and reason.78 
																																																								




Clark stipulates that external media must fulfill four main criteria to operate in this 
way (2004, 6): (first) the resource must be accessible and oft-used (the notebook, 
which functions as Otto’s primary cognitive aid, is with him at all times); (second) 
the resource must be trustworthy as “something retrieved clearly from biological 
memory”; (third) the information contained within must be easily accessible; and 
(fourth) the information “must have been previously endorsed by the subject” (it was 
Otto himself who wrote the museum address in his notebook) (Tollefson 2006, 142). 
This theory has been enormously influential in scholarly discussions of mind and 
has, in recent years, been further developed and successfully applied to a wide-
ranging body of data, from material objects, to collective memory, to group 
intentionality.79 This chapter will discuss some of the elaborations most immediately 
useful to a scientific reading of Odyssey 19. 
 
I.I. Extended Cognition in Homer 
There is ample evidence to suggest that, in Homer, external stimuli operate as part of 
an individual’s psychological functioning and that, in this sense, brain, body, and 
world constitute an extended, inclusive cognitive system.80 A good example of this is 
																																																								
79 Borghi (2005), for example, provides a compelling study of material objects and extended cognitive 
systems. There is also a growing number of studies in social psychology that examine the role of other 
people as extended cognitive systems, of which Tollefson (2006) and Tomasello, et al. (2005) have 
been recent and influential contributors. These initial studies have most recently been applied to areas 
of study such as shared remembering; for this, see Barner, Sutton, and Harris (2008, 2013) in 
particular, who examine shared remembering in long-term intimate couples. I will discuss these issues 
in greater depth in the fourth section of this chapter, with reference to the Odysseus/Penelope and 
Menelaus/Helen relationships. 
80 In general, modern scholarship acknowledges the psychological significance of Homeric material 
objects as personal, social, cultural, and political media. Following Foley, for example, Zeitlin (1995, 
117) argues that, “all material objects in both the Iliad and the Odyssey are invested with 
psychological and cognitive resonances that go far beyond the details of their mere description and 
exemplify a typical and indispensible mode of charting social and mental experience”. For more 
recent studies that of how material objects operate as mental tools in Homer, see Bouvier (2002), 
Criedlaard (2003), Mueller (2007, 2010), Grethlein (2008), Minchin (2007), and Guiei (2005) for a 
response to Bouvier’s work. Most recently, L.G. Canevaro’s Leverhulme project, “Women and 
Objects in Greek epic” explores these ideas with a particular emphasis on gender. In using insights 
from extended mind theory, however, I take a somewhat more radical approach to material objects, in 
considering them as playing as equal a role in psychological functioning as the cognizing that takes 
place “in the head”. While my work builds on these earlier studies, therefore, I argue that theories of 
cognitive extension reveal that material objects play a more active role in Homer than has been 
previously considered.  
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in Iliad 3, where Iris finds Helen weaving the story of the Trojan War on her loom 
(125-128): 
 
τὴν δ' εὗρ' ἐν μεγάρῳ· ἣ δὲ μέγαν ἱστὸν ὕφαινε 
  δίπλακα πορφυρέην, πολέας δ' ἐνέπασσεν ἀέθλους 
Τρώων θ' ἱπποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων, 
οὕς ἑθεν εἵνεκ' ἔπασχον ὑπ' Ἄρηος παλαμάων· 
 
Helen was weaving at a loom a large double-folded purple mantle, and was 
sprinkling in the many ordeals of the horse-taming Trojans and the bronze-
armoured Achaians, those they had suffered because of her under the hands of 
the God of war. 
 
Helen’s loom is not the only aspect of her environment that contributes to her 
cognitive functioning—as Atchity (2014[1978], 28) comments, “an image-galaxy of 
disorder” consisting of loom, bed, house, and web surrounds her—but it is the most 
overt, as the narrator establishes direct links between her psychological state, the act 
of weaving, and the events she memorializes.81 To be specific, Helen weaves her web 
as she includes narrative of the Trojan War; both ὑφαίνω (weave, 125) and 
ἐμπάσσω (sprinkle in, 126) appear in the same lines and imperfect tense, suggesting 
that these are continuous acts that occur simultaneously. The narrator, additionally, 
provides us brief insight to Helen’s perspective about her own role as an instigator of 
conflict: the fighting represented in the web, he tells us, was undertaken for her sake 
(οὕς ἑθεν εἵνεκ' ἔπασχον, 128).82 Helen’s physical locale might also play a role: 
Helen weaves in the bedchamber she shares with Paris—a place that she closely 
associates with shame in the successive narrative (410-412)—as he prepares to duel 
Menelaus at Hector’s suggestion (86-94). In switching between the bedchamber, 
																																																								
81 The links between weaving and psychological functioning in Homer are well established. Studies 
that consider weaving in this sense focus primarily on metaphorical uses of ὑφαίνω (to weave). For 
examples of some of these metaphors, see Il. 3.211-13, 6.187-89, 7.324-25; Od. 4.677-80, 5.356-57, 
9.420-23, 13.303-7, 13.386-88. Cairns (2012) has recently discussed weaving and garment metaphors 
in Greek literature, with an especial focus on Homer; but see also Snyder (1981), Jenkins (1985), and 
Kruger (2001). I will further discuss these points in the next chapter, in a discussion of Penelope’s 
weaving of the funeral shroud. 
82 Although van Wees (2005b, 47) points out that her weaving could as equally be a method of self-
glorification: “Helen’s chosen motif might be seen both as self-expression and self-glorification, since 
the war was for her simultaneously a cause of guilt and a source of future fame, as she was keenly 
aware”. See also Mueller (2010, 1) on this point, who argues that, “Helen’s peplos attests to the 
potential for handcrafted objects to immortalize those who have made them. It also serves as a useful 
reminder that even within Homeric epic, which in itself is an outstanding example of male kleos, 




Helen’s weaving, her psychological state, and the action that takes place on the 
battlefield, the narrator highlights the intimate connection between them—all of 
which are encapsulated by the subject matter of her web.  
 
The finished product—the embroidered robe—thus constitutes more than a record of 
the Trojan War and Helen’s craftsmanship: taken with the other material (marriage 
bed), environmental (her bedchamber), and contextual (the duel) elements of the 
narrative, it forms an extended, continuous cognitive loop that incorporates brain (the 
cognizing in her head), body (the physical act of her hands weaving the threads), and 
world (her surrounding environment, the material objects that symbolise her life with 
Paris, and the action taking place on the battlefield); all of these things impact upon 
and constitute her psychological perspective of her past. In doing so, it fulfils the 
criteria stipulated in Clark and Chalmers’ “parity principle”: (first) Helen’s loom is, 
as a tool that enables her to fulfil one of a Homeric woman’s essential duties, 
accessible and oft-used; (second) the events Helen incorporates in her web are 
clearly retrieved from her memory; (third) the information contained within the 
physical spectrum of the robe is easily accessible; and (fourth) the narrative, being 
events that Helen has herself witnessed and partially instigated, has been previously 
endorsed by her. As a component of her psychological functioning, therefore, we 
might understand Helen’s weaving as “thinking on the loom”: in a similar sense that 
Clark proposes that writing with a pen is “thinking on paper”, Helen actively 
explores her culpability through the physical act of weaving. As a continuation of a 
thought process that takes place outside the mind, this weaving is an equal and 
indispensable part of her psychological functioning.   
 
Material media can also operate as “scaffolding” that facilitates cognitive interaction 
between parties, thus operating as an extended and enactive mechanism for inter-
subjective exchange. We witness this process at play in Iliad 6 where Hector, 
motivated by Helenus’ prophecy (73-101), instructs his mother (273-278): 
 
“τὸν θὲς Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασιν ἠϋκόμοιο, 
καί οἱ ὑποσχέσθαι δυοκαίδεκα βοῦς ἐνὶ νηῷ 
ἤνις ἠκέστας ἱερευσέμεν, αἴ κ' ἐλεήσῃ   275 
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ἄστύ τε καὶ Τρώων ἀλόχους καὶ νήπια τέκνα, 
αἴ κεν Τυδέος υἱὸν ἀπόσχῃ Ἰλίου ἱρῆς 
ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο”.  
 
“Place it upon the knees of lovely-haired Athene, and promise to sacrifice 
twelve cows in the shrine, yearlings untouched by the goad, if she will show 
mercy to the city of the Trojans, and its wives, and its infant children, if she 
holds the son of Tydeus from sacred Ilion, the savage spearman, the mighty one, 
author of flight”. 
 
Borghi (2005), in an investigation of enactive cognition, argues that abstract 
concepts should be regarded “as a set of sensorimotor patterns that allow the 
organism to interact with the physical world, rather than as a collection of abstract 
symbols” (Pecher and Zwaan 2005, 3). Her specific focus is on material objects, 
stating that we are able to access a range of cognitive processes when we use them; 
in this way, we enact cognition when we come in contact with and utilize physical 
items (Borghi 2005, 9-10). The πέπλος of the Iliad 6 passage accordingly expresses 
the hopes of one party and their intention to form a temporary, potential bond with 
another: Hector’s desire to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with Athene, 
in which he honours the goddess with valuable goods in exchange for her favour and 
protection from Diomedes.83 It includes a promise of future gifts: if Athene accepts 
the offering and fulfils Hector’s request, then he will sacrifice a dozen cows in her 
honour. On one level, thus, the πέπλος is a physical extension of three different 
aspects of Hector’s mindedness: (first) his desire for victory on the battlefield; 
(second) his hopes to secure Athene’s aid and his eventual effort to do so; and (third) 
as a promise for the future, in which the Goddess’ potential aid might result in the 
gifting a more valuable items. On another, it is also a medium that facilitates a 
potential change in relationship between two parties; it is a physical means by which 
they enact and navigate a delicate negotiation. It is representative, and acts as a part, 
of a potential reciprocal agreement. In other words, and with respect to Borghi’s 
																																																								
83 It is common in Homer for the giving of gifts to operate as a means of establishing long-lasting 
friendships. This can be the case for both supplication and guest-friendship contexts; I further discuss 
these ideas elsewhere in this chapter, on the mnemonic functions of material objects. 
For supplicatory scenes, see Priam’s petition of Achilles in Iliad 24 and Agamemnon’s offer of goods 
to Achilles in Book 9 for good examples of how material objects are used in this way. I will discuss 
gift-exchange in guest-friendship relationships in greater depth with respect to Odysseus and Penelope 
in the final section of this chapter. 
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study, it is a medium through which several parties are able to access, interact with, 
and enact different cognitive processes.  
 
Athene also enacts her own cognition on the item, though her response to Hector and 
Hecuba’s offering is negative. After receiving the πέπλος, she throws her head back 
in an aggressive and abrupt refusal: Ὣς ἔφατ’ εὐχομένη, ἀνένευε δὲ Παλλὰς 
Ἀθήνη (311).84 Grasiozi and Haubold (2010, 165-166) suggest several potential 
reasons for Athene’s rejection of the item. First, that Theano goes beyond Helenus’ 
original prophecy and requests Diomedes’ death (301-310). Second, that Athene, 
having sworn an oath never to aid the Trojans in battle, might already be disinclined 
to accept the offer (Il. 20.313-317). Third, that the πέπλος itself, acquired during 
Paris’ return to Troy from Sparta, is associated with past events that make it an 
undesirable gift. Though we are left to speculate the reasons for Athene’s refusal—as 
an audience, we employ our theory of mind abilities to “fill the gap”—we can see 
how, in interacting with the past and present significance of the πέπλος and 
providing her response to Hector by means of nonverbal behaviour, Athene’s 
cognitive functioning is extended, via the textile, by the body and the world. This is 
also the case for Hector and Hecuba, who enact their own cognition through the 
physical medium of the πέπλος; the πέπλος is thus an item that facilitates different 
psychological processes between cognizing individuals.  
 
These accounts of “active externalism” in Iliad 3 and 6 may also resonate with more 
traditional phenomenological approaches to material culture—most specifically, to 
that of Heidegger’s insights on the way in which individuals interact with objects. In 
Heidegger’s view, there is always a complex interaction between people and “things” 
that incorporates function (its use), environment (culture and society), and its 
personal significance; the significance of an object is thus in both its functionality 
and its relationship to the individuals using them (1962, 51). For Heidegger, 
additionally, “Dasein” is “being-in-the-world”; as Rowlands (2010, 76) explains, 
“The being of each of us consists in a network of related practices. Each of these 
																																																								
84 For uses of the verb ἀνανεύω elsewhere in Homer (4× Il. 1× Od.), all of which denote refusal of a 
request, see Il. 16.250, 252, 22.205; Od. 21.129. 
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practices are embedded in a wider system of instruments”. Heidegger, therefore, 
repudiates not only the Cartesian separation of mind and body, but also earlier 
discussions in the western philosophical tradition of the relationship between people 
and objects as being uninvolved and analytical. Individuals, in other words, have 
deep and multifaceted connections to the objects they use. His interpretation of 
individual relationships to objects fall into two categories: “present-at-hand” (an 
observer views an object as a thing for contemplation) and “ready-at-hand” (an 
individual uses an object, and thus directly engages with it—also known as a “thing-
for”) (Hall 1993, 125). In order to illustrate this distinction, Heidegger uses the 
analogy of a hammer. While using the hammer, Heidegger argues, its status as an 
object becomes less important than the task at hand; it thus becomes part of a 
network involving the hammer, nails, roof tile, and rafter (1962, 97). When the 
hammer breaks down—when one is unable to continue using it—it becomes a 
“present-at-hand” object: an item for which we contemplate its use, rather than 
actively utilize as a tool. 
 
For Hector and Hecuba, the primary significance of the πέπλος is in its function as 
an intermediary item: in its use as a supplicatory item that they hope will facilitate an 
alliance between themselves and Athene. In doing so, they engage with the πέπλος 
as a usable objects—as a “ready-at-hand” or “thing-for”. This is also the case for 
Helen, for whom the loom—and the πέπλος she weaves on it—is less important (at 
the time) as a usable object, and more so as a constituent part of an overarching 
cognitive process. The narrator makes this clear by foregrounding her emotional 
progression in Iliad 3, from her bedchamber, to her interview with Priam, to her 
eventual encounter with Paris. Athene, by contrast, uses the πέπλος both as a “ready 
at hand” and “present-at-hand” object: in rejecting the πέπλος, Athene also rejects 
Hector’s and Hecuba’s supplication, thereby using it in its former sense; but in the 
latter sense, she passively contemplates its problematic history, thereby viewing it as 
a “present-at-hand”. The point, here, is not only that there are many and complex 
ways of interacting with objects in Homer; but also that, in using these items, 
Helen’s, Hector’s, Hecuba’s, and Athene’s cognizing clearly does not take place only 
within the head. Rather, we might consider that, in each of these scenes, individual, 
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other people, environments, and objects are networks in which cognition is 
embodied, embedded, and extended. 
 
II. ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα: Odyssean Disguises 
In Iliad 3 and 6, therefore, we see how material media operate as important 
components of individual and inter-subjective cognizing for Homer’s characters. 
These items form a “coupled system” that extends beyond the boundaries of the body 
and the brain; they are also objects by which individuals can enact their cognition in 
the world. This is also the case for Odysseus’ use of external media, but especially as 
it pertains to the μῆτις for which he is especially well-known and loved by Athene; 
to the deceptive capacities by which he figuratively and literally navigates his way 
home from Troy. It is accordingly Odysseus who, of all Homer’s characters, most 
frequently and successfully manipulates the thoughts, emotions, memories, and 
expectations of others. He does so through metaphorical and literal disguise: by 
employing physical concealments and clever, convincing stories, and by appealing to 
the most deep-seated and affecting aspects of his audiences’ psychologies. It is in 
these ways that he not only re-affirms his heroic identity, but also achieves a 
successful homecoming. “The return of Odysseus is not a simple revelation”, Block 
(1985, 11) argues, “but a process through which deception identifies a hero by 
concealing him, as clothing identifies a man by covering him”.85 
 
This section examines how Odysseus’ cognizing is comprised of a system that 
incorporates brain (lying tales), body (nonverbal behaviour and physical disguise), 
and world (environments and other people). It explores this idea in three ways: (first) 
the cultural and social connotations of the beggar’s garb, and (second) disguise as a 
																																																								
85 Murnaghan (2011[1987]), Pucci (1987), and Stewart (1981) provide extensive discussions of 
Odysseus’ capabilities for successful disguise in the Odyssey, especially as it relates to identity and 
mindedness. Murnaghan (2011[1987] 4-5) argues that Odysseus’ singular affinity for disguise 
distinguishes him not only from others in the Homeric world, but most significantly and notably from 
other Homeric heroes. Odysseus is, however, not always successful in denying his own identity. This 
has considerably disastrous effects at some points of the Odyssey. In Book Nine, for example, 
Odysseus is able to escape Polyphemus’ cave by naming himself,  “Nobody” (364-368). After leaving 
the island, however—and despite his companions’ warnings—he cannot resist identifying himself to 
Polyphemus as his attacker (500-505). In response, Polyphemus supplicates Poseidon to prevent 
Odysseus’ homecoming (525-535), thereby putting into motion the events that will lead to his losing 
his ship, his spoils from Troy, and his companions. 
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functional, extended part of his cognition and as a means for enacting his deceptive 
capabilities in his interactions with others, and (third) as a medium through which 
others can speculate about and attempt to alter his identity. 
 
II.I. Odysseus and Aethon 
Though Odysseus frequently adopts disguises during his journey home to Ithaca, he 
spends the majority of the Odyssey as the prince-cum-beggar Aethon, a false persona 
that he maintains from the point at which Athene disguises him in Book 13 (431-
438) until the final unveiling of his identity at the start of Odyssey 22 (1-7). Aethon’s 
story is elaborate, and most fully articulated during his interview with Penelope in 
Odyssey 19.86 He explains that he traces his lineage to King Minos of Crete as the 
son of Deucalion and brother of Idomeneus (178-183). He claims, furthermore, to 
have hosted Odysseus for twelve days while the hero was on his way to Troy (185-
202), but now wanders, exiled, from country to country, dependent on the good will 
of others for his survival.87 Odysseus’ story depends both on his ability to deceive 
others with clever rhetoric and on the physical disguise that, shortly after returning to 
Ithaca, Athene bestows on him (13.431-438):  
 
κάρψε μέν οἱ χρόα καλὸν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσι, 
ξανθὰς δ' ἐκ κεφαλῆς ὄλεσε τρίχας, ἀμφὶ δὲ δέρμα 
πάντεσσιν μελέεσσι παλαιοῦ θῆκε γέροντος, 
κνύζωσεν δέ οἱ ὄσσε πάρος περικαλλέ' ἐόντε·  434 
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν ῥάκος ἄλλο κακὸν βάλεν ἠδὲ χιτῶνα, 
ῥωγαλέα ῥυπόωντα, κακῷ μεμορυγμένα καπνῷ· 
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν μέγα δέρμα ταχείης ἕσσ' ἐλάφοιο,   
ψιλόν· δῶκε δέ οἱ σκῆπτρον καὶ ἀεικέα πήρην, 
πυκνὰ ῥωγαλέην·  
 
While she withered the handsome skin on his supple limbs, she made the blond 
hair disappear from his head, and over all of his limbs she put the skin of an 
aged old man, and made dim his eyes that up until now had been handsome. 
And around him she threw another tattered garment and a tunic, ragged and 
filthy with the ill effects of smoke. And she put around him the great skin of a 
swift deer. And she gave him a staff and a meagre pouch, full of holes. 
																																																								
86 Odysseus also tells an extended, elaborate version to Eumaios in Odyssey 13 (191-359) in which is 
the son of the Cretan Kastor and a concubine. 
87 This final point is especially important because of Homeric ideas about guest-friendship: if Aethon 
did indeed host Odysseus in Crete, this means that Penelope is now even more obliged to offer him 





Odysseus’ disguise mediates and conditions the way that others perceive and treat 
him. It does so because clothing, in general, is an important indicator of one’s social 
and economic status in the Homeric world: the colour, embellishment, and amount of 
cloth convey nonverbal messages about the political and social clout of its wearer. A 
lack of clothing, conversely, indicates destitution and dependency. “Tunic and cloak 
were worn by everyone, from aristocrat to slave”, van Wees (2005a, 44) says, “It was 
the mark of a beggar to have no cloak, and make do with an old deerskin”. Clothing 
thus has an important representative function in the Homeric world, in that it is 
perceived as accurately reflecting the identity of its wearer. Disguise undermines this 
process by exploiting the social importance of clothing. Pucci (1987, 85) argues that 
the signifiers embedded in clothing, when used as disguise, mislead others by 
presenting false identity cues: 
 
The uncanny nature of disguise depends on its seeming capability to meddle 
successfully with a system of “signs”. Disguise seems to imply that the signs 
that “represent” an entity are, as it were, detachable from the entity: when the 
disguise is recognized for what it is, that is, a simulation, the disguising signs 
appear as “artificial”, “added”, and “controllable”.88 
 
Odysseus, as we see above, is dressed in tattered (ῥωγαλέα, 436), ragged (ῥάκος, 
435), and filthy (ῥυπόωντα, 436) clothes; they are choked with smoke (κακῷ 
μεμορυγμένα καπνῷ, 436); he wears a deerskin around his body, and he carries an 
old, battered pouch (πυκνὰ ῥωγαλέην, 438). His disguise suggests the opposite of 
who he really is. Both he and his fellow beggar Iros, accordingly, are described as 
being badly dressed (κακοείμων), which characterizes and reflects their low social 
status (Od. 18.41). It is for this reason that Odysseus is subject to the abuse of 
Melantho (Od. 18.326-336, 19.65-69), Melanthios (17.215-238), and the Suitors 
(19.72), all of whom primarily interact with the kinds of nonverbal messages sent by 
his rags.  
 
																																																								
88 For Odysseus’ manipulation of the symbolic meaning of his clothing, see also Stewart (1976) and 
Murnaghan (2011). Lateiner (1995, 182), discussing Odysseus’ disguise in particular, argues that, 
“Odysseus’ disguise as a homeless, hungry, and aged beggar represents negative display [author’s 




Penelope’s attitude towards Aethon is similarly conditioned by his clothing; this is 
especially the case in Book 23, when, after Telemachus chides his mother for not 
approaching her husband, Odysseus informs him that (115-116), 
 
“νῦν δ' ὅττι ῥυπόω, κακὰ δὲ χροῒ εἵματα εἷμαι 
τοὔνεκ' ἀτιμάζει με καὶ οὔ πώ φησι τὸν εἶναι”. 
 
“But now I am filthy, and wear a base garment on my skin, she holds me in no 
honour and does not say that I am that man”.89 
 
This same garb also marks him out as a suppliant in Ithaca. Both Eumaios and 
Penelope, along these lines, make judgements about his status based on his clothing: 
while the former explains that it is his duty to take him in (14.55-61) and, in 
accordance with Homeric social norms, feeds him (72-79), the latter states that she 
had pitied Aethon as a suppliant in her house before he proved his past connection to 
her husband (19.253-254). Odysseus’ disguise is thus successful because of the 
social, political, and economic significance Homeric characters place in the types of 
clothes worn by others, and in their inherent understanding of the nonverbal 
messages sent by textiles and garments. 
 
But, with respect to extended approaches to mind, Odysseus’ garb is also a part of 
his cognitive functioning. This is perhaps an obvious point: after all, it is essential 
that Odysseus disguise himself if he is to remain incognito in Ithaca until the right 
moment. But it is important to emphasize that the disguise does not just fulfil the 
function of concealing him: it is a means by which he enacts the plot constructed 
with Athene after his return to Ithaca (Od. 13.372-428). Odysseus’ return, 
accordingly, is entirely dependent on the success with which he can deceive those 
around him; his beggar’s garb, thus, is essential not only because is reinforced and 
substantiates his false tale, but also because, as a socially significant set of items, it 
controls and manipulates the kinds of inferences others make about him. Both these 
considerations are at play in his interview with Penelope in Odyssey 19, in which the 
																																																								
89 The narrator (94-95) also informs us that the beggar’s garb prevents Penelope from recognising her 
Odysseus. In this vein, see also 14.506, where Odysseus claims to Eumaios that he is subject to the 
swineherd’s bad treatment because of his clothing: νῦν δέ μ’ ἀτιμάζουσι κακὰ χροῒ εἵματ’ ἔχοντα” 
(“Now they dishonor me because I wear filthy clothing upon me”). 
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clothing (first) physically and outwardly substantiates Aethon’s identity, (second) 
mediates his interactions with Penelope, (third) manipulates the way in which 
Penelope engages with Odysseus psychologically, (fourth) forestalls recognition 
until he can test her loyalty to his memory, and (finally) represents his status as a 
manipulator par excellence. 
 
On the one hand, then, this clothing is both an extension of Odysseus’ mindedness 
(of his active efforts to conceal his identity) and a set of material objects that 
facilitates false interpretation and psychological engagement between husband and 
wife. On the other, Odysseus’ disguise is an articulation of his true identity, even if it 
conceals it from others: as Block (1985, 11) argues, “Odysseus’ concealments 
expose his power to make the false express the true, and the truth come clear through 
lies”. Aethon’s clothing, therefore, operates within a constellation of resources that, 
taken together, contribute to both individual (Odysseus’) and inter-subjective 
(Odysseus’ and Penelope’s) cognizing within the Odyssey 19 sequence. 
 
II.II. Stripping Away Disguise: Eurycleia and Helen 
These are not the only ways in which Odysseus’ mindedness—and the mindedness 
of others—is extended and enacted through the clothing he wears throughout the 
Odyssey. The stripping away of his disguise, for example, is synonymous with both 
the revelation of his identity and his ruse: Odysseus reveals himself to Eumaios and 
Philoetius (21.217-222), and Laertes (24.331-335) by lifting his rags to display his 
scar, and he removes his clothing after stringing the bow and announcing his identity 
(22.1-2).90 In Book 19, too, Eurycleia ultimately recognizes Odysseus when, lifting 
his rags so that she can wash his feet (467-471):91 
 
  τὴν γρηῢς χείρεσσι καταπρηνέσσι λαβοῦσα 
γνῶ ῥ’ ἐπιμασσαμένη, πόδα δὲ προέηκε φέρεσθαι· 
ἐν δὲ λέβητι πέσε κνήμη, κανάχησε δὲ χαλκός, 
																																																								
90 Although they do not yet seem to recognize him at this point, and even doubt him after he explicitly 
identifies himself (22.45-59). The narrator, however, attributes this to the Suitors’ lack of mental 
aptitude (31-33), and thus the issue here might not be in the clothing themselves, but the Suitors’ 
foolishness. 
91 Earlier in the narrative, Odysseus inwardly expressed this same concern as, upon realizing the 
identificatory power of his scar, he turns his face from the fire (388-391).  
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ἂψ δ’ ἑτέρωσ’ ἐκλίθη· τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἐξέχυθ’ ὕδωρ.  
τὴν δ’ ἅμα χάρμα καὶ ἄλγος ἕλε φρένα, τὼ δέ οἱ ὄσσε 
δακρυόφιν πλῆσθεν, θαλερὴ δέ οἱ ἔσχετο φωνή. 
 
The old woman, holding it with her downturned hands, knew the scar, having 
touched it, and threw off her hold of his foot. His shin fell into the basin, and the 
bronze rang out, immediately tilting to one side, and water spilled out on the 
floor. Pain and joy seized her phrēn at once, and her eyes were filled with tears, 
and her stout voice was held in check. 
 
Eurycleia instantly recognizes Odysseus because his scar is a σήμα: a persistent 
mark of identity.92 But it also prompts a sudden and vivid memory for Eurycleia, 
who recalls both its origin and the events immediately before and after the boar hunt 
during which it was inflicted (399-468). This type of remembering, both Minchin 
(2012, 88) and Scodel (2002, 108-11) point out, is termed “flashbulb memory” in the 
modern sciences. Flashbulb memory—a form of autobiographical or episodic 
memory—was first coined by Brown and Kulik (1977), and is characterized by its 
personal significance, emotional investment, and surprise (Scodel 2002, 105). 
Autobiographical memory, in general, consists in specific episodes and events that, 
combined, constitute what we might understand as “individual memory”; flashbulb 
memory, in respect to this, is usually sudden, vivid, emotionally significant, and 
persistent (Brown and Kulik 1977; Conway, 1995; and Pillemer 1990). “Although 
flashbulb memories are not completely accurate”, Scodel (2002, 105) explains, “they 
decay less over time than other memories, and their strength does not appear to 
depend on how often they are recited”. They thus typically endure over a lifetime, 
though they are not always immediately accessible in a person’s long-term memory; 
they depend on certain external cues in order to prompt recall (Cohen, et al, 1990). 
We can see that, in this passage, Eurycleia’s spontaneous recollection and sudden 
emotional arousal93 fits in with this kind of memory: it happens in an instant and is 
prompted by the sight of Odysseus’ scar.94 She also has an obvious emotional 
																																																								
92 Other σήματα include Penelope’s and Odysseus’ marriage bed, Odysseus’ bow, the grove of trees 
in the Ithacan Palace, and the historic brooch and cloak. 
93 Rutherford (1992, 189) interprets Eurycleia’s emotional reaction as being “grief at Odysseus’ 
ragged condition and fear for his safety”. He also identifies similarly powerful emotions in other 
recognition scenes: Od. 22.500-501, 23.210-212, 231-240. 
94 Scodel (2002, 104-105) also identifies Iliad 2.350-353 and Odyssey 2.172-176 as further examples 
of flashbulb memory in Homer. In the first example, Nestor recalls Zeus’ thunder as they embarked 
for Troy; in the second, Halitherses articulates his prophecy of Odysseus’ return to Ithaca. “Homer 
had no special term for such memories, of course”, Scodel (2002, 106), “but the experience of intense 
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response: she knocks over the basin, her eyes fill with tears, and she is unable to 
speak.95 In his commentary on these lines, Rutherford (1992, 189) places especial 
emphasis on the rapidity of this process: 
 
The whole passage from 467-73 is marvellously vivid, with fast movement, 
sudden noise of metal and water (469, 470), and three clauses describing the 
nurse’s overwhelming emotional response to her discovery… [her] instant 
reaction reminds us that the whole scar-narrative has filled only a split second of 
“real” time. 
 
The unveiled scar, thus, is important not only because it extends and represents 
Odysseus’ identity, but also because it is a powerful means by which Eurycleia can 
interact with her own. To be precise, it prompts recollection of an important 
biographical detail from her life—one that also represents her intimate connection 
and persistent relationship with Odysseus. Though Odysseus soon lets his disguise 
fall back in place and returns to Penelope, the poet gives us access to a moment of 
spontaneous and powerful cognitive interaction between master and nursemaid that 
involves memory, cognitive extension, interpersonal exchange, and external stimuli. 
On an extra-narrative level, the scene as a whole demonstrates that, although the 
narrator may not have been aware of flashbulb memory in its modern scientific 
sense, it is clearly in operation in his epics. 
 
Helen, too, engages with Odysseus’ true and false identities by stripping away his 
disguise. In Odyssey 4, she recollects meeting him in Troy (247-456): 
 
“ἄλλῳ δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἤϊσκε 
δέκτῃ, ὃς οὐδὲν τοῖος ἔην ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν· 
τῷ ἴκελος κατέδυ Τρώων πόλιν, οἱ δ' ἀβάκησαν 
πάντες· ἐγὼ δέ μιν οἴη ἀνέγνων τοῖον ἐόντα,  250 
καί μιν ἀνειρώτευν· ὁ δὲ κερδοσύνῃ ἀλέεινεν. 
ἀλλ' ὅτε δή μιν ἐγὼ λόεον καὶ χρῖον ἐλαίῳ, 
ἀμφὶ δὲ εἵματα ἕσσα καὶ ὤμοσα καρτερὸν ὅρκον, 
μή με πρὶν Ὀδυσῆα μετὰ Τρώεσσ' ἀναφῆναι,  254 
πρίν γε τὸν ἐς νῆάς τε θοὰς κλισίας τ' ἀφικέσθαι, 
καὶ τότε δή μοι πάντα νόον κατέλεξεν Ἀχαιῶν”. 
																																																																																																																																																													
memory is universal and the Odyssey’s main recognitions depend on durable signs that prompt 
individual flashbulb memories”.  
95 See Russo (1992, 95), who notes that Homer highlights how suddenly Odysseus’ disguise is 




“Concealing himself he seemed like another man, a beggar, who was nothing 
alike the one by the ships of the Achaians. In this likeness he went down to the 
city of the Trojans, and they all took no heed. But I alone recognized him, and I 
questioned him. But he avoided me cunningly. But when I had bathed him, and 
anointed him with oil, and set a garment around him, and swore a great oath, to 
not make Odysseus known in the midst of the Trojans, at least before he had 
reached the swift ships and the camp, at that time he set out the whole plan of 
the Achaians”. 
 
Helen’s treatment of Odysseus is synonymous with the final un-veiling of his 
identity; it succeeds where questions fail. But what is also important about this 
passage is that Helen and Odysseus engage each other psychologically through the 
physical medium of his disguise and the new garments in which she re-clothes him. 
Helen is a character who herself is particularly adept at seeing through the disguises 
of others: she is able to identify the Horse for what it really is (Od. 4.274-289), she 
correctly identifies Aphrodite on the walls of Troy (Il. 3.396-398), and she 
recognises Telemachus instantaneously upon her arrival to the Spartan banquet (Od. 
4.138-146). In this passage, she recognizes (ἀνέγνων, 250) Odysseus even despite 
his beggar’s garb. This passage, thus, not only demonstrates Odysseus’ cunning and 
his ability to manipulate the expectations of and inferences made by others, but 
Helen’s, who is able to see past the disguises used by others. In other words, and 
more specifically, the way that both characters engage with the garments in this 
scene speaks primarily to their mental aptitude; they physically represent the 
psychological capabilities of the pair, and facilitate cognitive interaction between 
them. 
 
II.III. Odysseus in Scheria 
This section has so far discussed the way in which clothing—Odysseus’ in 
particular—is an active part of cognitive processes and interactions. It has explored 
how, in being a part of Odysseus’ extended cognitive system, others are able to 
engage with his disguise, both intellectually (Helen) and mnemonically (Eurycleia). I 
now shift my focus to the way in which individuals impose abstract desires and 
motivations on Odysseus—in which they illustrate and enact future hopes—through 
gifted clothing. As stated above, clothing is an important indicator of social status in 
the Homeric world; in Scheria, it physically represents attempts by different 
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members of the royal household to encourage Odysseus into or dissuade him from 
different roles. This is the case for all the women with whom Odysseus comes in 
contact on his journey home. “By giving clothing to Odysseus”, Yagamata (2005, 
540) argues, “these women are trying to control his identity, to make him what they 
want him to be”.96  
 
Nausicaa cultivates Odysseus as a potential spouse by dressing him in garments from 
her trousseau. This is not just a practicality, as we know from the episode’s broader 
context that courtship is at the forefront of Nausicaa’s mind: Athene had encouraged 
her to prepare for her future wedding in a dream (6.25-40), and Alcinous had 
understood her unspoken intentions when she had asked permission to leave the 
house (66-67).97 Within the context of this exchange, clothing is one means by which 
Nausicaa’s intentions towards Odysseus and the relationship she aims to establish 
with him are represented by the narrator. It does so because (first) the clothing from 
her trousseau operates as a metonym for marriage, in which the production and 
provision of clothing is one of a wife’s key responsibilities, (second) the gifted 
clothing occurs within a broader episode that is already heavily loaded with 
undertones of courtship, and (finally) Nausicaa, described as a παρθένος ἀδμής 
(228) while Odysseus is dressing, is explicitly presented as a marriageable option. 
But these considerations are especially important when Odysseus first arrives at 




96 Block (1985, 10) similarly argues that, “Each woman in Odysseus’ life clothes him in ways 
appropriate to her own role and the aspect of his identity with which she is concerned”. 
97 Subtexts of marriage, sex, and courtship permeate the entire Phaeacian episode, but especially this 
initial exchange between Nausicaa and Odysseus. In particular, the location of their meeting—the 
flowery meadow— is overtly sexual as, elsewhere in early Greek epic, it is often the site of erotic 
activity; see Schein (1995, 21) on this point, who argues that an inversion of this motif is the “Sirens” 
episode, and Vernant (1996, 186). Other examples include: (1) Odysseus describes the conditions of a 
good marriage to Nausicaa (178-185); (2) Alcinous’ offer of Nausicaa as a bride for Odysseus 
(17.311-315); and (3) Demodocus’ song about Aphrodite and Ares’ affair, and Hephaestus’ retaliation 
(8.266-365). Garvie (1994, 140) and Besslich (1996, 91), furthermore, note that the simile that occurs 
at lines 224-237 to mark Odysseus’ rejuvenation, partially brought on by Nausicaa’s gifted clothing, 
present him as a bridegroom. For discussions of this same simile elsewhere in the Odyssey, see Kilb 
(1973, 161-163) and Rutherford (1992, 57).  
98 The classic scholarly analysis of this exchange is in Schadewaldt (1959), who comments on the 
tension that stems from her initial recognition of his garments. For further discussion that builds upon 
Schadewaldt’s work, see Hölscher (1960) and Krischer (1989). 
	 	
	 110	
τοῖσιν δ’ Ἀρήτη λευκώλενος ἤρχετο μύθων· 
ἔγνω γὰρ φᾶρός τε χιτῶνά τε εἵματ’ ἰδοῦσα 
καλά, τά ῥ’ αὐτὴ τεῦξε σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισι γυναιξί· 
 
White-armed Arete was the first among them to speak, for she recognised the 
cloak and the tunic, having seen the fine clothing, the ones she herself had made 
with her attendants. 
 
It has been established that Homer’s characters use their theory of mind abilities in 
supplying mental states and motives for others when there is little other available 
information. The cognitive process through which Arete undergoes in this passage is 
signalled by γιγνώσκω (234), which represents the pattern of inferences she makes, 
based on his clothing, about the newly arrived supplicant and his potential 
relationship with her daughter. Nausicaa’s garments, then, fill a cognitive gap in that 
they represent her “signature” on Odysseus that Arete is able to interpret where there 
is little other information about his identity available to her. 99 Arete articulates her 
confusion about the discrepancy between his suppliant status and the familiarity of 
his garments in her following address (238-239):   
 
                      “τίς τοι τάδε εἵματ’ ἔδωκεν; 
οὐ δὴ φῂς ἐπὶ πόντον ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ’ ἱκέσθαι;” 
 
“Who gave you those garments? Did you not say to have come from the roving 
sea?”  
 
These two questions operate as additional confirmation that Arete has used 
Odysseus’ clothing as source material with which she can interpret Nausicaa’s 
motives and intentions. In order to discourage Odysseus from the role that her 
daughter envisions for him, Arete gifts him with two additional sets of clothing 
during his stay in Scheria (8.438-41, 13.66-67); this ensures that, as Yagamata (2005, 
541) argues, his place in the Phaeacian household is “honoured guest” rather than 
“potential suitor”. Throughout the Phaeacian episode, therefore, clothing is an 
extended means by which Odysseus’ identity is manipulated to fit different potential 
roles. In doing so, they express the intentions and motivations of both Arete and 
																																																								
99 On possible connections with the Odyssey 19 exchange, Garvie (1994, 212-213) comments that the 
questions asked by Arete of Odysseus are similar to those posed by Penelope at 19.104-105. 
Additionally, the textiles of both scenes play a similar role for their characters in that they help to “fill 
the gaps” in the host-suppliant relationship. 
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Nausicaa in that they operate as cognitive “tools” and physical extensions of their 
mindedness. 
 
III. “ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ”: Memory, Imagination, and Pictureability 
The garb in which different women (Athene, Helen, Arete, and Nausicaa) clothe 
Odysseus in the Odyssey is (first) a powerful mark of identity, (second) an active 
component of his psychological functioning, and (third) a medium through which 
others can explore their own mindedness. Odyssey 19 is no exception, as clothing—
both real (his disguise) and imagined (historic textiles)—plays a key role in his 
attempt to engage Penelope psychologically. It is to the more immediate context of 
Aethon’s speech that I now turn, but especially to his introductory remarks about 
how he will respond to her challenge (221-224): 
 
“ὦ γύναι, ἀργαλέον τόσσον χρόνον ἀμφὶς ἐόντα 
εἰπεῖν· ἤδη γὰρ τόδ’ ἐεικοστὸν ἔτος ἐστίν, 
ἐξ οὗ κεῖθεν ἔβη καὶ ἐμῆς ἀπελήλυθε πάτρης·    
αὐτάρ τοι ἐρέω, ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ”.        
        
“My lady, it’s difficult for me, away for such a long time, to tell you, since it is 
the twentieth year for him, from when he went from there and left my 
fatherland. But I will tell you as my ētor depicts it to me”. 
 
Aethon states that, although it has been twenty years since he last saw Odysseus, he 
will recall and describe him as imagined (ἰνδάλλεται, 224) by his ἦτορ. The use of 
ἰνδάλλομαι (to seem, appear) to describe the mechanics of this process reinforces 
the idea that the source material from which Aethon’s ἦτορ draws are mental 
images, reproduced by the mind’s eye and derived from memories that the beggar 
himself struggles to recall. Accordingly, Eustathius explains of these lines in his 
commentary that, 
 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἐρέω ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ, τουτέστι φαντάζεται 
ἀνειδωλοποιεῖται, ἅ περ εἴποι ἂν ὁ δυσχερῶς μεμνημένος τινὸς, ἐπιφέρει.  
 
But I will speak as my ἦτορ pictures it to me, that is to say, makes it present to 
the mind’s eye [represents in imagery]. He adds the sort of thing that a person 




Both ancient and modern thought on the role of mental imagery and imagination—
the latter of which is usually associated with φαντασία in Greek (Sheppherd 2014a, 
361)—are, I think, at the heart of the process of recall and description on which 
Odysseus embarks in the narrative to follow.100 In his influential work on the mind’s 
eye in science and literature, Paivio (1983, 1990) proposes that individuals recall 
information in a dual-coded approach that involves images and words, the former 
being more memorable and accessible when they are more vivid, the latter a crucial 
element in communicating these images to others. This is particularly useful in 
decoding the role of the storyteller who, in providing vivid and coherent pictures that 
he reproduces in speech, is able to both connect with his audience and involve them 
emotionally in his tale.101 But the debate on mental imagery, memory recall, and 
creative imagination—“how we imagine”—is much broader, and deserves some 
extra discussion.  
 
In a general sense, modern study of imagination and memory is a wide-ranging, 
inclusive field that spans both the sciences and the humanities. The most fully 
articulated form of imagination—creative imagination—not only has a long 
evolutionary history, but may also have enabled homo sapiens to flourish in contrast 
to other members of their genus (Mithen 2007, 5). The ability to produce, 
manipulate, and navigate complex networks of mental images is thought to be at the 
heart of how imagination functions from cognitive and neuroscientific perspectives. 
Described by Pearson (2007, 187) as, “a quasi-perceptual state of consciousness in 
which the mind appears able to simulate or re-create sensory life experience”, mental 
imagery and imagination have also been linked to our ability to perform different 
creative tasks, such as conceptualizing scientific theories (Miller 1984) and problem-
solving and decision-making processes (Finke 1990; Kauffmann 1988). Accordingly, 
anecdotal evidence from Einstein (Gardner 1993), Tesla (Miller 2000), and Feynman 
(Miller 1984) all suggest that the ability to conceptualise complex theory through 
																																																								
100 Sheppard (2014a, 363) also links it to the Latin imaginatio. For more on the Latin term, see Watson 
(1998). 
101 There have been numerous discussions about how this might work in the context of the Homeric 
poems. Minchin in particular has argued along these lines for Homeric similes (2001a, 2009). 
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mental imagery is at the heart of scientific progress.102 Mental images are also 
inherently dynamic in nature (Paivio 1983, 8). As Minchin (2001, 27) points out, 
“We can transform and manipulate them; we can scan a scene which we hold in the 
mind’s eye; we can focus on events to one side; and we can move back and forward 
through sequences with little effort”.  
 
Foundational studies by Finke, Pinker, and Farah (1989) and Finke and Slayton 
(1988) tested two potential theories for the mechanics of imagination: (first) guided 
mental synthesis, (second) creative mental synthesis. 
 
In Finke, et al.’s (1989) studies, participants were guided through a mental task that 
required them to reproduce and manipulate sets of shapes into a single image. 
Participants were instructed to draw the final image for their interviewer at the end; if 
the instructions were followed correctly, then they would have produced an easily 
identifiable image. Of these participants, 60% were able to follow instructions on 
their interviewer’s verbal cues; 70% of these produced a recognizable object. 
“Participants were able”, Pearson (2007, 191) concludes of their findings, “to 
reinterpret their images as resembling familiar objects or scenes without any 
additional support from an external perceptual source… the mental image itself was 
sufficient to provide a basis for the discovery”.  
 
Finke and Slayton (1988) devised an experiment termed the “creative synthesis task” 
which, in contrast to the guided method, focused more on independent generation of 
mental imagery. In this experiment, participants were given fifteen numeric and 
geometric shapes that they memorized until they were able to produce them based on 
verbal cues. They were then given three symbols and asked to combine and 
manipulate them mentally until they formed a recognizable shape in short periods of 
time. Results in these tests showed that participants were able to produce familiar 
objects 40% of the time (Pearson 2007, 193), even given limited time frames and 
restrictive choices in shapes as source material. 
 
																																																								
102 See Pearson (2007, 188-190) for a more detailed discussion of some of this anecdotal evidence. 
	 	
	 114	
These studies show that human beings are adept in re-creating, combining, and 
manipulating mental images using different methods, and for different purposes. 
Aethon, in describing Odysseus’ historic clothing, appearance, and companions to 
Penelope, engages in a guided mental synthesis task. More specifically, he leads 
Penelope through a set of instructions that, combined, encourage her towards 
formulating recognizable images based on vivid and detailed mental images. He 
notably does so without any external stimuli: the clothing in question is historical—
lost during his long absence from Ithaca—and thus does not exist in any actual, 
material sense. In synthesizing each separate component into one cohesive image, 
Odysseus is able to connect with her psychologically. The success of this process is 
implicit in the lines following Aethon’s speech, in which the narrator describes 
Penelope’s reaction (249-250): 
 
ὣς φάτο, τῇ δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑφ’ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο 
σήματ’ ἀναγνούσῃ, τά οἱ ἔμπεδα πέφραδ’ Ὀδυσσεύς. 
 
Thus he spoke, and in her the desire to weep was stirred up even more, 
recognizing the steadfast signs that Odysseus pointed out. 
 
Penelope’s recognition of the different elements described by Aethon is described 
using the compound ἀνα + γιγνώσκω (to know again/perceive well, 250); 
additionally, they stir up (ὄρνυμι, 249) the desire in her to weep, which suggests 
genuine emotional involvement with his story. This not only verifies the success of 
Odysseus’ attempts to connect with his wife on a psychological and emotional level, 
but also reflects the ability for embodied imagery to act as an intermediary between 
two individuals; the narrator, in his use of language, primarily emphasizes the 
significance of these described textiles as mental cues and as a means of 
psychological engagement.103  
 
																																																								
103 These lines might also, according to Scodel (2002, 107), signify that Penelope has had a flashbulb 
memory. In a more general sense, Scodel (2002, 107) points to the formula ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο (249) 
as indicating, “the response to memory of the dead or to thoughts of those who are alive but 
unreachable. It indicated an unrealizable longing to make actual contact in place of the intense mental 
connection the character feels to an absent friend” (see also Il. 23.14, 108, 153, 24.507; Od. 4.113 for 
further examples of this formula). In describing the clothing, however, “he arouses Penelope’s precise 
memory of one moment, while pretending to evoke another, when the women admired Odysseus’ 
clothing” (108). In this sense, Scodel (2002, 107) argues, Penelope’s reaction to Odysseus’ historic 
clothis is “both intellectual and emotional”.  
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Ancient concepts of ἐναργεία and φαντασία are also useful here. In a seminal study 
of these terms in rhetorical manuals, Webb (2009, 87) defines ἐναργεία as, “the 
quality of language that appeals to the audience’s imagination”, but particularly as it 
engages with their emotions.104 In contrast to this, φαντασία (appearance, image) is 
most often associated with the English “imagination”. Aristotle (de An. 428a5) views 
it as the faculty of imagination; Philostratus (Vita Apolonii 6.19), additionally, 
associates it with creative imagination; Longinus (Sublime 3.1) credits it as the use of 
images in literature. As Sheppard (2014a, 354) argues of Longinus’ understanding of 
the term in particular,  
 
Phantasia is connected explicitly with visualization by the writer and the 
recreation of such visualization in the audience… this way of talking about 
visualization is very common in ancient literary criticism and is closely linked to 
concepts of enargeia.  
 
While ἐναργεία is the quality that makes a particular description vivid, memorable, 
or “emotional”, therefore, φαντασία is the imagery that constitutes a particular 
description. Although Homer does not explicitly refer to the function of ἐναργεία 
and φαντασία in either their intra- or extra-narrative contexts, Sheppard (2014a, 
354-355) argues that the “seeds of the later theory are already present… Homer is 
concerned with the poet and his ability to tell a story as if he had been present 
himself; the idea that he makes his audience feel as if they in their turn had been 
present is at best implicit” (355). In Odyssey 8, for example, Odysseus praises 
Demodocus for the skill with which he tells of events in the Trojan War (489-491): 
 
“ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ’ ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ’ Ἀπόλλων· 
λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον ἀείδεις,  
ὅσσ’ ἕρξαν τ’ ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ’ ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί,  
ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας”. 
 
“Either the Muse, Zeus’ daughter, or Apollo taught you, for truly, in good order, 
do you sing the fate of the Achaians, all the Achaians had done and suffered, as 
if you had been there yourself, or heard it from one who was”. 
																																																								
104 Webb provides the most thoroughly and influential work to date on ἐνάργεια in the ancient world, 
but especially as it was used in first century C.E. rhetorical texts. Eden (1986, 72-73), however, argues 
that theories about ἐνάργεια were already developed in the fifth century B.C.E., in which the narrator 
“set out to reproduce the vividness of ocular proof through language”. See also Watson (1988, 1994) 




Like the Homeric narrator himself, inspiration for Demodocus’ art comes from the 
divine: from the Muses or Apollo (ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ’ ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ’ 
Ἀπόλλων, 489). But, as Sheppherd argues, the mechanisms underlying epic poetry 
(and its recitation) to which Odysseus alludes are best encapsulated by concepts of 
ἐναργεία. Garvie argues (1994, 332) of 489-490 (λίην… κόσμον) that, “the 
phrase… combines the sense of aesthetic arrangement with the accurate reproduction 
of things as they were, and perhaps also appropriateness to the requirements of the 
audience”.105 Though Homer makes no overt reference to it in Odysseus’ praise of 
Demodocus, they clearly underpin his statements. Odysseus, accordingly, has an 
obvious emotional reaction in the succeeding lines when, after Demodocus sings of 
the Trojan horse, he begins weeping in the manner of a women being dragged into 
slavery (521-531). Demodocus, then, is not only able to reproduce—as a conduit of 
the Muses or Apollo—a vivid, eyewitness account of the events he narrators, but also 
engages his audience (here, Odysseus) emotionally in his tale.  
 
I want to linger on the Homeric narrator’s art a little longer, but especially as it 
relates to his potential relationship with his audience. In a discussion of Homeric 
simile, Minchin (2001) analyzes the narrator’s use of mental imagery that facilitates 
understanding and insight for his audience. She is especially concerned with how 
scientific studies on mental imagery elucidate aspects of Homer’s craft and, in doing 
so, identifies three main purposes of simile in the Iliad and Odyssey (2001, 33-34):  
 
[T]he function of similes fall into three broad categories: some are ideational, 
for they express new ideas about the topic; some are interpersonal, in that they 
build new relations between speaker and listener; and some, since they are 
concerned with the organization and presention of the message, are textual. 
 
With respect to the second sense—building relations between speaker and listener—
Minchin argues that the production of detailed and multi-sensory narratives is 
essential in establishing links between poet and audience. This is especially the case 
when the images contained within a particular narrative relate to the experiences of 
																																																								
105 See also Walsh (1984), Adkins (1972, 16-17), and Gostoli (1986, 158-159) on these points. 
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his audience. “Intimacy may develop”, Minchin (2001, 33) explains, “between a 
speaker and his or her audience when the speaker chooses vehicles for comparison 
that refer directly to the experience of the audience”. These images are usually 
“readily pictureable” to an audience. Elsewhere in this thesis, I have shown how this 
is the case in (for example) similes likening the Lapithae to great oaks and 
Idomeneus to a boar. In illustrating her point, Minchin discusses, among others, a 
simile likening Achilles to a lion in Iliad 24: Πηλεΐδης δ’ οἴκοιο λέων ὣς ἆλτο 
θύραζε (572). The audience, Minchin (2001, 35-36) argues, is led to draw 
comparisons between the behaviour of Achilles as he prepares to desecrate Hector’s 
body with that of a wild animal’s. Certain features of the lion are especially 
important, and held in the mind’s eye as we interpret the image: his paws, mane, and 
sharp teeth. But Minchin (2001, 36) also states that, 
 
What is more important is that we also bring to bear on the issue what we know 
of the instinctive behaviour of lions and the fear which men and animals feel in 
their presence. So when we compare Achilles to a lion we are observing that the 
hero shares the lion’s readiness for action, his uncompromising single-
mindedness, and his power to terrify.  
 
Intimacy is created between poet and audience because the “finished product”—the 
simile—contains images which are both exceptionally pictureable and derived from 
the audience’s own experiences. In accessing these experiences and bringing them to 
bear in their interpretation of the simile, Minchin (2001, 36) argues, audiences 
establish relationships with both the narrative and its narrator. 
 
Both internal (Demodocus) and external (the Homeric poet) narrators thus engage in 
similar processes when constructing their narratives for their audiences. This is also 
the case for Odysseus in Odyssey 19. His own tale, he claims, is comprised of mental 
images, derived from his memory and produced by his ἦτορ that, when described for 
Penelope, enables her to reconstruct them in her own mind and thus affirm Aethon’s 
identity. These ideas are underpinned both by ancient concepts of ἐναργεία and 
φαντασίαι and modern studies of creative imagination and mental imagery. We 
have also seen that, in making sense of Aethon’s tale, Penelope begins weeping. It is 
therefore clear that she has real emotional engagement in his story, both because of 
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its content—it is clear that she clings close to the memory of her husband—and 
because, being derived from her own experience, she engages in complex mental 
mechanics in reproducing the images for herself. Intimacy is thus established 
between the disguised husband (narrator) and his wife (audience) partially through 
this process; Odysseus articulates this intersubjective exchange succinctly in the 
opening lines of his speech. 
 
It is also important to note that the cognitive processes in Aethon’s speech are 
primarily framed using cognitive metaphors. At line 236, for example, Aethon 
instructs Penelope to “cast” the information he relates in her φρήν (“ἄλλο δέ τοι 
ἐρέω, σὺ δ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν”, 237). This is an example of the “Mind is a 
container” and “Communication is sending [conduit metaphor]” image schemata. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 29) have accordingly shown that container metaphors are 
common linguistic features in several languages. Obvious containers, they argue, are 
rooms and houses; moving from one room or house to another is moving between 
containers. This can also be the case for events, actions, and states, which can be 
conceptualized metaphorically in a similar way. Of conduit metaphors, additionally, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 10) explain: “The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words 
(containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/objects 
out of the word/containers”. Reddy (1993[1979], 286-287), in a study of conduit 
metaphors, argues that this kind of metaphor accounts for up to seventy percent of 
the conceptual expressions used in the English language; examples of these include 
phrases such as, “It’s hard to get that idea across to him”, “I have you that idea”, “It’s 
difficult to put my ideas into words”. With this in mind, we might be able to better 
understand the way in which Aethon conceives of the cognitive processes underlying 
his exchange with Penelope: here, her φρήν is clearly described as a container (ἐνὶ 
φρεσὶ βάλλεο, 237) in which ideas can be placed, stored, or (in Penelope’s case) 
processed; Aethon’s described images, in turn, are likened to objects that he “sends” 
to Penelope as he describes the clothing to her. Additionally, Aethon cites the “well-
made” (δαίδαλος, 227) pin that holds the χλαῖνα in place, which may be a comment 
on the composition of the speech itself and (pre-emptively) its overall success: the 
superb craftsmanship is a reflection upon Odysseus’ skill as a rhetorician, which 
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“holds” his speech together. Aethon’s use of metaphor and embodied imagery thus 
articulates the cognitive process that occurs in the background of the exchange, in 
which a disguised husband attempts to generate a successful, “well-made” tale and 
establishes a psychological link with his cautious wife via the reproduction and 
communication of mental images. On an extra-narrative level, this enables the 
audience to gain insight to the mental processes taking place in the scene. 
 
IV. Empathy, Group Cognition, and “Feeling Others” 
The previous chapter of this thesis explored, in part, the processes by which we intuit 
mental states and processes based on observable nonverbal behaviour. It argued that 
Homer’s characters possess robust theory of mind abilities that they bring to bear in 
interacting with and formulating judgements about other people. Idomeneus, for 
example, describes bravery and cowardice based on their affective, somatic qualities, 
and argues that it is by these “outputs” that one discerns the character of an 
individual. This is also the case for Odysseus throughout the Odyssey, whose 
identity—social, political, personal, and economic—is concealed based upon the 
types of disguises he dons on his way home from Troy. In these instances, clothing is 
a medium of interpretation for the people around him. Both Arete and Nausicaa, in a 
similar vein, enact their own cognition on Odysseus with the clothing they gift him 
during his time among the Phaeacians. The removal of his disguise, additionally, 
enables Eurycleia to explore their shared history as she identifies Aethon as her 
returned master. I argued that, inasmuch as these disguises take an active role in 
Odysseus’ psychological functioning and represent the cognizing of others, they 
operate as part of extended cognitive systems that incorporate brain, body, and 
world. 
 
One recent and popular scientific elaboration of extended cognition theory addresses 
group minds, collective intentionality, and social cognition. Tollefson, a pioneer in 
this area, incorporates Clark’s and Chalmer’s original “parity principle” in describing 
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her objection to more traditional accounts of group minds in scientific discourse 
(2006, 140):106 
 
The resistance to collective mental states is motivated by the view that mental 
states are located in minds and minds are located in heads. Since groups do not 
have heads or brains, they cannot have mental states… but if “the mind ain’t in 
the head”,107 then this removes a major barrier preventing the acceptance of the 
idea that groups are bearers of states. 
 
In contrast to what Tollefson terms Clark’s and Chalmer’s “solipsistic systems”—
cognitive loops that involve artefacts such as computers, books, and tablets—these 
extended networks are “collective systems”: “coupled systems that are constituted 
primarily by humans” (2006, 141). This idea also has a firm basis in evolutionary 
development: as Tummolini and Castelfranchi (2006) point out, the human species is 
deeply co-operative. “Our ability to act together with our conspecifics”, they (2006, 
97) state, “vastly surmounts that of other animals (including our closest primate 
relatives) both in its scale and its temporal extension”.108 
 
I find these ideas deeply compelling, and think that they can aid us in understanding 
the Odysseus-Penelope interview of Odyssey 19, which is, at its heart, a 
demonstration of how empathy, inter-subjectivity, co-operation, and social cognition 
are at work in the Homeric poems. Odysseus and Penelope are renowned for their 
ὁμοφροσύνη: for their one-ness of mind that differentiates them from other 
Homeric couples. This section argues that, along the lines of recent studies 
conducted on married couples, Odysseus and Penelope represent a “collective 
system”—that they are active parts of each other’s psychological functioning. 
																																																								
106 See Bratman (1993) and Tuomela (1992), for example; also Searle (1990, 1995), who advocates for 
group minds retaining a sense of individualism within them in arguing that “we-intentions” and “we-
beliefs” are a collection of individual mental states and processes. On a similar vein, Gilbert (2002, 
2003) ambiguously promotes the idea of “plural subjects”, though she alludes to group beliefs as 
being the beliefs of individuals.  
107 For the origin of this phrase, see McDowell (1992), which appears as a variation of Putnam’s 
(1975) saying, “meaning ain’t in the head”. 
108 See also Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005), and Tummolini and Castelfranchi 




Odysseus and Penelope’s interview occupies most of Odyssey 19 and is, as an 
example of inter-subjective cognition, multi-faceted and complex. Because of this, I 
think it is helpful to fully outline the aspects of this exchange that are important for 
my discussion: 
 
First half of the Odysseus-Penelope interview 
107-120 Aethon praises Penelope and likens her fame to that of a well-respected and 
god-fearing king, but requests that she not ask him about his identity, since 
his past is too painful to remember. 
124-129 Penelope refutes Aethon’s initial claims, citing the toll her grief takes on 
her, and stating she would be even more famed, were Odysseus to return. 
137-156 The weaving of Laertes’ funeral shroud/deception of the Suitors. 
157-161 Penelope’s parents and son are anxious for her to remarry; particularly 
Telemachus, whose inheritance is diminished by her suitors. 
165-171 After her insistence that Aethon identify himself, he warns Penelope that 
retelling his story will make him unhappy (“ἦ μέν μ’ ἀχέεσσί γε δώσεις 
πλείοσιν ἢ ἔχομαι”), but states that he will still cede to her request. 
172-202 Aethon’s backstory 
185-202 Aethon claims to have hosted Odysseus for twelve days while he was on his 
way to Troy. 
Penelope’s reaction to Odysseus’ lying tale, and her challenge 
203 Odysseus is able to make his lies convincing for Penelope (ἴσκε ψεύδεα 
πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). 
204-209 [Simile] As snow thaws (κατατήκετ’) on mountain-tops (ἀκροπόλοισιν 
ὄρεσσιν), thawed (κατέτηξεν) by the East wind and poured down 
(καταχεύῃ) by the West wind… so Penelope’s cheeks melted (ὣς τῆς 
τήκετο καλὰ παρήϊα) as she shed tears (δάκρυ χεούσης) for her husband. 
209-212 Though Odysseus feels pity for Penelope, he remains outwardly unmoving 
(ὀφθαλμοὶ δ’ ὡς εἰ κέρα ἕστασαν ἠὲ σίδηρος ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροισι), 
maintaining his disguise. 
215-19 Penelope challenges Aethon on three points of his story: (first) the clothing 
Odysseus wore at the time, (second) his appearance, and (third) the 
companions who were with him. 
Aethon’s response to Penelope’s challenge 
221-224 Though it has been twenty years since he last saw Odysseus, he will 
describe him to Penelope as his ētor pictures him. 
225-231 Description of Odysseus’ double-folded, purple mantle and golden brooch… 
232-235 …and the shining, fringed tunic that was admired by many of the Cretan 
women. 
236-240 Aethon expresses doubt about the origin of the clothing and cites Odysseus’ 
popularity. 
241-248 Aethon informs Penelope that he sent Odysseus off with proper guest-gifts 
and describes his companion, the herald Eurybates. 
Penelope’s reaction to Aethon’s response 
249-50 Penelope recognizes the proof offered by Aethon and, because of them, 
weeps a second time. 
253-260 She informs Aethon that, because of this, he is a friend, rather than a 
suppliant in her house and confirms that she herself had supplied Odysseus 
with the clothing he describes to her, but insists that he will not return home. 
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261-305 Aethon reveals to Penelope that Odysseus is soon to return, recounts some 
of his troubles since leaving Troy, and praises his good judgment in 
collecting wealth on his way home (ὣς περὶ κέρδεα πολλὰ καταθνητῶν 
ἀνθρώπων οἶδ’ Ὀδυσεύς). He is close at hand. 
308-334 Penelope expresses doubt about Aethon’s story, and instructs her 
maidservants to wash his feet and prepare a bed for him. 
[interlude with Eurycleia] 
Second half of the Odysseus-Penelope interview 
508-53 Penelope expresses her inner turmoil about whether she should marry again, 
or stay in Odysseus’ house, and recounts her dream of the geese and the 
eagle. 
554-8 Odysseus confirms that the dream spells the destruction of the Suitors… 
560-9 …though Penelope again doubts its meaning, and points out the ambiguity 
of dreams. 
570-87 Penelope informs Aethon that she will set up the contest of the bow; Aethon 
urges her to do so quickly. 
588-604 Penelope concludes the interview, returns to her rooms, and weeps until 
Athene puts her to sleep. 
 
This section first addresses how Penelope and Odysseus interact with each other in 
the two halves of their interview, but especially on a psychological and mnemonic 
level. I argue that, in line with modern studies of cognition in intimate relationships, 
they form a “coupled system”. I then contrast their relationship with that of 
Menelaus’ and Helen’s, who engage in what I call, “competitive remembering”. In 
this sense, their relationship is the antithesis of Odysseus’ and Penelope’s, whose 
interactions are deeply co-operative. The third portion of this section focuses 
specifically on Aethon’s use of material media. After providing a brief survey of how 
material objects facilitate remembering for Homer’s characters in general, I examine 
the different ways in which Odysseus’ clothing engages Penelope’s mindedness. 
 
Eurycleia and Odysseus, by contrast, share a history as former-nursemaid and 
nursling; their relationship his one of a (pseudo) mother and her child. In Homer, 
such relationships are partially represented through nonverbal behaviour that is 
grounded in evolutionary and early cognitive development. The next section 
discusses how the narrator presents the intimacy—and aggression—between the pair 
from the perspective of modern science. 
 
IV.I. Remembering Together: Memory Recall in Intimate Relationships 
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Recent discoveries in extended and social cognition found that—despite more 
traditional thinking in the sciences—groups can “share” minds and mental states. 
Tollefson, as stated above, is especially influential in this area; but, more recently, 
experiments undertaken by (for example) Harris and Sutton have explored how 
group minds and extended cognition function more specifically in long-term, 
intimate relationships (2011, 2013). In general, these studies found that there are 
benefits for members of these relationships in “remembering together”. This is 
typically termed “transactive memory theory”, which denotes, “the process by which 
benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads (couples) or 
groups” (Harris, et. al. 2011, 267). Recent experiments by Harris et al. (2011, 2014) 
aimed to test this theory in four separate studies (2014, 288-289):109 
 
Study One tested 12 couples, aged 60-89, and married for 26-60 years. Each couple 
was tested twice (first as individuals and then as a pair two weeks later). The couples 
were tested on three separate tasks: (first) recalling a word list, (second) recalling a 
list of personal import, and (third) recalling a shared event in an interview.  
 
Study Two tested 19 couples, aged 69-86, and married for 15-62 years. Each couple 
was tested twice in the same session, half recalling (first) individually and (second) 
collaboratively, while the other half recalled individually both times. Again, couples 
were asked to perform three tasks: the first two tasks of Study One, and (third) 
recalling two autobiographical events in detail. Harris et al., furthermore, distributed 
the Memory Compensation Questionnaire to “assess couples’ reported day-to-day 
memory strategies” (2008, 288). 
 
Study Three tested 20 couples, aged 70-88, and married 38-65 years. Each couple 
was tested using the same programme as in Study Two. They performed a memory 
task developed from the Episodic Recombination paradigm (Addis et al., 2008), “in 
which couples elicited and then remembered in detail six autobiographical events 
that they had experienced together”. 
																																																								
109 Details of these studies are summarized from Harris, et. al. (2014, 288-289); I have here adapted 




Study Four administered Study Three with 13 couples, aged 26-42, and married 2-19 
years, in order to test whether findings from the first three studies were limited to 
older couples.  
 
Despite marked differences in success levels—some couples collaborated better as a 
unit, while others performed better individually—Harris et al. were able to identify 
four main benefits—termed “emergence”—for couples recalling significant 
autobiographical events: (first) new information became available when couples 
collaborated, versus when they remembered alone, (second) the described events 
were “emotionally richer and more vivid collaboratively” (Harris et al. 2014, 291), 
and (third) couples were able to reach a better understanding of the event; “the same 
event was now understood differently” (Harris et al 2014, 291). While the amount 
recalled by couples was not increased through collaboration, therefore, working 
together meant that the autobiographical event in question was richer and more 
productive. In illustrating their point, Harris et al. (2014, 290-291) provide an 


















And how many trips did you do? There’s the Greek islands. 
South America. 
We did South America, yes, we did Peru and Brazil and Argentina and 
Bolivia and the Andes. We went up to… do you remember munching 
on the coca leaf to try… 
Oh yes. 
We went up to The Andes at 5,000 meters, and munching on coca leaf, 
and [wife] decided she needed to have a pee. 
So we were on the road here, you see, but the little latrine was up on 
the top. 
It was about 50 meters higher. 
So we had to climb up from the road. 
So I said, all right, I’ll take you up there. By the time I got down, 
which at 5,000 meters climbing, I’d just about had it. 
Yes, we thought we were going to faint, but we didn’t. But those coca 
leaves were very good. I rather liked them. 
 
In this example, we see how—though the interviewer struggled to keep the couple 
on-track—the husband and wife engage in “collaborative remembering”: in taking 
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cues from each other, they were able to reconstruct an autobiographical event more 
easily and with greater detail than if they recalled them individually. “In this case”, 
Harris et al. (2014, 291) conclude, “the rich cuing that occurs with a partner means 
that detailed, specific memories can be recalled that neither individual is able to 
access when tested by themselves”. Additionally, several theorists claim that this 
shared remembering can also alter individual memory in different ways; that 
collaboration produces affects for each member of the married unit, as well as for the 
relationship as a whole (Theiner and O’Connor, 2010; Wegner, 1987). 
 
Penelope and Odysseus—even despite his disguise—engage in collaborative 
remembering in the Odyssey 19 interview. We see them take cues from each other: 
(first) Aethon states that he hosted Odysseus in Crete for twelve days (185-202), 
(second) based upon this information, Penelope requests that he elaborate on three 
points of his tale (215-219), (third) Aethon provides a more detailed account of the 
Cretan episode, addressing each of Penelope’s points (221-248), and (fourth) 
Penelope, in confirming the truth in Aethon’s response, adds to the memory by 
describing the origin of the clothing (255-260): 
 
“αὐτὴ γὰρ τάδε εἵματ’ ἐγὼ πόρον, οἷ’ ἀγορεύεις,  
πτύξασ’ ἐκ θαλάμου, περόνην τ’ ἐπέθηκα φαεινὴν 
κείνῳ ἄγαλμ’ ἔμεναι. τὸν δ’ οὐχ ὑποδέξομαι αὖτις   
οἴκαδε νοστήσαντα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν. 
τῶ ῥα κακῇ αἴσῃ κοίλης ἐπὶ νηὸς Ὀδυσσεὺς 
ᾤχετ’ ἐποψόμενος Κακοΐλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν.” 
 
“For I myself provided the cloak, as you speak [of it], folding it from out of the 
inner room, and I set the radiant pin on it, to be that person’s ornament. But I 
won’t welcome him again having returned home to his dear fatherland. Then, by 
evil destiny, on a hollow ship Odysseus went to look on Evil Ilium, a name not 
to be spoken”. 
 
The memory from which Odysseus’ historic clothing is drawn is a significant 
autobiographical event: the day on which he left for Troy. Penelope’s responses 
serve to fill the gaps in Aethon’s narrative: in describing the clothing’s origin and 
providing context for how Odysseus came about them, she not only engages in his 
tale, but also makes the act of remembering richer and more vivid. In addition to this, 
they derive new understanding account of their shared remembering: (first) their 
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exchange becomes more intimate after they have engaged in the exercise (Penelope, 
for example, confides her dream in Aethon and asks for his advice in interpreting its 
meaning, 535), and (second) Penelope states that their shared connection to 
Odysseus has changed their relationship from matriarch-beggar to hostess-guest. In 
this back-and-forth between husband and wife, therefore, we can perhaps see how 
the same kind of remembering as witnessed in Harris et al.’s experiments are implicit 
in the Homeric data.  
 
Odysseus and Penelope, as stated above, are famed in the Odyssey for the like-
mindedness (ὁμοφροσύνη) that distinguishes them from other Homeric couples. It 
is here, I think, that we have our closest approximation to the shared mindedness 
explored by modern studies of social cognition. Because of this, I think it important 
to briefly consider one further example of how this manifests in the Odyssey. 
Odysseus articulates his and Penelope’s ὁμοφροσύνη most fully to Nausicaa during 
their initial meeting on the beach in Scheria (6.181-184): 
 
“ἄνδρα τε καὶ οἶκον, καὶ ὁμοφροσύνην ὀπάσειαν  
ἐσθλήν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρεῖσσον καὶ ἄρειον,  
ἢ ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχητον  
ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή”. 
 
“May they grant you a husband and a house, and good homophrosyne. For 
nothing is stronger and better than this, than when two people, harmonious in 
mind, keep a house as man and wife”.110 
																																																								
110 A further defining passage for ὁμοφροσύνη is in Odyssey 13, where Athene claims mental 
concord with Odysseus herself (13.296-299): 
 
“ἀλλ' ἄγε μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα, εἰδότες ἄμφω  
κέρδε', ἐπεὶ σὺ μέν ἐσσι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων  
βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι  
μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν”. 
 
“But come, let’s talk about this no longer. Both of us know wiles, since you are the best 
of mortal men for counsel and stories, and I am famous among the divinities for metis 
and wiles”. 
 
Despite this profession of like-mindedness, however, Athene goes on to confirm her superiority (299-
300): “οὐδὲ σύ γ’ ἔγνως Παλλάδ’ Ἀθηναίην” (“And yet you never recognized Pallas Athene”). 
While Odysseus’ and Athene’s relationship might involve ὁμοφροσύνη, therefore, Athene’s divine 
nature means that she will always supersede her mortal counterpart in mental aptitude. But, as 
Murnaghan (1995, 72) comments, Odysseus is ultimately dependent upon his and Athene’s 
ὁμοφροσύνη for his survival: in Book One, for example, it is Athene’s patronage and favour that 




While this persistent bond between Odysseus and Penelope is a recurring theme 
throughout the Odyssey, we have already seen how their mental concord is at play in 
their initial interview of Odyssey 19.111 Penelope and Odysseus demonstrate a high 
level of emotional intimacy throughout the first half of the interview; Penelope, 
additionally, demonstrates unusual comfort in Aethon’s presence, even despite his 
relative strangeness and the fact that this is—as far as Penelope is concerned—the 
first time they have spoken at length.  
 
Evidence of their mental closeness persists in Book 20, however, where the narrator 
describes both Odysseus’ and Penelope’s restlessness in similar terms. With respect 
to this, Russo (1982, 12) comments on the “striking complementarity in their 
physiological and psychological rhythms”, and Rutherford (1992, 201) states that, 
“[a]fter the encounter with Penelope, Odysseus and his wife sleep separately, and 
both have restless and unhappy nights. Lines 1-55 (Odysseus) and 56-91 (Penelope) 
complement one another”. The narrator partially constructs this psychological 
symmetry by stressing the concordance in their physiological and mental behaviour 
(56-58, 88-90, 92-94): 
 
εὖτε τὸν ὕπνος ἔμαρπτε, λύων μελεδήματα θυμοῦ,  
λυσιμελής, ἄλοχος δ' ἄρ' ἐπέγρετο κεδνὰ ἰδυῖα,  
κλαῖεν δ' ἐν λέκτροισι καθεζομένη μαλακοῖσιν. 
 
When sleep took hold of him, a limb-relaxing one, unbinding the cares of the 
thumos, then his caring wife woke, and sat up in her soft bed, crying. 
 
“τῇδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ,  
τοῖος ἐὼν, οἷος ᾖεν ἅμα στρατῷ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ  
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη”.  
 
																																																																																																																																																													
ensures his success in returning home. In this sense, it is his relationship with the Goddess that is the 
most significant of all those in the Odyssey. 
111 For a recent study of ὁμοφροσύνη in Homer, see Bolmarcich (2001). Discussion of their mental 
concord, however, is long-standing and rich. Zeitlin (1995, 120-121) examines the mutual challenge 
of the marriage bed in particular, ultimately arguing that Penelope demonstrates herself as “his match 
in those very same qualities that characterize him (and therefore identifies her as a suitable wife for 
him, his ‘other half’)” (142). For other interpretations of the trick of the bed, see Suzuki (1989) and 
Katz (1991); also Russo (1982) for the couple’s ὁμοφροσύνη in general. 
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“For on this night, one like him slept by my side, as he had been when he went 
with the army. My kēr was happy, since I did not think it was a dream, but at 
last real”. 
 
τῆς δ' ἄρα κλαιούσης ὄπα σύνθετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς·  
μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα, δόκησε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν  
ἤδη γινώσκουσα παρεστάμεναι κεφαλῆφι.  
 
God-like Odysseus heard her voice as she cried, and debated anxiously 
thereafter, and in his thumos it seemed like she had aldready recognized him 
[and was] standing by his head. 
 
In the first passage, Penelope wakes just after Athene puts Odysseus to sleep; in the 
second, she cites an unnerving feeling that Odysseus had been with her; in the third, 
Odysseus fancies her physically close as he hears her weep, and wonders whether 
she has already recognized him. The narrator establishes the enduring bond between 
them in three primary ways: (first) by their mutual disquiet and restlessness after 
their interview, (second) by the shared feeling of physical closeness and the 
symmetry in their thought processes (Penelope senses that Odysseus is 
near/Odysseus wonders whether Penelope has recognized him), and (third) by 
shifting rapidly between them in the narrative; here, the thoughts of Odysseus and 
Penelope blend almost seamlessly together. Accordingly, de Jong (2001, 484) terms 
this shift in focus the “interlace technique”, stating in her commentary of these lines 
that, “the effects of the ‘interlace’ technique are… to stress… the distance between 
the two, who have still not been reunited, and their mental closeness, since each 
dreams/fantasizes about the other”. Their psychological closeness is thus partially 
constructed using concepts of physical closeness, felt and expressed by them both in 
the narrative. 
 
Menelaus and Helen, meanwhile, are psychologically disparate; the narrator 
describes their relationship as one of discord and inherent unhappiness. This is only 
tenuously masked by the drugs provided by Helen, which barely succeeds in 
providing emotional numbness from their difficult memories (220-226).112 The 
underlying tension in their relationship is clear, however, in their attempts to 
undercut each other as they recall their past. This competitive remembering is 
																																																								
112 See Bergren (2009) on Helen’s use of drugs in Odyssey 4. 
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implicit in the Spartan banquet of Odyssey 4 where, having arrived in the Hall, Helen 
immediately recognizes Telemachus and embarks on a story about his father; I 
discussed this passage with respect to Odysseus’ use of disguise in the first section of 
this chapter. After recounting the tale, Helen professes her persistent loyalty to her 
husband and homeland (259-264): 
 
“ἔνθ’ ἄλλαι Τρῳαὶ λίγ’ ἐκώκυον· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ 
χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ ἤδη μοι κραδίη τέτραπτο νέεσθαι    
ἂψ οἶκόνδ’, ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον, ἣν Ἀφροδίτη  
δῶχ’, ὅτε μ’ ἤγαγε κεῖσε φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης, 
παῖδά τ’ ἐμὴν νοσφισσαμένην θάλαμόν τε πόσιν τε  
οὔ τευ δευόμενον, οὔτ’ ἂρ φρένας οὔτε τι εἶδος”.  
 
“The other Trojan women cried out shrilly, but my kēr was happy, since by now 
my kardia had turned about going back home, and I regretted my atē, that which 
Aphrodite gave me, when she led me from my own faitherland. I deserted my 
daughter, my bedchamber, and my husband, who lacks for nothing, neither in 
phrenes nor wit”. 
 
Rather than embellish upon the memory, Menelaus contradicts Helen’s profession of 
loyalty by offering a counter-tale (285-289): 
 
“ἔνθ’ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἀκὴν ἔσαν υἷες Ἀχαιῶν,     
Ἄντικλος δὲ σέ γ’ οἶος ἀμείψασθαι ἐπέεσσιν  
ἤθελεν· ἀλλ’ Ὀδυσεὺς ἐπὶ μάστακα χερσὶ πίεζε  
νωλεμέως κρατερῇσι, σάωσε δὲ πάντας Ἀχαιούς·  
τόφρα δ’ ἔχ’, ὄφρα σε νόσφιν ἀπήγαγε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη”. 
 
“Then all the rest of the Achaeans’ sons were silent. Anticlus was the only one 
wanting to respond. But Odysseus was pressing on his mouth unceasingly with 
his strong hands, and saved all of the Achaians. He held him, until Pallas Athene 
led you away from us”. 
 
Menelaus claims that Helen was not as loyal as she would have them believe. In 
presenting his own tale about the past, he contradicts his wife and engages in 
competitive remembering—they do not, as Odysseus and Penelope, work in co-
ordination with each other. Accordingly, several commentators note the tension in 
the first Spartan episode; Olson, for example, claims that this exchange is indicative 




The stories Helen and Menelaus tell about Odysseus are thus not only inspiring 
accounts of a great hero’s exploits, but are also subtle acts of self-justification, 
self-explanation, and mutual recrimination… these tales touch, on their deepest 
level, on the problems and dangers in the relationship between husband and 
wife. 
 
Odysseus’ and Penelope’s recollection of past events is collaborative and productive; 
Helen’s and Menelaus’ is competitive and antagonistic. This not only reflects the 
ὁμοφροσύνη possessed by Odysseus and Penelope, but also the inherent discord in 
Helen’s and Menelaus’ relationship. But Odysseus and Penelope, in engaging with 
their shared autobiographical history in this way, also provide a co-operative account 
that is emotionally rich and vivid. Prior to Penelope’s challenge of Aethon, the 
narrator vividly describes the empathy and emotional engagement of husband and 
wife. Aethon claims to have hosted Odysseus for twelve days in Crete; his skill is 
such that the false tale sounds convincing (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν 
ὁμοῖα, 203). Penelope is moved to tears (204-209): 
 
τῆς δ’ ἄρ’ ἀκουούσης ῥέε δάκρυα, τήκετο δὲ χρώς.  
ὡς δὲ χιὼν κατατήκετ’ ἐν ἀκροπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν,    
ἥν τ’ εὖρος κατέτηξεν, ἐπὴν ζέφυρος καταχεύῃ,  
τηκομένης δ’ ἄρα τῆς ποταμοὶ πλήθουσι ῥέοντες· 
ὣς τῆς τήκετο καλὰ παρήϊα δάκρυ χεούσης,  
κλαιούσης ἑὸν ἄνδρα, παρήμενον. 
 
As she listened her tears ran and her body melted. As snow thaws on lofty 
mountains, the East Wind’s thawed after West Wind pours it down, and, when it 
melts, flowing rivers are filled with it, so her fair cheeks melted as she shed tears 
and cried for her husband, sitting at her side.  
 
On a preliminary note, this simile is important both because of its position in the 
narrative, and because of the rich psychological imagery that provides structure for 
Penelope’s emotional experience. For the former, this excerpt occurs just before 
Penelope issues her challenge to Aethon; it therefore expresses her mental state in 
the narrative to follow. The latter depends not only on embodied imagery, but also on 
specific cultural understandings of cognitive metaphor. The narrator likens the tears 
streaming down Penelope’s cheeks to melting snow on a mountain (ὡς δὲ χιὼν… 
ὄρεσσιν, 205), and the extremity of her emotional reaction to the flooding banks of a 
river (τηκομένης…πλήθουσι ῥέοντες, 207). He partially achieves this through 
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repetition of language that maps her nonverbal behaviour with the images from the 
natural world: the East Wind “thaws” (κατέτηξεν, 206) and the West Wind “pours 
down” (καταχεύῃ, 206) melted snow in the same way that a person shed tears from 
their eyes; the snow thaws on the mountains (κατατήκετ’, 205) under the onslaught 
of the East and West winds just as cheeks melt beneath tears (τήκετο, 208) and 
bodies melt (τήκετο, 204). Audiences of Homer, I think, understand Penelope’s 
mental state in two primary ways. 
 
The first way is by mapping the image of a mountain onto the physical contours of 
Penelope’s face, in which the peaks are her eyes, the slopes are the curves of her 
cheeks, and the melted water is the tears that pour down them in reaction to the 
beggar’s words. We see a similar process occur in more modern contexts, where the 
physical contours of a body are compared with images from the natural world. 
Lakoff and Turner (1989, 25-26), for example, cite the opening lines of 
Shakespeare’s seventy-third sonnet: 
 
That time of year thou mayst in me behold 
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang 
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold, 
Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang. 
 
Lakoff and Turner argue that these lines evoke the “People are Plants” metaphor, in 
which there is correspondence between the life stages of people and plants. But they 
also point out that there is a more conventional metaphor, here, which entails “the 
superimposition of the image of a tree upon the figure of a man, with limbs 
corresponding to limbs and trunk to trunk. Since the tree is doing what people 
usually do, the superimposition is immediate and natural” (26). I think that the 
superimposition of images in the Odyssey 19 passage is as immediate and natural as 
the Shakespearan sonnet; the narrator encourages us to make these connections 
because of the repetition of language between the melting snow and shedding tears.  
 
Second, more culturally specific understandings of cheeks as metaphorically 
“melting” under tears also provide coherence for the simile. To be precise, the 
narrator’s metaphorical description of Penelope’s tears is a common one in Greek 
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literature, where people frequently, metaphorically “melt”. Helen, for example, 
describes herself as being “worn” with weeping (“τὸ καὶ κλαίουσα τέτηκα”, 176) 
in Iliad 3; Odysseus, too, “melts” (αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς| τήκετο, δάκρυ δ’ ἔδευεν 
ὑπὸ βλεφάροισι παρειάς, 521-522) with tears in reaction to Demodocus’ song in 
Odyssey 8. The Odyssey 19 passage, however, shows very clearly that a person’s 
cheeks do not actually melt—that this is a metaphor, and that it is presented as such 
by the narrator. The poet, in other words, makes explicit that he is taking images 
from the natural environment and applying it to individual psychology; this is an 
obvious case of the world informing, and providing structure, for the mind. 
 
The simile also describes Penelope’s emotional transition from paranoia and caution 
to vulnerability and fragility. The mountains are “high-ranging” (ἀκροπόλοισιν, 
205) an image that suggests isolation and remoteness; they are covered in snow, 
which has connotations of the barrenness and intractability of winter. Both these 
images relate to Penelope’s initial attitude of suspicion and hard-heartedness towards 
the beggar, where her psychological reticence and isolation are presented in terms of 
physical distance and coldness.113 Odysseus’ clever rhetoric is the “wind” that 
exposes her emotional vulnerability and fragility in the same way that melting snow 
exposes the rocky face of a mountain in the spring.114 As Rutherford (1992, 166) 
argues, “Penelope’s resistance to flattery and scepticism in the face of good news are 
weakening in the face of Odysseus’ tactful and sympathetic rhetoric”. 
 
Penelope’s mental transition is thus presented by the narrator using images of 
hardness (the rocky face of the mountain), remoteness (the high-ranging, lofty 
																																																								
113 This characterizes Penelope’s approach to the disguised Odysseus until his correct identification of 
the process by which he crafted their marriage bed. Eurycleia (Od. 23.71) and Telemachus (Od. 
23.96-103) rebuke her for her suspicion and hard-heartedness after Odysseus has revealed himself and 
slaughters the Suitors; in the latter case, Telemachus explicitly employs adjectives that denote cruelty 
and hardness (ἀπηνής, 97), as well as firmness and inflexibility (στερρός/λίθος, 103). In Od. 23.213-
216, Penelope apologizes to Odysseus for having adopted this attitude and explains that she did so to 
guard herself against imposters. 
114 Rhetoric is likened to wind elsewhere in Homer and in the Greek tradition. At Iliad 3.209-224, 
Odysseus’ rhetoric is described as flying like flakes of snow. Dionysus of Halicarnassus in De 
Demosthenes 5 remarks of Plato’s style that, “a sweet breeze emanates from it, as from the most 
fragrant of meadows”. For modern scholarship on imagery associated with rhetoric, see Innes (2006, 
305-309) discusses natural imagery used by Longinus in particular, but especially light, sun, 
thunderbolts, fire, rivers, and sea; also Porter (2010).  
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peaks), and coldness (the snow that melts on their slopes); Odysseus’ rhetoric, which 
continues on in the successive lines, is likened to a gentle but inexorable wind; his 
success in weakening Penelope’s resolve is reflected in the image of the melting 
snow flowing into a rushing river that is bursting its banks. This demonstrates the 
level of psychological engagement between them: the affect Odysseus has on 
Penelope is described seamlessly with her emotional reaction. The fact that the 
simile itself describes a process from the natural world, furthermore, might suggest 
just how deep is their psychological engagement at this moment—it is as natural and 
inevitable as the cycle of seasons.  
 
But Odysseus is also deeply affected by Penelope’s tears, as his own eyes are likened 
to horn or iron when he tries to hide his reaction in the next lines (209-212): 
 
                                   αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς  
θυμῷ μὲν γοόωσαν ἑὴν ἐλέαιρε γυναῖκα,    
ὀφθαλμοὶ δ’ ὡς εἰ κέρα ἕστασαν ἠὲ σίδηρος  
ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροισι·  
 
Then Odysseus felt pity in his thumos for his groaning wife, but his eyes, as if 
they were horn or iron, stood without a tremor in his eyelids, and he hid his tears 
with guile. 
 
Odysseus feels sympathy for Penelope’s grief, though he is unable to show her 
without revealing his disguise.115 The narrator conceptualises Odysseus’ emotional 
response and caution in two ways: (first) through his tears, which are an outward 
sign of the pity (ἐλέαιρε, 210) that he feels inwardly (θυμῷ, 210) and is unable to 
express; and (second) by contrasting Penelope’s emotional “softness” with the 
“hardness” of his mental resolve—by describing his self-control as horn (κέρα, 211) 
and iron (σίδηρος, 211). This is the only use of κέρα in Homer to describe a 
psychological state; but σίδηρος is similarly used of Achilles in Iliad 20 (372): “εἰ 
πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικε, μένος δ’ αἴθωνι σιδήρῳ” (“Though his hands are like fire, and 
his menos is like iron”).116 Hector informs the Trojans that, despite Achilles’ martial 
																																																								
115 See Austin (1975, 200-238) for an extended discussion on the sympathy between Odysseus and 
Penelope. 
116 An identical metaphor is used of Achilles in Iliad 23 (177), when Achilles kills the Trojan captives 
on Patroclus’ funeral pyre. 
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prowess and mental toughness, he will still face him in battle. The underlying image 
here, like Odysseus in Odyssey 19, is of psychological resilience. The use of 
ἀτρέμας is also interesting: as shown in the previous chapter, Idomeneus 
differentiates cowardice and bravery based on physical instability and resilience; 
Odysseus is more akin to the brave man, in that he is outwardly unmoving—“without 
tremor”—in the face of a stressful situation. Accordingly, Rutherford argues that this 
description of Odysseus reflects his character development in the latter half of the 
Odyssey (1992, 167):  
 
This self-discipline, borne out of experience of the dangers involved in bragging 
and openness, has become second nature to him, so much so that later, with 
Laertes in Book 24, he cannot break free of it even after the danger is past. 
 
The melting, liquid quality of Penelope’s resolve is thus contrasted with Odysseus’ 
disciplined maintenance of his disguise, here described using language of 
inflexibility and solidity. But we know that this seeming hard-heartedness is 
ultimately a ruse: Odysseus may be adept at concealing his emotions from others—a 
skill learned throughout his arduous journey home—but he still shares in his wife’s 
grief. The narrator, in presenting this pair of similes, not only demonstrates the deep 
connection and collaborative spirit shared by Odysseus and Penelope, but also 
engages sensory aspects of experience—especially touch—in metaphorically 
describing the nonverbal elements their exchange. Insights from cognitive linguistics 
and embodied metaphor theory best explain how this is achieved in the narrative.  
 
With respect to shared remembering, Penelope and Odysseus display all three forms 
of emergence: (first) both uncover new information in the process of their mutual 
remembering (their psychological concordance, and extra details of a significant 
autobiographical event), (second) it is an emotionally vivid collaboration, in which 
both Odysseus and Penelope engage and invest in their shared memories, and (third) 
they reach new understanding as a result of it. Odysseus and Penelope are Homeric 
models, therefore, of a successful collaborative partnership: they are a couple that are 
more psychologically adept when their mental resources are combined. Helen and 
Menelaus, by contrast, only display one form of emergence—new understanding—in 
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which, through their tense contradiction of each other’s perception of the past, they 
reveal the inherent mental dissonance and unhappiness of their marriage. 
 
IV.II. Mnemonic Media, Psychological Engagement 
In a recent article, Grethlein (2008) explores the ways in which Homeric narrators 
and characters preserve and commemorate the past through material media, but 
especially in the context of tomb-markers, fortifications, and armour.117 Though he 
argues that the ability of these objects to act in this capacity is limited to a maximum 
of three generations, Grethlein stresses that, in interacting with material objects, 
characters are given opportunity to comment on, explore, and negotiate the past. 
Objects, in this sense, are frameworks through which individuals engage with 
different temporal contexts. This is important because they (first) generate historic 
dialogue and thereby preserve the past, (second) can significantly influence an 
individual’s present and future actions, and (third) are intermediaries through which 
groups of people can explore and enact their past, present, and future relationships 
with each other. 
 
A brief survey of the Homeric data reveals how unique objects facilitate important 
mnemonic functions for characters and audiences.118 Alcandre’s weaving equipment 
in Odyssey 4, for example, is an artefact of the friendship between herself and Helen, 
and commemorates the time that the Spartans spent in Egypt (125-127). In retelling 
the history of its acquisition, the narrator explains the relationship between the two 
women. In doing so, he indirectly references the Spartans’ journey home from Troy, 
thus placing this event—and the current episode—within the broader context of the 
Trojan Cycle. Athene also places primary emphasis on the friendship that the act of 
																																																								
117 On the historic significance of material objects in Homer, see also Griffin (1980, 1-49), Richardson 
(1990, 61-69), and Minchin (2001b, 100-131). 
118 See Zeitlin (1995a, 118) on the mnemonic function of material objects, who explains that: “The 
result is that such objects are often talismans of power. They can be circulated and exchanged, 
transmitted as previous heirlooms, and endowed with certain active values that inhere in the 
genealogy of their ownership as well as in the beauty of their manufacture. In some instances, like the 
shield and spear of Achilles, they may belong wholly to particular individuals, functioning like 
personal attributes or as inalienable signs of identity that no one else, oude tis allos, can appropriate. 
An item can also belong to several categories. Odysseus’ bow, for example, although ultimately 
reserved for his use alone, was originally a gift form a guest-friend and, like many such items, 
constitutes a tangible link of memory that connects the hero to the world of other heroes”. 
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gifting establishes between Menelaus and Telemachus, where the “furnishing” of 
material goods is an embodiment of the “furnishing” of friendship (Od. 15.51-55): 
 
ἀλλὰ μέν’, εἰς ὅ κε δῶρα φέρων ἐπιδίφρια θήῃ 
ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης, δουρικλειτὸς Μενέλαος, 
καὶ μύθοισ’ ἀγανοῖσι παραυδήσας ἀποπέμψῃ.                      
τοῦ γάρ τε ξεῖνος μιμνῄσκεται ἤματα πάντα 
ἀνδρὸς ξεινοδόκου, ὅς κεν φιλότητα παράσχῃ. 
 
“But wait, until the hero Atreides, spear-famed Menelaus, can bring gifts and 
put them in the chariot and send us off with gentle words of consolation. For a 
guest remembers all his days that man, the host who furnished him with 
friendship”. 
 
The provisioning of material goods, Athene states, is synonymous with the 
friendship that is established between host and guest; these items, in other words, are 
friendship concretized.119 After Telemachus returns home, they will remind him of 
Menelaus, the time he spent in Sparta, and the bond established between the two 
men.120 Additionally, the gifts reflect the value and honour with which one part 
regards another. Menelaus orders his attendants to bring the most esteemed 
(τιμηέστατόν) and most beautiful (κάλλιστον) of his household stores. The wealth 
of the objects themselves is a reflection of the perceived value of his newly 
established relationship with Telemachus; through the act of gifting, furthermore, 
this considerable τίμη is transferred to Telemachus. “Telemachus is honoured by 
being selected as the recipient of a valuable treasure”, Scodel (2008, 34) argues, “and 
when he displays it to others he will enlarge the reputation of the man who gave it to 
him, and even of the man from whom Menelaus received it”.  
 
Menelaus emphasizes his past relationship with Odysseus. In providing Telemachus 
with gifts, he also re-affirms a persistent link between the Ithacan and Spartan 
households. As objects of mnemonic value, Menelaus’ gifts thus operate in three 
																																																								
119 For discussions of gift-exchange practices in the ancient Greek world, see Donlan (1982a, 1982b), 
Mauss (1990[1950]), and von Reden (1995). 
120 See Scodel (2008, 34) on the mixing bowl gifted to Telemachus at 15.115-119 in particular, which 
Menelaus tells him was gifted by the king of the Sidonians. In assessing the types of associations 
made by the poet with the mixing bowl, Scodel explains that, “When Telemachus uses this bowl, it 
will evoke memories not only of his own visit to Sparta, but of Menelaus’ visit to Sidon and of the 
Trojan War that caused him to go there”. 
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temporal phases: (first) the past, because of the prior link between Odysseus and 
Menelaus (Od. 4.168-182); we know that this is not a newly-established connection, 
but a re-affirmation of it with the next generation, (second) the present, in that the 
“furnishing” of gifts represents Menelaus’ proper conduct as a host, and (third) the 
future, because by re-using these items in the Ithacan household, Telemachus will 
remember Menelaus and his generosity. While the aesthetic qualities of the items—
the mixing bowl in particular (115-119)—quantifies the value with which Menelaus 
regards his connection with the Ithacans, their main importance is in (first) the 
continued relationship the act of gifting reinvigorates between them in successive 
generations, and (second) the tangible link it creates with the past. In gifting the bowl 
to Telemachus, Menelaus establishes a link between himself, Odysseus’ son, and the 
Sidonians. This is also partially the case for Alcinous (Od. 8.430-432) and Helen (Od. 
15.125-129), whose recognition of the mnemonic value of gifted objects operate in 
three temporal phases. In Odyssey 8, Alcinous not only states that his gifting of the 
goblet ensures that Odysseus remembers him long after he has left Scheria, but 
includes a hope that his guest will use the item in libations to the gods: 
 
“καί οἱ ἐγὼ τόδ’ ἄλεισον ἐμὸν περικαλλὲς ὀπάσσω,  
χρύσεον, ὄφρ’ ἐμέθεν μεμνημένος ἤματα πάντα               
σπένδῃ ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ Διί τ’ ἄλλοισίν τε θεοῖσιν”. 
 
“And I myself will present him this beautiful golden goblet of mine, so that he 
will remember me every day, when he makes libation in his hall to Zeus and the 
other gods”. 
 
We might understand that Alcinous as incorporating himself into the daily rituals of 
the Ithacan royal household. This integrates Alcinous into its future: he gifts the 
goblet with the intention that Odysseus will remember the time he spent in Scheria 
each time he uses it. This is made more poignant because we know that the 
Phaeacians will pay very dearly at the hands of Poseidon for aiding Odysseus (Od. 
13.177); this goblet becomes especially important, then, in terms of preserving the 
memory of a lost nation. Helen, by contrast, draws important connections between 
different people and periods of time when she gifts Telemachus a πέπλος (125-129):  
 
“δῶρόν τοι καὶ ἐγώ, τέκνον φίλε, τοῦτο δίδωμι, 
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μνῆμ' Ἑλένης χειρῶν, πολυηράτου ἐς γάμου ὥρην, 
σῇ ἀλόχῳ φορέειν· τεῖος δὲ φίλῃ παρὰ μητρὶ                     
κεῖσθαι ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ. σὺ δέ μοι χαίρων ἀφίκοιο 
οἶκον ἐϋκτίμενον καὶ σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.” 
 
“And I give this gift to you, dear child, a record of the hands of Helen, at the 
time of much-loved marriage, for your wife to wear. But until then allow your 
dear mother to store it away in the hall. And I hope for your arrival at your well-
made house and your fatherland, rejoicing.” 
 
Helen informs Telemachus that the πέπλος—a “record” of her own hands (μνῆμ' 
Ἑλένης χειρῶν, 126)—is intended for his future bride; for the present, it should be 
kept safe by his mother. It might thus be understood as a physical link between three 
temporal phases: (first) the past, which illustrates Helen’s relationship with 
Telemachus and her craftsmanship of the πέπλος that is, very specifically, a 
mnemonic of her own hands (second) the present, Penelope’s custodianship of the 
item, which constitutes another physically represented relationship, this time 
between the two women themselves, and (third) the future, in which the item will 
take on a new historic significance as clothing for Telemachus’ bride, and thus 
incorporates Helen into the story of Ithaca’s next generation. The textile, therefore, is 
able to operate both as a means by which honour and value is transferred to 
Telemachus and as an extension of relationships between multiple members of two 
families. Penelope, Telemachus, and his future bride, by maintaining and re-using 
this item in a physical sense, maintain and perpetuate its mental and mnemonic 
significance.121  
 
IV.III. Odysseus’ Clothes and Penelope’s Memory 
Odysseus and Penelope engage in collaborative remembering in Odyssey 19: they 
embellish upon autobiographical events and, in working together, engage each other 
on a deep psychological level, come to a better understanding of their shared history, 
and explore their relationship. Their success in doing so is partially evidenced by 
their level of emotional engagement, as well as the vivid historical narratives that 
they produce together. One of the most complex elements of this exchange follows a 
																																																								
121 Helen herself is keenly aware of the mnemonic potential of her own weaving when she describes 
her gift to Telemachus as a μνῆμ' Ἑλένης χειρῶν (126); as Mueller (2010, 9) argues, “[w]omen 
weave to be remembered. The finished products of their weaving, such as the peplos Helen gives to 
Telemachus, serve as agents of that memory”. 
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challenge by Penelope who, after hearing Aethon’s origin story, asks him to 
elaborate on three points: (first) the clothing worn by Odysseus while in Crete, 
(second) his appearance, and (third) his travelling companions (212-219): 
 
ἡ δ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὖν τάρφθη πολυδακρύτοιο γόοιο, 
ἐξαῦτίς μιν ἔπεσσιν ἀμειβομένη προσέειπε: 
“νῦν μὲν δή σευ ξεῖνέ γ’ ὀΐω πειρήσεσθαι,  
εἰ ἐτεὸν δὴ κεῖθι σὺν ἀντιθέοισ’ ἑτάροισι 
ξείνισας ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐμὸν πόσιν, ὡς ἀγορεύεις. 
εἰπέ μοι, ὁπποῖ’ ἄσσα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο, 
αὐτός θ’ οἷος ἔην, καὶ ἑταίρους, οἵ οἱ ἕποντο.” 
 
When she had enough of tearful groaning, she spoke again to him in answer: “I 
think, stranger, to make a test of you, if you really accepted my husband as a 
guest in your halls, together with his godlike companions, as you say. Tell me 
what sort of garments he wore around his skin, of what sort he himself was, and 
his companions, those who went with him”. 
 
This test is typical of Penelope, who continually challenges Odysseus in the second 
half of the Odyssey by placing obstacles in his way that he must overcome. On a 
preliminary note, this exchange thus demonstrates the psychological trials that 
Odysseus undergoes before achieving a successful homecoming. In this sense, it also 
reflects the ὁμοφροσύνη shared by the pair: in this back-and-forth in which they 
engage, Penelope and Odysseus confirm their suitability as each other’s ideal 
partners and re-invigorate their unique bond. 
 
Odysseus focuses most especially on Penelope’s first request—to describe the 
historic clothing—in his response. After informing Penelope that he will do his best 
to recall her lost husband, he continues (225-231): 
 
χλαῖναν πορφυρέην οὔλην ἔχε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,  
διπλῆν· ἐν δ’ ἄρα οἱ περόνη χρυσοῖο τέτυκτο 
αὐλοῖσιν διδύμοισι· πάροιθε δὲ δαίδαλον ἦεν·          
ἐν προτέροισι πόδεσσι κύων ἔχε ποικίλον ἐλλόν, 
ἀσπαίροντα λάων· τὸ δὲ θαυμάζεσκον ἅπαντες, 
ὡς οἱ χρύσεοι ἐόντες ὁ μὲν λάε νεβρὸν ἀπάγχων,  
αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐκφυγέειν μεμαὼς ἤσπαιρε πόδεσσι.            
 
God-like Odysseus had a purple cloak of wool, a double-folded one. And the pin 
was gold and made with double grooves, and the front was cunningly wrought. 
A dog held a spotted fawn with his front paws, looking on it as it was struggling, 
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and everyone admired it, being golden, it [the dog] holding the fawn, strangling 
it, but the fawn struggled with its feet to escape him.  
 
This chapter has placed especial emphasis on how objects can operate as part of 
extended cognitive systems in Homer. I have argued that, in a similar way to which 
we use modern technology in our every day lives, so too do Homer’s characters 
utilise material resources in performing cognitive tasks. Studies undertaken by 
Dixon, de Frias, and Bäckman (2001) have shown how, in married units (especially 
longer-term, older couples), external resources operate as memory aids that fulfil 
important cognitive functions. In the Memory Compensation Questionnaire, couples 
were tested based on seven memory strategies: (first) external media (calendars, 
notebooks, diaries), (second) internal mnemonic strategies, (third) longer time 
allowances, (fourth) extra effort in learning, (fifth) reliance on others, (sixth) 
commitment to success, and (finally) strategy changes over set periods of time (5-10 
years) (Dixon et. al 2001, 653). The results of this test—both of Dixon et. al.’s 
preliminary ones and Harris et. al.’s secondary adaptation—reported reliance on 
external media as the most commonly occurring strategy among married couples 
(Dixon et. al. 2001, 655; Harris et. al. 2014, 293). Harris et. al. (2014, 293) explain,  
 
One man, when asked about the couple’s shared calendar, states, “it’s our 
bible”; another described the couple’s shared diary as “the structure of our 
lives”… interestingly, husbands’ greater concern with memory success was 
associated with their wives’ increased use of external strategies. 
 
In line with this, Dixon et. al. (2001) and Harris et. al. (2014, 293) both report that 
men tend to rely on their partners more than women, while anecdotal evidence 
gathered during their experiments suggest that women were more often responsible 
for maintaining shared external resources. “For instance”, Harris et. al. (2014, 293) 
cite an example from their experiment, “one man commented, ‘I don’t use the 
calendar, but [wife] sort of refers to it constantly, and she’ll remind me… so she’s a 
constant reminder’”. These studies are interesting for two reasons. First, they 
demonstrate the extent to which couples in long-term, intimate relationships rely on 
each other and shared external resources in performing certain cognitive tasks. 
Second, couples in each case fulfil the criteria stipulated in both Clark’s and 
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Chalmer’s “parity principle” (2002[198]) and Tollefson’s “solipistic system” (2006) 
theories: for the husbands of each relationship, their spouse (and the resources 
managed by them) are (first) reliable, (second) trustworthy, (third) accessible, and 
(fourth) previously endorsed.  
 
It is accordingly through these historic garments that we see Odysseus’ most overt 
attempts to engage Penelope psychologically.122 In doing so, both husband and wife 
not only rely on external media in generating historic dialogue, but also re-establish 
an extended network that involves brains, bodies, objects, and each other; they form, 
to use Tollefson’s terminology, a “solipsistic system”. In this section, I will describe 
the psychological aspects of Aethon’s speech, and the different ways in which it 
engages Penelope’s mindedness. 
 
First, Odysseus’ outfit, like his scar, is a σήμα—a proof by which Penelope can 
verify Aethon’s tale (σήματ’ ἀναγνούσῃ, τά οἱ ἔμπεδα πέφραδ’ Ὀδυσσεύς, 
250)—with which she has an especially intimate connection. This is because the 
production, maintenance, and storage of a household’s textiles are some of the 
primary responsibilities of a Homeric wife. 123 “It is in her capacity as a producer and 
keeper of goods”, Jenkins (1985, 112) explains, “that a woman’s role is defined 
through textiles”; additionally, aristocratic woman are often shown weaving and 
handling particularly elaborate garments, such as the ones described by Aethon in 
																																																								
122 This is not just the case for Odysseus’ historic clothing, but for textiles and garments in the 
Homeric poems more generally. As manufactured objects, textile production and maintenance are the 
responsibility of women, and are thus indicators of their technical skill as weavers and caretakers; 
they are sources of τίμη and κλέος for the women who create them, both within their own households 
and for the ones to which they are gifted. When used as clothing, textiles can operate as part of the 
psychological experiences of their wearers; in other words, they are essential parts of the construction 
and performance of thought and emotion. As commemorative objects, textiles evoke past events and 
relationships, and can thus act as memory cues for personal or collective histories. Finally, as items of 
gift exchange, they are co-operative and competitive mechanisms that establish and symbolize 
relationships between households. But this is also the case for other material objects in Homer. Both 
ancient and modern scholarship has, for example, pointed to the representational versatility of items 
such as Odysseus’ bed (Od. 23.181ff.) and bow (Od. 21.13ff.), Ikmalios’ chair (Od. 19.57ff.), and 
Agamemnon’s inherited staff (Il 2.100ff.).  
123 For examples of women and the maintenance or storage of textiles, see Il. 6. (Hecuba), Od. 6. 
(Nausicaa), and Od. 15. (Helen); for examples of aristocratic women weaving rich, elaborate webs, 
see Il. 3. (Helen), Il. 22. (Andromache), and Od. 2.94-105 (Penelope).  
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Odyssey 19. 124 This is an indication, first and foremost, of their social status: it 
signifies that the woman in question has the resources to delegate the production of 
mundane, everyday items to others.125 Penelope falls into this category as Odysseus’ 
wife, Telemachus’ mother, and the matriarch of an aristocratic household, and would 
have therefore had a close connection to and good knowledge of the garments 
described by Aethon. They are thus, like their conjugal bed, especially relatable 
σήματα that reflect Penelope’s place in the Homeric world and her relationship with 
the people closest to her. The clothing in this passage thus engages Penelope because 
it represents an enduring bond between husband and wife. “Clothes and pin”, 
Mueller (2010, 5) argues, “act as Penelope’s signature on Odysseus… [they] are 
fool-proof tests of authenticity, ways around the wiles and doloi of strangers”. 
Odysseus is able to manipulate and challenge Penelope in this exchange primarily by 
appealing to her role as his wife and the caretaker of his household; within the scope 
of this passage, textiles represent some of her most important roles and are central to 
the life that they share together. But they are also metonyms for Odysseus himself, 
and are therefore important in gauging her personal loyalty to him and his place as 
the patriarch of the Ithacan household: if Aethon’s description of the textiles incites a 
genuine emotional reaction from Penelope, then it acts as proof of her dedication to 
the survival of the Ithacan household and her loyalty to the memory of her husband. 
 
Second, Odysseus appeals to Penelope’s honour and reputation in this passage, but 
especially (first) in the quality of the described clothing, and (second) the reaction of 
the Cretan women who witness his tunic in particular (232-235):  
 
τὸν δὲ χιτῶν’ ἐνόησα περὶ χροῒ σιγαλόεντα, 
οἷόν τε κρομύοιο λοπὸν κάτα ἰσχαλέοιο· 
τὼς μὲν ἔην μαλακός, λαμπρὸς δ’ ἦν ἠέλιος ὥς. 
ἦ μὲν πολλαί γ’ αὐτὸν ἐθηήσαντο γυναῖκες.        
 
And I saw the glittering garment about his skin, of such a sort as the peel of a 
dried onion. It was soft, and it was radiant as the sun. Many of the women were 
gazing at it. 
																																																								
124 For other discussion of women’s domestic responsibilities in ancient Greece, see Schaps (1979), 
Lefkowitz (1983), and van Wees (2005b). 
125 See van Wees (2005b) on the connection between the size, colour, and embellishment of cloth and 




Textile production, as an indicaton of their skill as weavers, is a matter of τίμη and 
κλέος for the women who create them. “Spinning and weaving skills”, van Wees 
(2005a, 47) points out, “were sources of personal reputation for women, especially 
among other women. The censure of other women punished failures to meet 
standards… [c]onversely, the praise of other women confirmed weaving skills”. 
Odysseus’ historic clothing is particularly rich: his cloak is double-folded (διπλῆν, 
226) and purple (πορφυρέην, 225); it is secured with an elaborate golden pin (ἐν δ’ 
ἄρα οἱ περόνη χρυσοῖο… δαίδαλον ἦεν, 226-227); and it is worn around a tunic 
that is glittering (σιγαλόεντα, 232), soft (μαλακός, 234), and as radiant as the sun 
(λαμπρὸς δ’ ἦν ἠέλιος ὥς, 234). While these qualities make the clothing especially 
vivid and memorable (and, therefore, more easily imagined by Penelope), the 
admiration of the Cretan women is designed to appeal to Penelope’s ego, as their 
recognition of her prowess as a weaver increases her reputation beyond the limits of 
her own household.  
 
Despite this indirect praise, however, Odysseus continues by stating that he is 
uncertain about the origin of the clothing (237-240): 
 
οὐκ οἶδ’, ἢ τάδε ἕστο περὶ χροῒ οἴκοθ’ Ὀδυσσεύς, 
ἦ τις ἑταίρων δῶκε θοῆς ἐπὶ νηὸς ἰόντι 
ἤ τίς που καὶ ξεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πολλοῖσιν Ὀδυσσεὺς 
ἔσκε φίλος· 
 
I do not know either if that which Odysseus wore about his skin was from this 
house, or if some companion gave it to him going onto his swift ship, or a 
stranger, since Odysseus to many people was a friend. 
 
This is a third means by which Odysseus engages with Penelope, but this time it is to 
incite her jealousy: in describing the admiration of the Cretan women and expressing 
doubt about who gifted him the clothing, he alludes to the potential of extra-marital 
affairs.126 If Penelope’s clothing represents Odysseus “signature” upon him—as 
Mueller points out—and if the garments themselves are powerful symbols of 
marriage, then the idea that another woman dressed him presents the possibility, 
																																																								
126 See Ahl and Roisman (1996) on this point; also L.G. Canevaro’s Leverhulme project “Women and 
Objects in Greek Epic” on potential liaisons with other women. 
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perhaps, that their bond as husband and wife has been undermined. But, as 
Rutherford (1992, 170-171) points out, these claims are also in keeping with 
Odysseus’ tendency for conceit and self-praise: “Odysseus’ vanity shows through 
here in a very amusing way; cf. 239-40, ‘since Odysseus was a friend to many 
people; for there were few of the Achaians like him’”.127 In this sense, thus, 
Odysseus’ words also function as a reflection upon his own character. 
 
Odysseus, fourth, engages Penelope as a matriarch and hostess when, after 
describing the clothing, Aethon informs her that he had continued his journey with 
Cretan guest-gifts (241-243): 
 
καί οἱ ἐγὼ χάλκειον ἄορ καὶ δίπλακα δῶκα 
καλὴν πορφυρέην καὶ τερμιόεντα χιτῶνα, 
αἰδοίως δ’ ἀπέπεμπον ἐϋσσέλμου ἐπὶ νηός. 
 
I gave him a bronze weapon and a double-folded mantle, beautiful and purple, 
and a fringed tunic, and sent him off with respect upon his well-benched ship. 
 
Aethon’s assertion that he had fulfilled his responsibilities to Odysseus as a good 
host serves two purposes in this exchange. First, by engaging Penelope as a 
hostess, it ensures that he will remain in the Ithacan household until he is able to 
murder the suitors, as Penelope is now obliged, in accordance with proper guest 
friendship practices, to return the favour. Second, it is additional evidence for the 
veracity of Aethon’s claims, but particularly of his prior status as Odysseus’ host. 
It does so because these textiles are representative of the host-guest relationship 
that had existed between the two men; like the garments gifted by Penelope to 
Odysseus upon his departure to Troy and the items given to Telemachus by 
Menelaus, these objects are relics of an established, historic bond. As Haubold 
and Graziosi (2010, 140) argue of the Diomedes-Glaucus episode in Iliad 6, gifted 
items are “tokens of social memory”; additionally, Mueller (2010, 2) states of 
garments in particular that, “Clothing functions as a metonym of the relationship 
of hospitality between the host and his guest and symbolizes their commitment to 
																																																								
127 Rutherford also cites 23.328, 337, 339 as further examples of Odysseus’ egotistical tendencies. 
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house and protect one another”.128 Penelope recognizes the significance of these 
textiles when she responds to Aethon that (253-254): 
 
“νῦν μὲν δή μοι, ξεῖνε, πάρος περ ἐὼν ἐλεεινός, 
ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐμοῖσι φίλος τ’ ἔσῃ αἰδοῖός τε”. 
 
“Now indeed to me, stranger, while before this you were being pitiful to me, you 
shall now be a friend to me, and honoured in my hall”. 
 
The different textiles that Aethon has been able to describe trigger his transition 
within the Ithacan household from suppliant to honoured friend. More precisely, the 
primary importance of these items is in (first) the psychological bonds that they 
represent between Aethon and Odysseus, (second) their function in appealing to 
Penelope’s role as hostess in Ithaca, and (finally) the change in relationship that it 
prompts for Aethon and Penelope, the latter of who now has an obligation to 
reciprocate the former’s hospitality to her husband.129 
 
Odysseus appeals to Penelope as woman, wife, mother, and matriarch. His speech, 
thus, not only verifies Aethon’s story and maintain his disguise, but also tests 
Penelope on each of these levels; in responding to her challenge with one of his own, 
he gauges her loyalty to his memory and to his house. In evoking these different 
psychological processes, Odysseus relies primarily on external resources—on the 
historic clothing—and on his thorough knowledge of his wife. The clothing, thus, is 
an important extension of both Odysseus’ and Penelope’s mindedness, as well as the 
interaction taking place between them. That it is also especially significant in terms 
of context (it was given on Odysseus’ departure from Ithaca) and personal meaning 
(in representing the bond between husband and wife) may lend strength to its 
function, in Dixon et. al.’s and Harris et. al.’s terms, as a persistent, reliable set of 
objects in which husband and wife can share and explore their mindedness. 
																																																								
128 For discussions of material objects and their role in physically representing relationships more 
generally, see Minchin (2007) and Scodel (2008).  
129 Guest friendship obligations exist outside the context of hospitality. Again, the Diomedes-Glaucus 
exchange in Iliad 6 is relevant here: Diomedes and Glaucus discover during an encounter on the 
battlefield that their ancestors had been guest-friends; Diomedes recounts the gifts that were given on 
the occasion, which he states are still in his house (219-221). Because of this, Diomedes requests that 
they exchange armour as a renewal of the bond between their houses, and that they avoid fighting 




IV.III. Odysseus and Eurycleia: Dominance and Intimacy 
This section has focused almost exclusively on Odysseus’ and Penelope’s interview 
from the perspective of social cognition and extended mind theory. I now return to 
the moment of recognition between Odysseus and Eurycleia, and the way in which 
nonverbal behaviour structures the scene’s cognitive processes. After describing the 
origin of Odysseus’ scar, the poet returns to his main narrative: to Eurycleia’s 
recognition of her returned master and subsequent reaction (473-481): 
 
ἁψαμένη δὲ γενείου Ὀδυσσῆα προσέειπεν· 
“ἦ μάλ’ Ὀδυσσεύς ἐσσι, φίλον τέκος· οὐδέ σ’ ἐγώ γε 
πρὶν ἔγνων, πρὶν πάντα ἄνακτ’ ἐμὸν ἀμφαφάασθαι.”   
  ἦ, καὶ Πηνελόπειαν ἐσέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσι, 
πεφραδέειν ἐθέλουσα φίλον πόσιν ἔνδον ἐόντα.  
ἡ δ’ οὔτ’ ἀθρῆσαι δύνατ’ ἀντίη οὔτε νοῆσαι· 
τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηναίη νόον ἔτραπεν. αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς  
χείρ’ ἐπιμασσάμενος φάρυγος λάβε δεξιτερῆφι,   
τῇ δ’ ἑτέρῃ ἕθεν ἄσσον ἐρύσσατο φώνησέν τε· 
 
Having grabbed Odysseus’ chin, Eurycleia spoke to him, “Yes, you are 
Odysseus, dear child. I did not know you before, not until I had touched all of 
my master”. She spoke, and looked at Penelope with her eyes, wanting to show 
her that her dear husband was here. But Penelope was unable to observe or 
perceive here, since Athene had turned her noos away. Then Odysseus dropped 
for Eurycleia, taking her by the throat with his right hand, pulled her closer with 
the other one, and spoke. 
 
There are three aspects of this passage that are important for our current discussion. 
On a preliminary note, and as stated above, this scene is a multi-faceted 
representation of how nonverbal behaviour structures and communicates both 
psychological processes and interactions between individuals. The narrator describes 
Odysseus’ and Eurycleia’s cognizing primarily through these somatic aspects of 
experience. This behaviour, furthermore, is grounded not only in contemporary 
Homeric practices, but also in nonverbal universals that are common to human 
expressions of emotion and interactions with others. 
 
First, the narrator establishes intimacy between Odysseus and his once-nursemaid, 
both in reciting Eurycleia’s first-hand memories of her ward and the subsequent 
reaction it evokes (τὴν δ’ ἅμα χάρμα καὶ ἄλγος ἕλε φρένα, 471), and in placing 
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emphasis on physical touch as a form of recognition (πρὶν πάντα ἄνακτ’ ἐμὸν 
ἀμφαφάασθαι, 475). Parent-child relationships are, elsewhere in Homer, partially 
structured by physical contact. Eumaeus (16.12-21) and Penelope (17.36-40), for 
example, welcome Telemachus home by kissing—Minchin (2008, 23) describes this 
in particular as, “the most intimate of behaviours”—and embracing him, the former 
of who is likened to a father greeting his newly returned son. Thetis’ and Achilles’ 
nonverbal behaviour, similarly, reflects the shared affection of a parent and her child 
(Il. 1.360-361): 
 
καί ῥα πάροιθ' αὐτοῖο καθέζετο δάκρυ χέοντος, 
χειρί τέ μιν κατέρεξεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζε· 
 
She sat at before him while he wept, and stroked him with her hand and spoke to 
him, and called him by his name. 
  
Achilles, in the moment prior, had exhibited distinctly “son-like” behaviour: 
weeping, he had stretched out his hand and called for Thetis as his mother (μῆτερ 
ἐπεί μ’ ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἐόντα, 352). Achilles’ behaviour—and those of 
other Homeric children interacting with their caregivers—has a strong basis in 
evolution and early cognitive development. Bowlby (1969, 304-305), a pioneer in 
this field, shows that attachment behaviour in human and non-human primates stems 
from evolutionary pressures. “Attachment theory”, he (1988, 120-121) explains, 
“regards the propensity to make intimate emotional bonds to particular individuals as 
a basic component of human nature, already present in germinal form in the neonate 
and continuing through adult life into old age”. In doing so, infants seek the 
protection and support of their primary caregivers in stressful or dangerous 
situations, anticipating that they will remove the source of threat on their behalf 
(Bowlby 1960b; Prior and Glaser 2006). We know, from the broader context of the 
passage, that this is just what Achilles intends to ask Thetis: to remove a status threat 
by punishing the Achaians for Agamemnon’s lack of respect (1.407-412).  
 
But Achilles’ tears, within the scope of this caregiver-child exchange, are 
particularly interesting. “Crying”, Vingerhoets, Bylsma, and Rottenberg (2009, 460) 
argue, “is an inborn behaviour that functions to call for and assure the protective and 
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nurturing presence of caregivers, and it has been proposed that tears continue to be 
an attachment behaviour throughout life”. That this attachment behaviour develops 
in infancy and persists into adult life is well attested in modern scientific discourse 
(Bowlby 1960a, 1969; Hendriks, et al. 2008; Nelson 2005). The narrator, in ascribing 
to Achilles the attachment behaviour of a child, thus uses real world, nonverbal 
means in illustrating his relationship with Thetis. In responding by immediately 
going to Achilles’ side, stroking his face, and calling him “child” (τέκνον, 362), 
Thetis poignantly reacts as a mother, rather than as a goddess. This behaviour is a 
relic of a parent’s attempts to soothe their crying infant by physical touch that 
persists, as equally, once their child is grown (Bowlby 1969). Another good example 
of attachment behaviour in Homer is in Iliad 6 (466-470): 
 
  Ὣς εἰπὼν οὗ παιδὸς ὀρέξατο φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ· 
ἂψ δ’ ὃ πάϊς πρὸς κόλπον ἐϋζώνοιο τιθήνης 
ἐκλίνθη ἰάχων πατρὸς φίλου ὄψιν ἀτυχθεὶς 
ταρβήσας χαλκόν τε ἰδὲ λόφον ἱππιοχαίτην, 
δεινὸν ἀπ’ ἀκροτάτης κόρυθος νεύοντα νοήσας.  
 
Having spoken thus, brilliant Hector reached out for his son. But the child leant 
back to his nurse’s well-girdled bosom shrieking, having been distraught at the 
appearance of his own father, frightened when he saw the bronze and the crest 
with horse hair. He had perceived it bending forward terribly, from the highest 
point of the helmet. 
 
The scene to which this passage belongs is an especially vivid, touching account of 
parent-child relationships. Astyanax, like Achilles, responds nonverbally with classic 
attachment behaviour: the narrator tells us that, having been frightened of Hector’s 
helm (ταρβήσας χαλκόν τε ἰδὲ λόφον ἱππιοχαίτην, 469), Astyanax shrieks 
(ἰάχων, 468) and leans towards his nursemaid (ὃ πάϊς πρὸς… τιθήνης ἐκλίνθη, 
467-468). In doing so, Asytanax seeks physical proximity and, in crying out, alerts 
his nursemaid to a potentially dangerous situation for which he (as he perceives it) 
requires protection and emotional support. Hector, in turn, demonstrates both 
paternal and spousal care in his treatment of Astyanax and Andromache in the 
following moments.  For Astyanax, Hector behaves in a similar way to Thetis: he 
kisses him and takes him in his arms. Hector is, in this moment, a father: “At this 
point Homer”, Minchin (2008, 23) comments, “offers us a glimpse of Hector and 
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Andromache, not now as warrior fated to die and soon-to-be widow, but quite simply 
as parents”.130 With respect to attachment behaviour, Hector’s treatment of 
Andromache is also interesting (484-485): 
 
                                           πόσις δ’ ἐλέησε νοήσας, 
χειρί τέ μιν κατέρεξεν ἔπος τ’ ἔφατ’ ἔκ τ’ ὀνόμαζε· 
 
And Andromache’s husband saw [her tearful smile], and took pity on her, and 
stroked her with his hand, and called her by her name and spoke to her. 
 
Hector responds in much the same way as Thetis to Achilles when, seeing 
Andromache’s tears and feeling pity for her, he strokes her face (χειρί τέ μιν 
κατέρεξεν, 485).131 In their commentary on these lines, Graziosi and Haubold (2010, 
220) point out: “similar lines introduce the words of mothers when they try to 
console their children”;132 we know, too, that Andromache has already claimed that 
Hector is both a mother and father to her (“Ἕκτορ ἀτὰρ σύ μοί ἐσσι πατὴρ καὶ 
πότνια μήτηρ”, 429). Hector’s quasi-paternal care for Andromache in this 
passage—a care that is primarily established in the similarity between his nonverbal 
behaviour and that of other Homeric caregivers—also has its basis in modern 
attachment theory. Elaborations of Bowlby’s original attachment behaviour theory, 
undertaken by Hazan and Shaver (1987, 1990, 1994) in particular, explore how 
evolutionary and early developmental pressures underpinning parent-child 
relationships can also manifest in romantic couplings. Hazan and Shaver had 
observed similarities between parental and romantic relationships: (first) desire for 
physical proximity, (second) separation anxiety and loneliness in their partners’ 
absence, and (third) feelings of safety and security that aim towards mitigating threat 
and danger. Andromache’s and Hector’s exchange in Iliad 6 exhibits this kind of 
persistent attachment: as stated above, Andromache (first) claims that Hector fulfills 
the role of both her parents, (second) looks to Hector for support and protection, and 
Hector (finally) uses nonverbal behaviour typical of parents to their children in 
																																																								
130 See also de Jong (1987, 109) on this point. 
131 Both Kirk (1990) and Graziosi and Haubold (2010), in their commentaries of this line, point to the 
inherent femininity of face stroking in Homer. Graziosi and Haubold (2010, 22) in particular comment 
that, “Hector is the only male character who caresses another person”. 
132 Dione, for example, comforts Aphrodite in such a way after Diomedes attacks her on the battlefield 
(Il. 5.372); see also Thetis and Achilles in Iliad 24 (126-127). 
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comforting Andromache.133 The same attachment behaviour that influences parents, 
children, and romantic partnerships in the every day, therefore, also gives structure to 
similar relationships in the Homeric epics. 
 
Eurycleia’s claim about sensory recognition powerfully evokes an intimacy between 
herself and Odysseus, developed in infancy and persisting into adulthood. It is a 
mature example, in other words, of the one presented by Astyanax and his nursemaid 
in Iliad 6, and a comparable one to that of Thetis and Achilles. On an extra-narrative 
level, these relationships—Eurycleia’s and Odysseus’, Thetis’ and Achilles’, and 
Hector’s, Andromache’s, and Astyanax’s—are perhaps so relatable and touching 
because they mirror real-world, parent-child relationships. But Odysseus’ and 
Eurycleia’s bond is further reflected in their use of language. Eurycleia, first, calls 
Odysseus “dear child” (φίλον τέκος, 474) which, as Rutherford (1992, 190) argues, 
“combines quasi-maternal love and a servant’s loyalty”. In exhorting Eurycleia to be 
quiet, Odysseus also refers both to her as “my nurse” (τροφοῦ, 489) and to her role 
in raising him (“μαῖα, τίη μ’ ἐθέλεις ὀλέσαι; σὺ δέ μ’ ἔτρεφες αὐτὴ| τῷ σῷ ἐπὶ 
μαζῷ”, 482-483). 
 
The second point of interest in this passage is in the eye contact that Eurycleia 
attempts to make with Penelope (καὶ Πηνελόπειαν ἐσέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσι… ἡ δ’ 
οὔτ’ ἀθρῆσαι δύνατ’ ἀντίη οὔτε νοῆσαι, 476-478). In the previous chapter of this 
thesis, I briefly discussed how vision operates as an indicatory gesture between 
indviduals; this is implicit in the nonverbal exchange between Aias and Phoenix in 
Iliad 9 (222-224). This gesture, as I claimed there, is a nonverbal universal: we, like 
Homer’s characters, engage in the same kinds of attention-seeking mechanisms. Like 
attachment behaviour, visual communication strategies derive from infancy (Argyle 
and Cook 1976). As Cairns (2005a, 123) explains, “The way that the infant makes, 
withdraws, then re-establishes eye-contact with others is the origin of the 
																																																								
133 The intimacy between them is further displayed in their shared laughter when, in reaction to 
Astyanax’s scream: ἐκ δ’ ἐγέλασσε πατήρ τε φίλος καὶ πότνια μήτηρ (6.471). I think that this 
laughter operates on two levels. First, as both Levine (1982, 99) Poyatos (1993, 274; 2002, 80) point 
out, laughter between adults can sometimes occur at the naïve behaviour of a child; in this case, it 
denotes shared feelings of superiority. Second, it is a form of bonding between the pair; see 
Siefenhövel (1997, 61-85) on this point. 
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characteristic ambivalence in human interaction between contact-seeking and 
contact-avoidance”.134 The function of this particular nonverbal behaviour, thus, is 
communicatory: it is intended to establish a connection between Eurycleia and 
Penelope (even if it is unsuccessful), and thereby physically project a message 
between parties in a tense and difficult moment. “Visual contact”, Knapp et al. 
(2014, 298), “occurs when we want to signal that the communication channel is 
open. In some instances, eye gaze establishes virtual obligation to interact”.135 In 
explicitly stating, furthermore, that Eurycleia wants to alert Penelope to Odysseus’ 
presence (πεφραδέειν ἐθέλουσα φίλον πόσιν ἔνδον ἐόντα, 477), the narrator 
shows explicit awareness of psychosomatic aspects of experience, foregrounds 
theory of mind abilities in providing structure for the potential exchange, and 
demonstrates that he considers this nonverbal gesture as taking an active role in 
cognitive functioning and communication between individuals.  
 
Eurycleia describes touch as a sign of intimacy in the passage; it is in this way that 
she is able to recognize her returned master, with whom she has a long-term, 
especially close relationship. Odysseus, by contrast, uses touch to negative affect in 
the passage, in both asserting his dominance over and threatening Eurycleia: he 
reaches out for her (χείρ’ ἐπιμασσάμενος, 480), grabs her by the neck (φάρυγος 
λάβε δεξιτερῆφι, 480), and draws her closer (τῇ δ’ ἑτέρῃ ἕθεν ἄσσον ἐρύσσατο, 
481) so that he can threaten her verbally (φώνησέν, 481). In one respect, as we saw 
above, this deimatic behaviour is a product of Odysseus’ long and difficult journey 
home, in which he (as Rutherford argues) has had to hone his survival instincts in 
order to remain alive. But it is equally grounded in real world evolutionary and 
psychological development. 
 
In a recent study of nonverbal communication, Knapp et al. (2014) list physical 
proximity, and slow, controlled gestures as two common ways that individuals 
establish dominance over others. But Odysseus grasping Eurycleia’s throat is, 
																																																								
134 This point is well established in scientific discussions of eye contact and its communicatory 
function. See, for example, Samuels (1985), Farroni et al. (2004), Reid and Striano (2005), Brooks 
and Meltzoff (2002), and Lohaus, et al. (2001). 




perhaps, the most overt of this behaviour, as I think it is best explained by 
referencing aggressive behaviour in men and animals. In Homer, killing prey in both 
the battlefield and the natural world seems common: lions are especially described as 
attacking the throat as means of killing their prey quickly and efficiently (Il. 5.161, 
11.175, 17.63, while men are often killed on (and off) the battlefield by arrows, 
spears, or rocks directed at their necks.136 Accordingly, Hector kills Teukros by 
smashing his throat with a stone (Il. 8.324-327): 
 
                  τὸν δ’ αὖ κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ 
αὐερύοντα παρ’ ὦμον, ὅθι κληῒς ἀποέργει   
αὐχένα τε στῆθός τε, μάλιστα δὲ καίριόν ἐστι, 
τῇ ῥ’ ἐπὶ οἷ μεμαῶτα βάλεν λίθῳ ὀκριόεντι.  
 
As Teukros drew the shaft by his shoulder, in that place where the clavical and 
the neck and the chest meet, and this spot is most mortal; there shining-helmed 
Hector struck him furiously with a jagged boulder. 
 
When Odysseus threatens Eurycleia by taking her by the neck and drawing her 
closer, he both attempts to assert his dominance over her and engages in an overt 
threat display. In focusing directly on the neck, in other words, he not only uses his 
considerably greater strength in subduing her, but also engages in behaviour that is 
elsewhere attributed by the narrator to brutal displays of aggression; these displays 




This chapter primarily examines the ways that different kinds of external resources 
operate as part of psychological functioning in Homer. It is concerned with how 
																																																								
136 Il. 5.657, 7.12, 10.455, 11.240, 13.298, 14.465, 15.451, 16.332, 339, 587, 17.49, 20.455, 481, 
21.117, 406, 22.324, 22.327, 23.821; Od. 10.559, 11.64, 18.96, 19.539, 22.16, 329. 
137 This nonverbal behaviour is, markedly, also used in the English language to express concepts of 
extreme psychological aggression. “He went for the jugular” and “he ripped his throat out”, for 
example, are commonly used in describing someone who use what they know will hurt an individual 
with whom they are arguing the most; they conceptualize an especially cruel form of psychological 
punishment, or an attempt to destroy the argument of an opponent. “They were at each other’s 
throats” is another comparable example of this same phenomenon, in that it describes a situation in 
which two people are arguing in a particularly aggressive manner. Each of these idioms have their 
source in animal aggression; in the idea that animals often rip out the jugular artery when killing their 
opponent quickly and efficiently.  
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extended networks are formed by, enacted through, and re-affirmed for Homer’s 
characters, both in individual and collective senses. I place my primary focus on 
Odysseus’ interactions with Penelope and Eurycleia in Odyssey 19, which, I argue, 
are prime examples of extended networks at work. This study has drawn from (first) 
Clark’s and Chalmer’s original “extended mind” thesis, which demonstrates how 
nonorganic media can perform as equal a role in cognitive functioning as the “brain 
matter” within the head, (second) more recent and important elaborations of the 
extended mind thesis, such as Tollefson’s “solipsistic system” theory, (third) further 
work in both these areas, such as Harris et al.’s discoveries about shared 
remembering in intimate relationships, and (finally) theories of enactivism, both as 
they are articulated in philosophical (Heidegger) and scientific dialogue. Viewing 
Odyssey 19 (and other, similar passages) through the lens of this material enables us 
to better appreciate the complexity of these interactions and better understand the 
mechanics underpinning inter-subjective exchange. 
 
The Odysseus-Penelope relationship is, above all, famed for its ὁμοφροσύνη: it is 
deeply collaborative, intimate, and empathic. The narrator establishes this in several 
different ways. The first way is through rich dialogue, in which husband and wife 
engage in collaborative remembering about their shared history. The mechanics of 
collaborative memory, as explored by Harris et al., and Tollefson, reveal how 
intimacy can positively alter strategies for remembering. A contrast to the Odysseus-
Penelope model is Menelaus’ and Helen’s relationship. Despite their complementary 
stories, Menelaus and Helen engage in competitive remembering; while Penelope 
and Odysseus produce richer, more vivid narratives, Menelaus and Helen reveal how 
psychologically disparate they are. Second, the narrator presents Odysseus’ and 
Penelope’s psychological engagement through conceptual metaphor and mental 
imagery, in which (for example) concepts of hardness and softness, container 
metaphors, and images from the natural world describe the reciprocity and emotional 
progression of the couple through their interactions with each other. Third, through 
material media: Odysseus’ recitation of his historic garments particularly evokes not 
only his and Penelope’s relationship, but also engages her on several different 
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psychological levels. His historic clothing, thus, is both a part of their shared 
extended network and a means by which he and Penelope can enact their cognition.  
 
The narrator portrays the Odysseus-Eurycleia relationship by describing their 
nonverbal behaviour, which communicates ideas of intimacy, parental care, and 
dominance. Audiences understand their psychological processes and states not only 
because similar nonverbal behaviour is employed else in Homeric parent-child 
relationships, but also because he models them on real-world relationships. I have 
shown in the previous chapter how nonverbal behaviour is both universally 
determined and culturally specific. Touch plays a primary role in their interaction: it 
not only characterizes their parent-child relationship, but is also the means by which 
Odysseus asserts his control over her. Studies of attachment behaviour, deimatic 
displays, and communication strategies (eye contact) reveal how the narrator 
employs evolutionary, interactional, and physical aspects of experience in presenting 
the psychological aspects of the scene. 
 
Both ancient and modern studies of memory also played an important role in my 
discussion. Shepherd (2014a, 354-355) that, although Homer makes no explicit 
mention of ἐναργεία or φαντασίαι, “seeds of the later theory are already present” in 
his epics. These concepts, I think, underlie both the narrator’s use of simile and 
metaphor in Odyssey 19: in the first case, in his description of Penelope’s weeping, 
and in the second, in the process by which Odysseus describes his historic clothing. 
In this sense, Odysseus’ attempt to engage Penelope in their interview also mirrors 
the art of the poet himself who, in producing vivid stories, establishes intimacy with 
his audience. 
 
This chapter has focused primarily on Odysseus’ cognitive processes in Odyssey 19; 
but, as several scholars point out, their exchange is also problematized by the 
ambiguity with which Penelope’s mindedness is presented in the narrative. The next 
chapter, therefore, turns to an examination of Penelope, both in Book 19 and the 
Odyssey more generally. 
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Chapter Five: Penelope’s Perspective and Ambiguous Mindedness 
 
This chapter narrows its focus to Penelope’s mindedness in Odyssey 19, which is 
problematized by (first) the question of whether she has yet recognized Aethon as 
her returned husband and (second) the ambiguity with which her mental states are 
presented in the narrative. While there is ample evidence that suggests Penelope has 
genuine and considerable investment in Odysseus’ memory, we are left uncertain as 
to how aware she is of Aethon’s true identity. This has important implications for 
how we interpret her treatment of him, in both Odyssey 19 and the poem more 
generally.138 Accordingly, the narrator is frustratingly evasive on this point; her 
actions in relation to her husband, son, and suitors are thus difficult to rationalize in 
any concrete sense, and what insight we are given to her motives comes primarily 
from nonverbal behaviour, speeches, and the inferences made about her by others.139 
“Penelope’s motives are difficult to assess”, Murnaghan (2011[1987], 105) argues, 
“Because the poet is generally uncommunicative about her thoughts… leaving us to 
deduce her state of mind from outward gestures and speeches”.140 
 
Intra-narrative reports about Penelope’s loyalties are varied, as different characters 
express conflicting opinions to Odysseus throughout the epic. On the one hand, 
Athene (13.336-338), Agamemnon (11.444-446), and Anticleia (11.181-183) praise 
Penelope as a positive example of female fidelity and assure him of her loyalty. On 
the other, stories of Aphrodite’s (8.265-224), Clytemnestra’s (11.435-444), and 
Helen’s (4.266-289) unfaithfulness to their husbands recur throughout the poem, and 
reflect the enormous potential for Penelope’s infidelity during Odysseus’ long 
																																																								
138 Critics point out, however, that Penelope’s behaviour in the face of repeated signs that Odysseus is 
soon to return home constitutes an inadvertent betrayal of her husband. Katz (1991, 93-133) provides 
a good overview of previous opinions on this point. Armory (1963), Austin (1975, 235), Whitman 
(1958, 303-304), and Russo (1982) regard Penelope as especially intuitive, arguing that she has, at 
least subconsciously, recognized Odysseus.  
139 On her speeches in particular, Foley (1995, 97) argues that, “although the text does not give us full 
access to Penelope’s thoughts and feelings, her well-articulated dilemma and her stated reasons for her 
establishing the contest make it possible to judge and make ethical sense of her decision”. 
140 See also Suzuki (1989, 91), who remarks that: “Penelope is portrayed from without, and the poet, 
while according her subjectivity, does not seek to represent it; he sees her through the eyes of the male 
characters around her… and he conveys their uncertainty about her”; Felson-Rubin (1993, 1995), 
Winkler (1990), Katz (1991), and Zeitlin (1995) for important discussions on Penelope’s mindedness. 
Winkler in particular has argued that Penelope does indeed recognize Odysseus; see also Harsh (1950) 
for a similar argument. 
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absence. Even Penelope, in simultaneously defending and condemning Helen, 
provides a confusing self-portrait when she relates to Odysseus that (23.215-224), 
 
“αἰεὶ γάρ μοι θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν   
ἐρρίγει, μή τίς με βροτῶν ἀπάφοιτ’ ἐπέεσσιν 
ἐλθών· πολλοὶ γὰρ κακὰ κέρδεα βουλεύουσιν.  
οὐδέ κεν Ἀργείη Ἑλένη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα, 
ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀλλοδαπῷ ἐμίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ, 
εἰ ᾔδη, ὅ μιν αὖτις ἀρήϊοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν  
ἀξέμεναι οἶκόνδε φίλην ἐς πατρίδ’ ἔμελλον. 
τὴν δ’ ἦ τοι ῥέξαι θεὸς ὤρορεν ἔργον ἀεικές· 
τὴν δ’ ἄτην οὐ πρόσθεν ἑῷ ἐγκάτθετο θυμῷ 
λυγρήν”. 
 
For the thumos in my stethos was afraid,141 lest some mortal man come and 
beguile me with words. For many deliberate for evil gains. Not even would 
Argive Helen, born of Zeus, have mixed in love and bed-sport with a foreigner, 
if she had known that the warlike sons of the Achaians were going to bring her 
home to her fatherland. Indeed, a god urged her to do the shameful deed, she had 
not stored that atē in her thumos before. 
 
Penelope claims, on the one hand, that Helen would not have left with Paris had she 
known the consequences of her actions; on the other, that her cousin’s behaviour was 
vastly out-of-character, and thus must have been the product of some outside 
influence.142 This conflicting description of Helen, delivered at the very moment 
Odysseus’ identity is confirmed to Penelope, is also a self-defence;143 an assurance 
that, despite her claims about his bed being moved, that she has kept faith with her 
husband. A similarly ambiguous portrayal is in Book 19 (536-550), where Penelope 
recounts a dream in the second half of her interview with Aethon. Penelope explains 
																																																								
141 The literal translation of ῥιγέω is “I shudder”, though Lattimore glosses the term by the emotion 
with which it is most commonly associated: fear. In this case, we have an instance of a physical 
symptom of an emotion (shuddering) being used to represent an entire emotional experience (fear). 
See Cairns (2014) in particular on this point, and also my discussion of fear and anxiety in Chapter 
Three. 
142 Clytemnestra, Nestor tells us, suffered the same fate: in describing Agamemnon’s murder to 
Telemachus, he states that she had been virtuous and faithful before the removal of her court bard by 
Aegisthus and he subsequent seduction (3.266-272). Felson-Rubin (1994, 40) states of Penelope’s 
words that, “Penelope exonerates Helen to exonerate herself. Her second metis, setting the bow 
contest, raised the spectre of bigamy and of a second ‘Trojan War’… [h]er own offence was slight 
compared to Helen’s, but alarm at what she might have done allows this strange empathy with Helen, 
as she appeases Odysseus for not embracing him right away and for nearly remarrying”. 
143 See de Jong (2001, 557-558) on Penelope’s self-defence in this passage, who argues that it is 
especially important that she affirm her loyalty to Odysseus given (first) her family connection to both 
Helen and Clytemnestra, and (second) Odysseus’ disapproval at her hesitation in receiving him 
(23.163-172).   
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the dream herself (546-550), stating that Odysseus is an eagle who slaughters her 
beloved geese—the Suitors—who she loves to watch (537, καί τέ σφιν ἰαίνομαι 
εἰσορόωσα). In doing so, she expresses affection for the Suitors—and anguish at 
their death—despite her repeated assertions that she (first) resents their presence in 
her ever-diminishing house, (second) longs for Odysseus’ return, however unlikely 
after so long an absence (541-543): 
 
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὀνείρῳ, 
ἀμφὶ δέ μ’ ἠγερέθοντο ἐϋπλοκαμῖδες Ἀχαιαί,  
οἴκτρ’ ὀλοφυρομένην, ὅ μοι αἰετὸς ἔκτανε χῆνας. 
 
“Then I wept and cried—in my dream, that is—and the fair-haired Achaian 
women gathered around me, as I mourned that an eagle had killed my geese”. 
 
This seeming inconsistency has, as other representations of Penelope in Homer, 
divided commentators. In his analysis of this scene, Dodds (1951, 123) borrows the 
Freudian “inversion of affect”, arguing that it represents the opposite of her true 
feelings about the Suitors, while Devereux (1957), Rankin (1962), and Felson-Rubin 
(1987) suggest that the dream signifies subconscious eagerness for their attention. 
Rutherford (1992, 194-195), however, argues against both these interpretations: 
“Penelope grieves while she thinks the dead geese are themselves, but says nothing 
of any distress after the eagle explains what their death symbolizes”. 
 
The lack of consensus about Penelope’s mindedness, both for the poem’s characters 
and for modern critics, makes her an interesting study of the way the narrator 
presents the thoughts, emotions, and intentions of his characters when they are 
otherwise ambiguous. For the more specific purposes of the current study, 
understanding this ambiguity is also crucial for how we interpret Penelope’s 
behaviour throughout her conversation with Aethon. My own analysis focuses on 
what we can discern of Penelope’s psychology from the external resources 
(nonverbal behaviour, interaction with material objects, and speeches) she employs, 
and the inferences made by others about them. On an extra-narrative level, I am also 
concerned with the mental imagery employed by the narrator in describing her 
	 	
	 158	
psychological processes, and by how our theory of mind capacities are engaged in 
interpreting her behaviour.  
 
My discussion takes place in three parts. In the first, I briefly define Penelope’s 
mental state at the beginning of Odyssey 19. Section Two examines Penelope’s 
description of the process by which she wove Laertes’ funeral shroud—both a 
physical and psychological δόλος—with particular reference to Homeric garment 
metaphors. In doing so, I not only examine the use of τολυπεύειν and ὑφαίνειν in 
the Odyssey 19 passage, but place Penelope’s speech in a broader context by 
examining garment metaphors elsewhere in Homer. I then turn to the “nightingale” 
simile of 513-519. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how others interpret 
Penelope’s mindedness, using Amphimedon and Antinous’ description of her 
weaving in Odyssey 2 and 24, and Penelope’s appearance before Odysseus and the 
Suitors in Odyssey 18. 
 
In discussing Penelope’s mindedness, I do not attempt to put forward my perspective 
on when—if at all—she recognizes Odysseus before he reveals his identity. Rather, 
my analysis focuses on the means used by the narrator in rendering Penelope’s 
complicated mindedness; I examine not only how she rationalizes her own position 
in Book 19, but also how others interpret the connections and disconnections 
between outer behaviour and (what they perceive as) her inner mentality elsewhere 
in the Odyssey. In these presentations of her mindedness, I argue, we see extended 
and enacted cognition and theory of mind at work. 
 
I. Contextual Concerns 
On a preliminary note, we know that Penelope spends most of the Odyssey at a 
psychological “breaking point”: the suitors have discovered her ruse of Laertes’ 
shroud, Telemachus is restless and frustrated by their continued threat to his 
inheritance and, as time goes on, it seems less likely that Odysseus will return home. 
Penelope makes clear how laborious are these external pressures when describing her 




“νῦν δ’ οὔτ’ ἐκφυγέειν δύναμαι γάμον οὔτε τιν’ ἄλλην 
μῆτιν ἔθ’ εὑρίσκω· μάλα δ’ ὀτρύνουσι τοκῆες 
γήμασθ’, ἀσχαλάᾳ δὲ πάϊς βίοτον κατεδόντων, 
γινώσκων· ἤδη γὰρ ἀνὴρ οἷός τε μάλιστα    
οἴκου κήδεσθαι, τῷ τε Ζεὺς ὄλβον ὀπάζει”. 
 
“Now I am unable to escape marriage and I find no other metis any longer. My 
parents strongly urge me to marry, and my child is vexed because they eat our 
stores. He knows it, for he is a man by now, the kind who cares for a house, to 
wihich Zeus gives glory”. 
 
This vast emotional strain is obviously at play throughout her interview with Aethon. 
While Penelope demonstrates her considerable mental talents—an aptitude that rivals 
Odysseus’ own—she is also in a highly vulnerable, fragile state of mind, oscillating 
between cunning, calm resolve, and debilitating grief. Eumaios claims that the reason 
for this is that other guests have, over the years, made false reports about Odysseus’ 
impending return in hopes of receiving a reward from Penelope (14.123-132). Given 
this history, we can perhaps well understand Penelope’s suspicion and scepticism at 
the arrival of yet another informant in her house, her frustration at repeated and 
relentless disappointments, and her awareness that, after years of holding the Suitors 
at bay, it might now be time to act. Each of these cognitive processes, however, 
conflict with the considerable emotional investment Penelope still has in her lost 
husband, and her longing for his return. This mental oscillation is expressed in the 
narrative through nonverbal behaviour, metaphors, similes, speeches, and material 
objects; it is to these I now turn. 
 
II. Textile and Garment Metaphors: τολυπεύειν and ὑφαίνειν 
At the outset of her interview with Aethon in Odyssey 19, Penelope gives a detailed 
account of the process by which she wove Laertes’ funeral shroud (137-151):  
 
οἱ δὲ γάμον σπεύδουσιν· ἐγὼ δὲ δόλους τολυπεύω. 
φᾶρος μέν μοι πρῶτον ἐνέπνευσε φρεσὶ δαίμων 
στησαμένῃ μέγαν ἱστὸν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ὑφαίνειν, 
λεπτὸν καὶ περίμετρον· ἄφαρ δ’ αὐτοῖς μετέειπον·   
“κοῦροι, ἐμοὶ μνηστῆρες, ἐπεὶ θάνε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,  
μίμνετ’ ἐπειγόμενοι τὸν ἐμὸν γάμον, εἰς ὅ κε φᾶρος  
ἐκτελέσω, μή μοι μεταμώνια νήματ’ ὄληται, 
Λαέρτῃ ἥρωϊ ταφήϊον, εἰς ὅτε κέν μιν 
μοῖρ’ ὀλοὴ καθέλῃσι τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο·    
μή τίς μοι κατὰ δῆμον Ἀχαιϊάδων νεμεσήσῃ,  
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αἴ κεν ἄτερ σπείρου κεῖται πολλὰ κτεατίσσας.” 
ὣς ἐφάμην, τοῖσιν δ’ ἐπεπείθετο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ.  
ἔνθα καὶ ἠματίη μὲν ὑφαίνεσκον μέγαν ἱστόν, 
νύκτας δ’ ἀλλύεσκον, ἐπὴν δαΐδας παραθείμην.   
ὣς τρίετες μὲν ἔληθον ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειθον Ἀχαιούς· 
 
“They urge on marriage. I wind wiles. A divinity first breathed into my phrenes 
to set up a great loom in my hall and to weave a shroud, a very large and 
delicate one. Then I said to them: ‘Young men, my suitors, now that the great 
Odysseus has died, wait, though you are eager to marry me, until I finish this 
web, so that my weaving will not be useless and wasted. This is a shroud for the 
hero Laertes, for when the destructive doom of death which lays men low shall 
take him, lest any Achaian woman in this neighbourhood hold it against me that 
a man of many conquests lies with no sheet to wind him’. So I spoke, and the 
proud thumos in them was persuaded. Thereafter in the daytime I would weave 
at my great loom, but in the night I would have torches set by, and undo it. So 
for three years I was secret in my designs, convincing the Achaians”. 
 
This ruse, in highlighting the cunning and duplicitousness that defines Penelope 
throughout the narrative, is a powerful expression of both her identity and the like-
mindedness she shares with Odysseus.144 It is also in keeping with her most common 
epithet in Homer—περίφρων (circumspect)—as well as the possible etymology of 
her name, πήνη (thread in a shuttle) and ὄψ (face), all of which are appropriate to a 
character that challenges others through the weaving of figurative and literal webs.145  
 
On a preliminary note, it is important to point out that Penelope’s account comes 
right before she questions Aethon about his origins and identity. In this sense, it 
operates as a warning against any attempts on Aethon’s part to deceive her. 
Penelope, thus, not only demonstrates her cunning and duplicity by re-telling the 
story of the shroud, but also points towards her aptitude in decoding the wiles of 
others. The deception woven by Penelope, in other words, is meant to dissuade any 
potential ones by Aethon in the conversation that follows.  
 
																																																								
144 On these points, Pantelia (1993, 496-497) states that, “Penelope herself… proves that she is 
Odysseus’ worthy wife when she deceives the suitors by turning her actual weaving of Laertes’ 
shroud into “a wile.” In this case, the web becomes not only a symbol of the female sphere of 
influence and the traditional idea of familial order that Penelope seems to accept and represent in the 
poem, but also the very weapon which she uses in order to protect and maintain this kind of order by 
deceiving those who threaten it”. 
145 See Kruger (2001, esp. Ch. 3) for more on Penelope’s metaphoric weaving of wiles. 
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But Penelope’s weaving is also a powerful cognitive metaphor, in that it combines 
mental and physical modes of experience in two ways: (first) she falsely encourages 
each of the suitors to hope in overtly stating her intention to re-marry, thereby 
engaging them psychologically with words, and (second) she enacts her plan 
primarily through the physical process of weaving and unravelling her web, which is 
an extension and embodiment of her mindedness.146 Penelope’s work, thus, is a 
complex deception that is deeply influenced by extended and embodied approaches 
to mind. For the former, Penelope’s account suggests that her web is an active part of 
her cognitive functioning—as an object that operates as part of an extended system. 
In the previous chapter, I showed how this was also the case for Helen, who, in 
weaving her textile, not only memorializes the Trojan War, but also explores her 
central part in it. In Odyssey 19, Penelope describes her mental deception as being 
simultaneous with her physical weaving of the web. The textile she produces is thus 
inseparable from her thought processes; it is a means by which she enacts her 
cognition—like Helen, Penelope “thinks” on the loom. In both these cases, woman, 
weaving, web, and world form a continuous, extended loop that, combined, comprise 
a cohesive cognitive process. 
 
We see cognitive embodiment at work in the literal and figurative uses of ὑφαίνειν 
and τολυπεύειν, which not only describe the physical production of Penelope’s 
textile, but also constitute complex garment metaphors. “The incomprehensible 
dexterity of the female art of weaving”, Jenkins (1985, 115) observes of ancient 
Greek culture more broadly, “provides a natural metaphor for the art of deception; 
the more poikilos (elaborate) the fabric, the more poikilos (cunning) it became”. 
Though this metaphor is not quite so common in the English language, we might 
refer to telling a long, convoluted story as “spinning a yarn”; so too, in Walter 
																																																								
146 Jenkins (1985, 118) points out that one of the reasons Penelope so successful in this plot is because 
of the general lack of male knowledge about the process of weaving in the ancient world; more 
broadly, he explains that it was partially for this reason that weaving and women’s work in general 
were treated with a degree of suspicion. Penelope also references her social role as Odysseus’ wife—
and the censure she might invoke from other women, were she to not perform this final task—in 
delaying the suitors, as well as masculine ignorance about textile production, which is traditionally the 
sole province of women in Homer’s world. In these senses, therefore, Penelope’s weaving also has a 




Scott’s Marmion, we have the oft-quoted, “Oh, what a tangled web we weave,| when 
first we practice to deceive!”. In this example, Scott maps the physical process of 
weaving on the metaphor’s subject matter: tales and deceptions. Both Beekes (2010, 
1540) and Cunliffe (2012[1924], 402) identify two primary meanings of ὑφαίνειν: 
(first) to weave, and (second) “to piece together in the mind, contrive, devise” 
(Thomas 1988, 261; Cunliffe 2012[1924], 402).147 ὑφαίνειν therefore denotes woven 
words, wiles, and textiles in Homer.148 On a preliminary note, the literal and 
metaphorical uses of ὑφαίνειν are united in the figure of Athene, who is both a 
weaver of webs and wiles par excellence. Her protégé, Odysseus, appeals to both 
these capacities after returning to Ithaca and hearing about the state of his house: 
“ἀλλ’ ἄγε μῆτιν ὕφηνον” (“But come, weave a mētis”, Od. 13.386). Odysseus very 
succinctly unites the two senses of ὑφαίνειν in beseeching Athene for her aid, in 
which the physical act of weaving is used to describe the process by which Athene 
will devise a plan for Odysseus. Another particularly good example of this is in 
Odyssey 5, where a drowning Odysseus questions Ino’s motives for giving him her 
veil (356-359): 
 
“ὤ μοι ἐγώ, μή τίς μοι ὑφαίνῃσιν δόλον αὖτε 
ἀθανάτων, ὅ τέ με σχεδίης ἀποβῆναι ἀνώγει. 
ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὔ πω πείσομ', ἐπεὶ ἑκὰς ὀφθαλμοῖσι 
γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἰδόμην, ὅθι μοι φάτο φύξιμον εἶναι. 
 
“Ah me, may it not be that one of the immortals is weaving a trick for me, 
whichever one urges me to step from the raft. But I will not obey yet, since I 
have seen with my own eyes that land is far away, where she says there is a safe 
haven for me”. 
 
This passage is something of a locus classicus for embodied cognition and cognitive 
linguistics, as it demonstrates that the Homeric narrator had an implicit 
understanding of cognitive metaphor that he brought to bear in composing his 
																																																								
147 Beekes (2010, 1540), furthermore, lists its cognates as: (first) ubhnāti/umbháti (to bind, fetter), and 
úrnā-vābhi- (spider) in Sanskrit, (second) ubdaēna- (consisting of woven texture) in Young Avestan, 
(third) ven (weave) in Armenian, (fourth) weban (to weave, twist, spin) in Old High German, and 
(fourth) wäp-/wāp (to weave) in Tocharian A/B. 
148 Some metaphors that employ ὑφαίνειν include Il. 3.211-13, 7.324-25, Od. 4.677-80, 9.420-23. For 
secondary scholarship on the two uses of ὑφαίνειν, see Snyder (1981), 194; Pantelia (1993), 494 and 
Murnaghan (1995); the next chapter of this thesis more thoroughly discuss category of metaphors.  
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epics.149 Odysseus establishes a very explicit link, here, between Ino’s woven textile 
and the potential deception it represents; he does so by mapping the concrete (the 
textile) onto the abstract (the deception) and, in the process, not only references the 
double-meaning of ὑφαίνειν, but also unites physical and psychological modes of 
experience. This is a case, as in Scott’s Marmion, in which the physical creation and 
use of a material object becomes “scaffolding” for conceptualizing an abstract 
concept. Audiences of Homer would perhaps have understood these connections, 
especially given the frequency of weaving and garment metaphors in the Iliad and 
Odyssey.  
 
Penelope’s art, too, unites these literal and metaphorical understandings of ὑφαίνειν: 
she physically weaves her web as she constructs and enacts her deception of the 
Suitors; in this context, the former becomes a means by which she conceptualizes the 
latter. Her aptitude for deception is also metaphorically represented in both the 
length of time for which she manages to deceive them, and in the size (περίμετρον, 
140) and beauty (λεπτὸν, 140) of the textile; in other words, and put more simply, 
Penelope’s skill as a weaver and reflects upon her aptitude for deceit.  
 
τολυπεύειν (“ἐγὼ δὲ δόλους τολυπεύω”, 137), which denotes the preparation of 
wool for spinning, also provides structure for the cognitive metaphor in this passage. 
Rutherford (1993, 150-151) notes that its appearance here is unusual, as the verb 
usually appears with πόλεμον in Homer: it is used four other times in the Odyssey 
(1.238, 4.490, 14.368, 24.95) in metaphor for exacerbating martial conflict (“ἐπεὶ 
πόλεμον τολύπευσεν”), and twice in the Iliad in the context of bringing war (14.86) 
and actions (24.7) to completion. Rutherford (150-151) goes on to argue that 
Penelope’s use of the verb perhaps in Book 19, “stresses the necessity for guile in the 
Odyssey, and its special appropriateness to women in general, who must work 
indirectly against the stronger sex, and to the wife of the cunning Odysseus in 
particular”. Beekes (2010, 1492), accordingly, identifies both literal and 
																																																								
149 Cairns (2012) and Budelmann and LeVen (2014) have most recently applied insights from 
cognitive linguistics to ancient Greek literature; in contrast to them is Clarke (1999), who refutes the 
existence of cognitive metaphor in Homer. Passages such as these, however, perhaps throw into doubt 
Clarke’s argument; I shall discuss a further example of this same phenomenon in the next chapter, in 
my investigation of the opening sequence of Odyssey 20. 
	 	
	 164	
metaphorical uses of the verb. Derived from τολύπη, it means (first) to wind wool or 
yarn into a clew, and (second), metaphorically, “to instigate, accomplish with 
difficulty”. 
 
I think that, in the Odyssey 19 passage, there is a natural and automatic mapping 
between the literal and figurative uses of τολυπεύειν and ὑφαίνειν, in which the 
former denotes Penelope’s preparation of her deception/the wool, and the latter its 
execution/weaving and unpicking the web. His τολυπεύειν and ὑφαίνειν is, thus, 
intended to describe the entirety of Penelope’s thought processes by making points of 
comparison between two stages of weaving webs and wiles. In establishing these 
connections, the narrator aids his audience in conceptualizing a complex thought 
process using elements and concepts from the physical world. Textile production is 
an especially useful one, since it might have been familiar to most of his audiences; it 
is a common and persistent aspect of everyday life in the archaic and classical Greek 
world.  
 
II.II. Other Garment Metaphors in Homer 
Textile and garment metaphors are common elsewhere in Homer, and are employed 
by the narrator in conceptualising a broad range of psychological experiences. We 
have already seen how Penelope’s cunning and aptitude for deception is almost 
entirely structured by the double meaning of τολυπεύειν and ὑφαίνειν. Before 
moving on, I would like to linger on other instances of similar metaphors in Homer 
that take χεῖν and καλύπτειν as their main verbs, in hopes of placing the Odyssey 19 
passage in its broader context. In doing so, I focus on ἄχος (distress) and death as 
case studies. 
 
II.II.I. ἄχος in Homer 
Though ἄχος most frequently denotes the mourning of the deceased in Homer, its 
range and usage also extends to experiences of anger, foreboding, panic, and 
distress—Aeneas, for example, experiences ἄχος at a near miss from Achilles’ spear 
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on the battlefield (Il. 20.281-283).150 It is in funerary contexts, however, where the 
experiential and physical underpinnings of garment metaphors are most evident. In 
these examples, ἄχος is a “black cloud” (νεφέλη μέλαινα) that “veils” (καλύπτω) 
its victim. These clouds are metaphorically conceived as garments.151 As Onians 
(1988, 421) points out: 
 
This covering or wrapping was perhaps conceived as vaporous, as indeed was 
the stuff of consciousness. It is important to recognize this way of thinking of 
vapour or cloud as a garment or wrapping.152 
 
Accordingly, the body of the deceased and the mourner’s head are covered with 
fabric in Homeric funeral rites; there is a clear connection, therefore, between the 
actual, physical use of clothing and metaphorical constructions of the psychological 
states associated with mourning.153  
 
At news of his brother-in-law’s death, for example, Hector’s ἄχος is a black cloud 
that covers him (Il. 17.591): ὣς φάτο, τὸν δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα 
(Thus he spoke, and a black cloud of pain covered him). The main verb in this 
metaphor, καλύπτειν, takes the νεφέλη μέλαινα (black cloud) of ἄχος as its main 
subject, with Hector as the affected party. This construction is typical of Homeric 
garment metaphors governed by καλύπτειν; as Cairns (2012, 177) explains, 
 
In the two most basic constructions of καλύπτειν in Homer, the substance itself 
is (in the first) the subject of the verb (e.g. the cloud covers the earth) and (in the 
second) the instrument (the agent covers the object with the substance). 
 
																																																								
150 On experiences of ἄχος in relation to anger in particular, see Cairns (2003), who comments that, 
“achos represents the mental distress which is part of anger and other emotions; thus, on occasion, an 
occurrence of achoes, insofar as it denotes a painful, emotional response to an insult or affront of 
one’s timē, can refer to the emotion of anger itself”. 
151 See, for example, Il. 5.186, 345, 14.350, 15.308, 17.551, 20.150; Od. 5.291, 8.562. 
152 For further discussion of the connection between clouds and garments, see Onians (1988, 420-425) 
and Cairns (2012), and Dyer (1964, 29), who separates five basic uses of καλύπτειν in these Homeric 
examples.  
153 See Cairns (2012) for the connection between metaphorical descriptions of ἄχος, death, and 
funerary practice, who states that (182), “The notion of earth as a layer of stuff that covers the dead 
may be more or less literal, but it is also used as a symbol for the abstract notion of death, and the 
latent idea of a garment in such phrases is activated in references to ‘wearing earth’ as a variant of the 
same metonymy. By the same token, the use of actual garments, whether by the dying to cover their 
faces or by the bereaved to cover the corpse or the cremated remains, serves as a physical embodiment 
of the metaphor of death as a cover or garment”. 
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Hector’s ἄχος fits into the first category, and offers a physical description, extended 
by means of metaphor, for an otherwise invisible cognitive process. Elsewhere in 
early Greek epic, a literal change in clothing can accompany a shift between one 
intangible state and another: Thetis (Il. 24.89-95) and Demeter (HH 2.40-44), for 
example, don a κάλυμμα as part of spontaneous mourning rituals and the grief they 
denote, while Priam, in covering himself, signifies a temporary alteration in status 
from king to suppliant before approaching Achilles in Il. 24. Hector’s transition 
between one emotional state and another is likewise described metaphorically by the 
“covering over” of the black cloud; it is perhaps also important to note that it is 
described as encompassing him, which may allude to the intensity of his emotional 
response—of his ἄχος as consuming him. Metaphorical conceptualizations of death 
in Homer, additionally, often contain cloud imagery, in which darkness covers 
(καλύπτειν) the face and eyes of its victim; I will discuss this further in my next 
case study. For the present discussion, however, it is important to point out that the 
similarity between metaphorical constructions of death and “funerary” ἄχος may 
suggest that Hector’s emotional experience is, in this passage, connected with the 
experience of death itself; his experience, in this sense, may be likened to that of the 
brother-in-law for which he mourns. 
 
The narrator limits his description of Hector’s ἄχος in Iliad 17 to the metaphor that 
signifies his change in emotional state. Achilles’ experience of ἄχος, however, is 
paired with an outward demonstration of grief. This further highlights the way that 
psychological experiences are embodied and extended beyond the bounds of the 
brain in Homer. At the beginning of Iliad 18, Achilles mourns Patroclus (22-27): 
 
Ὣς φάτο, τὸν δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα· 
  κἀμφοτέρῃσι δὲ χερσὶν ἑλὼν κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν 
χεύατο κὰκ κεφαλῆς, χαρίεν δ' ᾔσχυνε πρόσωπον· 
νεκταρέῳ δὲ χιτῶνι μέλαιν' ἀμφίζανε τέφρη. 
αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κονίῃσι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ τανυσθεὶς 
κεῖτο, φίλῃσι δὲ χερσὶ κόμην ᾔσχυνε δαΐζων. 
 
Thus he spoke, and a dark cloud of pain covered over him. With both hands, 
having taken the smoky dust, he poured it over his head, and made ugly his 
handsome countenance. And black ash settled upon his fragrant tunic. The man 
himself, mighty in greatness, lay in the dust, stretched out, and tearing his hair 




Achilles finds expression for his ἄχος in the physical: he pours (χεύατο, 24) dust 
over his head (κὰκ κεφαλῆς, 24), damages his face (ᾔσχυνε πρόσωπον, 24), lies in 
the dirt (αὐτὸς δ' ἐν…τανυσθεὶς κεῖτο, 26-27), and tears at his hair (κόμην 
ᾔσχυνε, 27). This behaviour is a part of his ἄχος; it is an outer elaboration, or 
extension, of the cognitive process that takes place in his head. The narrator, 
conversely, articulates it through the metaphor of 22 that, like Hector in Iliad 17, 
describes ἄχος as a black cloud that consumes (= covers over, καλύπτειν) its 
victim. In both senses, this passage not only describes the extremity of Achilles’ 
ἄχος, but also reinforces the perceived concordance between the embodiment of 
psychological processes via metaphor and actual bodily movement and physical 
behaviour.154 
 
But ἄχος, as stated above, also occurs outside funerary contexts. In Odyssey 4, for 
example, Penelope receives news of Telemachus’ departure from Ithaca (716-719): 
 
τὴν δ' ἄχος ἀμφεχύθη θυμοφθόρον, οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτ' ἔτλη 
δίφρῳ ἐφέζεσθαι πολλῶν κατὰ οἶκον ἐόντων, 
ἀλλ' ἄρ' ἐπ' οὐδοῦ ἷζε πολυκμήτου θαλάμοιο 
οἴκτρ' ὀλοφυρομένη· 
 
And thumos-destroying pain was shed around her, she could no longer manage 
to sit upon a seat though there were many in the house, but sat on the threshold 
of her elaborate chamber, weeping pitifully. 
 
We have seen how the main verb governing the metaphor of 716, χεῖν (to shed), is 
also used in Iliad 17 to describe how Achilles pours dust over his head as part of his 
mourning for Patroclus. Here, it is used primarily as a metaphor that describes 
Penelope’s ἄχος; the underlying image here is of ἄχος shedding over her like a 
physical substance. The addition of ἀμφι, furthermore, suggests that it is particularly 
consuming, and its extremity is amplified by the inclusion of θῡμοφθόρος (thumos-
destroying). But Penelope’s ἄχος also finds expression in her physical behaviour: 
																																																								
154 See Edwards (1991, 144) for the intensity of Achilles’ emotional reaction, who states that, “[i]n his 
agony of grief, Akhilleus defiles his head with dust, rolls on the ground, and tears his hair. The 
language of mourning is mingled with that of death, for defiling the head with dust is the sign not only 
of extreme grief but also of death on the battlefield”. 
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she sits at the entrance of her bedchamber and weeps. As in the Iliad 17 passage, 
therefore, Penelope’s emotional experience is described using both embodied 
metaphor and nonverbal behaviour. In doing so, the narrator unites physiological and 
psychological modes of experience, and borrows, again, from the use of garments 
and textiles in making Penelope’s ἄχος comprehensible for his audience. 
 
II.II.II. Death: Iliad 20.470-477 
Garment metaphors are also commonly used in describing states of consciousness in 
Homer. This is especially the case for metaphors of death, which is described as a 
darkness that covers the eyes and mouth of its victim.155 “Darkness”, Onians (1988, 
422) argues, “was believed to be substantial, mist. The darkness which veils the eyes 
in swoon or death seems to be outside, to envelope the victim”. As shown above, 
dress metaphors for ἄχος in funerary contexts employ similar terminology and 
underlying image schema; there is a close connection, therefore, between 
descriptions of ἄχος that specifically denotes mourning and metaphors of death. 
Metaphorical descriptions of death, furthermore, are closely connected with actual 
funerary rites, in which there is concordance between the covered body of the 
deceased and the head of a mourner.156 
 
A good example of this is in Iliad 20, when Achilles kills Tros, Moulion, and 
Echelos on the battlefield (470-477): 
 
ἐκ δέ οἱ ἧπαρ ὄλισθεν, ἀτὰρ μέλαν αἷμα κατ' αὐτοῦ 
κόλπον ἐνέπλησεν· τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψε 
θυμοῦ δευόμενον· ὃ δὲ Μούλιον οὖτα παραστὰς 
δουρὶ κατ' οὖς· εἶθαρ δὲ δι' οὔατος ἦλθ' ἑτέροιο 
αἰχμὴ χαλκείη· ὃ δ' Ἀγήνορος υἱὸν Ἔχεκλον 
μέσσην κὰκ κεφαλὴν ξίφει ἤλασε κωπήεντι, 
πᾶν δ' ὑπεθερμάνθη ξίφος αἵματι· τὸν δὲ κατ' ὄσσε 
																																																								
155 For example, Il. 3.381, 4.461, 503, 526, 13.575, 580, 14.519, 15.578, 16.316, 325, 21.181. 
156 For examples of the body of the deceased being covered in cloth before burial, see Il. 18.352; for 
the covering of the head in grief, see HH. 2.182; for the covering of earth over the body, see Il. 6.464, 
14.114 For the covering of the corpse with cloth, see van Wees (2005, 18), who points out that, “The 
bodies of dead men are fully clothed and covered with one or more wraps or peploi serving as 
shrouds; their ash urns are also wrapped in one or more peploi. To burn or bury large quantities of fine 
cloth is the ultimate display of wealth through clothing, a form of conspicuous consumption 




ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή. 
 
His [Tros’] liver slipped out of him, and his garment was filled with its black 
blood. His eyes were covered in darkness, lacking thumos. And he struck 
Moulion, being nearby, with a spear down into his ear. And at once the bronze 
spearhead went through the other ear. And he struck Echelos, the son of Agenor, 
in the middle of his face with a hilted sword, and the sword grew warm with 
blood. And red death and mighty fate seized the man’s eyes. 
 
There are two metaphors in this passage. The first is one of dress, and describes 
Tros’ death and follows the pattern used most often in Homeric metaphors of death: 
his eyes are covered (καλύπτειν, 471) in darkness (σκότος, 471). This not only 
accompanies the narrator’s description of Tros’ actual death (ἀτὰρ μέλαν αἷμα κατ' 
αὐτοῦ| κόλπον ἐνέπλησεν, 470-471), but also, perhaps, is grounded in the 
physiological effect of death as being the ultimate and permanent deprivation of the 
senses. The deceased, more specifically, are unable to communicate with or take part 
in the mortal world; this metaphorical covering over of the eyes, thus, may be 
symbolic of the actual physical changes that occur in the body itself and the isolation 
of the deceased from the living. But these ideas also find expression in more modern 
metaphors of death, which conceptualise the experience in terms of darkness (and, 
conversely, of life as light). Lakoff and Turner (1989, 89), for example, argue of 
metaphors such as that describe death as night, darkness, sleep, and rest that: 
 
They are related by virtue of commonplace knowledge that links their source 
and target domains: typically, night is cold and dark, people sleep at night, and 
sleep is rest. Furthermore, dead people are cold, as is night, and are immobile, as 
if at rest. Thus, night, dark, cold, sleep, and rest are correlated with one another 
in our commonplace knowledge. It is this correlation that makes the metaphors 
coherent with one another and accounts for the relationship we sense between 
them. 
 
In illustrating their point, Lakoff and Turner discuss an excerpt from The Peacock’s 
Egg—a collection of Indian love poems (102-103): 
 
The monk stares at 
her navel 
and she at the moon his face 
the crows steal  
both their 




The theft of the spoon and bowl in this poem, Lakoff and Turner argue, alludes to the 
“total obliviousness of the monk and the woman to anything but each other” (103). 
But, on a deeper level, Lakoff and Turner also point out that there is a more complex 
metaphorical and metonymic interaction in the poem in the inclusion of the crow, 
which has strong connotations of death (as a scavenger that feeds on the deceased).157 
They argue that (103): 
 
The blackness of the crow stands for death in another way. Next, the spoon and 
bowl, mapped by image-metaphors onto male and female genitalia, stand 
metonymically for sexual vitality… by EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and LIFE IS 
A PRECIOUS POSSESSION; death steals their sexual vitality. The suggestion 
is that the meditative life has robbed the monk of his sexuality. 
 
Conceptualisations of death as darkness, therefore, have a strong experiential basis in 
both the treatment of buried and unburied bodies, and in sensory deprivation; the 
Iliad 20 passage demonstrates how these concepts converge in describing the deaths 
of Achilles’ victims. Sensory deprivation (and the lack of ability to communicate that 
comes with it) also extends to the deceased in the Underworld, who are unaware of 
events in the world of the living: Agamemnon presses Odysseus for news of Orestes 
(11.457-61), and Achilles in particular describes the deceased in the Underworld as 
senseless (ἀφρᾰδής, 476) (475-476):  
 
“πῶς ἔτλης Ἄϊδόσδε κατελθέμεν, ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ 
ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων;” 
 
“How have you endured to descend to Hades, to that place where the senseless 
dead are dwelling, shadows of perished mortal men?”. 
 
 In addition to this, we are told that Tros was “lacking (δεύειν) thumos”. The 
narrator’s description of death as being a state in which the deceased lacks θύμος 
may reinforce this idea of the darkening of the eyes as equating to the deprivation of 
																																																								
157 This complex mapping of birds (crows) à scavengers à metaphor for death also exists in Homer, 
in which birds and dogs are described as feasting on unburied corpses. For examples of this, see Il. 
1.5-6, 2.393, 8.379, 11.395, 13.831 (=17.241), 22.335, 22.354, Od. 3.259. In some of these cases, 
birds and dogs as scavengers becoming metonymies for death itself. 
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the senses. But this metaphorical darkness is also symbolic for the journey that the 
deceased undergoes from the world of the living to that of the dead, which is 
described in Homer as a transition from light to darkness.158 As Clarke (1993, 139) 
states: 
 
To travel to Hades is to pass through people shrouded in dark mist, with night 
stretched across them. When the dead man is to take up his new role in the new 
world beyond the grave, he must make the same leap into darkness, across the 
ζόφος of death and into the ἔρεβος of Hades.  
 
The second metaphor in this passage is used to describe the death of Echelos, in 
which “red death” (πορφύρεος θάνατος, 477) and “mighty fate” (μοῖρα κραταιή, 
477) “seize” (λαμβάνειν, 477) his eyes. While the underlying image in this second 
metaphor is that of a physical presence—an opponent—subduing Echelos, rather 
than a garment, it is still interesting for the purposes of our broader discussion for 
three main reasons. First, death is described as πορφύρεος, which, elsewhere in 
Homer, is used as an adjective for blood (17.361). Second, κραταιή describes both 
the inevitability of μοῖρα and (perhaps) the manner in which Echelos was killed: 
brutally, suddenly, and unceremoniously. Third, the inclusion of κατά, which 
suggests downward motion, also evokes concepts of subjugation by an external 
force. In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson describe one category of 
“orientational metaphors” that conceive control as upward and helplessness as 
downward motion (1980, 15). This, they argue, are implicit in English metaphors 
such as, “I had control over her”, “I’m on top of the situation”, “He’s under my 
control”, and is underpinned by the idea that “physical size correlates with physical 
strength, and the victor of a fight is typically on top” (1980, 15). The metaphor that 
																																																								
158 The Underworld is described as a place bereft of the light of Helios: for example, the gates of 
Tartarus in Theogony is covered three times in night (726-728); the house of Death is shrouded in 
darkness (759-761); and the Kimmerians, who dwell on the outer edges of the earth, close to the 
barrier of the Underworld, live in a perpetual, sunless fog (11.14-19). For further discussion on these 
points, see Vernant (1986) and Nakassis (2004). The crossing of boundaries in Homeric poetry, 
particularly those between life and death, are also connected with issues of remembrance and 
obscurity: the newly dead are in an indeterminate position in that they are in danger of being forgotten 
by the living. Accordingly, Redfield (1975, 175) argues that an important aspect of funeral rites is to 
successfully integrate the dead into social memory: “The funeral may be thought of as a ceremony by 
which a definite social status is conferred upon the dead. It is this release for which the psychai pray 
when, during the interval between death and burial, they speak to the living”. See also Reinhardt 
(1996) and Vernant and Ker (1999, 12-13), who link motifs of death and obscurity, but with particular 
reference to Odysseus’ journey through the margins of the earth.  
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describes Echelos’ death, therefore, structured both by the experiential and physical 
aspects of death and also by universal metaphorical mappings between different 
kinds of motion, antagonism, and control. Taken with the garment metaphor of 478, 
this not only highlights Achilles’ martial superiority and victory over the pair, but 
also structures an abstract concept—death—using somatic aspects of experience. 
 
This investigation has shown (first) that the Odyssey 19 passage fits into a much 
broader set of metaphors that draw their source material from textile production and 
use, (second) that the construction of these metaphors were deeply influenced by 
physical and experiential aspects of experience, and (third) that, given the 
pervasiveness of these metaphors in narrative and the commonness of textile 
production in the Greek world, the audience would have been comfortable in 
drawing connections between figurative garments and the psychological experience 
they represent. Laertes’ funeral shroud, in other words, is not only a powerful 
metaphor that taps into the everyday experiences of its audience, but also unites the 
physical and psychological in complex and interesting ways. It is also a means 
through which Penelope’s deceptive capacities and ambiguous mindedness are 
extended and enacted, and by which we can conceptualize them. 
 
III. The Nightingale, Odyssey 19.513-529 
Penelope employs weaving metaphors in her account for Aethon to demonstrate her 
cunning and to warn him against any potential duplicitousness of his own. On an 
extra-narrative level, the narrator uses these same metaphors to illustrate the points 
of similarity between weaving webs and wiles (and, in the process, embodies the 
latter), and to render Penelope’s psychological processes more comprehensible for 
his audience. This metaphor is grounded in both the more immediate context of their 
exchange and in the broader context of garment and textile metaphors in Homer in 
general. 
 
The nightingale simile (513-529) is another instance in which mental imagery is used 
in describing Penelope’s complex psychology. Penelope had described the context of 
her frequent mourning: after night falls and the rest of the house is asleep (αὐτὰρ 
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ἐπὴν νὺξ ἔλθῃ, ἕλῃσί τε κοῖτος ἅπαντας, 515), Penelope remains awake (κεῖμαι 
ἐνὶ λέκτρῳ, 516), troubled by anxieties that make her heart beat faster (πυκιναὶ δέ 
μοι ἀμφ’ ἁδινὸν κῆρ| ὀξεῖαι μελεδῶναι ὀδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν, 516-517). 
Penelope articulates her mental state by describing the somatic quality of her anxiety 
(the adrenaline that physically overcomes her and her rapidly beating heart), and 
through the story of the nightingale (518-524): 
 
“ὡς δ’ ὅτε Πανδαρέου κούρη, χλωρηῒς ἀηδών,  
καλὸν ἀείδῃσιν ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο, 
δενδρέων ἐν πετάλοισι καθεζομένη πυκινοῖσιν,    
ἥ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυδευκέα φωνήν,  
παῖδ’ ὀλοφυρομένη Ἴτυλον φίλον, ὅν ποτε χαλκῷ 
κτεῖνε δι’ ἀφραδίας, κοῦρον Ζήθοιο ἄνακτος· 
ὣς καὶ ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα”. 
 
“As when the daughter of Pandareus, the greenwood nightingale, sings 
beautifully at the beginning of spring, sitting in the thick trees’ leaves, who, 
often changing her many-toned song, mourns her son Itylus, whom she killed 
with bronze at one time, because of folly, the son of lord Zaethus. So my thumos 
is divided two ways, back and forth”. 
 
The metaphor in this passage depends on Penelope’s use of δίχα (524) and ἔνθα καὶ 
ἔνθα (524), both of which structure her mental state using concepts of physical 
distance and movement. I will discuss these ideas in much greater depth in the final 
chapter of this thesis, with respect to Odysseus’ internal monologue in Odyssey 20. 
But the important point of comparison, here, is between Penelope’s psychological 
dissonance and the varied song of the nightingale (ἥ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει 
πολυδευκέα φωνήν, 521), which reflects her mental conflict as she struggles, under 
pressure from her suitors, parents, and son, to resolve her ambiguous position.159 But 
it is also, as stated above, structured by an embodied metaphor, where different 
choices are presented as physically disparate locations, between which Penelope 
mentally oscillates.  
 
These metaphors also occur in everyday English parlance, in which (for example) 
																																																								
159 This interpretation of the passage is well attested in Homeric scholarship: see, for example, 
Stanford (1948, 336-337), Rutherford (1992, 192-193), and Anhalt (2002, 146). Rutherford (1992, 
192), additionally, also points out that it is, “especially unusual for a mythical simile to be used by a 
character rather than a poet”.  
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important decisions are forks in the road, different choices are diverging pathways, 
and death is a final destination, geographically disparate from life. The narrator, for 
example, describes Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ psychological dissonance in the 
proem of the Iliad using imagery of physical space (6-7): ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα 
διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε| Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς (Since that 
time when first stood in division of conflict| Atreus’ son, lord of men, and brilliant 
Achilles). Achilles and Agamemnon, in their conflict, mentally “stand apart”; in a 
similar way, Penelope articulates her own psychological conflict—that of her 
longing for Odysseus and her awareness of the toll the Suitors take on her 
household—by conceiving of them metaphorically as physical division and disparate 
locations. 
 
IV. The Perspective of Others 
The previous discussion shows how the narrator portrays Penelope’s mindedness 
using mental imagery derived from physical modes of experience, and, in turn, how 
Penelope herself articulates her own ambiguous mindedness to Aethon. In the first 
example, Penelope’s speech incorporates weaving terminology in describing her 
deception of the suitors; in the second, her psychological conflict is concretized 
using concepts of physical division, distance, and space. As external audiences, we 
are led to speculate about Penelope’s motives and intentions based on these reports 
of her mindedness; but the metaphors provided by the narrator, in drawing from the 
physical, aid us in conceptualizing her psychological state throughout the narrative.  
 
Penelope’s internal audiences similarly speculate about her loyalties throughout the 
Odyssey; as stated above, both Odysseus and the poems’ audiences receive 
conflicting reports about the motives underlying her behaviour and opinions about 
her character. This section turns to two important examples of how others intuit 
Penelope’s mindedness: (first) Amphimedon’s and Antinous’ interpretation of her 
weaving of Laertes’ funeral shroud, and (second) Penelope’s use of the veil in 
Odyssey 18, in which both Odysseus and the Suitors offer conflicting interpretations 




IV.I. Weaving Webs: Laertes’ Funeral Shroud 
Penelope’s account of the process by which she wove Laertes’ funeral shroud 
highlights her cunning intelligence and suggests her loyalty to Odysseus in delaying 
her re-marriage; but, as stated above, it also operates as a warning for Aethon that 
she is not easily misled by the doloi of others. There are two further descriptions of 
this same event, however, recounted by (first) Antinous (2.91-93), and (second) 
Amphimedon to Agamemnon in the Underworld (24.125-128): 
 
πάντας μέν ῥ' ἔλπει, καὶ ὑπίσχεται ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ, 
ἀγγελίας προϊεῖσα· νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοινᾷ.  92 
ἡ δὲ δόλον τόνδ' ἄλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμήριξε· 
 
 “While she causes all to hope, and makes promises to each man, sending 
messages, her mind desires other things. And she devised this other trick in her 
phrenes”. 
 
μνώμεθ’ Ὀδυσσῆος δὴν οἰχομένοιο δάμαρτα· 
ἡ δ’ οὔτ’ ἠρνεῖτο στυγερὸν γάμον οὔτε τελεύτα, 
ἡμῖν φραζομένη θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν,  127 
ἀλλὰ δόλον τόνδ’ ἄλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμήριξε· 
 
“We courted the wife of the long-departed Odysseus. She neither rejected nor 
accomplished a hateful marriage, contriving black death and fate for us, but 
devised this trick in her phrenes”. 
 
Although both accounts of this process are formulaic (motivation, explanation, 
process, and result), Antinous and Amphimedon provide different perspectives of 
what they say it reveals about Penelope’s mindedness and character. For Antinous, 
Penelope’s weaving is one example of the ways in which she has misled them; for 
Amphimedon, it is evidence of complicity in Odysseus’ murder of the suitors, fully 
integrated into the tale of their demise. Theory of Mind is useful here: Antinous and 
Amphimedon make inferences about Penelope’s intentions and motivations based on 
her actions, the former citing her weaving as one in a list of manipulative acts, the 
latter including it as part of what he believes to be a grander scheme authored by 
husband, wife, and son; in both cases, they interpret the weaving of the funeral 
shroud as a manifestation of Penelope’s duplicity. Both Antinous and Amphimedon, 
therefore, believe they can attribute a mental state to Penelope through this process; 
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this has come about not only by observing a pattern of behaviour, but by making 
inferences about the discrepancy between Penelope’s actions and intentions. 
 
Antinous’ and Amphimedon’s audiences also condition how they present the 
information itself, and what kinds of inferences they choose to describe; their tales 
aim not only to rationalize Penelope’s behaviour via Theory of Mind, but also to 
engage with their listeners’ mindedness. In Antinous’ case, he is complaining of 
Penelope’s behaviour to Telemachus, and adds that she enhances her reputation as a 
skilled deceiver at the expense of his inheritance (2.125-126): “μέγα μὲν κλέος 
αὐτῇ ποιεῖτ’, αὐτὰρ σοί γε ποθὴν πολέος βιότοιο” (“She makes great fame for 
herself, but the loss of much sustenance for you”). Antinous appeals to Telemachus’ 
position as his father’s heir, the next patriarch of the Ithacan household, and as a man 
who should assume control of his mother. Amphimedon describes Penelope’s actions 
as contributing to the murderous schemes of the suitor’s rivals: Odysseus and 
Telemachus (147-190). That Agamemnon, the man famously murdered by his wife 
and her lover, is his audience is clearly of primary importance: Amphimedon, like 
Antinous, tailors his narrative based on what he believes will resonate most with its 
hearer. Accordingly, Amphimedon’s description prompts Agamemnon to raise the 
issue of Clytemnestra, but it perhaps has the opposite affect to what he was 
intending: rather than empathizing with the slaughtered suitor, Agamemnon praises 
Penelope for loyalty to her husband (191-202). What is important here is that both 
Antinous and Amphimedon make inferences not only about Penelope’s motivations 
and intentions, but also about their audiences’ sympathies. Their narratives are 
designed especially to incite a reaction from their listeners, and Penelope’s shroud is 
thus also a cognitive tool by which they can achieve their own ends; in other words, 
it acts as Penelope’s thought embodied and as a medium through which the suitors 
can engage and manipulate the mindedness of others. 
 
IV.II. Penelope, Odysseus, and the Suitors, Odyssey 18 
Laertes’ funeral shroud prompts interpretation by others, who observe Penelope’s 
work and, based on it, make inferences about her cognitive processes. Amphimedon 
and Antinous, in “reading” Penelope’s weaving, both claim to know something about 
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her mindedness. Their opinions are, however, irrevocably coloured by their personal 
bias. This demonstrates the potential for material objects to act not only as a means 
of extending individual mindedness (Penelope), but also as scaffolding for the 
psychological engagement of others (the Suitors); as a means by which characters 
explore their relationships with others and reflect upon their own circumstances. 
 
Theory of mind and extended cognition are at the heart of these passages. The 
previous two chapters have shown how this is also the case for (first) Hector, 
Hecuba, and Athene in Iliad 6, (second) Odysseus, Arete, and Nausicaa in Odyssey 6 
and 7, (third) Odysseus and Penelope in Odyssey 19, and (fourth) Penelope and the 
Suitors Odyssey 2, 19, and 24. My focus now turns to Odyssey 18, when Penelope, 
ostensibly ready to choose a new husband, appears before Odysseus, Telemachus, 
and the Suitors (206-211). Athene had encouraged her to do so; the narrator provides 
us insight to the Goddess’ reasoning (158-162): 
 
τῇ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
κούρῃ Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρονι Πηνελοπείῃ, 
μνηστήρεσσι φανῆναι, ὅπως πετάσειε μάλιστα   
θυμὸν μνηστήρων ἰδὲ τιμήεσσα γένοιτο 
μᾶλλον πρὸς πόσιός τε καὶ υἱέος ἢ πάρος ἦεν. 
 
But now the goddess, grey-eyed Athene, put it in the phrenes of Icarius’ 
daughter, circumspect Penelope, to show herself to the suitors, so that she might 
open their thumos and so that she might seem all the more precious in the eyes 
of her husband and son even than she had been before this. 
 
Penelope’s descent from her rooms serves three primary purposes: (first) to attract 
the Suitors’ attention, thereby (second) reinforcing her value in Telemachus’ eyes, 
and (third) reigniting Odysseus’ own desire for his wife. The success of Athene’s 
plan partly depends on the meaning and use of Penelope’s veil that, like Odysseus’ 
“Aethon” disguise, is loaded with social and cultural significance. Penelope wears a 
κρήδεμνον in this scene, which, in Homer, is typically associated with sexual 
modesty, especially in marital contexts (Bergren 1989, 11-12; Kardulias 2001, 30).160 
Helen (Il. 3.141-144), Andromache (Il. 6.399-400), and Penelope (Od. 1.330-335, 
																																																								
160 The link between sexual modesty and the veil is widely recognized in Homeric scholarship: see 




16.413-417, 21.63-66), accordingly, all appear in public in this way. “This wrapping-
up of the body”, van Wees (2005b, 19) argues, “contributes to the image of sexual 
modesty which is projected by the married women who, in the absence of their 
husbands, veil their faces and surround themselves with maidservants in male 
company”. When Andromache tosses aside (τῆλε δ' ἀπὸ κρατὸς βάλε δέσματα 
σιγαλόεντα, 468) her headdress in Iliad 22 (468-472), conversely, she articulates 
her change in status between protected, married woman and unprotected, widowed 
slave. That her head-dress—the head-binding (δέσματα, 468), diadem (ἄμπυξ, 
469), hair-net (κεκρύφαλος, 469), plaited band (πλεκτή, 469), and veil 
(κρήδεμνον, 470)—was given to her by Aphrodite on her wedding day is especially 
poignant, in that it signifies the removal of Hector’s protection for both Andromache 
herself and Troy more generally.161 As Llewellyn-Jones (2003, 132) argues: 
 
These women’s [Andromache’s and Hecuba’s] actions of throwing off their 
veils (not simply lifting them, but casting them off) denotes their own loss of 
social status, the social displacement of the royal women, and of the Trojan 
women as a whole, and the desecration of sacred Ilion herself. The self-imposed 
gesture of veiling tells of a blurring of female social roles and opens up the 
women to abuse, defilements, and impending slavery.162 
 
These ideas about veiling and un-veiling also extend towards embodied metaphors of 
martial conquest. In Iliad 16, for example, Achilles says to Patroclus (99-100): “νῶϊν 
δ’ ἐκδῦμεν ὄλεθρον,| ὄφρ’ οἶοι Τροίης ἱερὰ κρήδεμνα λύωμεν (“But you and I 
could emerge from the slaughter, so that we two alone could loosen Troy’s sacred 
veil”). In expressing hope that their cause will prevail, Achilles likens Troy to a 
woman, and the process of martial conquest to loosening (λύωμεν, 100) the veil 
(κρήδεμνα, 99) from her body. Understanding this metaphor depends not only on 
																																																								
161 The precise meaning of each of these terms is contested among modern scholars. See Llewellyn-
Jones (2003) for the most comprehensive survey of veil-terms in ancient Greece, who argues of the 
ἄμπυξ in particular that (31): “It is attested in other sections of Homer by the epithet krusampux, 
literally meaning ‘with golden ampux’. It is frequently used by Homer as an item in a woman’s 
toilette… the ampux takes the form of a metal strip or band, possibly with beaten gold”. See also 
Nagler (1974, 48-49), and Richardson (1993, 157), who similarly speculates of these terms that, 
“[M]ost probably the ἄμπυξ is a headband, the κεκρύφαλος a cap (or sometimes later a net) to keep 
the hair in order, and the πλεκτή ἀναδέσμη some kind of woven or plaited binding for the hair… 
[t]he three items in 469 are found only here in Homer”. 
162 See also de Jong’s (2012, 183) commentary on these lines, as well as Nagler (1974, 49-51) for one 
of the more influential analyses of this scene, who argues that, “With this gesture, Andromache… 
now enacts her certain downfall in every sense, including the feeling of sexual violation so 
remorselessly developed in the Trojan plays of Euripides”. 
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making points of comparison between the body of a woman and a city, but also the 
social and cultural meaning of a veil. Achilles, in personifying Troy and embodying 
the abstract concept of conquest in the veil, here makes the same connections that we 
do in the removal of the κρήδεμνον in Iliad 22. 
 
With respect to these ideas, Penelope’s veil sends the nonverbal message that she is a 
protected entity; it signifies that she is of high status, protected, and virtuous. But it is 
also an object that, for the purposes of the immediate narrative, is highly ambiguous, 
and invites speculation and interpretation by those around her. Odysseus and the 
Suitors, in employing their theory of mind abilities, have different opinions about her 
mental state based on its use. The Suitors, who seem to take Penelope at her word, 
have an obvious emotional reaction to Athene’s ploy (212-213): 
 
τῶν δ’ αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατ’, ἔρῳ δ’ ἄρα θυμὸν ἔθελχθεν,  
πάντες δ’ ἠρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι. 
 
Their knees were loosened, and they were bewitched in their thumos by desire, 
and all prayed to lie alongside her. 
 
We can see here that the narrator describes their initial reaction to Penelope through 
their nonverbal behaviour: their knees loosen (λύτο γούνατ’, 212) at the sight of 
her, and they all hope to lie beside her (πάντες δ’ ἠρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι 
κλιθῆναι, 213). The Homeric narrator especially associates loosened knees with fear 
and desire: a particularly good example of this is in Iliad 21, where Lykaon’s fear is 
described as a psychosomatic experience (114-115): Ὣς φάτο, τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ λύτο 
γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ· (So he spoke, and in the other the knees and inward 
thumos went slack).163 In emphasising the physical dimension of Lykaon’s emotional 
state, the narrator employs real-world nonverbal expression, illustrates the 
psychosomatic quality of emotion experience, and describes a more cohesive picture 
for his audience. The same could be said for Suitors’ reaction to Penelope, though, in 
their case, it also speaks to the success of her appearance in the Hall: that they have 
made the inferences intended by Athene when she first encouraged them. Extra 
																																																								




evidence of this is in the gifts that they then offer Penelope (292-300), which not 
only partially restores the household’s wealth, but also physically quantifies and 
reifies the psychological exchange that takes place between them.  
 
Odysseus, however, watches this exchange between Penelope and the Suitors and 
reaches his own conclusions (281-283): 
 
ὣς φάτο, γήθησεν δὲ πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, 
οὕνεκα τῶν μὲν δῶρα παρέλκετο, θέλγε δὲ θυμὸν 
μειλιχίοισ’ ἐπέεσσι, νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοίνα. 
 
Thus she spoke, and enduring, god-like Odysseus was glad, because she enticed 
gifts from them, and enchanted their thumos with gentle words, but her noos 
desired other things. 
 
We have seen how observation, interpretation, and belief are central to the way that 
individuals understand the mindedness of others. These considerations, I have 
argued, are also at play in the Homeric poems; we see how this is the case for 
Odysseus’ “reading” of Penelope’s behaviour in Odyssey 18. Odysseus, more 
specifically, makes inferences about Penelope’s intentions based on her nonverbal 
behaviour: that she shares in his desires and deliberately manipulates the Suitors to 
enrich his depleted household. For Odysseus, the external stimuli provided by 
Penelope give him insight to her motivations and intentions: to entice the Suitors 
with her veiled, beautified appearance (οὕνεκα… δῶρα παρέλκετο, 282) and 
encourage them with soft words (θέλγε… μειλιχίοισ’ ἐπέεσσι, 282-283) while 
intending other things (νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοίνα, 283). Odysseus not only reads 
Penelope’s behaviour in a very particular way but, like Amphimedon and Antinous 
in Odyssey 2 and 24, reaches certain conclusions about her mindedness based on his 
own beliefs and bias.  
 
Odysseus and the Suitors, however, are not the only ones led to speculate about 
Penelope’s intentions and desires. On an extra-narrative level, the complex pattern of 
inferences taking place in this scene exploits our own ability to understand levels of 
intentionality and mental attribution. Theory of Mind can aid us in explaining this 
process. In a series of experiments undertaken by Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall 
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(1998), for example, participants were read short stories that involved three (A 
believes that B thinks that C wants) and five (A believes that B thinks that C 
supposes that D believes that E wants) levels of intentionality; they were then 
required to answer questions based on each of these stories. Results found that failure 
rates were much lower for participants processing third level (5-10%) as opposed to 
fifth (60%) level intentionality (Dunbar 2000, 241). This, Zunshine (2006) argues, is 
because it is easier to understand the cognitive processes underlying straightforward 
mental attribution (third-order) than indirect mental representation and elaborate 
causal chains (fifth-order). In later discussions of these experiments, Dunbar (2000, 
146) suggests that authors are among those who exploit their audience’s ability to 
understand mental attribution and influence in their work. There is, indeed, ample 
precedent for this outside Homer; the second chapter of this thesis showed how high-
order intentionality, false belief, and mental attribution are likewise at play in Austen 
and Woolf. We can see third-order intentionality at play in Odyssey 18: 
 
Odysseus believes that 
the Suitors think that 
Penelope intends to choose among them. 
 
The narrator, additionally, adds more complexity to this process in Odysseus’ belief 
that Penelope’s intentions mirror his own and his interpretation of the Suitors’ 
reaction to her divinely inspired ploy. The audience must negotiate even more levels 
of intentionality and mental attribution in interpreting the entire scene:  
 
Athene wants that Penelope appears to want to make the Suitors believe that 
she intends to choose among them [the Suitors do believe it, and have a physical reaction to 
Penelope] so to impress Odysseus and Telemachus, who believe that Penelope wants to 
incite courting gifts and thereby works in concert with them 
 
This scene, in short, is a study in mental gymnastics in which there are multiple 
cognitive processes, believes, inferences, and potential desires at play. In presenting 
these complex psychological networks, the narrator challenges our ability to 
negotiate multiple mental states, their connections and influences, and the potential 






Penelope is a character most often portrayed from “without” in the Odyssey: in 
absence of any reliable account of her mindedness, both internal and external 
audiences are left to speculate about her psychological states based on her external 
behaviour. She is thus an interesting study in how characters and audiences are 
required to employ their mind reading abilities as they interpret her behaviour. 
 
This chapter has accordingly examined portrayals of Penelope’s potential 
mindedness, primarily using theory of mind methodology. Though it has placed 
emphasis on Odyssey 19, it has also examined the courting scene of Book 18, and the 
complex interactions taking place between Penelope, Odysseus, Telemachus, and the 
Suitors. In each of these cases, observing audiences speculate about her mindedness 
by gauging her verbal and nonverbal behaviour. The Suitors in particular, however, 
react to the latter: they have a physical reaction to the sight of her, before responding 
to her verbal instructions with gifts. They accept her willingness to re-marry on face 
value. Though Odysseus also interprets Penelope’s behaviour based on his own 
desires (that she works in concert with him), he comes to the reverse conclusion 
about her intentions. The second chapter of this thesis showed how false belief 
operates in the everyday; we also see it at work in this scene, in which there is the 
potential that (at least) one party fails to interpret Penelope’s behaviour correctly.  
 
We receive similarly conflicting reports about Penelope’s weaving, each of which 
are heavily influenced by the personal bias of the storyteller. While Antinous claims 
it as further evidence for Penelope’s duplicity, Amphimedon asserts that it was part 
of a grander scheme authored by husband and son. Their audiences also condition the 
way in which they present Penelope’s mindedness: we have seen how Antinous and 
Amphimedon, for example, tailor their accounts for (respectively) Telemachus and 
Agamemnon. The Suitors’ own motives are thus more complex than a 
straightforward recitation of the past; in this sense, their interpreting Penelope’s 





Penelope’s own account of her weaving is more complex. On one level, it is a 
mechanism for self-glorification and praise, in which Penelope establishes herself as 
a worthy opponent for her male counterparts. On another, it is a warning to Aethon, 
who is about to embark on his own life story, that she is skilful in creating and 
decoding wiles. It thus also serves a purpose within the more immediate context of 
their interview, in which she asserts her mental superiority over her guest; her 
weaving, in this sense, is evidence of her psychological prowess.  
 
Internal observers of the poems engage in the same mind reading tactics employed 
by external audiences; there is thus similarity, here, between the mind reading 
capacities of Homer’s characters and our own. As in other Homeric passages, the 
narrator foregrounds our theory of mind abilities and, by monopolizing on them, 
encourages us to explore the complex psychology of his characters. But he also 
engages our implicit understanding of conceptual metaphor: we see this, in 
particular, in the Odyssey 19 similes, as well as in his presentation of Penelope’s 
weaving, which is composed of the double-meaning of webs and wiles. Though 
Penelope’s mindedness remains ambiguous, both internal and external audiences are 
led to engage mental capacities used in the everyday in forming their own opinions. 
These passages are, I think, good examples of how complex are the mental 
mechanics and patterns of inference at play in Homer.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis moves from issues of theory of mind and social 
interaction to Homeric internal monologues, with an especial focus on what is 
regarded as one of the richest and most complex descriptions of psychological 




Chapter Six: Tying the Threads Together, Odyssey 20.5-30 
 
The Odyssey is a poem about physical and psychological journeys. It documents 
Odysseus’ voyage home from Troy at the same time it is intensely concerned with 
the re-invigoration of his heroic identity—with his psychological transition from 
helpless victim and ceaseless wanderer to self-determining hero and lord of Ithaca. 
Both journeys hinge on this exceptional mental aptitude: on Odysseus’ ability to 
undergo and overcome arduous trials with cunning and intellect, to adopt and 
maintain convincing disguises, and to endure circumstances other Homeric heroes 
would find intolerable with fortitude and patience.164 Odysseus’ thoughts and 
emotions are thus subject to particular narrative interest and attention throughout the 
epic: he is furnished with a full mental life to which the poet frequently refers in 
explaining his intentions, motivations, and actions.  
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis examines the way in which Odysseus brings this 
mental aptitude to bear in interactions with Penelope and Eurycleia in Odyssey 19. It 
also investigates how these same women, who share (to different extents) in this 
character-defining intellect, challenge him throughout the Book. In doing so, it 
especially focused on their use of external resources—material objects, nonverbal 
behaviour, and each other—in establishing and exploring extended cognitive 
networks. On an extra-narrative level, it examines the poet’s use of mental imagery 
in rendering the complicated mindedness of these characters. Audiences of Homer, 
in interpreting the narrative via their (first) theory of mind abilities, and (second) 
familiarity with these cognitive metaphors, gain a full picture of his characters’ 
cognizing because, as in the every day, they are based in physical, material, 
interactional, and evolutionary aspects of experience. 
 
As I have shown, the poet frequently conveys psychological processes such as these 
using metaphors, metonymies, and similes that draw their source material from the 
																																																								
164 Murnaghan (1987, 4) discusses these ideas with special reference to Odysseus’ capacity for 
disguise; she argues that: “Odysseus’ affinity to disguise is related to the capacity for endurance that is 
expressed in his characteristic epithet, polutlas, ‘much enduring’. It represents the ability to endure a 
suspension of recognition—both in the narrow sense of recognition of identity, and in the broader 
sense of recognition of achievement of status—that other Homeric heroes are unable to tolerate”.  
	 	
	 185	
physical world, as well as nonverbal behaviour as a means of delineating cognitive 
activity. This thesis has aimed to show how the narrator, in using techniques such as 
these, consistently advocates an interpretation of mind that consists of brain, body, 
and world. In doing so, he presents his cast of characters as individuals whose 
psychological experiences are structured by interactions between them. 
 
This thesis concludes with an examination of one of the most oft-referenced and 
fruitful examples of psychological functioning in Homer: the opening sequence of 
Odyssey 20, in which a disguised Odysseus watches, furious, as his disloyal 
maidservants go to the Suitors’ beds (5-30). I think it useful to describe each stage of 
this complex scene in full: 
 
5-8 Odysseus remains awake in bed (κεῖτ’ ἐγρηγορόων) devising evils (κακὰ 
φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ) for the suitors while the maidservants happily exit the palace, 
bound for their beds 
9 Odysseus’ θυμὸς stirs (ὠρίνετο) within him. 
10-13 [Monologue] he debates (μερμήριζε) in his θυμὸς and φρήν (φρένα καὶ κατὰ 
θυμόν) either to rush in and kill them or to allow them to mix (μιγῆναι) one last 
time (ὕστατα καὶ πύματα) with the suitors 
13 his κραδίη growls (ὑλάκτει) within him… 
14-15 [Simile] …just as a bitch (κύων) steps around her weak puppies (ἀμαλῇσι … 
σκυλάκεσσι) and growls at a stranger (ἄνδρ’… ὑλάει), eager to fight (μέμονέν τε 
μάχεσθαι)… 
16 …so Odysseus growls (ὑλάκτει) inside himself, indignant at their evil actions 
(κακὰ ἔργα) 
17 Pounding himself on the chest, he reproaches (ἠνίπαπε) his κραδίη with words 
(μύθῳ) 
18-21 [Monologue] “Endure this, κραδίη. You endured (ἔτλης) an even worse thing 
(κύντερον) on that day when the Cyclops, uncontrollable in strength, ate my strong 
companions (μοι… ἰφθίμους ἑτάρους). You endured (σὺ… ἐτόλμας) it, until 
μῆτις led you from the cave, though expecting to die”. 
22 Re-iteration of his reproach to his own (φίλον) ἦτορ in his chest.  
23-24 In great obedience (μάλ’ ἐν πείσῃ) Odysseus’ κραδίη remains unceasingly 
enduring (μένε τετληυῖα νωλεμέως) 
24 Despite this, Odysseus himself (αὐτὸς) tosses (ἑλίσσετο) back and forth (ἔνθα καὶ 
ἔνθα) 
25-27 [Simile] As when a man with a blood pudding, turns (αἰόλλῃ) it back and forth 
(ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) over a burning fire (πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο), eager (λιλαίεται) to cook 
it quickly (μάλα…ὀπτηθῆναι)… 
28-30 …so Odysseus tossed (ἑλίσσετο) back and forth (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) debating 
(μερμηρίζων) how, being alone among many (μοῦνος ἐὼν πολέσι), he could lay 
his hands on the shameless suitors (μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι) 
30-35 Athene appears and asks Odysseus what is wrong 
36-43 Odysseus confides his troubles in her 
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44-54 Athene assures Odysseus that he will soon have his revenge, and drifts sleep over his 
eyes 
 
The primary focus of this passage is on Odysseus’ decision-making process as he 
struggles for control over his anxiety, fear, and anger. In a general sense, these 
debates are recurring narrative devices that occur elsewhere in moments of crisis, 
where a Homeric hero, struggling with overwhelming, unfavourable odds, chooses 
between self-preservation and perseverance. As I will show in the first section of this 
chapter, internal monologues not only provide compelling insight to the 
psychological workings of Homer’s characters, but also tell us important things 
about how internal conflict is embodied within the poems. The Odyssey 20 passage 
has, however, attracted especial attention from ancient and modern scholarship alike 
because of its dense psychological imagery and interplay: within twenty-five lines, 
there are two similes, eight metaphors, three monologues, didactic uses of memory, 
nonverbal behaviour, and multiple references to psychological terminology.165 This 
passage is so important, therefore, because it demonstrates the full range of ways in 
which the Homeric poet conceptualizes his characters’ internal experiences. 
Combined, each of these elements provides an accessible means for making sense of 
Odysseus’ complicated thought processes. “The passage prefigures later Greek ways 
																																																								
165 For ancient references to the passage, see Plato’s Phaedrus (94d6-e1) and Republic (390d4-5, 
441b4-c2). In the latter case, it is used as supporting evidence for Plato’s theory about the relationship 
between reason and spirit. For other references to the passage in the later Greek philosophical 
tradition, see Gill (1983, 137). Gill (1996, 183-190) elsewhere discusses this passage in particular 
detail as an example of psychological conflict. “The passage”, he states (1996, 184), “is marked by a 
number of features which are unusual in Homeric phraseology. It is unusual in deploying in one 
context all three of the formulaic modes of Homeric deliberation. These are combined, here alone, 
with two colourful similes, which do not occur elsewhere in Homer”. Pelliccia (1995, 177) states that, 
“the importance of the passage cannot be exaggerated” and continues (122f), “[i]ts singularity, 
however, can: in relation to “ordinary” Homeric psychology what is depicted in the scene differs in 
degree rather than in kind”. Russo (1992, 108) comments that the details comprising this scene are 
“totally different from Homer’s usual practice”, and argues that this might be the case in order “to 
achieve an unusually strong intensification of the description of [Odysseus’] inner turmoil”. See also 
Jahn (1987), Caswell (1990), Halliwell (1990), and Darcus-Sullivan (1998). Earlier analyses of this 
passage viewed it as a rudimentary presentation of psychological functioning. Snell (1964), for 
example, saw the passage as the beginning of a development in self-consciousness and psychological 
conflict. He argues that, although it demonstrates awareness of irrational or extreme emotion, there is 
no complementary acknowledgement of rationality: “The element of reason appears only in its 
negative function as a hindrance and prevention of disaster” (185). Voigt (1934), by contrast, argues 
that the passage demonstrates awareness in Homer for the necessity of decision making; still, he 
argues, there is no conscious awareness of an autonomous, self-determining individual (70-74). My 
own analysis stands in opposition to that of Snell’s and Voigt’s, in that it argues that we are presented 
with a highly complex picture of psychological functioning in Homer. 
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of conceptualizing psychological interplay”, Gill (2014, 786) states, “but it also 
exemplifies the scope for presenting cohesive internal relationships within Homeric 
terminology”. 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the cognitive aspects of the 
Odyssey 20 passage. It takes place in four parts. It first examines the narrator’s 
description of Odysseus’ internal organs (5-13), but especially as he concretizes them 
using metaphors of spaces, containers, and objects. It also briefly discusses how 
internal monologues embody thought and emotion elsewhere in the Homeric poems, 
with especial emphasis on Agenor’s speech of Iliad 21. Section Two investigates the 
hungry man simile (24-28), in order to show how concepts of heat and motion 
underpin the narrator’s presentation of Odysseus’ fear, anger, and frustration. The 
third section shifts its focus to the canine simile (14-15), with especial reference to 
evolutionary theory. The final section examines Odysseus’ didactic use of memory, 
with relation to the Polyphemus episode of Odyssey 9. In doing so, this chapter not 
only endeavours to present an in-depth account of the psychosomatic aspects of the 
Odyssey 20 passage, but also seeks to place Odysseus’ internal struggle within the 
broader context of the Homeric corpus. 
 
In a more specific narrative sense, two contextual considerations exacerbate 
Odysseus’ internal conflict, anxiety, and frustration. First, it is the night before 
Odysseus and Telemachus take revenge on the Suitors, cleanse their household, and 
re-establish proper order in Ithaca. In this sense, it is also the culmination of 
Odysseus’ journey home from Troy. It is therefore essential that he not reveal his 
identity until the proper moment, though he still struggles with his reaction to the 
things he sees and experiences in his home. Second, Odysseus has just spoken with 
Penelope and has, in the process, witnessed the full extent of her own grief and 
anxiety. Odysseus, despite his outward stoicism and discipline, is not impervious to 
his wife; rather, the previous chapters have shown how deep is their psychological 
connection. It would be fair to assume, I think, that Odysseus is troubled by 




In portraying this internal struggle, the narrator employs complex mental imagery 
that taps into some of our deepest and most subconscious physical, material, and 
evolutionary experience. It is in this passage, I argue, that we have our best example 
of phenomenological structures of psychological experience in Homer. This 
presentation of Odysseus’ mindedness is, thus, illustrative of Homer’s craft on a 
larger scale. 
  
I. Homeric Internal Organs and Monologues 
In the Homeric poems, an individual’s intellectual capacities are often associated 
with a set of terms that, taken together, constitute a lexicon of mind.166 These are  
θυμὸς, φρήν/φρένες, νόος, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη/καρδία, μῆτις, ψυχή, μένος, and 
πραπίδες. One of the most influential works dealing with Homeric organs was 
undertaken by Jahn (1987), who concludes that certain terms denoting mental 
capacities—θυμὸς, φρήν/φρένες, ἦτορ, κῆρ, and κραδίη/καρδία—are 
synonymous, operating within a formulaic system. This view, however, has come 
under some scrutiny. Darcus-Sullivan (1991, 67), for example, argues that while 
“there is much overlap in meaning among psychic terms… [and] the formulaic 
nature of Homeric verse strongly influences which term may appear… detailed 
examination of passages shows that subtleties in meaning among these terms are 
present”. Some of these organs do have more of a physical presence than others: 
while spears are able to pierce the φρήν (Il. 16.481) and the κραδίη/καρδία pounds 
in the chest (Il. 13.438-444, 13.282-283, 22.460-461), the θυμὸς is more 
insubstantial—several scholars, as I will discuss below, relate it to the Latin fumus, 
and describe it as a breath-like substance.167 The ψυχή, by contrast, is dormant in the 
																																																								
166 Each of these terms appear with varying frequency in the Iliad and Odyssey; these are, according to 
Jahn (1987, 6 n. 29) θυμὸς (816×), φρήν/φρένες (379×), νόος (118×), ἦτορ (102×), κῆρ (90×), 
κραδίη/καρδία (63×), μῆτις (37×), and πραπίδες (14×). Though Pelliccia (2011, 510) points out 
that psychological functioning in Homer is more complex and involved that just these organ terms: 
“Homer’s representation of human mental behaviour”, Pelliccia (2011) argues, “is relentlessly 
dynamic: if a reader should recollect Achilles’ struggle to restrain himself from killing Agamemnon in 
Iliad 1, it is unlikely that the role played by his “organs” (1.188-193) will be the first thing to spring to 
mind; if the hero’s internal struggled across the whole poem are contemplated, it seems even less 
likely these inner organs will figure prominently. Furthermore, recent scholarship has made it difficult 
to maintain that, even if the mental organs do not embody Homeric psychology, they at least reflect it 
to a degree that sheds like on his ‘mentality’”. 
167 Though Jahn (1987, 9-19) initially separates different organ terms based on their corporeality. For 
discussion of the physiology and nature of Homeric organs, see (for example) Böhme (1929, 2-11), 
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body until death: it appears to be the “essence” of a person that is expelled from the 
body out on a final gasp of breath (Il. 5.696, 14.518, 16.856).168  
 
The deliberative functions of intellectual organs, furthermore, far outstrip their 
physiological form. In Homer, these functions are conceptualised by means of 
metaphor that, as I have shown in earlier chapters of this thesis, are derived from the 
physical dimensions of experience. “The Homeric concept of the person”, Cairns 
(2003, 41) argues, “exhibits few, if any traces of psychophysical dualism; the 
intellectual and emotional functions of the person are fundamentally embodied”. 
This is also the case in the Odyssey 20 passage, which opens with metaphors of 
physical space, containers, and boundaries (5-13): 
 
ἔνθ’ Ὀδυσεὺς μνηστῆρσι κακὰ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ   
κεῖτ’ ἐγρηγορόων· ταὶ δ’ ἐκ μεγάροιο γυναῖκες 
ἤϊσαν, αἳ μνηστῆρσιν ἐμισγέσκοντο πάρος περ,  
ἀλλήλῃσι γέλω τε καὶ εὐφροσύνην παρέχουσαι.  
τοῦ δ’ ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι· 
πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,   
ἠὲ μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ,  
ἦ ἔτ’ ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι  
ὕστατα καὶ πύματα·   
 
Odysseus lay there awake, devising evils in his thumos for the suitors as those 
women were coming from the hall, the ones who had mixed with them before 
this, providing happiness and laughter for each other. His thumos swelled in his 
own stēthos, and he debated anxiously in his phrēn and thumos, whether to rush 
upon and make a death for each of them, or to let them mix with the arrogant 
suitors one last and final time. 
 
Odysseus plans the events of the follow day inwardly (μνηστῆρσι κακὰ φρονέων 
ἐνὶ θυμῷ, 5), and his second internal debate is introduced by the formulaic, “he 
debated anxiously in his phrēn and thumos” (μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ 
θυμόν, 10). In both these examples, the θυμὸς and φρήν are deliberative spaces 
																																																																																																																																																													
Onians (1954); Ireland and Steel (1975, 187-189) object to Onian’s assessment. Caswell (1990, 16-
21) also discusses the physiological makeup of internal organs with particular emphasis on the θυμός 
and φρήν/φρένες, and summarizes several influential works before her. Darcus-Sullivan (1979a, 
1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1988) provides several systematic accounts of ψυχή, φρήν, θυμὸς, and 
νόος in early epic and lyric.  
168 For studies of the ψυχή, see Rohde (1925), Claus (1981), Clark (1999), and Cairns (2003). 
Pelliccia (2011, 509) and Jahn (1987, 17-18) explain, furthermore, that the anatomical makeup of 
these organs is “concentric”: the στῆθος houses the φρένες, in which the θυμός is located; the  
θυμὸς contains the κῆρ, which contains the καρδία. 
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that, in terms of cognitive semantics, correspond to the “mind as a container” image 
schema: to a figurative conceptualization of our psychological capacities as having 
definable boundaries and in-out orientations.169 These metaphors are common 
elsewhere in Homer, where gods place ideas and motivations in the heads of mortals 
and people hide their thoughts from others within their minds. Thetis, for example, 
beseeches Achilles to reveal his thoughts to her in Iliad 1 (“μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ, ἵνα 
εἴδομεν ἄμφω”, 363), while Iris incites in Helen a desire for her past life in Book 3 
(“Ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ γλυκὺν ἵμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ| ἀνδρός τε προτέρου καὶ 
ἄστεος ἠδὲ τοκήων”, 139-140).170 Similarly, we have this metaphor in the English 
language: consider, for example, “I need to clear my mind”, “my brain is full of 
interesting ideas”, and “he’s empty-headed” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Kövecses 
2000). Odysseus’ deliberative content, furthermore, corresponds to the “ideas as 
objects” schema, in which his possible choices (his plans for the following day, and 
his more immediate intentions with the maidservants) are stored, examined, and 
processed within the container-mind. On a conceptual level, these metaphors depend 
on the kinds of bodies we have, the way we define and move through space, and the 
way we manipulate objects in our environment. As Lakoff and Johnson explain 
(1980, 29): 
 
We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the 
surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each 
of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We 
project our own in-out orientation onto other objects that are bounded by 
surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside. 
 
More specifically, we manipulate our environment from a very early age with our 
hands—throughout their first year of life, a child learns the boundaries and 
capabilities of their bodies by physical testing their surroundings—and objects within 
																																																								
169 The fullest explanation of container metaphors is in Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By 
(1980, 29-32). 
170 The same formula occurs at 16.19 [Achilles to Patroclus], and similar wording at 18.74 [Thetis to 
Achilles]. In these two further cases, thoughts are likewise represented metaphorically as physical 
objects that can be hidden from others. For further examples of gods putting thoughts or motivations 
in the minds of mortals, see Il. 2.451-2 [Athene and the Achaians], 5.512-13 [Apollo and Aeneas], 
13.82 [the two Ajaxes]; Od. 19.485-486  [Eurycleia]; 23.260 [Odysseus and Penelope]. For other 
examples of container metaphors, see Il. 4.39, 104, 245, 5.219, 8.218. 
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it—through play.171 Had we evolved without them, Wilson and Gibbs argue, we 
might not have developed metaphors like “grasping a concept” or “throwing out an 
idea” (2007).172 That we have hands, therefore, that we use in interacting with our 
world from an early age informs how we understand these cognitive frameworks; the 
fact that we also have bodies which move through space and orientate themselves 
based on the objects around them and, indeed, think of our bodies as objects 
themselves, help us to conceive of abstract concepts metaphorically as their own 
definable containers with bounded surfaces. This bodily basis for these metaphors 
not only inform the way we, in the every day, structure our mind and thoughts as 
containers and objects, but also the narrator’s presentation of Odysseus’ 
psychological functioning in Odyssey 20. 
 
I.I. Internal Monologues 
These are not the only ways in which the narrator metaphorically describes the 
mechanics of Odysseus’ thought processes, however: the entire scene is, notably, 
focused primarily on his heated internal debate. Elsewhere in Homer, and as stated 
above, these internal monologues often occur in times of crisis, where a Homeric 
hero struggles between self-preservation and perseverance. In doing so, the narrator 
employs conceptual metaphor, embedded narrative, and simile in embodying his 
hero’s thought processes. I think it is thus important to consider these monologues in 
a broader sense, in order to understand Odysseus’ internal debate in its broader 
Homeric context.  
 
The most common of these monologues are θυμὸς-speeches that, on a general note, 
usually occur at moments in which a hero is isolated and facing unfavourable odds.173 
																																																								
171 Gallagher (2005, 1). 
172 See also Gibbs’ (2006a, 441-442) discussion of metaphors that describe abstract concepts in terms 
of grasping and throwing; in this study, he argues that these metaphors entail a kind of “embodied 
simulation”, in which “conceiving of abstract entities as physical objects enables people to perform 
mental actions on these objects as if they possessed the properties of real-world, concrete, physical 
entities” (442). 
173 For one of the fullest discussions of θυμὸς-speeches in Homer, see Pelliccia (1993), but also 
Scully (1984). Though there are several internal monologues that are not characterized as θυμὸς-
speeches, what they all share in common is that they concretize, in different ways, abstract or internal 
thought processes. The Odyssey 20 passage is one such of these examples, in that it does not fit in 
with the superficially formulaic θυμὸς-speech. Despite this, I think that the underlying purpose of the 
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“Homeric inner dialogues”, Gill (1996, 187) explains, “occur at moments of 
exceptional isolation, in which the figure is unable to engage in the kind of 
interpersonal exchange that is the normal mode of Homeric deliberation, and is thus 
driven to talk to himself, in the absence of any other partner”. They typically share 
four common characteristics. First, internal monologues are framed by formulaic 
metaphors that introduce and conclude the speech, and generally follow a similar 
pattern: they begin with a statement that the individual is deeply troubled (ὀχθήσας) 
which leads them to directly address their θυμὸς; after covering all possible courses 
of action available to them, some of which are socially acceptable, and others which 
are socially shameful, there is some kind of resolution to the debate; the character’s 
final decision is then immediately put into action and the main line of narrative 
resumes. Second, they occur most often in martial contexts, where the individual is 
debating whether to fight or flee. Third, they typically involve embedded narratives, 
in which the individual imagines an alternate reality in which they might follow one 
particular course of action over another. Lastly, θυμὸς speeches are either preceded 
or followed by the use of a simile that further describes the character’s situation.174 
Despite these similarities, there is a large amount of variation in the monologues 
themselves. As Richardson explains (1993, 99-100), 
 
This type of speech is handled by the poet with considerable variation to suit 
context and character. Odysseus rejects the idea of flight as dishonourable, 
Menelaus decides on retreat as the wisest course, whereas Agenor realizes that 
flight would be disastrous. Hector’s reasoning is more complex. 
 
We can see this pattern emerge very clearly in Iliad 11. Odysseus finds himself alone 
on the front lines of battle and, upon finding the Trojans closing in on him (403-412):  
 
ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·    
“ὤ μοι ἐγὼ τί πάθω; μέγα μὲν κακὸν αἴ κε φέβωμαι 
πληθὺν ταρβήσας· τὸ δὲ ῥίγιον αἴ κεν ἁλώω 
μοῦνος· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Δαναοὺς ἐφόβησε Κρονίων. 
																																																																																																																																																													
speeches themselves—and their scientific bases—are similar. Examining θυμὸς-speeches are, 
therefore, useful for my discussion. Because my interest is primarily in the manner in which these 
speeches extend and embody abstract thought processes, furthermore, I will consider them as parts of 
the same poetic mechanism for substantiating cognition. 
174 Richardson (1993, 99) explains of examples such as Il. 11.403, 17.90, 22.98, 21.550 that, “In all 
these cases the hero is the subject of a simile just before or after the monologue”. 
	 	
	 193	
ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;       
οἶδα γὰρ ὅττι κακοὶ μὲν ἀποίχονται πολέμοιο, 
ὃς δέ κ' ἀριστεύῃσι μάχῃ ἔνι τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ 
ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἤ τ' ἔβλητ' ἤ τ' ἔβαλ' ἄλλον”. 
ἕως ὃ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,    
τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίχες ἤλυθον ἀσπιστάων. 
 
Perplexed, Odysseus spoke to his great-hearted thumos: “Ah me, what will 
happen to me? It will be a great evil if I flee, being alarmed by the multitude, but 
worse if I am caught alone. And the son of Kronos has set to flight the other 
Danaans. But why does my thumos in me debate about these things? For I know 
that cowards keep away from fighting, but if one is to win in battle, it is 
especially necessary to stand strong, whether he is struck or strikes another”. 
While he debated these things in his phrēn and thumos, the ranks of armoured 
Trojans came upon him. 
 
The speech opens with Odysseus’ formulaic address to his θυμὸς; he then debates 
between two possible courses of action (404-406): he claims that although it would 
be cowardly to flee from a fight, it would be worse if he were caught alone and 
outnumbered. He then asks why his θυμὸς debates on these things, and cites socially 
accepted ideas about bravery and cowardliness (407-410). In the mean time, the 
Trojan host has advanced too far towards him, cutting off any chance of escape (411-
412). A simile occurs immediately after this that further explains his predicament, 
describing the trapped Odysseus as a boar surrounded by a pack of hunting dogs 
(413-420). Most obviously, the embodiment of abstract concepts occurs at lines 403 
and 407, where the θυμὸς is metaphorically described as an entity that is capable of 
communication and deliberation: in the first, the narrator describes Odysseus as 
addressing his θυμὸς as if it were another person, and in the second, the θυμὸς itself 
takes on psychological powers of its own, now the agent who weighs up Odysseus’ 
options. At 411, we have an example of a different kind of embodied metaphor: here, 
the θυμὸς and φρήν are deliberative spaces, where Odysseus can “store”, “debate”, 
or “examine” ideas in a quasi-physical, internal forum.175 
 
Homeric internal monologues, as stated above, embody thought and emotion 
primarily through metaphor, simile, and embedded narrative. All these elements are 
																																																								
175 As I show below, Odysseus’ internal reaction to the maidservants’ behaviour is partially described 
using canine imagery. Chapter Three, additionally, examined how battlefield aggression is 
metaphorized using images from the natural world that, I argued, have their basis in evolutionary 
pressures. This is also the case for the simile that immediately follows his internal monologue in Iliad 
11, in which he is compared to a boar that is cornered by hunting dogs (the Trojans) (413-420).  
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very clearly at play in Iliad 21, where an increasingly anxious Agenor watches 
Achilles approach on the battlefield. In attempting to determine his next course of 
action, Agenor extensively imagines two viable strategies (550-570):  
 
αὐτὰρ ὅ γ' ὡς ἐνόησεν Ἀχιλλῆα πτολίπορθον 
ἔστη, πολλὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη πόρφυρε μένοντι· 
ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν· 
“ὤ μοι ἐγών· εἰ μέν κεν ὑπὸ κρατεροῦ Ἀχιλῆος 
φεύγω, τῇ περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀτυζόμενοι κλονέονται, 
αἱρήσει με καὶ ὧς, καὶ ἀνάλκιδα δειροτομήσει.     
εἰ δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τούτους μὲν ὑποκλονέεσθαι ἐάσω 
Πηλεΐδῃ Ἀχιλῆϊ, ποσὶν δ' ἀπὸ τείχεος ἄλλῃ 
φεύγω πρὸς πεδίον Ἰλήϊον, ὄφρ' ἂν ἵκωμαι 
Ἴδης τε κνημοὺς κατά τε ῥωπήϊα δύω· 
ἑσπέριος δ' ἂν ἔπειτα λοεσσάμενος ποταμοῖο 
ἱδρῶ ἀποψυχθεὶς προτὶ Ἴλιον ἀπονεοίμην·     
ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; 
μή μ' ἀπαειρόμενον πόλιος πεδίον δὲ νοήσῃ 
καί με μεταΐξας μάρψῃ ταχέεσσι πόδεσσιν. 
οὐκέτ' ἔπειτ' ἔσται θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξαι· 
λίην γὰρ κρατερὸς περὶ πάντων ἔστ' ἀνθρώπων. 
εἰ δέ κέ οἱ προπάροιθε πόλεος κατεναντίον ἔλθω·    
καὶ γάρ θην τούτῳ τρωτὸς χρὼς ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ, 
ἐν δὲ ἴα ψυχή, θνητὸν δέ ἕ φασ' ἄνθρωποι 
ἔμμεναι· αὐτάρ οἱ Κρονίδης Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀπάζει”.    
 
When Agenor noticed Achilles, sacker of cities, he stood firm, but his heart was 
heaving as he waited. Deeply disturbed, he spoke to his great-hearted thumos: 
“Ah me! If I were to flee from the might of Achilles, in the manner that others 
are driven in terror before him, he would still catch me and cut my throat like a 
feeble man’s. But if I allow these men to flee in confusion by the son of Peleus, 
Achilles, and if I take flight elsewhere from the wall and fertile plain of Ilion, 
until I might come to the shoulder of Ida and sink into the undergrowth. And 
towards the evening, when I have bathed in the river and washed away the 
sweat, I might leave Ilion. But why does my own thumos debate these things? In 
this way Achilles might discover me leaving the plain of the city and close in on 
me, and in the swiftness of his feet catch me. Then there will be no avoiding 
death and the death spirits. But if I go before the city and stand against him, I 
think even his flesh might be [made] vulnerable by the sharp bronze. In him 
there is one psuche, and men say that he is mortal. But Zeus, the son of Kronos, 
is giving him glory”. 
 
On the one hand, Agenor could flee from Achilles in the same way as others have 
before him; this would, however, certainly lead to his death, as Achilles would 
invariably catch him and slit his throat (553-555). On the other, he could take a 
different route and flee to the slopes of Ida where he might take refuge, thereby 
escaping both Achilles and the Trojan War altogether (553-561). Agenor dismisses 
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this second option as well, stating that Achilles might still catch him as he is leaving 
the city. He decides upon a third course of action instead: his only chance of survival 
as he sees it is to face Achilles head-on (562-570). On a preliminary note, Agenor’s 
monologue provides insight to his conflicted thoughts at a moment of extreme 
emotional distress: his thoughts are fragmented and frenzied, and this is reflected by 
how quickly he wavers between different courses of action. The reason for this is, in 
part, undeniably circumstantial: the Iliadic battlefield, an environment in which the 
conflict between self-preservation and the drive for heroic glory is at its most 
immediate, contributes to the desperation of Agenor’s psychological state; the 
impending approach of an enraged Achilles no doubt further compounds this.  
 
Agenor’s psychological processes are partially embodied through the formulaic and 
non-formulaic metaphors that frame and structure his monologue. On the one hand, 
the formulaic “ὀχθήσας-formula” achieves this by means of personification, in 
describing the θυμὸς, via metaphor, as an entity with which Agenor can 
communicate (ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν, 552) As I stated 
previously, θυμὸς-speeches most often begin with the “ὀχθήσας-formula”; Adkins 
(1969, 15) describes it significance in internal monologues: 
 
The tension in the Homeric hero between doing what he thinks he is obliged by 
his society to do and doing what he as an individual concerned with his personal 
welfare wants to do. Thus it conveys all at once a psychological response to 
distress, frustration, and anger.176 
 
At the heart of these monologues, then, is the conflict between honourable behaviour 
and the persistent, universal human drive for self-preservation. Agenor is more 
concerned with survival and self-preservation than heroic glory; his reasoning for 
remaining on the battlefield is the realisation that Achilles will catch him either way. 
This is made clear by the two scenarios he explores and his reasons for discarding 
them: his initial choices both concern flight, and his motives for setting them aside 
																																																								
176 See also Scully (1984, 14) on this point, who argues that, “The private thoughts of a hero question 
the values of heroic activity as he could never do publicly. Thus, it is the privileged domain of the 
soliloquy to convey the anxiety of the hero as he moves from indecision to resolution, from fear to 
courage, from thought to re-affirmation of heroic action. Although the soliloquy calls into question the 
values of society, it also serves to highlight the particular nature of heroism as conceived in the Iliad”. 
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are based upon the fact that Achilles is still likely to catch up with him. There is thus 
a connection between Agenor’s physical situation (the battlefield and Achilles’ 
approach), his emotional state (he is deeply troubled; ὀχθήσας), societal pressures 
(exemplified in Agenor’s automatic attribution of dishonourable thoughts to his 
θυμὸς: “ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;”), and the scenarios that he 
considers in the embedded narratives of the successive lines.  
 
Two other, less formulaic metaphors frame the entirety of Agenor’s monologue, and 
further embody his thought process. In the first instance, Agenor’s καρδία heaves 
(πορφύρω, 551) as he watches Achilles approach: πολλὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη πόρφυρε 
μένοντι (551). The use of πορφύρω is especially interesting for our purposes. 
Cunliffe (2012[1924]), Beekes (2010, 1223-1224), and Chartraine (1968, 930) 
identify two separate uses of the verb in early Greek: (first) “of the disturbed sea, to 
heave”, and “fig., of the heart, to be troubled, moved, stirred” (Cunliffe 2012 [1924], 
339), and (second) “to make purple” or “redden” (Beekes 2010, 1223-1224). Beekes 
(2010, 1223-1124) connects πορφύρω in its former sense to the Sanskrit jár-bhurīti 
(to convulse/sprawl); in the latter sense, it is linked with πορφύρα (purple clothes, 
purple fish). In connecting the two uses, Irwin (1974) argues of πορφύρεος that it, 
“describes the appearance which purple-dyed material and certain other objects have 
in common. This may be sheen or iridescence, the apparent mixture of light and dark 
on a changing surface”.  There are, however, two further uses in Homer. First, it is 
used of spilled blood on the battlefield, as in the case of Aias and the Trojans in Iliad 
17 (ὣς Αἴας ἐπέτελλε πελώριος, αἵματι δὲ χθὼν| δεύετο πορφυρέῳ, 360-361); 
elsewhere, this is also a metaphor for death, in which the eyes of a warrior are 
covered by red death (πορφύρεος θάνατος, Il. 16.334).177 Second, it is sometimes 
used to describe the shimmering quality of clouds, such as the ones in which Zeus 
(Il. 17.547) and Athene (17.551) wrap themselves. There are links, therefore, 
between the surge and heave of the sea, the iridescence of purple cloth, spilled blood 
																																																								
177 I think we see a convergence of the purple of cloth and the blood spilled on the battlefield in 
Andromache’s weaving of Iliad 22 (440-441), in which her textile is described as being red 
(πορφυρέην, 441); that she is doing this at the same time as Hector’s blood is being spilled on the 
battlefield by Achilles connects the two understandings of this term, especially given that Hector’s 




on the battlefield, the shimmering quality of clouds, and the metaphoric surge of 
Agenor’s καρδία as he watches Achilles’ approach.  
 
But I think that these images might also be physiologically based: more specifically, 
I think that the heave of Agenor’s καρδία describes not only his dread and distress, 
but an actual, physical acceleration of his heartbeat and circulatory system which, as 
shown in the case of Idomeneus’ coward, is physiologically felt as heat in the body; 
this affect also reddens the skin. This metaphor, thus, is deeply based not only in the 
connection between the physical and psychological uses of πορφύρω, but also in 
physiological changes that take place in the body in emotion experience. 
 
In the second instance, Agenor’s ἦτορ is described as being eager to fight once he 
has made his decision to persevere on the battlefield (ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ| ἄλκιμον 
ὁρμᾶτο πτολεμίζειν ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι, 571-572). Agenor’s ἦτορ described using 
animal imagery; it is an introduction to the simile in the successive lines which 
compares his confidence and resolve to that of a leopard (573-580). As a leopard 
emerges from the undergrowth (ἠΰτε πάρδαλις εἶσι βαθείης ἐκ ξυλόχοιο, 573) 
and fearlessly faces a hunter with no thoughts of fleeing (οὐδέ τι θυμῷ… ὑλαγμὸν 
ἀκούσῃ, 574-575), so too does Agenor stand his ground against Achilles, rather than 
running away (οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσαιτ’ Ἀχιλῆος, 580). Both the 
metaphor and simile, here, describe Agenor’s mental and physical resolve as he 
gathers himself in preparation to fight Achilles. In doing so, the narrator borrows 
from the behaviour of animals in concretizing and communicating Agenor’s mental 
state as he moves, at the end of the monologue, from indecision to resolution.  
 
Embedded narratives also feature very prominently in Agenor’s monologue, and are 
another means by which we can make sense of his psychological state. Each alternate 
choice is described using extended imagery that reflects the complexity of his 
thought process and guides the audience through his cognizing. Agenor is 
particularly detailed when he outlines the second of his choices, namely, the 
possibility that he could escape to Ida and then flee the war altogether (556-561). In 
this hypothetical situation, we follow this prospective path—as Agenor himself—as 
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he talks his way through this particular choice, flees the battle, and escapes into the 
wilderness. Two primary issues underscore this elaboration of Agenor’s conflicted 
thoughts. First, this form of imaginative speculation and strategy formulation is 
foregrounded by evolutionary pressures. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, I briefly 
discussed a form of creative imagination that relates to “working memory”: that is, 
creative imagining that is utilized in problem-solving tasks (Baddeley and Hitch 
1974; Pearson 2001; Pearson et al. 2001). “Examples of everyday tasks that rely on 
working memory”, Pearson (2007, 194) explains, “include performing mental 
arithmetic or remember a shopping list”. Turner (2007, 212) places the emergence of 
this kind of problem solving through creative imagining in the Upper Paleolithic 
period (c. 50,000 years ago), and argues that it is during this phase of evolution that 
“human beings began to demonstrate an unprecedented ability to be imaginative in 
whatever they encountered”. In line with this, Mithen (2007, 5), explains that: 
 
Homo sapiens’ ability to think more creatively about making tools, exploiting 
the landscape, and constructing social relationships… enabled them to out-
compete the Neanderthals and all other members of the Homo genus for 
resources. It is the product of a long evolutionary history, involving both 
biological and cultural change that began soon after the divergence of the two 
lineages that led to modern humans and African apes.178 
 
In mentally mapping his two courses of action, he rehearses and evaluates each 
possible choice available to him in a “safe space”—internally, with no immediate, 
real-world repercussions. The reason he is able to do so is because, with respect to 
modern studies of mind, he possesses a well-honed ability to strategize and problem 
solve via imagination and mental imagery. He therefore engages mental apparatus 
that has its roots in evolution: in humans’ sophisticated ability to simulate real-world 
actions and consequences that are, in evolutionary terms, geared towards survival 
																																																								
178 For further studies on imagination from an evolutionary perspective, see Mithen (1996, 2001), 
Whiten and Suddenhorf (2007), and Blackmore (2007). Mithen takes a somewhat different approach 
from Whiten and Suddenhorf, however, in that he relies primarily on archaeological data: on artefacts 
produced by ancestral artefacts that begin with stone tools and become progressively richer (i.e. rock 
art, poetry); Whiten and Suddenhorf, by contrast, combine genetic and fossil in order to identify 
“common psychological characteristics, shared by all descendants of the particular ancestral stage of 
interest” (2007, 32). In doing so, Whiten and Suddenhorf draw upon experimental and observational 
studies of modern chimpanzees and, based on this data, “infer that the common ancestors with which 
these species resemble would have been both inventive and capable of secondary representation—that 
is, operating with multiple non-verdical representations as is necessary for pretence, mirror self-
recognition, and ‘mind-reading’ the intentions of others” (Roth 2007, xxx-xxxi).  
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and progression. On an extra-narrative level, and in a second sense, the poet actively 
engages the audience in Agenor’s internal process. In witnessing him mentally enact 
each viable course of action, we are led, step-by-step, through Agenor’s thought 
processes. In this sense, thus, we actively participate in Agenor’s cognizing. 
 
II. ὡς δ’ ὅτε γαστέρ’ ἀνὴρ πολέος πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο… 
The narrator describes the mechanics of Odysseus’ thought processes using concepts 
of space, containers, and objects. We have seen how these ontological metaphors 
operate elsewhere in Homer, in scenes such as the Thetis-Achilles exchange of Iliad 
1 (363) and Odysseus’ and Penelope’s interview in Odyssey 19 (237). Homeric 
internal monologues, furthermore, embody thought and emotion using conceptual 
metaphor, simile, and embedded narratives. Evolutionary approaches to imagination 
can aid us in understanding the kinds of connections made by the narrator in these 
instances. 
 
The majority of this passage is, however, dedicated to Odysseus’ emotional 
response: to his internal process as he struggles in controlling his anger, frustration, 
anxiety, and indecision at a time of extreme psychological pressure. “Part of what is 
involved here”, Gill (1996, 189) argues, “is that, as the [narrative] action nears its 
climax, the narrative presents the strain placed on Odysseus’ capacity for endurance 
by the continued need for concealment”.179  
																																																								
179 See also Rutherford (1992, 206) on this point: “What the passage here above all conveys is the 
sheer physical quality of both Odysseus’ discomfort and his endurance”. Rutherford continues, 
furthermore, to claim that this passage also demonstrates Odysseus’ uncertain position in the Ithacan 
household. On the one hand, Odysseus adopts the passive role of the blood pudding; but on the other, 
he is the man who “should be in control and preparing his food; his eagerness for revenge corresponds 
to the impatience and hunger of the man in the simile” (206). This dual-correspondence, Rutherford 
argues, “matches the uncertain position of Odysseus in the narrative at this point: is he agent or 
victim, avenger or helpless onlooker?” (207). In contrast to this, de Jong (2001, 486) claims that this 
simile serves two narrative functions: (first) “to illustrate the tossing of the sleepless Odysseus”, and 
(second) “to suggest his eagerness for revenge”. While these are, indeed, two central purposes of the 
passage, de Jong omits what is perhaps the simile’s most primary purpose: to represent Odysseus’ 
internal conflict, and the choices with which he struggles. For other readings of this passage, see 
Morrison (2005, 77), who argues that, “the outer action serves as a guide to Odysseus’ emotional 
distress”, and Russo et al. (1992, 110) who states that ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα describes, “Odysseus’ eagerness 
to attack the suitors”. While these two assessments of the passage strike closer to the mark, they are 
both frustratingly brief. Unpacking both these statements requires a more in-depth survey of the 
mental imagery presented here, elsewhere in Homer, and in modern studies of cognitive metaphor; 




In conveying this struggle metaphorically, the poet employs concepts (first) derived 
from the natural world in the “canine” simile (14-16), and (second) of excessive 
physical motion and extreme heat in his “hungry man” simile (25-30). These two 
similes, Rutherford (1992, 204) points out, are “somewhat unusual, the second much 
more so”; that they occur in such close proximity, he adds, attests to the importance 
of the passage overall. In what follows, I focus on these two similes from three 
different perspectives. First, I establish that they are both complex examples of 
mental imagery that metaphorically describe Odysseus’ psychological functioning. 
Second, I examine the cognitive universals that underpin this imagery. Third, I 
describe culturally specific deployments of these universals elsewhere in Homer, 
thus showing how the narrator, in using these images, presents Odysseus’ cognitive 
experience in Odyssey 20 as primarily phenomenological. 
 
II.I. Movement: ἑλίσσω, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, and αἰόλλω 
Odysseus has just exhorted himself to calm down, citing his imprisonment in 
Polyphemus’ cave as evidence that he is capable of maintaining self-control in even 
worse situations (18-21). Though this rationale works for his καρδία, which remains 
“unceasingly enduring”, Odysseus himself anxiously and sleeplessly frets over his 
strategy for killing the suitors and taking revenge on his disloyal maidservants (25-
30): 
 
ὣς ἔφατ’, ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ·  
τῷ δὲ μάλ’ ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα 
νωλεμέως· ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. 
ὡς δ’ ὅτε γαστέρ’ ἀνὴρ πολέος πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο,   
ἐμπλείην κνίσης τε καὶ αἵματος, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα 
αἰόλλῃ, μάλα δ’ ὦκα λιλαίεται ὀπτηθῆναι,  
ὣς ἄρ’ ὅ γ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἑλίσσετο μερμηρίζων, 
           ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει. 
 
So he spoke, accosting his own ētor in his chest, and, in great obedience, his 
kardia remained unceasingly enduring. But he himself tossed back and forth. As 
when a man at a fire turns a stomach back and forth, full of fat and blood, and is 
eager to roast it very quickly, so Odysseus tossed back and forth, debating 





On the one level, this simile describes Odysseus’ body language as he tosses and 
turns in his bed. The points of comparison between simile and narrative hinge on the 
dense and repeated use of terms corresponding to rapid, back-and-forth movements: 
as a man turns (αἰόλλῃ, 30) a blood pudding back and forth (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 29) 
over a blazing fire, so too does Odysseus turn (ἑλίσσετο, 27, 29) back and forth 
(ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 27-29) in his bed. But, on the same hand, they also reflect his 
indecision as he struggles to formulate a plan (μερμηρίζων, 28)180 for the following 
day (ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει, 30). The narrator’s use of 
ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα and ἑλίσσω best encapsulates this process, in which separate choices 
are concretized in terms of physical distance, and the intensity and impact of 
Odysseus’ emotional state is similarly described using rapid, whirring movements.181 
To draw it more closely back to the simile, Odysseus physically tosses and turns as 
he mentally vacillates between one choice and the other—like a blood pudding over 
a fire. Both his body language and his conflicted thoughts, thus, are two dimensions 
of one cohesive cognitive process; the simile, in describing the rapidly churning 
blood pudding, describes both Odysseus’ rapidly churning body and mind in one 
unified image. In drawing heavily on ideas of rapid, excessive movement and 
physical distance, furthermore, this simile corresponds to the sorts of this we might 
do when processing difficult information or making hard decisions: we might have 
difficulty sleeping, pace back and forth, or rock our heads from side to side. In this 
sense, the nonverbal dimension of Odysseus’ experience—and its metaphorical and 
																																																								
180 For other uses of μερμηρίζων in passages that denote mental division, see Il. 1.89, 2.3, 5.671, 
8.167-169, 10.503, 12.199, 13.455, 14.159, 16.647, 20.17; Od. 1.427, 2.93, 325, 4.117, 533, 791, 
5.354, 6.141, 9.554, 10.50, 151, 438, 11.204, 15.169, 16.73, 237, 17.235, 18.90, 22.333, 24.235. 
181 This particular metaphor was later used as source material by Apollonius, in which Media, after 
waking from a dream about Jason, debates whether or not she should go to her sister’s bedchamber 
(Argonautica 3.651-655): 
 
ἐκ δὲ πάλιν κίεν ἔνδοθεν, ἄψ τ’ ἀλέεινεν 
εἴσω, τηΰσιοι δὲ πόδες φέρον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.  
ἤτοι ὅτ’ ἰθύσειεν, ἔρυκέ μιν ἔνδοθεν αἰδώς· 
αἰδοῖ δ’ ἐργομένην θρασὺς ἵμερος ὀτρύνεσκεν.  
τρὶς μὲν ἐπειρήθη, τρὶς δ’ ἔσχετο· τέτρατον αὖτις  
λέκτροισι πρηνὴς ἐνικάππεσεν εἱλιχθεῖσα. 
 
The same terminology is here used of Medea as for Odysseus in the Odyssey 20 passage, in which 
both ἑλίσσω and ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα describe her mental turmoil and body language (her literal back-
forth movements over her bedroom’s threshold). On this point, see also Apollonius’ famous 
“sunbeam” simile, in which the sunlight that darts ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα partially describes Medea’s 
conflicted thoughts as she determines whether or not to help Jason in Argonautica 755-760. 
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semantic correspondences in the simile—exhibits what Colombetti, citing Gibbs’ 
(2006) and Sheets-Johnstone’s (1999) phenomenological studies of emotion, 
describes as “the dynamical and kinetic character of emotional experience [author’s 
emphasis]” (2014, 119). This is, I think, precisely what we have here: it is not just 
that the narrator renders Odysseus’ psychological turmoil as a two-part, physical and 
mental account of emotion; instead, the physiological experience of emotion (tossing 
and turning in his bed) actually structures and frames the psychological one (internal 
decision making and plan formulation). To be specific, the audience is given access 
to Odysseus’ psychological conflict and mental anguish through their familiarity 
with and experiences of the somatic (nonverbal) aspects of anxiety and anger. The 
narrator, in presenting the relationship between the mind and the body in this way, 
demonstrates his understanding of the extent to which they mutually structure and 
influence one another. 
 
Audiences of Homer, thus, make sense of Odysseus’ nonverbal behaviour because it 
is similar to the things that we, in every day life, do when we are anxious, conflicted, 
or distressed. But the images underlying the Odyssey 20 simile are also used 
elsewhere in the Homeric corpus—especially ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα and ἑλίσσω. It is 
perhaps useful, then, to survey uses of these terms in the Iliad and the Odyssey, so to 
establish that audiences may have been familiar with making connections between 
the physical movement implicit in these terms and the psychological conflict that 
they metaphorically denote.  
 
ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα occurs relatively often in the Homeric poems, and describes both 
frenetic movement and mental vacillation. In the case of the former, Iliadic uses of 
the formula are primarily martial.182 Nestor, for example, uses ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in 
describing the physical sprawl of a particularly large opponent (7.155), Aeneas 
claims that the Trojan horsemen are well-versed in traversing (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) the 
plains in both pursuit of their enemies and withdrawal from the battlefield 
(“κραιπνὰ μάλ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διωκέμεν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι”, 5.223), and Achilles’ 
																																																								
182 There are eighteen occurrences of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the Iliad overall; these are 2.90, 462, 476, 
779, 812, 5.223, 7.156, 8.107, 10.264, 15.345, 17.394, 18.543, 20.249, 21.11, 354, 23.164, 320, 24.5. 
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Myrmidons move ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα through the Achaian camp, though they do not 
fight (φοίτων ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κατὰ στρατὸν οὐδὲ μάχοντο, 2.779). The formula 
is also used outside battle: farmers are described going ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα as they 
plough golden fields on Achilles’ shield (18.542-543), while ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα 
describes the pattern in which boar’s tusks have been sewn onto a helmet (10.263-
264). In the Odyssey,183 ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα describes the movement of the storm-tossed 
waves as they batter Odysseus’ raft (τὴν δ’ ἐφόρει μέγα κῦμα κατὰ ῥόον ἔνθα 
καὶ ἔνθα, 5.327), and the way in which Odysseus inspects his bow in the presence of 
Penelope’s suitors (ὡς ἐνὶ χερσὶ| νωμᾷ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κακῶν ἔμπαιος ἀλήτης, 
21.399-400).184 
 
The narrator’s use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in describing physical movement, thus, agrees 
with his portrayal of Odysseus’ physical and mental state in Odyssey 20, in which 
there are correspondences between the thread of a needle, the muster and movement 
of troops, the sprawl of limbs, and the anxious toss of a troubled mind and body. 
This is also the case for ἑλίσσω, which is appears fifteen times in the Iliad and 
denotes whirring, circular movements.185 In two of these cases, ἑλίσσω appears with 
ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα: (first) to describe the way in which the Trojan troops are flung 
around (ἑλισσόμενοι) in the Xanthos river as they desperately swim back and forth 
(ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) to stop themselves from drowning (21.11), and (second), in Book 
																																																								
183 There are fifteen uses of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the Odyssey: 2.213, 5.327, 330, 7.86, 95, 10.517, 11.25, 
14.11, 19.524, 20.24-28 (×3), 21.246, 394, 400. 
184 This final passage is also an excellent example of theory of mind abilities at work in the Homeric 
poems. Watching Odysseus (disguised as Aethon) handle the bow, the Suitors speculate (21.397-400): 
 
  “ἦ τις θηητὴρ καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ἔπλετο τόξων·  
ἤ ῥά νύ που τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτῷ οἴκοθι κεῖται, 
ἢ ὅ γ’ ἐφορμᾶται ποιησέμεν, ὡς ἐνὶ χερσὶ  
νωμᾷ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κακῶν ἔμπαιος ἀλήτης.”   
 
“Either he is some admirer—a cunning one—of bows, or maybe one such lies in his own 
house, too, or he wants to make one. In this manner he weilds it, back and forth in his 
hands, a vagrant proficient in evils”. 
 
Chapter Four shows how Odysseus’ disguise operated as a functional part of his cognition; how, in 
concealing his identity, it is a means by which he enacted his plan for revenge on the suitors and 
survival in his own house. It is important to note that, here, the Suitors ascribe to the beggar a certain 
set of intentions based on what they perceive is his identity: that he either admires the bow’s 
craftsmanship, steals them, or is planning to make one of his own. The fact that they do so shows how 
thoroughly they engage their theory of mind in making assessments about others. 
185 Il 1.317, 8.340, 12.74, 408, 467, 13.204, 17.283, 728, 18.372, 21.11, 22.95, 23.309, 320, 466, 846. 
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23, to describe the reckless turn (ἑλίσσεται) this way and that (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) of a 
charioteer (230). This particular phrasing also occurs outside Homer, in the Homeric 
Hymn to Apollo (361-363): 
 
 θεσπεσίη δ' ἐνοπὴ γένετ' ἄσπετος, ἣ δὲ καθ᾽ ὕλην  
πυκνὰ μάλ᾽ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἑλίσσετο, λεῖπε δὲ θυμὸν  
φοινὸν ἀποπνείουσ᾽. 
 
Thickly she writhed through the wood, rolling this way and that, till she let her 
murderous spirit escape with her breath. 
 
Here, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα and ἑλίσσω describe the way Typhon writhes in physical 
agony after being shot with an arrow by Apollo. In doing so, it not only describes her 
body language, but perhaps also the intensity of her pain, in which her excessive 
physical movement corresponds to her agony. 
 
Both ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα and ἑλίσσω, then, are often used in describing these circular, 
whirring, back-forth movements in the narrative; the mapping of these physical 
elements onto psychological processing, thus, might be automatic and comfortable 
for Homer’s audience. Outside the Odyssey 20 passage, these terms are likewise used 
in metaphorically describing psychological conflict. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, Penelope describes her mental state through the varied song of the 
nightingale, in which δίχα (524) and ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (524) metaphorically express 
concepts of mental division and extreme anxiety. In Chapter Four, additionally, I 
showed how the narrator highlights Odysseus’ and Penelope’s mental concord in 
switching rapidly between their sleepless, night-time musing in Odyssey 10. That 
both Odysseus and Penelope are described using this similar terminology might also 
further hint at their ὁμοφροσύνη: as Penelope is conflicted, aggrieved, and anxious 
about her current circumstances, so too is Odysseus; their minds both move ἔνθα 
καὶ ἔνθα as they mutually attempt to resolve a situation in which all odds are 
seemingly against them.  
 
Zeus (Il. 2.1-34), Agamemnon (Il. 10.91-95), and Achilles (Il. 24.4-13) all exhibit 
symptoms similar to that of Odysseus and Penelope as they experience their own 
forms of mental distress; in the latter two cases, this is physically expressed in their 
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restless nonverbal behaviour. It is on the last of these examples—on Achilles—that I 
want to linger here. Achilles, unable to sleep after Patroclus’ funeral games, wanders 
the beach alone at night (Il. 24.3-12): 
 
                                    αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς  
κλαῖε φίλου ἑτάρου μεμνημένος, οὐδέ μιν ὕπνος 
ᾕρει πανδαμάτωρ, ἀλλ’ ἐστρέφετ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα    
Πατρόκλου ποθέων ἀνδροτῆτά τε καὶ μένος ἠΰ, 
ἠδ’ ὁπόσα τολύπευσε σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ πάθεν ἄλγεα 
ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε κύματα πείρων·  
τῶν μιμνησκόμενος θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυον εἶβεν, 
ἄλλοτ’ ἐπὶ πλευρὰς κατακείμενος, ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε   
ὕπτιος, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνής· τοτὲ δ’ ὀρθὸς ἀναστὰς 
δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλός·  
 
Only Achilles wept as he remembered his beloved companion, nor did all-
subduing sleep come over him, but he tossed back and forth, yearning after 
Patroclus, for his manhood and his great strength and all the deeds he had 
brought to completion with him, and all the trials he had suffered: the wards of 
men, the difficult cleave of the sea. Remembering all of these things he let fall 
swelling tears, lying at one time on his side, another on his back, and now again 
prone; then standing straight, then pacing along the sea’s beach. 
 
There are several pertinent aspects of this passage that give structure to Achilles’ 
mental state. Achilles’ social isolation, first, is expressed by his physical locale: as 
both Montiglio (2005) and Redfield (1975) point out, the seashore is usually a 
location that evokes isolation or social precariousness in Homer.186 Second, Achilles 
alone is unable to sleep (τοὶ μὲν δόρποιο μέδοντο| ὕπνου τε γλυκεροῦ 
ταρπήμεναι, 24.2-3); this is a common motif for psychological distress and 
unresolved conflict that we otherwise see in the cases of Odysseus, Penelope, 
Agamemnon, and Zeus. Achilles also (third) weeps as he recalls the close 
relationship he had shared with Patroclus; we have seen how, elsewhere in Homer, 
this is a common nonverbal expression of grief. But finally, Achilles’ mental state is 
expressed in his body language: he turns (ἐστρέφετ’, 5) back and forth (ἔνθα καὶ 
ἔνθα, 5), shifts his position as he lies in the sand (ἄλλοτ’ ἐπὶ πλευρὰς 
κατακείμενος… ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνής, 10-11), and paces (τοτὲ δ’ ὀρθὸς ἀναστὰς 
																																																								
186 See also Kirk (1985, 56-57) on this point with regard to Chryses, who argues that the sea usually 
connotes “tension or sadness (e.g. of the heralds going unwillingly at 327; the embassy at 9.182; 
Akhilles’ mourning at 23.59, cf. his sadness at 1.350), and this perhaps colours Khruses’ temporary 
silence, making it ominous”. 
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δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλός, 11-12).187 Like Odysseus, his extreme grief, 
isolation, and anxiety find expression primarily in excessive physical movement that 
is grounded in everyday behaviour. 
 
Psychological conflict and distress, however, is not solely described using the 
terminology of Odyssey 20. We have already seen, for example, how Achilles’ and 
Agamemnon’s psychological dissonance is described using language of physical 
disparity and isolation in the opening lines of the Iliad (ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα 
διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε, 1.6). The metaphor here depends on the broader usage of 
διίστημι (to stand apart) in Homer, which describes literal, physical distance: 
Poseidon, for example, asks Apollo why they two keep away from the battlefield in 
Iliad 21 (“Φοῖβε τίη δὴ νῶϊ διέσταμεν;”, 436), Thrasymelos’ horses separate 
(διαστήτην) after one of them, Pedasos, is hit by Sarpedon’s spear (16.470-471), 
and the Trojan troops fragment (διαστάντες) before reforming into battalions under 
the leadership of Hector and Poulydamas (Il. 12.84-87). In making sense of the 
metaphor used to describe Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ divisive and bellicose mental 
states, we map concepts of physical distance derived not only from our real world, 
physiological experiences, but also based on comparable uses of διίστημι elsewhere 
in the narrative. 
 
Another good example of this phenomenon is in Iliad 9, in which the flagging 
confidence and collective fear of the Achaian army is likened to a turbulent sea and 
scattered seaweed, roused by the twin winds, Boreas and Zephyros (1-8): 
 
                                           αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὺς 
θεσπεσίη ἔχε φύζα φόβου κρυόεντος ἑταίρη,  
πένθεϊ δ’ ἀτλήτῳ βεβολήατο πάντες ἄριστοι. 
ὡς δ’ ἄνεμοι δύο πόντον ὀρίνετον ἰχθυόεντα  
βορέης καὶ Ζέφυρος, τώ τε Θρῄκηθεν ἄητον  
ἐλθόντ’ ἐξαπίνης· ἄμυδις δέ τε κῦμα κελαινὸν  
κορθύεται, πολλὸν δὲ παρὲξ ἅλα φῦκος ἔχευεν·  
ὣς ἐδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν. 
																																																								
187 στρέφω is also interesting for our purposes because, like ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, it evokes images of 
frenetic physical movement. There are twenty Iliadic and six Odyssean uses of this verb; these are: Il. 
5.40, 505, 575, 6.516, 8.168, 12.42, 47, 428, 13.396, 15.645, 16.308, 598, 17.699, 18.139, 488, 544, 




Meanwhile Panic, companion of cold Terror, gripped the Achaians as all their 
best were struck with unendurable sorrow. As two winds rouse the sea where the 
fish swarm, Boreas and Zephyros, north and west winds, blowing from 
Thraceward, suddenly descending, and the darkened water rears its crests, and 
far across the salt water scatters the seaweed; so the thumos in the stēthos of 
each Achaian was troubled. 
 
As in the Odyssey 20 and Iliad 24 accounts, emotional fragility and mental 
fragmentation is primarily expressed using images of excessive motion. The first 
way in which this occurs is through the personified Panic (φύζα, 2) that grips (ἔχε, 
2) the collective θυμὸς of the Achaians. The underlying image, here, is of an 
external force overcoming its opponent. Similar metaphors occur elsewhere in 
Homer, and are, more broadly, common conceptualizations of emotion.188 Lakoff and 
Kövecses (1987, 205-205; 218-219), accordingly, argue that struggling or fighting 
against an opponent is a basic level metaphor for extreme emotion. Their case study 
is of anger; examples of this phenomenon are, “I was seized by anger”, and “I was 
overcome by anger”. With respect to modern studies of cognitive linguistics, we 
might also understand relationship between Panic and the Achaians through Lakoff 
and Johnson’s “Emotional Effect is Physical Contact” metaphor (1980, 50), in which 
the physical touch of the personified Panic is comparable to examples such as, “His 
mother’s death hit him hard”, “He made his mark on the world”, and “That really 
made an impression on me”.  
 
In all these cases, representations of emotional arousal not only exploit common and 
universal ideas of opponent-victim relations, but also of movement: of seizing, 
striking, grabbing, and of one individual physically repressing another. The 
Achaians’ inner conflict is, second, expressed in the twin winds, Boreas and 
Zephyros, which disturb the sea and scatter its seaweed. The underlying images here 
convey concepts of especially furious movement: the winds blow (ἄητον, 5) from 
Thrace and suddenly descend (ἐλθόντ’ ἐξαπίνης, 6) to rouse (ὀρίνετον, 4) the sea, 
which is gathered (κορθύεται, 7) into waves; they scatter (ἔχευεν, 7) the seaweed. 
In this metaphor, then, the Achaians’ collective mental state is conceptualized 
																																																								
188 These metaphors also exist elsewhere in the early Greek corpus. In Hesiod’s Theogony, for 
example, Eros, the fairest of the immortals, is described as a limb-loosener (λυσιμελής) with the 
power to overcome (δάμναται) both gods and men. 
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primarily through furious, rapid movement. The use of ἄημι (to breathe hard, blow) 
is especially interesting in this regard, as, elsewhere in Homer, it is used almost 
exclusively of destructive storms.189 In one Homeric case, it metaphorically describes 
the divisive fury of the Olympians as they clash on the battlefield (21.385-387): 
 
ἐν δ’ ἄλλοισι θεοῖσιν ἔρις πέσε βεβριθυῖα    
ἀργαλέη, δίχα δέ σφιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἄητο·  
σὺν δ’ ἔπεσον μεγάλῳ πατάγῳ 
 
But upon the other gods descended the wearisome burden of hatred, and the 
wind of their fury blew from division, and they collided with a great clash. 
 
As with other examples that I have covered in this section, this passage describes 
mental discord using concepts of physical distance; but it also, markedly, compares 
with the Iliad 9 passage in likening an emotion to a natural force—anger to wind—
using underlying images of physical movement that are especially violent and 
extreme. Metaphors of emotion as natural forces are, to a certain extent, universal: 
Kövecses identifies two basic image schemata that are relevant here. The first, 
“Anger is a Storm”, is evidenced by everyday metaphors such as, “It was a stormy 
meeting”, “He stormed out of the room”, and “The storm was raging for hours” 
(2000, 28). The second, “Anger is a Natural Force”, is common to several different 
language systems: Kövecses (2000, 212) identifies it in Polish, English, Hungarian, 
and Chinese. But several scholars also acknowledge that, for the Greeks, the θυμὸς 
is conceived as a breath, wind, or vapour; Pelliccia (2014, 876), for example, notes 
that it potentially relates to the Latin fumus. Clarke (1999, 81), too, explains that, “it 
is specifically breath that is vigorous, active, self-propelling, with the strong swift 
movement that marks the actions of both warrior and thinker”.190 In both the Iliad 9 
and 24, passages, therefore, there is perhaps an additional link between the θυμὸς 
																																																								
189 There are four uses of ἄημι in the Iliad and eight in the Odyssey; these are Il. 5.526, 9.5, 21.386, 
23.214; Od. 3.176, 183, 5.478, 6.131, 10.25, 12.325, 14.458, 19.440. It is also used in Hesiodic and 
pseudo-Hesiod texts: see Th. 870, 876; WD 516, 552, 625; Scut. 8; Hymn 6.3. Beekes (2010, 27), 
accordingly, identifies two primary meanings of ἄημι: (first) wind or breath, and (second) airy, or 
quick. Both these meanings, Beekes (2010, 27) argues, have connections with the Sanskrit vāti, vě-jo, 
and wāen, all of which mean, “to blow”, as well as with vātula, “windy”. 
190 Richardson (1993, 86), accordingly, comments of the Iliad 24 verse that it is, “an appropriate 
expression for θυμὸς, if this originally refers to a ‘breath-spirit’”. For a very good discussion of the 
etymological background and associations of θυμὸς in Greek literature, see Clarke (1999, 79-83); 
also Cairns (2003, 65-75) for comparable metaphors and Caswell (1990, 15-22) for an extended 
discussion of (first) the physiology of θυμὸς in early Greek epic. 
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and the winds used to describe emotional impact and intensity; this may have been 
especially relatable to audiences of Homer, who may have been able to make natural 
and immediate connections between the potential nature of the θυμὸς as a vapour, 
the winds, furious motion, and extreme emotion. 
 
What these passages have in common, thus, is that mental conflict and psychological 
discord is commonly metaphorized using concepts of excessive movement and 
physical distance in Homer. These metaphors are grounded in (first) observable 
nonverbal behaviour—the physical aspects of emotional experience mapped onto the 
psychological, and (second) the way that people, natural forces, and objects move in 
the world. The narrator’s description of Odysseus in the Odyssey 20 passage 
combines all these elements in one cohesive image: (first) in describing his body 
language, which tosses anxiously back and forth in his bed; (second) his divided 
mental state as he vacillates between strategies, and (third) the blood pudding that 
metaphorically describes them both.  
 
II.II. Heat and Pressure 
Odysseus’ internal debate is, as stated above, made difficult by the psychological 
pressure under which he operates at this point in the narrative. In this sense, the 
simile also encapsulates the intensity of his emotional experience, in which his anger 
roasts him like a great, blazing fire (πολέος πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο, 26), and his 
eagerness to kill the suitors is compared with the hunger and desire of the starving 
man (μάλα δ’ ὦκα λιλαίεται ὀπτηθῆναι, 28). “The scene in Odyssey 20”, 
Halliwell (1990, 39) comments, on this note, “suggests a strong sense of 
psychological tension and convulsion”. The characteristically cunning and self-
disciplined Odysseus, in other words, struggles in formulating a plan because the 
rage he feels towards the maidservants, his frustration and inability to act, his anxiety 
for the day ahead, and his eagerness to kill the suitors “burns” him. This aspect of the 
simile has its roots in the neurobiological and psychophysical processes and effects 
of anger in the body that, in turn, also provide structure for universal metaphors of 
extreme emotion. In the analysis that follows, I will discuss some of the ways in 




Neurobiological and psychophysical studies show that extreme emotion is 
physiologically felt as heat and pressure—as an increase in temperature and blood 
pressure in the body (Ax 1953; Innes et al. 1959). In my discussion of Iliad 13, I 
examined the scientific basis for “flight or fight” impulses that, I argued, 
underpinned both Idomeneus’ description of his coward and similar Homeric 
passages of battlefield fear and anxiety. Studies in this area, I explained, demonstrate 
that fear and anxiety can trigger this response in individuals, in which humans and 
animals respond to threats or challenges with a general discharge of the central 
nervous system that discharges norephinephrine and epinephrine into the body. A 
similar process occurs in experiences of anger, and produces several accompanying 
physiological changes in both humans and animals, such as an acceleration of heart 
rates and circulatory systems, blood pressure, muscle tensity, and glucose levels. As 
Darwin observed early on (2009[1872], 235), “Rage exhibits itself in a most 
diversified manner. The heart and circulation are always affected; the face reddens or 
becomes purple, with the veins on the forehead and neck distended… monkeys also 
redden from passion”. 
 
In a more mundane sense, we know from everyday experience these are the sorts of 
things we can physically feel when we are angry: our faces grow hot, our muscles 
tense (clenched fists, for example, signal anger and precede physical aggression), and 
we might have a burst of quick energy. These physiological effects are consistent 
with the poet’s description of Odysseus’ fury in the “hungry man” simile, in which 
the audience is encouraged to make comparisons between the burning fire, his 
restless movements, and his emotional state. His mind, which rolls back and forth, is 
being “roasted” by the fire—the actions of the maidservants and suitors—that both 
inhibits his ability to think clearly and exacerbates his anger and frustration. But we 
also know, additionally, that fear and anxiety are motivating factors for his internal 
conflict. Odysseus is “alone among many” (μοῦνος ἐὼν πολέσι, 30); he has just 
come from his emotional night-time interview with Penelope; and he has reunited 
with his nursemaid, Eurycleia, to whom he has expressed the precise reasons for 
needing to remain incognito, even from his wife (19.481-483). We can, thus, also 
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apply Arrindel et al.’s (1991, 79) and Öhman’s (2008) insights about the 
evolutionary basis of fear and anxiety to Odysseus’ experience. As I described in 
Chapter Three, the four universal motivating factors in experiences of fear—
interpersonal events, death/injury/blood/illness, animals, and agoraphobia—all have 
their basis in evolutionary pressures, in that they reflect urges to survive and 
propagate, establish safe kin groups and secure environments, and avoid status 
threats (Öhman 2008, 711). Odysseus’ turbulent emotions evoke (first) a fear of 
death—we know that there is a very real possibility that he might die, and (second) a 
status threat, in which he might potentially be usurped as the patriarch of the Ithacan 
household by one of Penelope’s suitors. 
 
That Odysseus’ fear, anxiety, and anger are partially conceptualized using concepts 
of intense heat, pressure, and motion is, within this context, compelling; it suggests 
not only that the simile introduced by the narrator has its roots in everyday physical 
processes, but also that he expects his audience to have an implicit understanding of 
the phenomenological aspects of emotion experience. To put it more simply, the 
process by which we understand this simile is a comfortable and natural one because 
the metaphorical correspondences between heat, anger, and anxiety are based in 
physiological and evolutionary pressures. The image schemata on which these 
metaphors are based— “anger is a boiling liquid”, “love is a flame”, “passion is 
heat”, “dispassion is cold”— all have their deepest roots in the physiological effect 
of these experiences on the body (Kövecses 2000, 147-148). As Kövecses (2000, 21) 
explains: 
 
The domain of fire is related to that of heat. In addition to using fire to keep 
ourselves warm, we also use fire to cook and to destroy things. This source 
domain is especially common in the metaphorical conceptualization of passions 
and desires, such as rage, love, hate, and some others. 
 
Similar metaphors for extreme emotion as heat also occur outside the English 
language. In the Finnish-Ugrian group, for example, lust is conceived as a fire. 
Kövecses (2000, 140) identifies one such metaphor in Hungarian: Idővel majd 
elválik, hogy mi volt ez, fellángolás, vagy olyan érzelem, amire tartós kapcsolatot 
építhetnek./“With time we will see what this was; a flare-up, or a feeling on which a 
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lasting relationship can be built”. This demonstrates that metaphorical 
conceptualizing of passion is not just limited to Indo-European languages; it is a 
phenomenon that, in being drawn from the physiological affect of emotion on the 
body, occurs across cultures and time periods. Conversely, rationality and calm are 
often physiologically felt and metaphorically understood as a decrease in body 
temperature: Shakespeare’s Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for example, 
juxtaposes irrationality and anger with rationality and calm when he states that, 
“Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, such shaping fantasies, that 
apprehend more than cool reason ever comprehends” (5.1.4-6). We see this same 
comparison between fire/passion and ice/calm in Frost’s Fire and Ice,  
 
Some say the world will end in fire, 
Some say in ice. 
From what I’ve tasted of desire 
I hold with those who favor fire. 
But if it had to perish twice, 
I think I know enough of hate 
To say that for destruction ice 
Is also great 
And would suffice. 
 
On the surface, Frost compares two ways in which the world will end. But, in doing 
so, he also juxtaposes two kinds of human aggression: passion and desire with heat 
and fire, indifference and dispassion with cold and ice. Like Shakespeare’s Theseus, 
these two extreme aspects of emotion—likened, here, to an apocalypse—are 
metaphorically described using concepts of heat and cold. Accordingly, there are 
common English metaphors that also describe anger using concepts of cold, in which 
stares can be “icy”, people can give others the “cold shoulder”, and the victim of 
especially cruel behaviour is, “left out in the cold” (Kövecses 2000, 147). Similar 
ideas are implicit in the Odyssey 20 account. In presenting Odysseus’ anger using 
physiologically based metaphors of heat and temperature, thus, the narrator taps into 
physical, perceptual, and evolutionary dimensions of our experience that are, to a 
certain extent, universal. Our understanding of this internal process, furthermore, is 
made possible by our implicit and subconscious theory of mind—the process by 
which we intuit thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and emotions to others—which enables 
us to make inferences about Odysseus’ psychological state based on our own 
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historical, first-person experience with extreme emotion191 and, in a more mundane 
sense, of (first) the affect of fire and heat on bodies and (second) universal 
experiences of anger, fear, and anxiety.  
 
III. ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῇσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα… 
The narrator also makes extensive use of canine imagery in describing Odysseus’ 
turbulent mental state, in a cluster of metaphors and a simile that borrows from the 
aggressive and instinctual behaviour of animals in threatening situations. Elsewhere 
in this thesis, I have examined how bravery on the battlefield is sometimes described 
using images from the natural world. In Iliad 13 (469-475), for example, Idomeneus’ 
confidence, aggression, and resolve are likened to that of a boar’s, who glares at his 
opponents (475, ὀφθαλμὼ… πυρὶ λάμπετον), bristles his back threateningly (474, 
φρίσσει δέ τε νῶτον ὕπερθεν), and grinds his teeth (αὐτὰρ ὀδόντας θήγει). In 
examining this passage, I argued that the narrator establishes connections between 
human and animal threat displays that are deeply grounded in evolutionary 
development. This is partially conveyed in the narrative by the close coupling of 
Idomeneus’ and the boar’s nonverbal behaviour.  These similes are common 
elsewhere in Homer, but especially in battlefield contexts in the Iliad. Diomedes’ 
advance, for example, is likened to that of an enraged lion’s, while the Trojans are 
compared with sheep that become the victims of his furious onslaught (5.135-132); 
Odysseus and Diomedes, too, are compared to two lions as they stalk through the 
carnage on their night-time mission (10.296-298). In these contexts, lions and boars 
typically evoke martial strength and prowess, and function as positive assessments of 
the pre-eminence of warriors with whom the narrator makes comparison.192 
																																																								
191 See Cairns (2014, 86), who argues a similar point of φρίκη: “φρίκη is an experience of an animal, 
but what the application of the term pinpoints is the visible aspect of that experience in the eyes of 
others. When this term is applied to an emotional experience, what we are dealing with is (in the strict 
sense) the phenomenology of emotion, i.e. the shared, third person perspective that we all have… of 
what it is like to experience the emotion in the first person”.  
192 There are a limited amount of similes, however, in which one might argue that the subject of a 
simile, in being compared to animals, is the target of criticism by the narrator. In Iliad 11, for 
example, Agamemnon is likened to a lion that kills innocent deer in their den while their mother, 
though close by, is powerless to prevent him (107-121). Hainsworth (1993, 237-238) comments of 
these lines that, “The lion naturally represents ferocity just as the deer does timidity. The exploit of 
this dastardly lion adds little to our appreciation of Agamemnon’s prowess”. Another example of this 





Dogs, conversely, are typically accorded negative connotations in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey. Dogs and vultures are commonly named as battlefield scavengers (Il. 1.4, 
2.393, 8.379), they are used for insults (Il. 1.225, 11.362) and dishonourable 
behaviour is sometimes described as being “dog-like” (Il. 10.503; Od. 20.18). In one 
particularly strong use of canine imagery in Homer, Helen describes herself to 
Hector as being a bitch: “δᾶερ ἐμεῖο κυνὸς κακομηχάνου ὀκρυοέσσης” 
(6.344).193 In her discussion of this insult in particular, Graver (1995, 51) points out 
that, “the behaviour to which the dog metaphor is attached shows a disregard 
specifically for societal norms of meum et tuum”. Scholiasts, accordingly, gloss 
κύων with ἀναιδής (shameless) (Σ Il. 1.225, 13.623, 21.394); this is implicit in 
metaphors that use κύων, which can denote shamelessness in Homer (Il. 8.423, 
21.481; Od. 18.338).194 
 
Odysseus, Rose (1979) points out, is frequently associated with dogs, but especially 
in the latter half of the Odyssey, and with comparably positive connotations: he is 
nearly mauled by a pack of wild dogs outside Eumaeus’ hut in Book 14 (21-32), the 
golden pin given him by Penelope on his departure from Troy contains the scene of a 
dog attacking a fawn (19.228-231), and Odysseus’ relationship with his dog, Argos, 
is described in great detail in Book 17 (290-323). In the Odyssey 20 passage, the 
narrator emphasizes the protective instincts of a mother for her puppies. Odysseus’ 
θυμός is roused (ὀρίνω, 9)195 to anger as he watches the maidservants beds; his 
καρδία then growls (ὑλάκτει, 13) within (ἔνδον, 13) him (13-17), 
 
κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει. 
ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῇσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα 
ἄνδρ’ ἀγνοιήσασ’ ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι,   15 
ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα. 
στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· 
																																																								
193 She uses similar language to describe herself in the Odyssey (4.145-146), when she blames herself 
as the cause of the Trojan War. 
194 For an excellent discussion of dog metaphors in Homer, see further Graver (1995); also Rose 
(1979), who is specifically concerned with frequent associations of Odysseus and dogs in the latter 
half of the Odyssey. 
195 ὀρίνω, interestingly, is commonly used elsewhere in Homer of men and animals. Of human 
emotions, see Il. 2.142 [Achaians], 3.395 [Helen], 13.418 [Antilochus].  ὀρίνω is also used of natural 




And his kardia growled inside him. As a dog steps around her weak puppies and 
growls at a man she does not recognise, eager to fight, so Odysseus growled 
inside him, indignant at their evil actions, and pounded at his chest and 
reproached his kardia with words. 
 
This simile, in providing more information about what Odysseus can only do 
inwardly and covertly, closely couples his instinctual response, territoriality, and 
rage with that of a dog’s who, circling her puppies (the much-depleted Ithacan 
household), growls at a strange man (the suitors and the maidservants). My 
interpretation of the simile thus follows that of Rutherford’s (1992, 204), who argues 
that, “similes describing animals protecting their young are common [in Homer], but 
here the application is unusual: Odysseus is not wanting to protect the maids, but 
feels angry and possessive towards them: they correspond more to the unknown man 
at whom the bitch snarls”.196 Modern scholarship on the evolutionary roots of 
nonverbal behaviour has found that human and non-human primates, as well as other 
animals, engage in threat displays in similar ways.197 Darwin’s (2009[1872], 246-
247) early comments on this point are apt:  
 
The uncovering of the canine tooth is the result of a double movement… the  
action is the same as that of a snarling dog; and a dog when pretending to fight 
often draws up the lip on one side alone, namely that facing his protagonist.198 
 
Within the more specific context of the Homeric poems, close connections between 
aggressive behaviour in humans and animals, but especially when individual threat 
displays, involve the baring of teeth in a mirthless smile from beneath the brow (Il. 
7.211-213, 15.607-609). As demonstrated in the third chapter, the bristled brow, 
																																																								
196 See de Jong (2001, 486) for an alternative reading of this simile, who argues that the weak puppies 
are the maidservants, and that Odysseus is feeling protectiveness and paternal concern towards them. 
In substantiating this argument, she cites other instances in the Odyssey in which Odysseus is cast in a 
paternal role. While I think that Odysseus is protective of them to the extent that they are a part of his 
household, I think that de Jong’s assessment of the simile contradicts the passage itself: what is 
primarily at issue, here, is the threat to Odysseus’ authority as the patriarch of the Ithacan household. 
As the maidservants, in bedding with the enemy, are directly countermanding Odysseus’ authority, I 
would associate them more with the strange man who threatens his house and its resources—the 
puppies. 
197 See Redican (1982) for a more modern study on deimatic behaviour. For other examples of the 
application of this idea to aggressive smiling in Homer, see Clarke (2005, 38-39). See also Goffman 
(1967, 24-26) on the aggressive use of “face-work”. 
198 Darwin continues on to state that, interestingly, “Our word sneer is in fact the same as snarl, which 
was originally snar, the l ‘being merely an element implying continuance of action’” (247).  
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described using the verb βλοσυρός, is used elsewhere in early hexameter poetry to 
denote an animal’s “shaggy” or “bristling” coat (Sh 175, 191). Furthermore, and as 
stated above, warriors are often compared to animals on the Iliadic battlefield. The 
Odyssey 20 example is especially important, however, for two main reasons. First, it 
draws close connections between the behaviour of Odysseus and the dog, thereby 
delineating, more explicitly, the evolutionary basis for Homeric metaphors and 
simile. In describing Odysseus in this way, the narrator provides his audience with an 
accessible means for understanding his emotional state that is based in our deepest, 
most subconscious evolutionary roots. Second, this passage is especially interesting 
because these particular lines have been used for evidence that the Homeric narrator 
had an understanding of conceptual metaphor. To be specific, we might see how the 
simile of the snarling dog is used in concretizing the abstract thought processes in the 
metaphors of the surrounding lines (13, κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει; 16, ὥς ῥα 
τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα). In doing so, the narrator borrows 
from the physiological in order to conceptualize the psychological, in which the 
repeated use of ὑλακτέω characterizes both the dog’s actual physical behaviour and 
Odysseus’ emotional response. 
 
The evolutionary roots of this description are, I think, further revealed elsewhere in 
Book 20, where Odysseus, having avoided an ox hoof thrown by Ktesippos, 
grimaces inwardly (299-303): 
 
  ὣς εἰπὼν ἔρριψε βοὸς πόδα χειρὶ παχείῃ,  
κείμενον ἐκ κανέοιο λαβών· ὁ δ’ ἀλεύατ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς   
ἦκα παρακλίνας κεφαλήν, μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ  
                                 σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον· 
 
Thus he spoke, and threw an ox hoof with a heavy hand, one that he had caught 
up from where it lay in a basket. But Odysseus avoided this by a slight turn of 
his head. He smiled inwardly, a very sardonic smile. 
 
This is the only use of σαρδάνιος in early hexameter poetry, and tentatively 
associated with σαίρω (to grin/grimace) by some commentators (Levine 1984, 5; 
Rutherford 1992, 229; Clarke 2005, 38), who identify the underlying image as that of 
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a dog who bares its teeth threateningly.199 Darwin, additionally, makes these same 
connections between human and animal expressions of aggression (2009[1872], 
247): “I suspect we see a trace of this same expression in what is called a derisive or 
sardonic smile… on these occasions… a slight twitching of the muscle… draws up 
the outer part of the lip… this movement, if fully carried out, would have uncovered 
the canine”. If this attribution is correct, then what we have here, I think, is a further 
concordance between the protective, aggressive instincts of a dog and Odysseus’ 
barely repressed rage at the threat posed by the Suitors, with respect to both his 
position of authority in the Ithacan household and to the resources that they steadily 
deplete in their abuse of Penelope’s and Telemachus’ hospitality. As in the “canine” 
simile of 20.13-17, thus, we are led to make this comparison by the basic mapping of 
a source (dog) onto a target (Odysseus) domain. Unlike the simile, however, what 
occurs here is a part-for-whole mapping. Lakoff and Turner (1989, 102) explain, 
 
In images, part-whole relations are relations such as those between a roof and a 
house, or between a tombstone and a grave as a whole. It is the existence of such 
structure within our conceptual images that permits one image to be mapped 
onto another by virtue of their common structure. 
 
In this passage, accordingly, we map a very specific part of a dog—his teeth, bared 
in a threatening snarl—onto Odysseus’ emotional reaction to Ktesippos’ behaviour. 
Though Odysseus’ reaction is hidden—it occurs internally—we might imagine the 
image of the snarling dog’s teeth as being mapped onto Odysseus’ own. This part-
whole structuring not only encourages us to compare the dog’s instinct-driven 
protectiveness and aggression with that of Odysseus’, but also highlights 
evolutionary similarities in threat displays in both humans and animals. 
 
The link established between human and animal protectiveness that we see in 
Odyssey 20 occurs elsewhere in the Homeric poems. This suggests not only that 
there is a more pervasive tradition in the Iliad and Odyssey of appealing to 
evolutionary aspects of experience, but also that, like metaphors of heat and motion, 
the audience is expected to bring their own first-hand knowledge to play in making 
																																																								
199 For further discussion on this point, see Fenik (1974, 180-186) and Lateiner (1995, 194). 
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sense of emotion experience within the narrative. In Iliad 17, for example, both 
Menelaus and Aias are likened to animals protecting their young (4-5, 132-135):200 
 
ἀμφὶ δ’ ἄρ’ αὐτῷ βαῖν’ ὥς τις περὶ πόρτακι μήτηρ  
πρωτοτόκος κινυρὴ οὐ πρὶν εἰδυῖα τόκοιο·    
 
Menelaus stood around the body, as over a first-born calf the mother cow stands 
wailing, she who has had no children before this.  
 
Αἴας δ’ ἀμφὶ Μενοιτιάδῃ σάκος εὐρὺ καλύψας 
ἑστήκει ὥς τίς τε λέων περὶ οἷσι τέκεσσιν, 
ᾧ ῥά τε νήπι’ ἄγοντι συναντήσωνται ἐν ὕλῃ 
ἄνδρες ἐπακτῆρες·  
 
Now Aias stood fast, covering the son of Menoitios under his broad shield, like 
a lion over his cubs, when the lion is leading his little ones along, and huntsmen 
discover them in the forest. 
 
Leumann (1950, 242-2) argues that similes such as these, in which heroes are likened 
to animals protecting their young, suggest that they were meant to be perceived as 
“threatening”; Edwards (1991, 63) argues that both similes, “convey the tenderness 
for Patroklos often expressed in this Book”. Menelaus and Aias, accordingly, both 
exhibit especially protective, aggressive behaviour: they both stand over Patroclus’ 
body, shields raised and weapons turned threateningly towards the Trojans; Aias 
stands firm (ἑστήκει, 133), which evokes further images of bravery and resolute 
courage. Their tenderness for Patroclus, additionally, is conveyed both in the 
narrator’s description of the new-born calf as being the only one born to the cow 
(πρωτοτόκος κινυρὴ οὐ πρὶν εἰδυῖα τόκοιο, 5), and in the solicitousness of the 
lion who leads his cubs to safety (ᾧ ῥά τε νήπι’ ἄγοντι, 134). 
 
I think that the “canine” simile of Odyssey 20 is best understood with reference to 
similar instances where the poet makes close connections between the behaviour of 
humans and animals, in which the protectiveness, aggression, and solicitousness of 
an individual is likened to that of an animal’s care for their offspring. In the case of 
																																																								
200 There are, conversely, similes and metaphors that describe animals that fail in protecting their 
young against predators. In Iliad 2, for example, the Achaians’ favourable portent comes in the form 
of a snake who eats both a sparrow and her nestlings (311-320), while in Book 11, Isos’ and 
Antiphos’ death at Agamemnon’s hands is likened to a pair of innocent deer being mauled by a lion in 
their den, and the helplessness of the Trojans to a doe who, compared to the lion, is unable to save 
them (107-121).  
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Odysseus, Menelaus, and Aias, these comparisons are best understood with reference 
to their evolutionary background, which reveals the narrator’s awareness of some of 
the concordances between human and animal behaviour. It also, with respect to the 
conceptual metaphors of 20.13 (κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει) and 20.16 (ὥς ῥα 
τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα), demonstrates that the poet’s 
conceptualization of psychological functioning is deeply phenomenological: in using 
the mental images derived from the simile in constructing his metaphors, he 
establishes firm and obvious links between mental and physical aspects of 
experience.  
 
IV. Odysseus in Polyphemus’ Cave 
The final section of this chapter examines Odysseus’ address to his καρδία, in which 
he recollects his time in Polyphemus’ cave (18-21): 
 
  “τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης, 
ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἤσθιε Κύκλωψ  
ἰφθίμους ἑτάρους· σὺ δ’ ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις   20 
ἐξάγαγ’ ἐξ ἄντροιο ὀϊόμενον θανέεσθαι.”  
 
“Endure this, kardia. You once endured an even worse [“more dog-like”] thing, 
on that day when the Cyclops, uncontrollable in strength, ate my strong 
companions: you endured it, until metis led you from the cave, though expecting 
to die”. 
 
In comparing his prior and current circumstances, Odysseus attempts to control his 
turbulent emotions and sudden, aggressive response to the maidservants’ disloyal 
behaviour. In this sense, his reference to Polyphemus’ cave might be understood as a 
didactic use of memory, in which the past provides a framework by which Odysseus 
can psychologically resolve his present challenge.  
 
Odysseus’ didactic use of memory may hinge on the double meaning of κῆδος, 
which denotes both one’s possessions and extended family. More specifically, the 
Suitors deplete Odysseus’ household (and literally consume his possessions) as 
Polyphemus devoured his companions; the Ithacan Palace, as a site that poses an 
immediate threat to Odysseus, might be likened to the cave itself; and the Suitors’ 
failure to adhere to the obligations of the host-guest relationship, which threatens to 
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strip Odysseus of both his belongings and his return, is similar to that of 
Polyphemus’ in Odyssey 9. It is perhaps interesting, additionally, to consider the 
simile used in Od. 9, in which Odysseus’ companions are likened to puppies as 
Polyphemus kills them (288-290): 
 
“ἀλλ’ ὅ γ’ ἀναΐξας ἑτάροισ’ ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἴαλλε,  
σὺν δὲ δύω μάρψας ὥς τε σκύλακας ποτὶ γαίῃ 
κόπτ’·”  
 
“But he jumped up and set his hands on my companions, took hold of two at 
once and smashed them, as if they were puppies, against the ground”. 
 
In this sense, the past becomes a framework by which he can manage the present and 
the future. It is in recognizing the similarities between these two experiences that 
Odysseus reaches the conclusion that, as with Polyphemus, dealing with the suitors 
and the maidservants with forethought and endurance are best; on an extra-narrative 
level, the use of canine elements in both passages may reinforce the significance of 
this past experience for Odysseus’ present psychological processes. But the narrator 
might also achieve this in his presentation of the relationship between Odysseus’ 
relationship and his καρδία. As Gill (1996, 189) argues,  
 
The heart is treated as a partial substitute for Odysseus, embodying the capacity 
for being ‘much enduring’ and sharing his life history. Although the heart is 
distinguished from the aspect of Odysseus that makes him characteristically ‘of 
much cunning’, the passage emphasizes that it is the co-ordination of these 
aspects that enables him to manifest these two qualities effectively, and so to 
survive situations such as the present one and that in the Cyclops’ cave. 
 
Odysseus, in referencing Polyphemus, not only acknowledges the similarity in 
circumstance between his past and present challenges, but also appeals to persistent 
character traits that had previously enabled him to overcome difficult circumstances.  
 
Hector similarly uses memories and past experiences in framing and navigating 
present challenges. In Iliad 22, he recalls past encounters with Poulydamos and 





“ὤ μοι ἐγών, εἰ μέν κε πύλας καὶ τείχεα δύω, 
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει, 
ὅς μ' ἐκέλευε Τρωσὶ ποτὶ πτόλιν ἡγήσασθαι 
νύχθ' ὕπο τήνδ' ὀλοὴν ὅτε τ' ὤρετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. 
ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην· ἦ τ' ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν.     
νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμῇσιν,   
αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους, 
μή ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο· 
Ἕκτωρ ἧφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν. 
 
“Ah me, if I go within the gateway and walls Poulydamos will be the first to put 
a reproach upon me, since he had urged me to lead the Trojans towards the city 
on that deadly night when godlike Achilles rose up. But I did not obey him, 
which would have been much better. And now, since I have destroyed my men 
by my own foolishness, I feel shame before the Trojans and Trojan women with 
trailing robes, that someone who is baser than I would say, ‘Hector, being 
persuaded by his own strength, destroyed his people”. 
 
In this passage, Hector imagines how different groups of people will react to him if 
he flees to the safety of the city: (first) Poulydamos, a Trojan warrior and counsellor 
who he fears will rebuke him for yet another reckless action; (second) the Trojan 
men and women; and (third) a person of a lower social class. On a preliminary note, 
Hector is acutely aware of his αἰδώς, as well as the νέμεσις that such behaviour 
might invoke from witnessing audiences. It would be better, he concludes, to fight 
Achilles and risk death, rather than face the disappointment or reproach of these 
groups of people (108-110). These potential audiences parallel actual groups of 
people to whom he feels in some way accountable; at this point in the narrative, he 
pre-emptively bases his decision based upon a mental projection of actual, physical 
groups of people. But he is also, more notably, interacting with past experiences: 
another time in which he did not follow Poulydamos’ advice, which resulted in the 
deaths of many of his men. I think that there is a link, therefore, between these 
potential audiences, the social expectations by which Hector believes he must modify 
his behaviour, his past failures for which he feels ashamed, and his psychological 
state.201 All these considerations provide structure for his cognitive processes; like 
																																																								
201 Hector also considers Achilles’ potential mental state in this passage as he raises his second 
possible course of action: that he could leave his weapons behind and make a pact with Achilles in 
which Helen, her possessions, and half the goods in the city would be given to the Achaians (111-
121). It is at this point that Hector realizes that he will not be able to make any sort of compromise 
with Achilles: Achilles will not show him any mercy or any regard for his status, and will kill him 
even if he is unarmed (123-129). This “potential” Achilles, of course, mirrors the actual Achilles 
whose behaviour Hector has observed out on the battlefield; here, Hector shows an awareness of 
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The introduction to this chapter claims that this passage is a particularly appropriate 
end-point for this thesis as a whole; this is partially because it exhibits all the major 
ways in which the narrator embodies thoughts and emotions in his poems. The first 
section accordingly shows how the mechanics of Odysseus’ thought processes are 
presented using universal conceptual metaphors of containers, object-manipulation, 
and personification. It also examined how other Homeric monologues are embodied, 
with especial focus on metaphor, simile, embedded narrative, and imagination in 
Iliad 21; this phenomenon is thus not specific to Odysseus, but is a more persistent 
feature of the poems. The next section explored how physiological dimensions of 
emotion—movement and heat—provide structure for Odysseus’ experience. In 
contrast to this, we see how the canine imagery used of Odysseus in this passage is 
sourced in evolutionary concepts in the final two sections; but memory also played a 
role in the final section, in which Odysseus uses his past as a framework through 
which he can make sense of his present circumstances. 
 
The opening sequence of Odyssey 20 is a complex representation of individual 
psychology. In examining this passage, I have shown (first) how brain-body-world 
interactions lie at the heart of the Homeric narrator’s presentation of Odysseus’ 
psychological experiences, and (second) that audiences make sense of these complex 
thought processes because they are grounded in universally determined aspects of 
human experience. The Odyssey 20 passage demonstrates just how deeply physical, 
material, interaction, cultural, and evolutionary modes of experience underlie 
presentations of mind in Homer; examining these connections with respect to 
insights from cognitive science reveal the extent to which this is the case. 
 
																																																																																																																																																													
Achilles’ psychological state, and uses this link between his mind and his adversary’s to modify his 
behaviour and inform his final decision. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Phenomenologies of Experience 
 
This study has aimed to develop a better understanding of brain-body-world 
relationships as they are represented in the Iliad and Odyssey and, based on this 
analysis, to establish a more productive framework for reading Homeric 
psychological functioning. In doing so, it has borrowed heavily from cognitive 
science, which emphasizes the role of physical, interactional, environmental, 
evolutionary, and material modes of experience in the development of cognition. 
Minds and bodies are intimately connected; engaged in a constant process of 
exchange and influence that, having developed over the course of our evolutionary 
history, begins from the moment of birth and persists throughout our lifetimes. This 
is as true for Homer’s characters as it is for his audiences; this thesis has not only 
shown how deeply psychosomatic are his characters’ mental states and processes, but 
also how this cognitive life mirrors everyday functioning that is, to some extent, 
universally determined. The narrator, in monopolizing on these aspects of 
experience, thus presents a phenomenology of experience for his audiences: an 
account of psychological functioning that is deeply and inextricably structured by 
physiological development and interactions with the world. 
 
The psychology of Homer’s characters is complex, multi-modal, and sophisticated. It 
is for this reason that, in preparing this dissertation, I found that focusing primarily 
on case studies resulted in a more fruitful, productive account of Homeric cognitive 
functioning. Though I made ample reference to complementary passages in the 
Homeric corpus, I argued that an analysis of this kind allows us to determine and 
appreciate the full range of ways that the narrator constructs his characters’ 
psychological processes in individual scenes.  
 
The first of these case studies closely examined Idomeneus’ description of battlefield 
bravery and cowardice in Iliad 13. While his speech serves a very specific narrative 
purpose—as a means of appeasing Meriones—it powerfully elucidates how Homer’s 
characters understand the function of nonverbal behaviour as a communicative tool. 
In doing so, it first established that Homer’s characters possess fully developed 
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theory of mind abilities that they bring to bear in their interactions with others. 
Achilles and the heralds both intuit certain mental states and processes based on their 
nonverbal behaviour in Iliad 1; theory of mind and nonverbal behaviour similarly 
play key roles in the embassy scene of Book Nine. Idomeneus, in alluding to a theory 
of mind in Iliad 13 that, in a broader sense, is universally possessed by humans and 
shaped in the earliest stages of our cognitive development, best articulates the 
processes underlying scenes such as these. This description, I argued, is primary 
evoked in his use of ἐκφαίνω and διαείδω, which point to the body as an important 
component of psychological functioning and as a communicative and didactic tool. 
The mind reading tasks undertaken by Homer’s characters, furthermore, are also 
those of his audiences who, in using their own theory of mind as they interpret the 
poems, reach a more precise understanding of the psychological complexities at play 
in the narrative. 
 
I then examined the symptoms characterizing Idomeneus’ cowardly and brave men, 
showing how they are formed of psychophysical, neurobiological, and evolutionary 
aspects of experience. While the coward’s behaviour is best understood with 
reference to fight-or-flight responses in humans and animals, his brave man’s 
tenacity, discipline, and eagerness for battle are reminiscent of deimatic behaviour. 
The emotional experiences of both men, thus, are determined by evolutionary 
pressures; I demonstrated how this is the case with reference not only to scientific 
studies of these phenomena, but also to other passages in the Homeric corpus that 
establish more explicit links between human and animal behaviour. This chapter 
concluded with a discussion of the extent to which the brave and cowardly mens’ 
bodies occupy the foreground of their experience; I argued that, for the cowardly 
man, his body played a more conscious role than that of the brave man, who, in 
exhibiting self-discipline and control, experiences his body in a peripheral sense. 
 
Chapter Four examined how Homer’s characters build, maintain, explore, and re-
affirm extended cognitive systems. Using extended and enactive mind theories, I 
demonstrated how this was the case for Odysseus, Penelope, and Eurycleia in 
Odyssey 19, all of whom exhibit high degrees of intimacy, reciprocity, and co-
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operation in their interactions with each other. This is particularly the case for 
Odysseus and Penelope who, in a more specific narrative sense, are renowned for 
their like-mindedness. I argued that this defining feature of their relationship is not 
only made explicit in their nonverbal behaviour and use of material media, but is also 
best explained using modern studies of shared cognition in intimate relationships.  
 
Chapter Five narrowed its focus to Penelope’s mindedness, both in Odyssey 19 and 
the poem more generally. It explored, in particular, how internal and external 
audiences employ theory of mind abilities in interpreting her behaviour towards her 
husband and suitors. In this sense, Penelope is an excellent example of how 
audiences negotiate ambiguous mindedness—how they read individual psychology 
in the absence of any concrete, reliable knowledge about their thoughts and 
emotions. Based on this material, I argued that although the narrator provides us no 
clear answers, his presentation of Penelope at key points in the poem demonstrate 
how extensively and consistently he expects his audiences to actively interpret the 
metaphors, similes, and nonverbal behaviour used to express Penelope’s mindedness. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis examined the opening sequence of Odyssey 20. 
Conceptual metaphor, simile, and metonymy played central roles in my discussion, 
but especially as they utilized concepts of personification, movement, heat, pressure, 
and the natural world in embodying Odysseus’ thought processes. But I also claimed 
that it is in this passage that we see the full range of ways in which the Homeric 
narrator describes his characters’ cognition. This chapter, thus, also aimed to “tie the 
threads” of the rest of my study together; it showed, in other words, how some of the 
major themes explored in the previous chapters can provide powerful insight to 
individual cognizing in the narrative. 
 
Implications for future research are considerable. First, and as stated above, the 
Homeric data is so rich and complex that I have limited myself to focused analysis of 
specific passages. As I hope I have shown in my reading of these case studies, it is 
possible to uncover a wealth of information about psychological functioning from 
scenes such as these; but doing so requires a considerable amount of time and 
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attention that, for the purposes of this study, was impossible to give to each passage. 
These scenes deserve their own analysis, however; future work could thus show how 
cognitive approaches to mind similarly provide us deeper and more precise 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying other scenes in the Homeric corpus. 
 
The explanatory potential of cognitive science for the Homeric epics is considerable 
and, as recent investigations have shown, broadly applicable to both ancient and 
modern texts. Throughout the course of this thesis, I have borrowed from a wide 
range of theoretical frameworks in exploring Homeric minds. This was necessary 
because, as in the everyday, Homeric cognizing is highly complex; composed of 
many overlapping modes of experience. Any representation of cognition in the 
poems, therefore, will be important for many different reasons. There is still much 
more to be done in each of these areas, however; future research, thus, might also 
undertake more extensive studies that focus solely on, for example, shared 
remembering, conceptual metaphor, or imagination. In doing so, we might reach a 
better understanding of how these concepts operate throughout the entire Homeric 
corpus, rather than just as they apply to specific scenes. 
 
This study has consisted of a two-way dialogue: on the one hand, it has aimed to 
demonstrate the enormous potential of cognitive science as an explanatory tool for 
representations of psychology in literature; and on the other, it establishes the 
Homeric poems as a valuable corpus of material that, as an artefact of mind, lends 
weight to the findings of scientific survey and analysis. It not only, thus, occupies a 
place in dialogue of the ancient world and of the sciences, but also in a wider 
scholarly movement—cognitive poetics—which contends that literary minds are as 
complex and multi-modal as our own. Throughout this study, I have made reference 
to similar analyses of other literary works, showing how presentations of mind in 
Homer are comparable to those from other genres and time periods. 
 
This thesis primarily demonstrates how insights from cognitive science shed light on 
presentations of psychological functioning in the Homeric poems. It argues that 
brain-body-world interactions lie at the heart of the narrator’s presentation of his 
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characters’ psychological experiences; it also suggest that audiences make sense of 
these complex thought processes because they are grounded in universal, first-person 
human experience. The Homeric material is so interesting and important because it 
demonstrates just how deeply physical, material, interactional, cultural, and 
evolutionary modes of experience underlie presentations of mind in literature. In 
examining the connections between the brain, the body, and the world in greater 
depth, and with respect to modern studies of cognition, we reach a more precise 
understanding of how narrators and audiences conceive of individuals as cohesive 
wholes. For Homer, in other words, as in the everyday, “there is no such thing as a 
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